“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
AI Summary.Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
Kenan Fikri, Sarah Eckhardt and Benjamin GlasnerEconomic Innovation Group
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Transfer payments made up 18% of all US personal income in 2022, up from 8% in 1970. Social Security/Medicare made up 56% of the increase from 1970 to 2022, and income maintenance programs/Medicaid accounted for 35%. @kenanfikri @BenGlasner
How much have government transfers grown as a share of personal income?
Core argument: Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, ranking third as an income source after work and investments.
Transfers’ share of Americans’ total personal income has more than doubled over the past 50 years, from 8.2% in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022. They are the third largest source of Americans’ personal income, after income from work and investments. The average American received $11,500 in income from government transfers in 2022, compared to $40,500 in income derived from work and $12,900 from investments. Today, most U.S. counties depend on a level of government transfer income that was once reserved only for the most distressed places. In 1970, not even 1% of counties derived a quarter or more of their total personal income from transfers. In 2000, just 10.4% did. But by 2022, 53% of counties were receiving a quarter or more of their income from transfers. Increasing participation (as populations age) and rising underlying costs (driving up the expense of health-related programs, in particular) are the most significant factors at play. Income maintenance programs only account for 11.4% of the real increase in transfers from 1970 to 2022. In stark contrast to the rising elderly share of the population, the poor share has been stable.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, ranking third as an income source after work and investments.
In 2022, 53% of U.S. counties derived a quarter or more of total personal income from transfers, up from 10.4% in 2000 and under 1% in 1970.
Rising participation as populations age and rising underlying costs, particularly for health-related programs, are the most significant factors behind the increase, while income maintenance programs account for 11.4% of the real rise in transfers from 1970 to 2022.
Related Articles:
The Distribution of Household Income in 2021— Income after transfers and taxes grew most for households in the highest quintile, a rate that would have been nearly the same without temporary pandemic policies such as recovery rebate credits, expanded unemployment compensation, and the expanded child tax credit. Those policies raised average income in the lowest quintile to $48,700 from $41,200 without them.
Welfare Is What’s Eating the Budget— The U.S. redistributes 29.4% of its gross domestic product through transfers and taxes, a larger share than any developed country except France at 30.1%. Counting transfers as income and taxes as income lost and adjusting for household size, average households in the bottom, second, and middle income fifths have roughly equal incomes despite large differences in work effort.
AI Summary.The authors find China's tariff cuts after joining the World Trade Organization exceeded the norm of reciprocity, which raised aggregate real incomes in the United States and the rest of the world through better terms of trade while amplifying the China Shock. They estimate this shifted employment from tradable to non-tradable sectors abroad.
Chad Bown, Lorenzo Caliendo, Fernando Parro, Robert Staiger, and Alan SykesNational Bureau of Economic Research
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.@ChadBown and team find that China’s tariff reductions in its WTO accession exceeded reciprocity norms, increasing real incomes but driving an incremental 4% decline in labor demand for tradable goods in the rest of the world.
Did one-sided tariff cuts raise incomes while amplifying trade shocks?
Core argument: China's tariff reductions after its WTO accession exceeded the norm of reciprocity, under which exchanged tariff cuts leave relative world prices between countries unchanged.
When countries exchange tariff cuts that abide by reciprocity, relative world prices (the terms of trade between them) do not change. We find the tariff reductions China implemented after its WTO accession exceeded the norm of reciprocity. This deviation from reciprocity increased aggregate real incomes in the United States and in the rest of the world through improvements in their terms of trade, but it also amplified the magnitude of the China Shock. Figure 2 presents the percentage change in employment in the tradable sector and in the non-tradable sector in the rest of the world due to the movement in the terms of trade resulting from the actual changes in tariff between China and the rest of the world from 1990-2007. We find that China exceeding reciprocity resulted in employment shifting from the tradable sector to the nontradable sector in the rest of the world.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
China's tariff reductions after its WTO accession exceeded the norm of reciprocity, under which exchanged tariff cuts leave relative world prices between countries unchanged.
China's deviation from reciprocity raised aggregate real incomes in the United States and the rest of the world through improvements in their terms of trade, while also amplifying the magnitude of the China Shock.
Terms-of-trade movements from the actual tariff changes between China and the rest of the world from 1990 to 2007 shifted employment in the rest of the world from the tradable sector to the non-tradable sector.
Related Articles:
Trading Places: Mobility Responses of Native and Foreign-Born Adults to the China Trade Shock— U.S. local labor markets more exposed to import competition from China saw substantially larger net reductions in their foreign-born populations, with no significant reduction among native-born residents. Within exposed areas, foreign-born and native-born workers had comparably sized declines in employment-to-population ratios.
The World’s Rust Belts: The Heterogeneous Effects of Deindustrialization on 1,993 Cities in Six Countries— A study of 1,993 cities in France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US finds former manufacturing hubs lost employment on average after each country's manufacturing peak, though a large share fully recovered. After the peak, hubs with a higher initial share of college-educated workers grew significantly faster.
To Find Relative Earnings Gains After the China Shock, Look Outside Manufacturing and Upstream— Among workers initially employed in manufacturing, cumulative median nominal earnings growth from 2000 to 2007 varied widely by destination sector: 27% for those who stayed in manufacturing, higher for those moving to capital- or skill-intensive, higher-wage sectors, and negative for those moving to generally lower-wage sectors.
AI Summary.Survey data show 6.30% of US workers who switched to remote work after the pandemic moved states, compared with 3.58% of those who kept commuting, and plausibly exogenous changes in employer remote-work policies predict both higher remote work and higher interstate migration. Remote workers staying with the same employer are more likely to move states.
Alexander Bick, Adam Blandin, Karel Mertens, et al.Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers
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The rise in the work-from-home share accounts for more than half of the rise in overall interstate migration since 2019, and states with greater WFH opportunities experienced more out-migration.
Does remote work increase interstate migration?
Core argument: In the Real-Time Population Survey, 6.30% of workers who switched to work from home after Covid moved states since February 2020, compared with 3.58% of workers who commuted both before and after Covid.
In the American Community Survey (ACS), annual interstate migration [AIM] among adults ages 18-64 fell from 2.75% in 2005 to 2.23% in 2010. AIM rose from 2.40% in 2019 to 2.66% in 2022. Data from the Real-Time Population Survey (RPS) provide micro evidence that access to WFH increases interstate migration. [Fig. 4 shows] that 6.30% of workers who switched to WFH post-Covid moved states since February 2020, [compared to] 3.58% of workers who commuted both pre- and post-Covid. A potential concern [is]that the pandemic increased the desire to move across states and a large share of these moves involve WFH, but WFH itself was not necessary for those moves to happen [and thus not causal]. Using novel questions in the RPS - whether workers who commuted prior to the pandemic did so due to job characteristics, personal preferences, or employer requirements, and whether employer WFH policies had changed since 2020 - we find that plausibly exogenous changes in employer WFH policies predict higher rates of WFH and higher rates of interstate migration. Finally, consistent with the interpretation that WFH reduces the benefit of living near a workplace, we find that (i) among workers who remain with their pre-pandemic employer, WFH workers are more likely to move states, and (ii) among workers who move states WFH workers are less likely to change employers.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
In the Real-Time Population Survey, 6.30% of workers who switched to work from home after Covid moved states since February 2020, compared with 3.58% of workers who commuted both before and after Covid.
Annual interstate migration among U.S. adults ages 18–64 in the American Community Survey fell from 2.75% in 2005 to 2.23% in 2010, then rose from 2.40% in 2019 to 2.66% in 2022.
Plausibly exogenous changes in employer work-from-home policies predict higher rates of work from home and higher rates of interstate migration; among workers staying with pre-pandemic employers, those working from home are more likely to move states.
Related Articles:
Working From Density— Within the same metropolitan-area income quartile, denser neighborhoods have a higher share of jobs that can be done remotely. The authors argue this pattern suggests increased telework raises willingness to pay for housing in high-density places, where leisure amenities and nonwork social interaction are more available.
Remote Work Is Less Common Than We Thought— New Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates show hybrid remote work is substantially less common than other surveys indicated, while fully remote work matches other estimates at about one in ten workers, making fully remote slightly more common than hybrid. Nearly one in five college-educated workers are fully remote, and nearly 40% of advanced-degree holders work hybrid or fully remote.
Remote Work, Three Years Later— Remote work has reduced office utilization but not yet office occupancy, because most firms are locked into long-duration leases. Baseline estimates suggest remote work will exert 0.8 percentage points of upward pressure on the office vacancy rate near-term, 2.3 more over the following five years, and 1.8 thereafter.
AI Summary.Cultural individualism accounts for about one-third of cross-country differences in working from home, with the shift from the lowest-individualism country (Taiwan) to the highest (the US) associated with 0.7 more fully paid work-from-home days per week, and 1.1 more among college graduates. The authors find individualism explains more of this variation than industry mix, population density, or lockdown stringency.
Pablo Zarate, Mathias Dolls, Steven Davis, et al.National Bureau of Economic Research
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A measure of individualism accounts for about 1/3 of the cross-country variation in work-from-home rates, with WFH most prevalent in the Anglosphere and least in Asia. @PabloZarate98 @I_Am_NickBloom @Jose_MariaRD @cevatgirayaksoy
Does culture explain why working from home varies across countries?
Core argument: Cultural factors, specifically Individualism, account for about one-third of cross-country differences in work from home, with the move from Taiwan's lowest Individualism score to the highest in the US associated with 0.7 more full paid WFH days per week.
We examine how work from home varies across countries and across US workers. Our key finding is that cultural factors – specifically Individualism – account for about one-third of the differences across countries. Figure 3 shows the bivariate relationship between individualism and WFH. Moving from the country with the lowest Individualism score (Taiwan) to the one with the highest (the US) is associated with 0.7 more full paid WFH days per week (1.1 among college graduates). Individualism explains far more of the variation than industrial composition, population-weighted density, or lockdown stringency. Across US workers, industry and population density are the two most important determinants. But cultural factors are still statistically significant. Respondents who reside in counties that voted for Joe Biden in 2020 by a larger margin WFH at higher rates even after accounting for industry, state-level wages, population density, and a battery of demographics.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Cultural factors, specifically Individualism, account for about one-third of cross-country differences in work from home, with the move from Taiwan's lowest Individualism score to the highest in the US associated with 0.7 more full paid WFH days per week.
Among college graduates, the gap between the lowest- and highest-Individualism countries is associated with 1.1 more full paid WFH days per week, and Individualism explains far more variation than industrial composition, population-weighted density, or lockdown stringency.
Across US workers, industry and population density are the two most important determinants of working from home, while respondents in counties that voted for Joe Biden in 2020 by larger margins work from home at higher rates even after accounting for industry, state-level wages, density, and demographics.
Related Articles:
Remote Work, Three Years Later— Remote work has reduced office utilization but not yet office occupancy, because most firms are locked into long-duration leases. Baseline estimates suggest remote work will exert 0.8 percentage points of upward pressure on the office vacancy rate near-term, 2.3 more over the following five years, and 1.8 thereafter.
Does Working from Home Boost Productivity Growth?— After controlling for each industry's pre-pandemic productivity trend, there is essentially no statistically significant relationship between how easily an industry's work can be done remotely and its excess productivity growth during the pandemic.
Work From Home and the Office Real Estate Apocalypse— The authors estimate New York City office values fell 45% in 2020 and 39% in the longer run, a $453bn value destruction, with lower-quality buildings hit hardest as tenants shifted to higher-quality space. They argue this has implications for local public finances and financial sector stability.
AI Summary.Employees at more productive firms and firms with more structured management practices have substantially higher pay, with a doubling of productivity associated with 15% higher pay for the highest-paid employee versus 7% for the median worker. The authors estimate rising productivity can explain 40% of the increase in within-firm inequality.
Melanie Wallskog, Nicholas Bloom, Scott Ohlmacher and Cristina Tello-TrilloNational Bureau of Economic Research
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Increases in firm-level productivity disproportionately raise wages for top earners, and since 1980 have driven 40% of the rise in within-firm inequality as measured by the CEO/median pay ratio. @I_Am_NickBloom @WallskogMelanie @tellotri
How much of rising within-firm pay inequality does productivity explain?
Core argument: A doubling of firm productivity is associated with 15% higher pay for a firm's highest-paid employee, likely the CEO, versus 7% for the median worker.
We find that employees at more productive firms and firms with more structured management practices have substantially higher pay. This pay-performance relationship is particularly strong amongst top-paid executives, with a doubling of firm productivity associated with 15% more pay for the highest-paid employee (likely the CEO) compared to 7% for the median worker. The highest-paid worker sees a 19% pay increase in public firms but only an 11% pay increase in private firms for a doubling of productivity. More productive firms have higher within-firm inequality. The magnitude of this pay-performance slope suggests rising productivity can explain 40% of the rise in within-firm inequality since 1980.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
A doubling of firm productivity is associated with 15% higher pay for a firm's highest-paid employee, likely the CEO, versus 7% for the median worker.
For a doubling of productivity, the highest-paid worker's pay rises 19% in public firms but 11% in private firms, and more productive firms show higher within-firm inequality.
The magnitude of the estimated pay-performance slope suggests rising productivity can explain 40% of the rise in within-firm inequality since 1980; employees at firms with more structured management practices also have substantially higher pay.
Related Articles:
Why Do Wages Grow Faster for Educated Workers?— College graduates sort into professional, non-routine occupations where wages rise much more with job tenure, and the author estimates this occupational sorting explains at least half of the life-cycle growth in the college wage premium. That premium is estimated at 22% at age 26, 49% at age 40, and 56% at age 60.
Multidimensional Human Capital and the Wage Structure— The wage return to cognitive skills has declined, from about 10% higher hourly wages per standard deviation of test score in the 1980s and early 1990s to 4.5% in the 2000s and early 2010s, while returns to a bachelor's degree rose. Social skill-intensive occupations grew as a share of US jobs, with faster real wage growth.
AI Summary.Using administrative employer-employee data on workers displaced by firm closures, the authors find that workers in larger labor markets experience shorter non-employment spells and smaller earnings losses than those in smaller markets, indicating larger markets partially insure workers against job-loss shocks. The effects are larger in industries where human capital is more specialized and less portable.
Enrico Moretti and Moises YiNational Bureau of Economic Research
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Large labor markets are more liquid and improve matching. A 1% increase in market size results in an increase in the 1-year re-employment probability following a firm closure by .14 and .023 for high school and college graduates respectively. @MoisesYi3
Do larger labor markets protect workers against job loss?
Core argument: Using Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics administrative data, the authors find that workers displaced by firm closures in larger labor markets experience significantly shorter non-employment spells and smaller earnings losses than workers in smaller markets.
We use administrative data [Longitudinal Employer‐Household Dynamics reporting] to compare the job search outcomes of workers originally in large and small markets who lost their jobs due to a firm closure. Workers in larger markets experience significantly shorter non-employment spells and smaller earning losses following a closure than workers in smaller markets, indicating that larger markets partially insure workers against idiosyncratic employment shocks. We find that the effects are larger in industries where human capital is more specialized and less portable.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Using Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics administrative data, the authors find that workers displaced by firm closures in larger labor markets experience significantly shorter non-employment spells and smaller earnings losses than workers in smaller markets.
The authors read the larger-market advantage as an indication that larger labor markets partially insure workers against idiosyncratic employment shocks.
The estimated benefits of larger markets are greater in industries where human capital is more specialized and less portable, according to the authors.
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Changes in the U.S. Economy and Rural-Urban Employment Disparities— Long-term shifts in the US economy — technological innovation and automation, declines in some energy extraction, greater globalization, and the move to a knowledge-based economy — have coincided with disproportionately negative employment outcomes in rural communities, especially for prime working-age men and those without a high school degree.
The World’s Rust Belts: The Heterogeneous Effects of Deindustrialization on 1,993 Cities in Six Countries— A study of 1,993 cities in France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US finds former manufacturing hubs lost employment on average after each country's manufacturing peak, though a large share fully recovered. After the peak, hubs with a higher initial share of college-educated workers grew significantly faster.
Exodus From America’s Big Cities Slowed Last Year as Pandemic Receded— The core counties of large U.S. metropolitan areas lost a net of more than 800,000 residents to other parts of the country, an improvement from a 1.2m net outflow the prior year. About 500,000 net arrivals from abroad, plus more births and fewer deaths, left those counties' combined population little changed.
AI Summary.A study of 1,993 cities in France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US finds former manufacturing hubs lost employment on average after each country's manufacturing peak, though a large share fully recovered. After the peak, hubs with a higher initial share of college-educated workers grew significantly faster.
Luisa Gagliardi, Enrico Moretti and Michel SerafinelliUniversity of California
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Enrico Moretti, Michel Serafinelli and @GagliarL show that, among cities worldwide that were hit by shocks that caused a decline in manufacturing, those that had a high share of college-educated workers recovered faster.
Why do some former manufacturing hubs recover employment while others decline?
Core argument: Across 1,993 cities in France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US, former manufacturing hubs lost employment on average after their country's manufacturing peak, yet a surprisingly large share in each country fully recovered.
We study the employment consequences of deindustrialization for 1,993 cities in six countries: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We focus on former manufacturing hubs—defined as Local Labor Markets that in the year of their country’s manufacturing peak have a manufacturing employment share in the top tercile of their country’s distribution. While on average former manufacturing hubs lost employment after their country’s manufacturing peak, a surprisingly large share in each country was able to fully recover. We find that in the two decades before the relevant country’s manufacturing peak, cities with a high share of college-educated workers experienced a similar rate of employment growth as those with a low share of college-educated workers. By contrast, in the decades after the manufacturing peak, the employment trends diverge: cities with a high initial share of college-educated workers experience significantly faster employment growth.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Across 1,993 cities in France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US, former manufacturing hubs lost employment on average after their country's manufacturing peak, yet a surprisingly large share in each country fully recovered.
In the two decades before each country's manufacturing peak, cities with high and low shares of college-educated workers grew employment at similar rates, with trends diverging only after the peak.
After their country's manufacturing peak, cities with a high initial share of college-educated workers experienced significantly faster employment growth than those with a low share.
Related Articles:
Are Manufacturing Jobs Still Good Jobs? An Exploration of the Manufacturing Wage Premium— Manufacturing average hourly wages, once about 3% above private-sector wages, have grown more slowly than private-sector wages, erasing the manufacturing wage premium for most manufacturing jobs. The authors estimate that declining unionization accounts for more than 70% of that drop, an effect that remains significant after controlling for worker and sector characteristics.
Bottlenecks: Sectoral Imbalances and the US Productivity Slowdown— The authors estimate that greater dispersion in productivity growth among an industry's input and idea suppliers has a strong negative effect on that industry's own productivity growth, using data on 462 US manufacturing industries and 42 non-manufacturing industries. Their evidence implies most of the US productivity slowdown can be explained by rising cross-industry variance in productivity growth.
AI Summary.Because many immigrants send remittances home or plan to return, part of their spending occurs in their origin country rather than where they work, so local prices apply to only part of their budget. The authors argue this makes immigrants less deterred by high local costs, concentrating them in expensive cities.
Joan MonrasFederal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
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.@JoanMonrasEcon argues that immigrants cluster in cities with higher wages to support remittances to family members in their native countries, and are deterred less by higher living costs than US-born workers.
Why do immigrants concentrate in the most expensive cities?
Core argument: Because a large share of immigrants send remittances home or plan to return to their birthplace, a substantial part of their spending occurs in their origin country rather than the city where they work.
A large share of immigrants keeps ties with their origin countries. Many send money, known as remittances, to family members in those countries, while others plan to eventually return to their birthplace. In either case, this means that a substantial part of immigrants’ spending, now or in the future, takes place in their origin country rather than in the city where they currently work. Hence, for immigrants, the local prices in the city where they work only matter for the fraction of their total budget spent there. This means, that, relative to native-born workers, immigrants are equally attracted to high wages in select cities but less deterred by high local prices—particularly housing. This simple mechanism can explain why immigrants concentrate so much in a small number of select cities, and why these cities tend to have the highest costs of living.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Because a large share of immigrants send remittances home or plan to return to their birthplace, a substantial part of their spending occurs in their origin country rather than the city where they work.
Immigrants are as attracted to high wages in select cities as native-born workers but less deterred by high local prices, particularly housing, since local prices apply only to the fraction of their budget spent locally.
This spending mechanism can explain why immigrants concentrate in a small number of select cities and why those cities tend to have the highest costs of living.