Edward Conard

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  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
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Second-Generations Americas: A Portrait of the Adult Children of Immigrants

AI Summary. The U.S. is home to 20m adult children of immigrants, and immigrants plus their U.S.-born children are projected to account for 93% of working-age population growth by 2050. Second-generation Americans have higher median household incomes ($58,000 vs $46,000), college graduation (36% vs 29%), and homeownership (64% vs 51%) than immigrants.

Paul Taylor, D’Vera Cohn, Gretchen Livingston, Cary Funk, and Rich Morin Pew Research Center
Date Posted:
May 26, 2020
Is Database:
Database

20 million adult children of immigrants, 16 million US-born children of immigrants < 18.

Do the adult children of immigrants outperform their immigrant parents economically?

Core argument: Second-generation Americans have median household incomes of $58,000 versus $46,000 for first-generation immigrants, along with higher college graduation (36% vs. 29%) and homeownership (64% vs. 51%) rates and lower poverty (11% vs. 18%).

The U.S. is home to 20m adult children of immigrants and 16m U.S.-born children of immigrants under 18, highlighting a significant demographic shift. By 2050, immigrants and their U.S.-born children are projected to account for 93% of the growth in the working-age population, with the "immigrant stock" potentially reaching 160m, or 37% of the U.S. population. Second-generation Americans, particularly Hispanics and Asian Americans, show higher socioeconomic attainment than their immigrant parents, with median household incomes of $58,000 compared to $46,000 for first-generation immigrants. They also have higher college graduation rates (36% vs. 29%) and homeownership (64% vs. 51%), while being less likely to live in poverty (11% vs. 18%). This demographic is poised to significantly influence the nation's economic and political landscape in the coming decades.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Second-generation Americans have median household incomes of $58,000 versus $46,000 for first-generation immigrants, along with higher college graduation (36% vs. 29%) and homeownership (64% vs. 51%) rates and lower poverty (11% vs. 18%).
  2. Immigrants and their U.S.-born children are projected to account for 93% of the growth in the U.S. working-age population by 2050, with the "immigrant stock" potentially reaching 160m, or 37% of the population.
  3. The U.S. is home to 20m adult children of immigrants and 16m U.S.-born children of immigrants under 18.

Pew’s deep dive on second generations Americans

“…By then, the nation’s “immigrant stock” (first and second generations combined, adults and children combined) could grow from 76 million now to more than 160 million, at which point it would comprise a record share (37%) of the U.S. population.1 The focus of this report is on the 20 million adult members of the second generation (an additional 16 million U.S-born children of immigrants are under the age of 18)…”

Taylor, Paul, D’Vera Cohn, Gretchen Livingston, Cary Funk, and Rich Morin. February 7, 2013. “Second-Generations Americas: A Portrait of the Adult Children of Immigrants.” Pew Research Center.https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/02/07/second-generation-americans/

Population Projections. Immigrants tend to have higher birth rates than do native-born Americans.4 If current immigration flows and birth rates continue, then by 2050, an estimated 37% of the U.S. population—highest in modern history—will be immigrants or the children of immigrants, according to a 2008 Pew Research population projection. That projection also shows that, because of the aging of the Baby Boomer generation, as much as 93% of the growth of the working-age population between now and then will be accounted for by immigrants (43%) or their U.S.-born children (50%).

Second-Generations Americas: A Portrait of the Adult Children of Immigrants: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Group Differences within the Second Generation

The modern immigration wave to this country began with the passage of landmark legislation in 1965 that had the effect, for the first time in the nation’s history, of opening U.S. borders on a roughly equal basis to non-Europeans as well as Europeans. Half of the 44 million immigrants who have come since then have been from Latin America, about a quarter (27%) from Asia, and the remainder from other regions.5 In the nation’s two previous immigration waves during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, nearly nine-in-ten new arrivals were Europeans.

Hispanics and Asian Americans are the focus of the Pew Research survey research findings in this report. Each of these groups include immigrants from more than a dozen countries, all with unique cultures, characteristics and migration histories.6

Despite these country-of-origin differences, some broad patterns are evident. The bulk of Hispanic immigrants have relatively low levels of formal education and work in low-skilled, low-paying jobs, while the majority of Asian immigrants (especially those who have arrived in the past few decades) have relatively high levels of education and skills that help position them for jobs in higher-skilled occupations.

These large racial or ethnic group differences in the human capital of recent immigrants are echoed in the socioeconomic profile of the second generation. For example, some 55% of second-generation Asian Americans have a bachelor’s degree or more, compared with 21% of Hispanics. There are also gaps in household income and poverty rates among second-generation Hispanics and Asian Americans.

But while large gaps remain between groups, it is also the case that within each group, the second generation is doing better than the first on most key measures of economic success.

Intergenerational Mobility, Now and Then

Second-Generations Americas: A Portrait of the Adult Children of Immigrants: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Some scholars of immigration have questioned whether today’s immigrants and their offspring will be able to match the high levels of intergenerational upward mobility experienced by much of the immigrant stock of the 19th and early 20th centuries.7

The skeptics cite many factors: Most modern immigrants are non-white and thus face deeply ingrained social and cultural barriers; about a quarter of today’s immigrants (the vast majority of whom are Hispanic) have arrived illegally and thus must navigate their lives in the shadows of the law; globalization and technology may have eliminated many of the jobs that provided pathways to the middle class for earlier generations of hard-working but low-skilled immigrants; the relative ease of travel and communication have enabled today’s immigrants to retain their ties to their countries of origin and may have reduced incentives to adapt to American customs and mores.

It is beyond the scope of this report to make definitive statements about the success of today’s second-generation immigrants compared with those of earlier eras. Most of our data trends do not extend that far back in history. Moreover, with so many of today’s second generation just now starting to age into adulthood (16 million are under the age of 18), and with more than a million new immigrants continuing to arrive each year, it will take decades before one can attempt a comprehensive generational scorecard of the modern wave of immigrants and their children.

What we can say with certainty is that members of the second generation will have a major impact on this nation’s destiny for decades. And at this stage of their journey, we can provide some empirical assessments of their economic circumstances. For Hispanics and Asian Americans—the groups that comprise the bulk of the modern immigration wave—we can also provide some empirical assessments of their attitudes and beliefs, based on data gathered from our own surveys and those of the Census Bureau.

A Roadmap to the Report

The remainder of this report is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents a detailed analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data on the second generation in comparison with immigrants, with third and higher generations and with the U.S. adult population. Generational patterns are also examined separately for each of four racial and ethnic groups: Hispanics, Asian Americans, non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks.

Chapters 3 through 7 supplement this demographic portrait with an analysis of recent Pew Research Center surveys conducted with a nationally representative sample of Hispanics and a separate representative survey of Asian Americans on a range of topics. These chapters compare the second generation with the first generation in each group. No analysis of third-and higher-generation Hispanics or Asian Americans is included due to the small sample sizes of those subgroups in the survey data. Comparisons to the general public using data from other recent Pew Research Center surveys are included wherever possible. Survey data with an adequate number of second-generation whites and blacks for analysis is not available. Thus, the survey comparisons are limited to the two race or ethnic groups comprising the bulk of the modern immigration wave. These comparisons help illuminate the ways in which the second generation tends to be similar and dissimilar to the first generation within each race or ethnic group, but they cannot be used to characterize the second generation in the U.S. as a whole.

Chapter 3 looks at questions of self-identity, proficiency in English and attitudes about maintaining their ancestral language. Chapter 4 examines how the generations see their quality of life in relation to their parents, their expectations for their children, and their perception of their financial well-being. Chapter 5 examines attitudes about intergroup relations and intergroup marriage. This chapter includes a detailed analysis of data from the U.S. Census Bureau on the rate of intergroup marriage for all adults in the U.S. and separately for Hispanics, Asian Americans, whites and blacks. Chapter 6 focuses on attitudes about political party, ideology and social issues. Chapter 7 considers a wide array of other topics, including views about discrimination, personal goals, values and comparisons between the U.S. and their ancestral country. The appendices provide a detailed explanation of the methodologies used and a topline summary of the survey findings for Hispanics and Asian Americans. They also provide detailed tables, drawn from 2012 census data, that show the socioeconomic characteristics of first, second and third and higher generations of whites, blacks, Hispanics and Asian Americans.

About the Authors

This report is a joint effort of survey researchers, demographers and writers in the Pew Research Center. Paul Taylor, executive vice president of the Pew Research Center, wrote the overview and provided editorial guidance for the report. Senior writer D’Vera Cohn wrote the demographic analysis in Chapter 2 with data analysis and advice from research associate Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, senior demographer Jeffrey S. Passel and senior researcher Gretchen M. Livingston. Wendy Wang, research associate, number-checked Chapter 2 along with the detailed demographic tables in Appendix 1 and the analysis of intermarriage in Chapter 5. Chapter 3 was written by Livingston. Chapters 4 and 6 were written by senior researcher Cary Funk. Rich Morin, senior editor, wrote Chapters 5 and 7 with the assistance of Funk and Livingston. The analysis of intermarriage in Chapter 5 also benefited from the advice of Passel and Wang. Research assistant Eileen Patten number-checked Chapters 1, 3, 4 and 5. Research assistant Seth Motel number-checked Chapters 6 and 7 and prepared charts and tables for Chapters 1 and 2. Patten, Motel and Gonzalez-Barrera also assisted with other aspects of the report including compiling and checking the topline of findings, preparing charts and formatting the final report. The report was copy-edited by Marcia Kramer of Kramer Editing Services.

The report also benefited from the advice and guidance of Mark Hugo Lopez, associate director of Pew Research Hispanic Center; Rakesh Kochhar, associate director of research of Pew Research Hispanic Center; Kim Parker, associate director of Pew Research’s Social & Demographic Trends project; Phillip Connor, research associate in the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life; Scott Keeter, the Pew Research Center’s director of survey research; and Leah Christian, senior researcher in the Pew Research Center.

Notes on Terminology

All references to whites, blacks and others are to the non-Hispanic components of those populations. Asians include a small number of Hispanics. Whites, blacks and Asians are single-race-only groups. “Others” includes persons reporting single races not listed separately and persons reporting more than one race.

The terms “Latino” and “Hispanic” are used interchangeably in this report.

“Foreign born” refers to people born outside of the United States, Puerto Rico or other U.S. territories to parents neither of whom was a U.S. citizen. “Foreign born” and “immigrant” and “first generation” are used interchangeably. Unauthorized immigrants are included in this group.

“Native born” or “U.S. born” refer to people who are U.S. citizens at birth, including those born in the United States, Puerto Rico or other U.S. territories and those born abroad to parents at least one of whom was a U.S. citizen.

“Multi-generational family households” refer to those that include at least two adult generations (with the younger generation including at least one adult who is 25 years old or older) or households consisting of grandparents and grandchildren, with no parent present.

References to demographic data for all adults or the total population are to the civilian noninstitutional population included in the Current Population Survey. See Methodology for more information.

Immigrant Generations

“First generation” or “foreign born” refers to people born outside of the United States to parents neither of whom was a U.S. citizen. For this report, people born in Puerto Rico or other U.S. territories are not considered foreign born.

“Second generation” refers to people born in the United States, with at least one first-generation (immigrant) parent. People born in Puerto Rico or other U.S. territories with at least one parent born in a different country are considered second generation.

“Third and higher generation” refers to people born in the United States, including Puerto Rico or other U.S. territories with both parents born in the United States, including Puerto Rico or other U.S. territories.

Comparisons with Parents’ Country of Origin: Seven-in-ten second-generation Asian Americans and eight-in-ten (81%) second-generation Hispanics say that conditions for raising children are better in the U.S. than in their parents’ country of origin. Like immigrants, they also rate the U.S more favorably than their ancestral country in terms of treatment of the poor and the opportunity to get ahead. Less than half of both generations rate the U.S. as better than their ancestral country as a place to maintain strong family ties.

Perceptions of Generational Mobility. By lopsided margins, most second-generation Hispanics (67%) and Asian Americans (75%) say their standard of living is better than that of their parents at the same stage of life. Similar shares of the immigrant generations of both groups say the same. By contrast, 60% of the full U.S. population feel the same way. Looking ahead, two-thirds of second-generation Hispanics, but 41% of Asians, believe their own children will eventually surpass their current standard of living. Overall, 48% of American adults say the same.

Second-Generations Americas: A Portrait of the Adult Children of Immigrants: Extended Excerpt Image 3


Language Usage: About nine-in-ten second-generation Hispanic and Asian-American immigrants are proficient English speakers, substantially more than the immigrant generations of these groups. When it comes to retaining one’s ancestral language, there are sizable differences by race and ethnicity. Eight-in-ten second-generation Hispanics say they can speak Spanish at least pretty well; just four-in-ten second-generation Asian Americans say the same about their parents’ native tongue.

Nonmarital Childbearing: In what some scholars have described as a pattern of negative assimilation, 41% of second-generation women who recently gave birth were unmarried, compared with 23% of immigrant women who recently gave birth. The higher share of nonmarital childbearing among the second generation has been driven mostly by second-generation Hispanic women (52% of these women with a recent birth were unmarried). Among the U.S. population as a whole, 36% of women who recently gave birth were not married.3

Political and Social Values: Second-generation Hispanics and Asian Americans, as well the first generation of each group, identify more with the Democratic Party than the Republican Party and characterize themselves as liberals at higher rates than the general public. About half or more of the second generation believe that abortion should be legal, and more than two-thirds say homosexuality should be accepted by society. The relative youth of the second generation contributes to, but does not fully explain, their liberal political leanings.

Second-Generations Americas: A Portrait of the Adult Children of Immigrants: Extended Excerpt Image 4


Belief in Hard Work. About three-quarters of second-generation Hispanics (78%) and Asian Americans (72%) say that most people can get ahead if they’re willing to work hard. Similar shares of the immigrant generations of these groups agree. By contrast, 58% of the full U.S. population of adults feel the same way, while 40% say that hard work is no guarantee of success.

Intermarriage. About one-in-six (15%) married second-generation adults have a spouse of a different race or ethnicity from themselves, compared with 8% of all immigrants and 8% of all U.S. adults. Intermarriage rates are especially high for second-generation Hispanics (26%) and Asian Americans (23%).

Second-Generations Americas: A Portrait of the Adult Children of Immigrants: Extended Excerpt Image 5


Intergroup Relations: About half of second-generation Latinos (52%) and about two-thirds of Asian Americans (64%) say their group gets along well with all other major racial and ethnic groups in America; smaller shares of Latino (26%) and Asian-American (49%) immigrants say the same. The second generations of these groups are also more likely than the immigrants to say they have friends outside of their ethnic or country of origin group.

Second-Generation Americans

A Portrait of the Adult Children of Immigrants

Chapter 1: Overview

Second-generation Americans—the 20 million adult U.S.-born children of immigrants—are substantially better off than immigrants themselves on key measures of socioeconomic attainment, according to a new Pew Research Center analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data. They have higher incomes; more are college graduates and homeowners; and fewer live in poverty. In all of these measures, their characteristics resemble those of the full U.S. adult population.

Second-Generations Americas: A Portrait of the Adult Children of Immigrants: Extended Excerpt Image 6


Hispanics and Asian Americans make up about seven-in-ten of today’s adult immigrants and about half of today’s adult second generation. Pew Research surveys find that the second generations of both groups are much more likely than the immigrants to speak English; to have friends and spouses outside their ethnic or racial group, to say their group gets along well with others, and to think of themselves as a “typical American.”

The Pew Research surveys also find that second-generation Hispanics and Asian Americans place more importance than does the general public on hard work and career success. They are more inclined to call themselves liberal and less likely to identify as Republicans. And for the most part they are more likely to say their standard of living is higher than that of their parents at the same stage of life. In all of these measures, the second generation resembles the immigrant generation more closely than the general public.

As the U.S. Congress gears up to consider immigration legislation, this new Pew Research report on second-generation Americans looks at the attitudes, values, life priorities, economic experiences, intergroup relations and identity markers of a group that will have a significant impact on the nation’s economy and politics for decades to come.

Given current immigration trends and birth rates, virtually all (93%) of the growth of the nation’s working-age population between now and 2050 will be accounted for by immigrants and their U.S.-born children, according to a population projection by the Pew Research Center.

Second-Generations Americas: A Portrait of the Adult Children of Immigrants: Extended Excerpt Image 7


By then, the nation’s “immigrant stock” (first and second generations combined, adults and children combined) could grow from 76 million now to more than 160 million, at which point it would comprise a record share (37%) of the U.S. population.1

The focus of this report is on the 20 million adult members of the second generation (an additional 16 million U.S-born children of immigrants are under the age of 18).

This is a heterogeneous group that includes many younger Hispanic, Asian-American and white adults who are the children of modern-era immigrants as well as many older adults who are mostly the children of European immigrants who arrived as part of an earlier immigration wave that peaked a century ago.

Given the diversity of this population, two caveats are in order. First, the data presented here should not be interpreted as proving or disproving that there has been upward mobility between immigrant parents and their children.2 That’s because many of today’s second generation are not the children of today’s immigrants; many are the children of early 20th-century immigrants, now deceased. Second, the aggregate data on today’s second generation conceal what are often large subgroup differences by race and ethnicity. Whenever possible in this report, we disaggregate findings by these and other relevant demographic characteristics.

Here is a summary of key findings:

Second-Generations Americas: A Portrait of the Adult Children of Immigrants: Extended Excerpt Image 8


Educational and Economic Attainment: Adults in the second generation are doing better than those in the first generation in median household income ($58,000 versus $46,000); college degrees (36% versus 29%); and homeownership (64% versus 51%). They are less likely to be in poverty (11% versus 18%) and less likely to have not finished high school (10% versus 28%). Most of these favorable comparisons hold up not just in the aggregate but also within each racial/ethnic subgroup (e.g., second-generation Hispanics do better than first-generation Hispanics; second-generation whites do better than first-generation whites, and so on).

Identity: Pew Research surveys of Hispanics and Asian Americans—the groups that comprise the bulk of the modern immigration wave—find that roughly six-in-ten adults in the second generation consider themselves to be a “typical American,” about double the share of immigrants who say the same. Still, most in the second generation also have a strong sense of identity with their ancestral roots. Majorities say they identify themselves most often by their family’s country of origin (i.e., Mexican, Chinese American) or by a pan-ethnic or racial label (i.e., Hispanic or Asian American). Some 37% of second-generation Hispanics and 27% of second-generation Asian Americans say they most often describe themselves simply as “American.”

  • Demographics
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    • Other Comparison
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Showing 102 database articles primarily about Demographics

Falling Fertility: The Changing Value of Freedom, Fulfillment, and Family

AI Summary. Across surveyed countries, intended fertility and the ideal number of children both declined, while children came to be seen more as a constraint on parental freedom and less as a source of status. Gender roles grew less traditional and housework more equally shared, yet the belief that a fulfilled life requires children weakened most of all attitudes measured.

Raquel Fernández, Inés Berniell and Milagros Onofri National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
September 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Fernández et al. cast doubt on Goldin’s hypothesis that men’s limited willingness to share domestic responsibilities is central to fertility decline, pointing instead to the erosion of the belief that children are necessary for a fulfilling life.

Are shifting attitudes about children behind falling fertility intentions?

Core argument: Intended fertility fell in every Generations and Gender Survey country, from 28% to 21% on average, while the ideal number of children fell in 17 of 22 International Social Survey Programme countries, from 2.42 to 2.31.

Figure 1 documents how fertility outcomes and attitudes changed over the decade. Intended fertility fell in every GGS country, from 28 to 21% on average (Figure 1a). The ideal number of children fell in 17 of the 22 ISSP countries, from 2.42 to 2.31 on average (Figure 1b). [Children] became more likely to be seen as constraining parental freedom and less likely to be seen as conferring status (Figure 1c). Gender roles became less traditional, and the division of household work became more equal [Figures 1i]. Despite this greater sharing of chores and care, work–family conflict rose sharply. The decade saw changes that might have been expected to make the burden of children lighter, at least for women. Simultaneously, however, children became less attractive and, above all, less necessary: the belief that a fulfilled life requires children lost more ground than any attitude we measure [Table 2, Part II, Panel B].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Intended fertility fell in every Generations and Gender Survey country, from 28% to 21% on average, while the ideal number of children fell in 17 of 22 International Social Survey Programme countries, from 2.42 to 2.31.
  2. Children became more likely to be seen as constraining parental freedom and less likely to be seen as conferring status, and the belief that a fulfilled life requires children lost more ground than any other attitude measured.
  3. Gender roles became less traditional and household work was divided more equally, yet work–family conflict rose sharply.

Related Articles:

  • The Rise of Female Autonomy and the Decline of Fertility: The Role of Mismatch — Across 22 countries, the gap between women's and men's daily hours of housework and caregiving is strongly correlated with lower total fertility rates. Countries that modernized rapidly show larger gender gaps in home work and lower fertility than those with more continuous economic growth since 1920.
  • Babies and the Macroeconomy — Fertility rates have fallen in nearly every country, but timing differed: some developed nations fell below the 2.1 replacement level as early as the 1970s, while others dropped to "lowest low" levels below 1.3. The author argues nations with rapid, discontinuous growth saw sharper declines as women's expectations outpaced tradition-bound men's willingness to share family time.
  • The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences — The authors estimate the world total fertility rate is around 2.17, below the global replacement rate of roughly 2.21, meaning humanity is already below replacement, with fertility and births falling faster than anticipated. They project middle-income countries' fertility may fall below that of rich countries outside East Asia, with emigration compounding population decline.
  • Demographics
  • Workforce
    • Family/Marriage

Terra Incognita: The Economics of a Shrinking World

AI Summary. Global fertility is likely below the replacement level needed to keep population constant in the long run, though population momentum from large cohorts of women now having children means world population will keep growing for roughly another 30 years. Unless trends change, it is projected to peak near 9bn around 2056 and then decline.

Jesús Fernández-Villaverde and Patrick Norrick University of Pennsylvania
Date Posted:
August 14, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

The UN appears to systematically overestimate births; e.g. 33 of 37 countries with high-quality statistics registered fewer births in 2024 than the UN had forecast. Fernández-Villaverde and Norrick infer humanity is below replacement fertility in 2026.

Will world population keep growing even as fertility falls below replacement?

Core argument: As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below replacement fertility, with fewer births than needed to keep population constant in the long run.

In Table A1 we compare the World Population Prospects (WPP) estimates of births in 2022-2023 with the official numbers reported by several countries. [A2 shows the full sample with the deviations.] As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below the replacement fertility level: we are having fewer births than we need to keep population constant in the long run. This astonishing fact does not mean that population has stopped growing. Because of momentum effects (the large cohorts of women born two or three decades ago are having their children now, and their own parents have not died yet), world population will keep growing for another 30 years or so. But unless trends change, it will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then start falling, first slowly, then fast.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below replacement fertility, with fewer births than needed to keep population constant in the long run.
  2. World population is set to keep growing for roughly another 30 years because of momentum effects, as large cohorts of women born two or three decades ago have their children while their own parents are still alive.
  3. Unless trends change, world population will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then start falling, first slowly, then fast.

Related Articles:

  • The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences — The authors estimate the world total fertility rate is around 2.17, below the global replacement rate of roughly 2.21, meaning humanity is already below replacement, with fertility and births falling faster than anticipated. They project middle-income countries' fertility may fall below that of rich countries outside East Asia, with emigration compounding population decline.
  • Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come — Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
  • The Wealth of Working Nations — Because of population aging, growth in GDP per capita and GDP per working-age adult have diverged across advanced economies; from 1998 to 2019 Japan's accumulated growth per working-age adult was 31.9% versus 29.5% in the US. The authors find a standard neoclassical growth model calibrated to each country's working-age population tracks output per working-age adult in most economies.
  • Demographics
  • GDP
    • Growth
  • Science
    • Global Warming
  • Workforce
    • Family/Marriage

Americans Are Done With Being Put in Racial Boxes

AI Summary. Immigration from Asia and Latin America has been the chief driver of rising US diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White share of the population. Intermarriage across racial and ethnic lines is far more common among Hispanic and Asian Americans, and rising among Black and non-Hispanic White Americans, leaving more people outside single racial categories.

Justin Fox Bloomberg
Date Posted:
July 21, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Less than half of Americans < 29 years old are non-Hispanic whites. As of 2020, 33.8mm Americans – 10.2% of the population – identify as being of two or more races, largely driven by intermarriage between whites and either Hispanics or Asian Americans.

Are immigration and intermarriage making single racial categories obsolete?

Core argument: Immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of rising U.S. diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White share of the population.

The increase in immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of the rise in diversity and decline in the non-Hispanic White share of the population. But those immigrants have been doing what generations of immigrants before them did and, well, becoming Americans. Marriages across racial and ethnic lines are much more prevalent among Hispanic and Asian Americans than Black or non-Hispanic White Americans, while intermarriage rates have been rising steadily for the latter two groups, too. As a result, a growing share of Americans just isn’t going to fit neatly into any single racial or ethnic category that the US government can come up with.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of rising U.S. diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White share of the population.
  2. Intermarriage across racial and ethnic lines is much more prevalent among Hispanic and Asian Americans than among Black or non-Hispanic White Americans, though rates have been rising steadily for the latter two groups as well.
  3. A growing share of Americans does not fit neatly into any single racial or ethnic category the U.S. government defines, as recent immigrants follow earlier generations in becoming Americans.

Related Articles:

  • Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World? — An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.
  • Do Past Wealth Gaps Explain Modern Inequality? Evidence From Immigration To The United States — Historical records indicate immigrants arriving in the United States around the turn of the twentieth century came with almost no wealth, and by 1920 nearly half of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents. Households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry, who arrived later with fewer resources, are on average wealthier than those of Northwestern European ancestry.
  • America’s Immigration Mess: An Illustrated Guide — Current Population Survey estimates indicate America's foreign-born population surpassed 50m for the first time and exceeded 15% of the national population, above the prior peak of 14.8% recorded in 1890. Mass immigration during that earlier wave was associated in contemporary opinion with widening income and wealth gaps and depressed wages for less-skilled native-born men, and sweeping national restrictions followed.
  • Demographics
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Immigration

The Pig In The Python: US Decennial Labor Flows And Economic Opportunity, 1910–2040

AI Summary. The surge of baby boomers, women, and immigrants entering the US labor force between 1960 and 1980 was difficult for the economy to absorb, and young workers' wages fell sharply after peaking in the early 1970s. The author argues those entrants kept occupying jobs and suppressing demand for new workers until retirement.

Steven Ruggles Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Date Posted:
July 14, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Accounting for both inflows and the overhang of previous labor market entrants, Ruggles predicts a labor shortage such that “Americans born in the 2020s might be the first cohort in a half century that earns significantly more than their parents did.”

How does a large influx of workers affect young workers' wages?

Core argument: Wages for young U.S. workers declined sharply after peaking in 1973, as the economy struggled to absorb the influx of workers entering the labor force between 1960 and 1980 from the baby-boom cohort, rising female participation, and increased immigration.

Figure 3A highlights the influx of workers that occurred between 1960 and 1980, as the large baby-boom cohort entered the labor force, female labor-force participation expanded, and immigration rose [see Figure 2 for a detailed breakdown]. It was difficult for the economy to absorb all the new workers, and wages for young people declined sharply after peaking in 1973. Figure 3A does not, however, provide a valid measure of labor-market competition because the baby boomers and newly employed women and immigrants did not suddenly vanish after they entered the labor force; they kept working and occupying jobs until they eventually retired decades later. The glut of workers entering the labor force in the 1970s would continue to stifle demand for new workers until their eventual exit from the labor force, a process that is still in progress. The index of employment competition shown in Figure 3B is [a better] measure of relative cohort size than 3A. It represents the cumulative net labor-market entries over the previous five decades as a % of the working-age population in the current decade. As shown in Figure 1C, we are already seeing signs of an uptick in the wages of young workers, and as the demographic shortage accelerates we may finally see real wages of the young exceed the levels of the early 1970s.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Wages for young U.S. workers declined sharply after peaking in 1973, as the economy struggled to absorb the influx of workers entering the labor force between 1960 and 1980 from the baby-boom cohort, rising female participation, and increased immigration.
  2. Decennial labor-force entries alone misstate labor-market competition, because baby boomers, newly employed women, and immigrants kept occupying jobs and stifling demand for new workers until their retirements, a process still in progress.
  3. An index of employment competition measuring cumulative net labor-market entries over the previous five decades as a percentage of the current decade's working-age population is offered as a better gauge of relative cohort size, with young workers' wages already showing an uptick.

Related Articles:

  • Baby Busts and Growth Booms: Demographic Change and the Macroeconomy — A 1pp lower birth rate 20 years earlier is associated with 22 log points higher output per worker 20 years later and 29 log points higher after 40 years, about 0.73pp faster annual growth. The authors find lower birth rates are also associated with more labor-saving patents, larger high-tech shares, and higher productivity growth.
  • Technology and the Baby Bust Paradox — Aging populations create structural incentives to automate, and the argument is that demographic change could become one of the strongest long-run drivers of artificial intelligence deployment. Technology-producing economies may benefit twice, offsetting their own labor shortages while exporting automation, robotics, and AI to other aging societies.
  • Can A Depopulating America Still Flourish? — US labor force participation among women aged 25-54 has reached all-time highs, exceeding its previous 1999 peak, yet remains over 4 points below Europe's level and nearly 6 points below Japan's. About 3.5m prime-age American women are neither working nor looking for work, without children at home or husbands, compared with roughly 7m such men.
  • Demographics
  • Workforce
    • Immigration
    • Unemployment/Participation
    • Wages/Income

Baby Busts and Growth Booms: Demographic Change and the Macroeconomy

AI Summary. A 1pp lower birth rate 20 years earlier is associated with 22 log points higher output per worker 20 years later and 29 log points higher after 40 years, about 0.73pp faster annual growth. The authors find lower birth rates are also associated with more labor-saving patents, larger high-tech shares, and higher productivity growth.

Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, Keelan Beirne and Andrew Scott National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
July 7, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Cross-country evidence from 1950 to 2020 shows that a 1pp lower birth rate is associated with 22 log points (~25%) higher GDP per worker 40 years later and 29 log points (~44%) after 60 years, likely driven by labor-saving technical change.

Do lower birth rates raise output per worker decades later?

Core argument: A 1pp lower birth rate 20 years earlier is associated with 22 log points higher GDP per worker at t+20 and 29 log points by t+40, roughly 0.73 percentage points faster annual growth over the 40-year interval.

Figure 3 traces out how GDP per worker evolves following a 1pp increase in birth rates at t−20. Since cohorts born at t−20 (e.g., 1970) do not enter the working-age population until t = 0 (e.g., 1990), we should observe no response before t = 0; [indeed] the estimated coefficients are ~0 and statistically insignificant before t = 0. Beginning at t = 0, however, higher birth rates are associated with lower GDP per worker, and the negative effects grow progressively larger over time. For example, a 1pp lower birth rate at t−20 is associated with 22 log points higher GDP per worker at t+20 and 29 log points higher by t+40. The latter corresponds to roughly 0.73 percentage points faster annual growth over the 40-year interval. We find that lower birth rates are associated with more labor-saving patents and a growing share of high-tech industries across countries and US commuting zones [Figure 11]. They are also predictive of higher TFP growth across countries and US industries and increased patenting in ICT and broader automation technology classes. Using cross-country variation in WWII-era military and civilian deaths, we present suggestive evidence that the positive growth effects of falling birth rates are primarily driven by the scarcity of younger workers rather than by reductions in population per se [Figure 14]. [Editor’s note: the paper does not grapple with the fiscal consequences of an aging population.]

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A 1pp lower birth rate 20 years earlier is associated with 22 log points higher GDP per worker at t+20 and 29 log points by t+40, roughly 0.73 percentage points faster annual growth over the 40-year interval.
  2. Estimated coefficients for GDP per worker are near zero and statistically insignificant before affected cohorts enter the working-age population at t = 0.
  3. Lower birth rates are associated with more labor-saving patents, a growing high-tech industry share across countries and US commuting zones, higher TFP growth, and more ICT and automation patenting, with WWII-era death variation offering suggestive evidence that scarcity of younger workers, rather than smaller population, drives the growth effects.

Related Articles:

  • Can A Depopulating America Still Flourish? — US labor force participation among women aged 25-54 has reached all-time highs, exceeding its previous 1999 peak, yet remains over 4 points below Europe's level and nearly 6 points below Japan's. About 3.5m prime-age American women are neither working nor looking for work, without children at home or husbands, compared with roughly 7m such men.
  • Capital Is Making a Comeback — Tangible investment in property, factories and equipment fell from 12.5% to 8.5% of private gross domestic product, while intangible investment in intellectual property, software and process knowledge rose from about 11.5% to 16.75%. The author argues demand for tangible capital investment will now have to rise.
  • America Is Missing The New Labor Economy – Robotics Part 1 — Building an identical robotic arm in the US costs about 2.2x more than in China, and US-labeled components still depend heavily on Chinese parts and materials with no scalable alternative. The author argues China is the only country positioned to capture full-scale intelligent robotic automation, which would let it outcompete the US across production.
  • Demographics
  • GDP
    • Growth
  • Workforce

What Demographic Prediction Can and Cannot Achieve

AI Summary. Running standard demographic models—including the Cohort-Component, United Nations World Population Prospects, Lee-Carter, and Lotka-Volterra approaches—across all plausible analytical choices yields a wide range of possible global population outcomes for 2050 and 2075. The authors argue that presenting a single population trajectory hides the compounding uncertainty inherent in such projections.

Samuele Lo Piano, Marta Kuc-Czarnecka, Roger Pielke, and Andrea Saltelli Social Science Research Network
Date Posted:
May 29, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Simulation of the decision chain yielding projections of world population in 2050 that range from 6 to 14B suggests most of the variance in demographic forecasts arises not from parameter uncertainty or data randomness but from model choice.

How much uncertainty do single-trajectory population projections hide?

Core argument: Propagating all plausible analytical choices through global population projections to 2050 and 2075 yields wide overall uncertainty distributions, with the Cohort-Component, UN World Population Prospects, Lee-Carter and Lotka-Volterra models showing distinct sensitivities and outcomes.

We explore demographic predictions by propagating all plausible choices that can be made during the analysis through the modelling process. This approach involves navigating the so-called ’garden of forking paths’—mimicking in silico what would happen if multiple investigators were to examine the same problem. For this, we now abandon [the Chinese government mathematician] Song Jian’s ‘historic’ model and turn to models currently in use: the Cohort-Component and UN WPP models, the Lee-Carter model and the Lotka-Volterra model. Note that in standard use, these tools are used in isolation, see e.g. the FAO’s How to Feed the World in 2050, resting on a single UN WPP population trajectory shielding the reader from the compounding effect of their uncertainty. Unsurprisingly, the exercise capturing the modelling of the modelling process for global population projections to 2050 and 2075 reveals distinct characteristics regarding the sensitivity and projection outcomes of the different models. Once abandoned the straitjacket of Song’s approach, uncertainty is free to manifest itself. The overall uncertainty distributions of the projected populations show a wide range of possible outcomes, reflecting the inherent uncertainties in demographic projections.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Propagating all plausible analytical choices through global population projections to 2050 and 2075 yields wide overall uncertainty distributions, with the Cohort-Component, UN World Population Prospects, Lee-Carter and Lotka-Volterra models showing distinct sensitivities and outcomes.
  2. Standard demographic practice uses these projection models in isolation, as in the FAO's How to Feed the World in 2050, which rests on a single UN World Population Prospects trajectory and shields readers from the compounding effect of their uncertainty.
  3. Abandoning Song Jian's historic model and navigating the "garden of forking paths"—mimicking in silico what would happen if multiple investigators examined the same problem—allows uncertainty in demographic projections to manifest itself.

Related Articles:

  • The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences — The authors estimate the world total fertility rate is around 2.17, below the global replacement rate of roughly 2.21, meaning humanity is already below replacement, with fertility and births falling faster than anticipated. They project middle-income countries' fertility may fall below that of rich countries outside East Asia, with emigration compounding population decline.
  • World Depopulation: Prospects and Implications — The US is projected to account for a growing share of the rich world's labor force, youth, and highly educated talent, with continuing population and labor force growth and only moderate aging through 2050. Its fertility, though below replacement, exceeds that of East Asian and nearly all European countries, and sustained legal immigration is essential to this demographic advantage.
  • Take the Under — Downward revisions to global population and GDP projections make climate change appear more tractable, the author argues, since the scenarios used to model emissions rely on socio-economic assumptions that are more extreme than real-world observations. With slower population and economic growth, even partial policy successes could bring emissions consistent with a 2C target within reach.
  • Demographics
  • Science
    • Global Warming
  • Workforce
    • Family/Marriage
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