Macro Roundup

Borjas. the influx of Soviet Jew's to Isreal is a good data point to reinforce the "upside" of inequality"...Refugees damaged the prospects of natives with similar skill levels, the study found, but benefited natives with complimentary skill sets.For example, the Mariel boatlift brought about 120,000 refugees, mainly to Miami. Messrs. Borjas and Monras write that more than 60% lacked a high school diploma. “Even though the Marielitos increased Miami’s population by only 8%, they increased the number of male workers without a high school diploma by 32%,” the authors wrote. And that was the group that saw wages fall. By contrast, workers with a high-school or college degree saw wages rise. (That may be because the higher-skilled workers paid less for services filled by low-wage workers, like landscaping or housekeeping, making the wealthier workers more productive.)

In the case of Soviet Jews emigrating to Israel, most were college-educated. The influx, which increased the country’s population by more than 13%, hurt wages of high- and intermediate skill natives. But the earnings of the lowest education group increased, possibly because demand for the services they provide rose...."Jeffrey Sparshott, "What Happens to Wages When Refugees Arrive? More Than You Might Think,"Wall Street Journal, September 21, 2016, http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2016/09/21/what-happens-to-wages-when-refugees-arrive-more-than-you-might-think/

What Happens to Wages When Refugees Arrive? More Than You Might Think An influx of refugees can hurt the economic prospects of natives with similar skills, but benefit other workers The U.S. is accepting 85,000 refugees this fiscal year and the Obama administration plans to raise that figure to 110,000 next year. The plan is controversial amid worries that terrorists could slip through a rigorous screening process. But what about the economic implications? A study by Harvard University’s George Borjas and the Center for Monetary and Financial Studies’s Joan Monras looks at evidence from four earlier refugee surges and finds they worsen prospects for one segment of the population while bettering the lot of another. “In short, refugee supply shocks have sizable distributional consequences in the labor markets of receiving countries,” the authors said. Mr. Borjas is generally considered an immigration skeptic, though his work is careful to avoid political judgement or policy prescriptions. His work is often cited as evidence that immigration erodes wages for lower skilled U.S. natives. His latest work is surprising because it shows clear benefits as well—though not for everyone. The new study looks at the Mariel boatlift, which brought Cubans to Miami in 1980; an influx of French and Algerians into France as Algeria gained independence in 1962; a surge in Jewish emigres to Israel when the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s; and the tide of Balkan refugees as Yugoslavia splintered through the 1990s. Refugees damaged the prospects of natives with similar skill levels, the study found, but benefited natives with complimentary skill sets. For example, the Mariel boatlift brought about 120,000 refugees, mainly to Miami. Messrs. Borjas and Monras write that more than 60% lacked a high school diploma. “Even though the Marielitos increased Miami’s population by only 8%, they increased the number of male workers without a high school diploma by 32%,” the authors wrote. And that was the group that saw wages fall. By contrast, workers with a high-school or college degree saw wages rise. (That may be because the higher-skilled workers paid less for services filled by low-wage workers, like landscaping or housekeeping, making the wealthier workers more productive.) In the case of Soviet Jews emigrating to Israel, most were college-educated. The influx, which increased the country’s population by more than 13%, hurt wages of high- and intermediate skill natives. But the earnings of the lowest education group increased, possibly because demand for the services they provide rose. Mr. Borjas’ work isn’t without controversy. University of California, Berkley, economist David Card studied the Mariel boatlift and found no impact on wages or employment rates in Miami. In a paper earlier this year, he said Mr. Borjas’ work lacks nuance and offers a “one‐sided view of immigration.” So perhaps it is striking that Mr. Borjas finds such clear economic benefits from the arrival of refugees. To be sure, the U.S. is accepting a relatively small number of refugees relative to its population, and they tend to be distributed widely across the country. By comparison, the European Union is struggling to handle more than one million migrants, including many Syrians escaping civil war, who have settled in Germany, Austria and elsewhere. But even a small number of new entrants in the labor market can have an effect. “A couple of hundred refugees in a town with a thousand workers can have an effect,” Mr. Borjas said.

Gianni La Cava, "Piketty’s rising share of capital income and the US housing market," VoxEU. October 8, 2016, http://voxeu.org/article/piketty-s-housing-capital-results-new-us-facts
Interesting ~ Rognlie insight that that the changes in net capital income share is mainly due to the housing sector. But outside of that it does offer support for your idea that a great deal of compensation is just captured my land owners even though he explicitly says its' largely a story of "landed gentry are predominantly home owners, not private landlords" Also Figure 2 is a good example of how beating up on the banks has driven income inequality. When you limit access to credit you also lock people with poor credit risk out from the upside of a housing rebound. "...My results suggest that the ‘rise of housing’ is intimately linked to the same factors that underpin ‘secular stagnation’ (Summers 2014) - that is, the gradual decline in real (and nominal) interest rates since the 1980s has contributed to a gradual run-up in housing prices, and led to household wealth and income being increasingly concentrated in the hands of landownersThe decomposition of the national accounts by type of housing indicates that the secular rise ismainly due to a rising share of imputed rent going to owner-occupiers.The owner-occupier share of aggregate income has risen from just under 2% in 1950 to close to 5% in 2014 (top panel of Figure 2). The share of income going to landlords (i.e. market rent) has also doubled in the post-war era.But, in aggregate, the effect of imputed rent is larger simplybecause there are nearly twice as many home owners as renters in the US economy. A similar phenomenon is observed in the personal consumption expenditure data (bottom panel of Figure 2). In other words, today’s landed gentry are predominantly home owners, not private landlords....For 50 years, the share of total housing capital income going to the supply-elastic states has been unchanged at about 3% of GDP (Figure 3). In contrast, the share going to the supply-inelastic states has risen from around 5% in the 1960s to 7% of GDP more recently. Notably, these divergent trends in housing capital income are not due to a few ‘outlier’ states where housing supply is particularly constrained, such as New York or California - instead, there is a clear negative correlation between the long-run growth in housing capital income and the extent to which housing supply is constrained across all states (Figure 4)."

Authors’s note: The author completed this project while visiting the Bank for International Settlements under the Central Bank Research Fellowship program. The views expressed in this column and the associated paper are those of the author only and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Reserve Bank of Australia or the Bank for International Settlements. The author is solely responsible for any errors.ReferencesEndnotes

Albouy, D, G Ehrlich, and Y Liu (2014), “Housing Demand and Expenditures: How Rising Rent Levels Affect Behavior and Cost-Of-Living over Space and Time”, Paper presented at CEP/LSE Labour Seminar, London, 28 November.

Bonnet, O, P-H Bono, G Chapelle, and E Wasmer (2014), “Does Housing Capital Contribute to Inequality? A Comment on Thomas Piketty's Capital in the 21st Century”, Sciences Po Economics Discussion Paper No 2014-07.

Economist, (2015), ‘The Paradox of Soil’, 4 April, 18-20.

Ellis, L (2005), “Disinflation and the Dynamics of Mortgage Debt”, Investigating the Relationship between the Financial and Real Economy, BIS Papers No 22, Bank for International Settlements, 5-20.

La Cava, G (2016), `Housing Prices, Mortgage Interest Rates and the Rising Share of Capital Income in the United States’, Reserve Bank of Australia Research Discussion Paper, No 2016-04. Also published as BIS Working Papers No 572, Bank for International Settlements.

Piketty, T (2014), Capital in the Twenty-First Century,trans. A Goldhammer, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Piketty, T, and G Zucman (2014), “Capital is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich Countries 1700-2010”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129 (3), 1255-1310.

Rognlie, M (2015), “Deciphering the Fall and Rise in the Net Capital Share: Accumulation or Scarcity?”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring, 1-54.

Saiz, A (2010), “The Geographic Determinants of Housing Supply”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics,125 (3), 1253-1296.

Smith, N (2015), “The Threat Coming by Land”, Bloomberg View,9 September.

Sommer, K, P Sullivan, and R Verbrugge (2013), “The Equilibrium Effect of Fundamentals on House Prices and Rents”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 60 (7), 854-870.

Stiglitz, J E (2015), “New Theoretical Perspectives on the Distribution of Income and Wealth among Individuals: Part IV: Land and Credit”, NBER Working Paper No 21192.

Summers, L H (2014), “Reflections on the New ‘Secular Stagnation Hypothesis’”, VoxeEU.org, October 30 2014.

Torrini, R (2016), “Labour, Profit and Housing Rent Shares in Italian GDP: Long-Run Trends and Recent Patterns”, Banca D’Italia Questioni di Economia e Finanza, No 318.

Weil, D N (2015), “Capital and Wealth in the Twenty-First Century”, The American Economic Review,105 (5), 34-37.

The landed gentry was an historical British social class consisting of land owners who lived mainly off rental income.

The long-run rise in the `housing capital share’ of the US economy is not specific to the national accounts, but can also be observed across a range of US household surveys (Albouy, et al. 2014).

Structural factors such as an increase in the home ownership rate and an increase in the average size and quality of housing are important in explaining the increase in the housing capital income share in the period immediately after the Second World War. However, these structural factors appear to have been less important in explaining the ‘rise of housing’ in the period since the early 1980s.

Note: Housing capital income measured as the net operating surplus of the housing sector
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Figure 2. Housing capital income and expenditure

My results also potentially speak to a new literature on the distributional effects of monetary policy. This literature is still in its infancy, but it is surprising how little research there has been on the link between monetary policy and inequality via the housing sector. As is well-known, for most advanced economies housing assets typically comprise the largest share of total wealth for most households. Moreover, imputed rent for owner-occupiers often makes up the largest share of total household spending in the national accounts. The link between monetary policy and inequality via housing prices and imputed rent should therefore be a fruitful area of future research.

My research highlights the important role of housing in not only the distribution of wealth, but also the distribution of income in the US. Indeed, the observed increase in the share of aggregate income going to housing capital might even understate the importance of housing prices for the income distribution. The non-housing capital income share has been stable for several decades (as shown in Figure 1), but within the non-housing sector, there has been an increase in the share of capital income going to financial corporations. Much of the income flowing to the financial sector is likely related to the growth in intermediation services - services that are traditionally dependent on housing collateral and, ultimately, land prices.

The results are robust to different measures of housing capital income, to controls for observable state-level characteristics (e.g. population and income growth), and to unobservable state factors that do not vary with time (e.g. local amenities and distance to the coast).

The results are consistent with the argument that consumer price disinflation and the deregulation of the US mortgage market during the 1980s and 1990s acted as positive credit supply shocks (with high inflation and credit market regulation in the 1970s acting as artificial borrowing constraints). The associated decline in nominal interest rates lowered the cost of owning a home and increased the demand for housing for credit-constrained households (Ellis 2005). The resulting increase in housing demand led to higher relative prices for land in areas that were constrained in terms of new housing supply. This rise in the relative price of land, in turn, led to an increase in the share of nominal spending on housing.3 Sommer et al. (2013) and Stiglitz (2015) outline theories that are consistent with this story.

In a state-level panel regression framework, there is a strong negative correlation between the housing capital income share and nominal interest rates. Moreover, a simple decomposition using the Fisher equation reveals that the rise in housing capital income across states and over time is associated with declines in both real interest rates and consumer price inflation.

Finally, I provide statistical evidence that the rise in the share of housing capital income in recent decades is correlated with declines in both real interest rates and inflation, with these effects being particularly strong in supply-constrained states.

Notes: Share of housing capital income measured as housing gross operating surplus divided by GDP at state level; the estimated correlation coefficient shown is −0.52
Sources: Author's calculations; Bureau of Economic Analysis; Saiz (2010)Result 3: Interest rates (and inflation) matterImplications and directions for future research

Figure 4. Housing capital income growth and the elasticity of housing supply (1980-2014 average)

Notes: Housing capital income measured as the gross operating surplus of the real estate sector; the analysis abstracts from changes in depreciation due to the data being unavailable at the level of US state
Sources: Author's calculations; Bureau of Economic Analysis; Saiz (2010)

Figure 3. Contributions to gross housing capital income (as a share of total GDP)

The geographic decomposition reveals that the long-run rise in the housing capital income share is fully concentrated in states that face housing supply constraints. To see this, I divide the states into ‘elastic’ and ‘inelastic’ groups based on whether the state is above or below the median housing supply elasticity index (as measured by Saiz 2010). This index captures both geographical and regulatory constraints on home building across different US regions. For 50 years, the share of total housing capital income going to the supply-elastic states has been unchanged at about 3% of GDP (Figure 3). In contrast, the share going to the supply-inelastic states has risen from around 5% in the 1960s to 7% of GDP more recently. Notably, these divergent trends in housing capital income are not due to a few ‘outlier’ states where housing supply is particularly constrained, such as New York or California - instead, there is a clear negative correlation between the long-run growth in housing capital income and the extent to which housing supply is constrained across all states (Figure 4).

Note: Housing capital income measured as the net operating surplus of the housing sector
Source: Bureau of Economic AnalysisResult 2: Housing supply constraints matter

Figure 2. Housing capital income and expenditure

The decomposition of the national accounts by type of housing indicates that the secular rise is mainly due to a rising share of imputed rent going to owner-occupiers. The owner-occupier share of aggregate income has risen from just under 2% in 1950 to close to 5% in 2014 (top panel of Figure 2). The share of income going to landlords (i.e. market rent) has also doubled in the post-war era. But, in aggregate, the effect of imputed rent is larger simply because there are nearly twice as many home owners as renters in the US economy. A similar phenomenon is observed in the personal consumption expenditure data (bottom panel of Figure 2). In other words, today’s landed gentry are predominantly home owners, not private landlords.

My results suggest that the ‘rise of housing’ is intimately linked to the same factors that underpin ‘secular stagnation’ (Summers 2014) - that is, the gradual decline in real (and nominal) interest rates since the 1980s has contributed to a gradual run-up in housing prices, and led to household wealth and income being increasingly concentrated in the hands of landowners. This in turn may have implications for intergenerational inequality, given that the home is a key mechanism through which wealth and income are transferred across generations.

This investigation reveals three things about the rise in the US housing capital income share in recent decades. First, it has occurred due to an increasing share of income accruing to owner-occupiers through imputed rent. Second, it is concentrated in states that are constrained in terms of new housing supply. Finally, it is closely associated with the long-run decline in real interest rates and inflation.

In the US national accounts, income accruing to the housing sector is measured as ‘net housing capital income’, or simply, net rental income (i.e. gross rents less housing costs, such as depreciation and property taxes). This measure includes rental income going to both owner-occupiers (imputed rent) and landlords (market rent).2 The very detailed nature of the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ regional economic accounts allows for similar estimates of housing capital income to be constructed for each US state spanning several decades.

In a new paper, I examine the determinants of the rise in the US housing capital income share over recent decades (La Cava 2016). I build upon the foundations set by Piketty and Zucman (2014), but rather than focusing on trends at the national level, I dig deeper and decompose the US national accounts data by different types of housing (e.g. owner-occupied and tenant-occupied) and, even more importantly, by US state. To the best of my knowledge, my paper is the first to explore the determinants of the secular rise in the housing share of the economy by exploiting both cross-sectional and time-series variation in factors such as housing prices, interest rates and housing supply constraints.

So are we seeing the rise of a new `landed gentry’?1 And, if we are, what might explain it? Several research papers (e.g. Bonnet et al. 2014, Rognlie 2015, Weil 2015), print articles (e.g. Economist 2015) and blogs (e.g. Smith 2015) have hypothesised that the long-run increase in the housing income share is due to factors such as lower interest rates, higher mortgage debt, and constraints on home building, due to either geographic constraints or land zoning restrictions. But there is comparatively scarce empirical evidence to confirm these hypotheses.

Recent research has shown that the long-run rise in the net capital income share is mainly due to the housing sector (e.g. Rognlie 2015, Torrini 2016 - see Figure 1). This phenomenon is not specific to the US but has been evident in almost every advanced economy. This suggests that it is not entrepreneurs and venture capitalists that are taking an increasing share of the economy, but land owners.

Notes: Net capital income is equal to net operating surplus, or gross operating surplus less depreciation; net domestic income is equal to gross domestic product less total depreciation
Sources: Author's calculations; Bureau of Economic Analysis; Piketty and Zucman (2014)Result 1: It’s (mainly) an owner-occupier story

Figure 1.Net capital income, US (share of net domestic income)

A key observation in Thomas Piketty’sCapital in the Twenty-First Century(Piketty 2014) is that the share of aggregate income accruing to capital in the US has been rising steadily in recent decades (Figure 1). The growing disparity between the income going to wage earners and capital owners has led to calls for government intervention. But for such interventions to be effective, it is important to ask who the capital owners are.

The rising share of income accruing to housing is a key feature of the changing US income distribution. This column examines the determinants of this phenomenon. The rise occurred due to an increasing share of income accruing to owner-occupiers through imputed rent, it is concentrated in states that are constrained in terms of new housing supply, and it is closely associated with the long-run decline in real interest rates and inflation.

Gianni La Cava 08 October 2016

Piketty’s rising share of capital income and the US housing market