AI Summary. Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.

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Transfer payments made up 18% of all US personal income in 2022, up from 8% in 1970. Social Security/Medicare made up 56% of the increase from 1970 to 2022, and income maintenance programs/Medicaid accounted for 35%. @kenanfikri @BenGlasner

How much have government transfers grown as a share of personal income?

Core argument: Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, ranking third as an income source after work and investments.

Transfers’ share of Americans’ total personal income has more than doubled over the past 50 years, from 8.2% in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022. They are the third largest source of Americans’ personal income, after income from work and investments. The average American received $11,500 in income from government transfers in 2022, compared to $40,500 in income derived from work and $12,900 from investments. Today, most U.S. counties depend on a level of government transfer income that was once reserved only for the most distressed places. In 1970, not even 1% of counties derived a quarter or more of their total personal income from transfers. In 2000, just 10.4% did. But by 2022, 53% of counties were receiving a quarter or more of their income from transfers. Increasing participation (as populations age) and rising underlying costs (driving up the expense of health-related programs, in particular) are the most significant factors at play. Income maintenance programs only account for 11.4% of the real increase in transfers from 1970 to 2022. In stark contrast to the rising elderly share of the population, the poor share has been stable.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, ranking third as an income source after work and investments.
  2. In 2022, 53% of U.S. counties derived a quarter or more of total personal income from transfers, up from 10.4% in 2000 and under 1% in 1970.
  3. Rising participation as populations age and rising underlying costs, particularly for health-related programs, are the most significant factors behind the increase, while income maintenance programs account for 11.4% of the real rise in transfers from 1970 to 2022.

AI Summary. The authors find China's tariff cuts after joining the World Trade Organization exceeded the norm of reciprocity, which raised aggregate real incomes in the United States and the rest of the world through better terms of trade while amplifying the China Shock. They estimate this shifted employment from tradable to non-tradable sectors abroad.

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.@ChadBown and team find that China’s tariff reductions in its WTO accession exceeded reciprocity norms, increasing real incomes but driving an incremental 4% decline in labor demand for tradable goods in the rest of the world.

Did one-sided tariff cuts raise incomes while amplifying trade shocks?

Core argument: China's tariff reductions after its WTO accession exceeded the norm of reciprocity, under which exchanged tariff cuts leave relative world prices between countries unchanged.

When countries exchange tariff cuts that abide by reciprocity, relative world prices (the terms of trade between them) do not change. We find the tariff reductions China implemented after its WTO accession exceeded the norm of reciprocity. This deviation from reciprocity increased aggregate real incomes in the United States and in the rest of the world through improvements in their terms of trade, but it also amplified the magnitude of the China Shock. Figure 2 presents the percentage change in employment in the tradable sector and in the non-tradable sector in the rest of the world due to the movement in the terms of trade resulting from the actual changes in tariff between China and the rest of the world from 1990-2007. We find that China exceeding reciprocity resulted in employment shifting from the tradable sector to the nontradable sector in the rest of the world.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's tariff reductions after its WTO accession exceeded the norm of reciprocity, under which exchanged tariff cuts leave relative world prices between countries unchanged.
  2. China's deviation from reciprocity raised aggregate real incomes in the United States and the rest of the world through improvements in their terms of trade, while also amplifying the magnitude of the China Shock.
  3. Terms-of-trade movements from the actual tariff changes between China and the rest of the world from 1990 to 2007 shifted employment in the rest of the world from the tradable sector to the non-tradable sector.

AI Summary. Survey data show 6.30% of US workers who switched to remote work after the pandemic moved states, compared with 3.58% of those who kept commuting, and plausibly exogenous changes in employer remote-work policies predict both higher remote work and higher interstate migration. Remote workers staying with the same employer are more likely to move states.

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The rise in the work-from-home share accounts for more than half of the rise in overall interstate migration since 2019, and states with greater WFH opportunities experienced more out-migration.

Does remote work increase interstate migration?

Core argument: In the Real-Time Population Survey, 6.30% of workers who switched to work from home after Covid moved states since February 2020, compared with 3.58% of workers who commuted both before and after Covid.

In the American Community Survey (ACS), annual interstate migration [AIM] among adults ages 18-64 fell from 2.75% in 2005 to 2.23% in 2010. AIM rose from 2.40% in 2019 to 2.66% in 2022. Data from the Real-Time Population Survey (RPS) provide micro evidence that access to WFH increases interstate migration. [Fig. 4 shows] that 6.30% of workers who switched to WFH post-Covid moved states since February 2020, [compared to] 3.58% of workers who commuted both pre- and post-Covid. A potential concern [is]that the pandemic increased the desire to move across states and a large share of these moves involve WFH, but WFH itself was not necessary for those moves to happen [and thus not causal]. Using novel questions in the RPS - whether workers who commuted prior to the pandemic did so due to job characteristics, personal preferences, or employer requirements, and whether employer WFH policies had changed since 2020 - we find that plausibly exogenous changes in employer WFH policies predict higher rates of WFH and higher rates of interstate migration. Finally, consistent with the interpretation that WFH reduces the benefit of living near a workplace, we find that (i) among workers who remain with their pre-pandemic employer, WFH workers are more likely to move states, and (ii) among workers who move states WFH workers are less likely to change employers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In the Real-Time Population Survey, 6.30% of workers who switched to work from home after Covid moved states since February 2020, compared with 3.58% of workers who commuted both before and after Covid.
  2. Annual interstate migration among U.S. adults ages 18–64 in the American Community Survey fell from 2.75% in 2005 to 2.23% in 2010, then rose from 2.40% in 2019 to 2.66% in 2022.
  3. Plausibly exogenous changes in employer work-from-home policies predict higher rates of work from home and higher rates of interstate migration; among workers staying with pre-pandemic employers, those working from home are more likely to move states.

AI Summary. Cultural individualism accounts for about one-third of cross-country differences in working from home, with the shift from the lowest-individualism country (Taiwan) to the highest (the US) associated with 0.7 more fully paid work-from-home days per week, and 1.1 more among college graduates. The authors find individualism explains more of this variation than industry mix, population density, or lockdown stringency.

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A measure of individualism accounts for about 1/3 of the cross-country variation in work-from-home rates, with WFH most prevalent in the Anglosphere and least in Asia. @PabloZarate98 @I_Am_NickBloom @Jose_MariaRD @cevatgirayaksoy

Does culture explain why working from home varies across countries?

Core argument: Cultural factors, specifically Individualism, account for about one-third of cross-country differences in work from home, with the move from Taiwan's lowest Individualism score to the highest in the US associated with 0.7 more full paid WFH days per week.

We examine how work from home varies across countries and across US workers. Our key finding is that cultural factors – specifically Individualism – account for about one-third of the differences across countries. Figure 3 shows the bivariate relationship between individualism and WFH. Moving from the country with the lowest Individualism score (Taiwan) to the one with the highest (the US) is associated with 0.7 more full paid WFH days per week (1.1 among college graduates). Individualism explains far more of the variation than industrial composition, population-weighted density, or lockdown stringency. Across US workers, industry and population density are the two most important determinants. But cultural factors are still statistically significant. Respondents who reside in counties that voted for Joe Biden in 2020 by a larger margin WFH at higher rates even after accounting for industry, state-level wages, population density, and a battery of demographics.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Cultural factors, specifically Individualism, account for about one-third of cross-country differences in work from home, with the move from Taiwan's lowest Individualism score to the highest in the US associated with 0.7 more full paid WFH days per week.
  2. Among college graduates, the gap between the lowest- and highest-Individualism countries is associated with 1.1 more full paid WFH days per week, and Individualism explains far more variation than industrial composition, population-weighted density, or lockdown stringency.
  3. Across US workers, industry and population density are the two most important determinants of working from home, while respondents in counties that voted for Joe Biden in 2020 by larger margins work from home at higher rates even after accounting for industry, state-level wages, density, and demographics.

AI Summary. Employees at more productive firms and firms with more structured management practices have substantially higher pay, with a doubling of productivity associated with 15% higher pay for the highest-paid employee versus 7% for the median worker. The authors estimate rising productivity can explain 40% of the increase in within-firm inequality.

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Increases in firm-level productivity disproportionately raise wages for top earners, and since 1980 have driven 40% of the rise in within-firm inequality as measured by the CEO/median pay ratio. @I_Am_NickBloom @WallskogMelanie @tellotri

How much of rising within-firm pay inequality does productivity explain?

Core argument: A doubling of firm productivity is associated with 15% higher pay for a firm's highest-paid employee, likely the CEO, versus 7% for the median worker.

We find that employees at more productive firms and firms with more structured management practices have substantially higher pay. This pay-performance relationship is particularly strong amongst top-paid executives, with a doubling of firm productivity associated with 15% more pay for the highest-paid employee (likely the CEO) compared to 7% for the median worker. The highest-paid worker sees a 19% pay increase in public firms but only an 11% pay increase in private firms for a doubling of productivity. More productive firms have higher within-firm inequality. The magnitude of this pay-performance slope suggests rising productivity can explain 40% of the rise in within-firm inequality since 1980.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A doubling of firm productivity is associated with 15% higher pay for a firm's highest-paid employee, likely the CEO, versus 7% for the median worker.
  2. For a doubling of productivity, the highest-paid worker's pay rises 19% in public firms but 11% in private firms, and more productive firms show higher within-firm inequality.
  3. The magnitude of the estimated pay-performance slope suggests rising productivity can explain 40% of the rise in within-firm inequality since 1980; employees at firms with more structured management practices also have substantially higher pay.

AI Summary. Using administrative employer-employee data on workers displaced by firm closures, the authors find that workers in larger labor markets experience shorter non-employment spells and smaller earnings losses than those in smaller markets, indicating larger markets partially insure workers against job-loss shocks. The effects are larger in industries where human capital is more specialized and less portable.

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Large labor markets are more liquid and improve matching. A 1% increase in market size results in an increase in the 1-year re-employment probability following a firm closure by .14 and .023 for high school and college graduates respectively. @MoisesYi3

Do larger labor markets protect workers against job loss?

Core argument: Using Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics administrative data, the authors find that workers displaced by firm closures in larger labor markets experience significantly shorter non-employment spells and smaller earnings losses than workers in smaller markets.

We use administrative data [Longitudinal Employer‐Household Dynamics reporting] to compare the job search outcomes of workers originally in large and small markets who lost their jobs due to a firm closure. Workers in larger markets experience significantly shorter non-employment spells and smaller earning losses following a closure than workers in smaller markets, indicating that larger markets partially insure workers against idiosyncratic employment shocks. We find that the effects are larger in industries where human capital is more specialized and less portable.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Using Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics administrative data, the authors find that workers displaced by firm closures in larger labor markets experience significantly shorter non-employment spells and smaller earnings losses than workers in smaller markets.
  2. The authors read the larger-market advantage as an indication that larger labor markets partially insure workers against idiosyncratic employment shocks.
  3. The estimated benefits of larger markets are greater in industries where human capital is more specialized and less portable, according to the authors.

AI Summary. A study of 1,993 cities in France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US finds former manufacturing hubs lost employment on average after each country's manufacturing peak, though a large share fully recovered. After the peak, hubs with a higher initial share of college-educated workers grew significantly faster.

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Enrico Moretti, Michel Serafinelli and @GagliarL show that, among cities worldwide that were hit by shocks that caused a decline in manufacturing, those that had a high share of college-educated workers recovered faster.

Why do some former manufacturing hubs recover employment while others decline?

Core argument: Across 1,993 cities in France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US, former manufacturing hubs lost employment on average after their country's manufacturing peak, yet a surprisingly large share in each country fully recovered.

We study the employment consequences of deindustrialization for 1,993 cities in six countries: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We focus on former manufacturing hubs—defined as Local Labor Markets that in the year of their country’s manufacturing peak have a manufacturing employment share in the top tercile of their country’s distribution. While on average former manufacturing hubs lost employment after their country’s manufacturing peak, a surprisingly large share in each country was able to fully recover. We find that in the two decades before the relevant country’s manufacturing peak, cities with a high share of college-educated workers experienced a similar rate of employment growth as those with a low share of college-educated workers. By contrast, in the decades after the manufacturing peak, the employment trends diverge: cities with a high initial share of college-educated workers experience significantly faster employment growth.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Across 1,993 cities in France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US, former manufacturing hubs lost employment on average after their country's manufacturing peak, yet a surprisingly large share in each country fully recovered.
  2. In the two decades before each country's manufacturing peak, cities with high and low shares of college-educated workers grew employment at similar rates, with trends diverging only after the peak.
  3. After their country's manufacturing peak, cities with a high initial share of college-educated workers experienced significantly faster employment growth than those with a low share.

AI Summary. Because many immigrants send remittances home or plan to return, part of their spending occurs in their origin country rather than where they work, so local prices apply to only part of their budget. The authors argue this makes immigrants less deterred by high local costs, concentrating them in expensive cities.

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.@JoanMonrasEcon argues that immigrants cluster in cities with higher wages to support remittances to family members in their native countries, and are deterred less by higher living costs than US-born workers.

Why do immigrants concentrate in the most expensive cities?

Core argument: Because a large share of immigrants send remittances home or plan to return to their birthplace, a substantial part of their spending occurs in their origin country rather than the city where they work.

A large share of immigrants keeps ties with their origin countries. Many send money, known as remittances, to family members in those countries, while others plan to eventually return to their birthplace. In either case, this means that a substantial part of immigrants’ spending, now or in the future, takes place in their origin country rather than in the city where they currently work. Hence, for immigrants, the local prices in the city where they work only matter for the fraction of their total budget spent there. This means, that, relative to native-born workers, immigrants are equally attracted to high wages in select cities but less deterred by high local prices—particularly housing. This simple mechanism can explain why immigrants concentrate so much in a small number of select cities, and why these cities tend to have the highest costs of living.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Because a large share of immigrants send remittances home or plan to return to their birthplace, a substantial part of their spending occurs in their origin country rather than the city where they work.
  2. Immigrants are as attracted to high wages in select cities as native-born workers but less deterred by high local prices, particularly housing, since local prices apply only to the fraction of their budget spent locally.
  3. This spending mechanism can explain why immigrants concentrate in a small number of select cities and why those cities tend to have the highest costs of living.