“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
AI Summary.An analysis finds a Social Security tax-increase package lowers the debt-to-GDP ratio by 14.3 percentage points, with 97% of that coming from smaller Social Security deficits rather than economic growth. A benefit-reduction package cuts the ratio by 29.2 percentage points, raising long-run GDP by 12.1% versus 0.4%.
Andrew BiggsAmerican Enterprise Institute
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A Penn-Wharton simulation finds that restoring Social Security solvency with tax increases alone would cut debt/GDP by ~14pp by 2060, while a fix based only on benefit cuts would cut it by ~29pp.
How do benefit cuts and tax increases differ in reducing debt-to-GDP?
Core argument: The benefit-reduction package cuts the debt/GDP ratio by 29.2 percentage points in the long run, more than twice the 14.3 percentage points under the tax-increase package.
The first figure [in the gallery] decomposes the tax-increase reform package’s improvement to the debt/GDP ratio into separate effects: how much does it cut debt versus how much does it raise GDP? Almost all of the tax-increase plan’s improvement in debt/GDP comes from lowering federal debt by raising taxes. The plan has a small negative effect on the economy in the short run and a small positive effect in the long run. But 97% of its 14.3 percentage point long-run reduction in debt/GDP comes simply from reducing Social Security’s deficits. The economy is little-changed relative to a baseline in which Congress simply borrows to pay Social Security benefits. The benefit-reduction package [second figure in the gallery] tells a different story. It reduces debt/GDP by 29.2 percentage points, more than twice as much as the tax-increase package. Part of that comes from a larger reduction in debt: 17.2 percentage points versus 13.9. But the real kicker comes from higher long-run GDP: 12.1% under the benefit-reduction package versus just 0.4% under the tax-increase package.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The benefit-reduction package cuts the debt/GDP ratio by 29.2 percentage points in the long run, more than twice the 14.3 percentage points under the tax-increase package.
Of the tax-increase plan’s 14.3 percentage point long-run reduction in debt/GDP, 97% comes from reducing Social Security’s deficits, leaving the economy little changed relative to a baseline in which Congress borrows to pay benefits.
Long-run GDP rises 12.1% under the benefit-reduction package versus 0.4% under the tax-increase package, with debt falling 17.2 percentage points versus 13.9.
Related Articles:
The Fairest Way to Reform Social Security May Also Be the Worst Way to Grow the Economy— Fully closing Social Security's funding gap by raising the payroll tax rate would require an immediate, permanent increase from 12.4% to 17.6%, which would reduce labor supply and economic growth. Research on a prior benefit cut found affected Americans raised earnings by 61 cents per dollar of lost benefits, generating additional payroll tax revenue.
How Federal Spending is Distributed by Age— An analysis classifying $4.4tn of $7tn in federal spending by age finds retirees aged 65 and older receive $2.7tn, 38.6% of total outlays and 61.9% of age-assignable spending, versus $1.2tn for working-age adults and $449bn for those under 26. Social Security and Medicare account for 80% of age-assignable spending on older adults.
The Great “Transfer”-mation— Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
AI Summary.An analysis projects that by 2030 a rapid artificial intelligence growth scenario—3.3% annualized GDP growth with a rising capital share of income—could raise US federal revenues by up to $216bn, 3.3% above the Congressional Budget Office baseline. Because capital income receives preferential tax treatment, a falling labor share of income reduces the revenue gain that output growth would otherwise produce.
John Iselin and Ryan NunnYale University
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Iselin and Nunn expect AI to increase output growth but to reduce labor’s share of income. “This bias in AI-induced growth reduces the revenue increase one would otherwise expect, given the preferential tax treatment afforded to capital income.”
How much would AI-driven growth raise federal tax revenues?
Core argument: In a rapid AI growth scenario of 3.3% annualized GDP growth with a growing capital share, federal revenues by 2030 could grow by up to $216 billion, a 3.3% increase on top of CBO's 2026 baseline.
The additional output growth that is often expected from AI—a clear positive for the fiscal picture —is not the only potential impact that matters. Another widely expected consequence of AI adoption is a reduction in the labor share of income. This bias in AI-induced growth reduces the revenue increase one would otherwise expect, given the preferential tax treatment afforded to capital income. Further, any labor inequality effects of AI could increase revenues (in the case of increasing inequality) or reduce them (in the case of decreasing inequality). Because these channels are of first-order importance for understanding AI effects on tax revenues, our analysis focuses on their roles. Other channels, not considered here, could also turn out to have meaningful revenue implications. We project that by 2030, in a rapid AI growth scenario (3.3% annualized GDP growth and a growing capital share), federal revenues could grow by up to $216 billion, a 3.3% increase on top of CBO’s 2026 baseline.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
In a rapid AI growth scenario of 3.3% annualized GDP growth with a growing capital share, federal revenues by 2030 could grow by up to $216 billion, a 3.3% increase on top of CBO's 2026 baseline.
A reduction in the labor share of income from AI adoption would blunt the revenue gains otherwise expected from faster growth, because capital income receives preferential tax treatment.
AI's labor inequality effects could raise revenues if inequality increases or reduce them if inequality decreases, a channel of first-order importance alongside the shift in labor share.
Related Articles:
How Might Fiscal Policy Respond to the Rise of Artificial Intelligence?— The Congressional Budget Office estimates that a permanent 0.5 percentage point increase in annual productivity growth would lower publicly held federal debt after 30 years by 39% of GDP, offsetting roughly half the projected rise from 101% of GDP to 175%. Higher revenue and slower spending growth outweigh higher interest costs.
Can AI Avert the Impending Federal Budget Crisis?— U.S. GDP per capita, about $87,000, is projected to reach $102,000 by 2035 with 1.8% annual productivity growth, or $110,000 with 2.7% growth. Because the healthcare sector has been slow to adopt AI, health spending is projected to rise from 18.3% of GDP to 21% under slower growth and 21.7% under faster growth.
U.S. Treasury Investors Are Long in AI— The authors find U.S. government debt has a large positive productivity beta, because the tax code makes federal revenue highly sensitive to productivity growth while spending commitments change little, leaving bondholders implicitly long productivity growth. They argue greater market confidence in sustained productivity gains from AI could substantially reprice government debt, lowering nominal yields.
AI Summary.There is little evidence that fears of a Greek-style solvency crisis are driving U.S. interest rates, since long-term "breakeven" inflation expectations have changed little. Prices for credit default swaps, which insure against a U.S. government default, have also moved little.
Paul KrugmanKrugman Wonks Out
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Citing the stable long-term breakeven inflation rate and minimal rise in Treasury CDS prices, Krugman argues that high long-term rates reflect heavy federal borrowing, but not fears of outright default or inflation-induced debasement.
Are bond markets signaling fears about government solvency?
Core argument: Bond markets show very little evidence that fears of a Greek-style solvency crisis are driving U.S. interest rates.
There is very little evidence that fears of a Greek-style crisis are driving interest rates now. For example, if markets were really worried about U.S. solvency and the potential for the government to inflate the debt away, this should be reflected in measures that track inflation. But there has been, in fact, very little change in the “breakeven” inflation rate, a measure of long-term inflation expectations. Another indicator is the price of credit default swaps — insurance against a possible US default. These also haven’t moved much.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Bond markets show very little evidence that fears of a Greek-style solvency crisis are driving U.S. interest rates.
The breakeven inflation rate, a measure of long-term inflation expectations, has changed very little, which would be expected to move if markets feared the U.S. government would inflate away its debt.
Prices of credit default swaps, which insure against a possible U.S. default, also have not moved much.
Related Articles:
US Bond Selloff Drives 30-Year Yields to Highest Since 2007— The yield on 30-year US Treasury bonds rose to as high as 5.34%, its highest level since 2007, amid investor concern over rising government spending, heavy sales of long-dated bonds, and inflation that has run above the Federal Reserve's target for five years. Long-term yields also rose in Canada and Europe.
The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036— The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal deficit will grow from $1.9tn (5.8% of GDP) to $3.1tn (6.7%) over a decade, above the 3.8% averaged over the past 50 years, with rising net interest costs driving much of the increase. Federal debt held by the public is projected to rise from 101% to 120% of GDP.
AI Is Driving Up Treasury Yields: ‘It Just Touches Everything’— Investment-grade companies have sold nearly $1.5tn of bonds, up 36% from a year earlier, and some investors have sold US Treasuries to buy higher-yielding corporate debt. Bank of America economists estimate the surge in corporate-debt sales, along with more mortgage-backed securities issuance, pushed 10-year rates up by about 0.3 percentage point.
AI Summary.The average statutory US tariff rate stands at 11.1% and, under current law including scheduled increases, is projected to reach 11.8% by year-end. The authors estimate current-law tariffs will raise consumer prices by about 0.7% and generate roughly $1.9tn over ten years, with revenue somewhat lower after accounting for tariffs' negative effect on economic output.
John IselinYale University
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The US’s average statutory tariff rate stands at 11.1% and is set to rise to 11.8% by the end of year. John Iselin projects that the current regime will raise ~$1.9T in revenue over 10 years.
How much will current tariffs raise prices and revenue?
Core argument: The average U.S. statutory tariff rate stands at 11.1%, down about 0.3pp after Section 122 tariffs expired and were replaced with new tariffs under Section 301.
As of July 24th, the average statutory tariff rate stands at 11.1% after falling by about 0.3pp when Section 122 tariffs expired and were replaced with new tariffs under Section 301. Under current law, which includes several scheduled tariff increases in the coming months, this figure is set to be 11.8% by the end of this year. We estimate the ultimate consumer price impact of current-law tariff policy to be about 0.7%. Over the next ten years, we estimate that current-law tariffs will raise about $1.9 trillion. These numbers are somewhat lower, though, after taking into account the negative impact of tariffs on GDP.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The average U.S. statutory tariff rate stands at 11.1%, down about 0.3pp after Section 122 tariffs expired and were replaced with new tariffs under Section 301.
Under current law, which includes several scheduled tariff increases in the coming months, the average statutory tariff rate is set to reach 11.8% by the end of this year.
Current-law tariff policy is estimated to raise consumer prices by about 0.7% and to bring in about $1.9 trillion over ten years, with both figures somewhat lower after accounting for the negative impact of tariffs on GDP.
Related Articles:
Who Is Paying for the 2025 U.S. Tariffs?— The authors estimate that 94% of U.S. tariff costs were borne domestically over the first eight months of 2025, with a 10% tariff associated with only a 0.6 percentage point decline in foreign export prices. Pass-through into U.S. import prices later declined to 86%, shifting more of the burden to foreign exporters.
The Global Economy Is Threatened Again by Trade Imbalances— The International Monetary Fund calculates that global current-account deficits plus surpluses reached 3.7% of world gross domestic product, after fluctuating between 1% and 3% until the early 2000s. The US deficit of $1.1tn is the largest single imbalance, and the Fund estimates a budget deficit of 2% of GDP raises the current-account deficit by 0.5% of GDP.
Help for the Heartland? The Employment and Electoral Effects of the Trump Tariffs in the United States— The authors find that the combined effect of U.S.-China trade war import tariffs, retaliatory tariffs, and farm subsidies on employment in exposed U.S. locations was at best a wash and possibly mildly negative, while residents of tariff-protected areas became less likely to identify as Democrats and more likely to vote Republican.
AI Summary.Modeling U.S. venture-backed startups, the authors estimate that taxing capital gains as they accrue rather than at sale would cut founders' average ownership at exit by about 25% while raising the share of entrepreneurs with positive payoffs from roughly 16% to nearly 47%. Less risk-averse founders prefer taxation at sale.
Eduardo Azevedo, Florian Scheuer, Kent Smetters and Min YangNational Bureau of Economic Research
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~84% of venture backed founders end with zero exit value, while the top 2% capture ~80% of total exit value. Accrual-based taxation would reduce mean founder ownership stakes at exit by ~25%, but with fully refundable tax credits, raise the share of founders with >0 payoffs to ~47%.
How does taxing unrealized capital gains affect startup founders?
Core argument: The authors estimate that average founder shares at exit fall about 25% under accrual-based capital gains taxation relative to realization-based taxation, as advance taxation forces additional share sales before exit.
This paper examines how taxing unrealized capital gains affects entrepreneurship, combining a dynamic career-choice model with new evidence on all U.S. venture capital backed startups. Figure 1a plots a histogram of the positive company exit values. The distribution spans several orders of magnitude and is relatively similar to a lognormal, but with a right skew and fatter right tail. A stylized model highlights a key trade-off: accrual-based capital gains taxes dilute successful founders by forcing additional share sales before exit, a well known concern, yet they also provide insurance through tax credits to founders whose ventures fail, an aspect often overlooked. Quantitatively, advance taxation substantially reduces founders' ownership at exit: average founder shares fall about 25% under accrual-based taxation relative to realization based taxation. At the same time, accrual taxation increases the fraction of entrepreneurs with positive payoffs from around 16% to nearly 47%. Embedding these outcomes in a career-choice framework shows that the insurance value of accrual taxation partly offsets dilution costs: less risk-averse founders favor realization-based taxes, while more risk averse ones prefer accrual-based taxes. The strength of this insurance channel depends on the highly skewed distribution of entrepreneurial payoffs and the design of loss provisions under accrual-based taxation.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The authors estimate that average founder shares at exit fall about 25% under accrual-based capital gains taxation relative to realization-based taxation, as advance taxation forces additional share sales before exit.
Accrual-based taxation raises the fraction of entrepreneurs with positive payoffs from around 16% to nearly 47%, providing insurance through tax credits to founders whose ventures fail.
In the authors' career-choice framework, less risk-averse founders favor realization-based taxes while more risk-averse founders prefer accrual-based taxes, with the insurance channel's strength depending on the skewed payoff distribution and loss-provision design.
Related Articles:
Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance during World War II— Analysis of over 5,000 German World War II fighter pilots finds that public peer recognition was associated with higher victory scores among skilled pilots without higher mortality, while average pilots gained little in victories but died at higher rates. The authors conclude status-based awards can have uneven effects in high-risk settings.
One Hundred Years in the U.S. Stock Markets— Over a century, U.S. publicly traded stocks generated roughly $91tn in shareholder wealth enhancement, with returns strongly positively skewed and dominated by a relatively small number of high-performing firms. Because most possible outcomes fall below the mean in a skewed distribution, the authors argue financial planning should focus on median outcomes or the full distribution.
Never Enough: Dynamic Status Incentives in Organizations— Data on over 5,000 German fighter pilots show performance rose markedly as pilots approached the eligibility threshold for each medal in a tiered awards ladder and slumped immediately after receiving it, with the effect repeating at each successive rung. The authors estimate the ladder added 3,000–5,000 aerial victories, 5–10% of the total.
AI Summary.As labor force participation falls, a shrinking group of workers generates the income, taxes, and innovation supporting a growing number of non-workers, leaving the economy more fragile because labor shocks are concentrated among fewer participants. Labor scarcity raises the return on automation, robotics, and software, making growth depend on productivity rather than participation.
Paul KedroskyApplied Complexity
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Overall LFP is at a 50-year low. Kedrosky warns, “As fewer adults work or seek work, a larger fraction of voters experience the economy mostly as consumers, retirees, or rentiers, not as workers…[which] changes incentives around….taxation and redistribution.”
How does falling labor force participation reshape growth and fragility?
Core argument: Falling labor force participation leaves a shrinking core of workers generating the income, taxes, and innovation that support a growing number of non-workers, and makes the economy more fragile because labor shocks are concentrated among fewer participants.
As fewer adults work or seek work, a larger fraction of voters experience the economy mostly as consumers, retirees, or rentiers, not as workers. That changes political incentives around wages, immigration, AI, taxation, and redistribution. The economy becomes increasingly dependent on a shrinking core. A shrinking group of workers generates the income, taxes, and innovation that support a growing number of non-workers. The economy becomes more fragile because labor shocks are concentrated among fewer participants. Capital must increasingly substitute for labor. Labor scarcity raises the return on automation, AI, robotics, and software. The AI bet becomes as much about compensating for workers' absence as simple replacement. Growth increasingly depends on productivity, on not participation. Any [productivity] miss will be much more consequential than in the past, given that labor no longer picks up the slack.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Falling labor force participation leaves a shrinking core of workers generating the income, taxes, and innovation that support a growing number of non-workers, and makes the economy more fragile because labor shocks are concentrated among fewer participants.
As more voters experience the economy as consumers, retirees, or rentiers rather than workers, political incentives shift around wages, immigration, AI, taxation, and redistribution.
Labor scarcity raises the return on automation, AI, robotics, and software, making the AI bet as much about compensating for workers' absence as replacing them, with growth depending on productivity rather than participation and any productivity miss more consequential than in the past.
Related Articles:
Baby Busts and Growth Booms: Demographic Change and the Macroeconomy— A 1pp lower birth rate 20 years earlier is associated with 22 log points higher output per worker 20 years later and 29 log points higher after 40 years, about 0.73pp faster annual growth. The authors find lower birth rates are also associated with more labor-saving patents, larger high-tech shares, and higher productivity growth.
Have We Entered an Era of High Productivity Growth?— Labor productivity has grown solidly while the San Francisco Federal Reserve's total factor productivity index, which adjusts for the equipment and technology workers use, has grown modestly, suggesting gains so far reflect better tools rather than broader advances. A regime-switching model puts the probability of a high-productivity regime at 57% using labor productivity and 21% using total factor productivity.
The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036— The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal deficit will grow from $1.9tn (5.8% of GDP) to $3.1tn (6.7%) over a decade, above the 3.8% averaged over the past 50 years, with rising net interest costs driving much of the increase. Federal debt held by the public is projected to rise from 101% to 120% of GDP.
AI Summary.The authors estimate that about $200bn of “missing” labor compensation would account for roughly a third of the fall in the labor share since the late 1970s, which workers owning a bit above 10% of corporate profits through stock compensation would cover. Spread across the 4.2m top-decile public company employees, that implies about $40,000 in additional pay each.
Owen Zidar and Eric ZwickThe Everywhere Millionaire
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Zidar & Zwick suggest about one‑third of the post‑1970s drop in labor’s share is due to stock‑based pay to workers, in addition to the one‑third they already attribute to pass‑through income. That leaves only around one‑third for genuine shifts in technology, power, etc.
Does stock compensation explain part of the falling labor share?
Core argument: The authors report 2017 employee compensation of $7.2 trillion against corporate value added of $12.2 trillion after adjusting for the rise of pass-throughs, with unadjusted corporate profits, which exclude partnership profits, at $1.7 trillion.
In our data for 2017, after adjustments for the rise of pass-throughs, we report employee compensation of $7.2 trillion and corporate value added of $12.2 trillion. The unadjusted corporate profits number (which excludes partnership profits) is $1.7 trillion. If we could find around $200 billion of “missing” labor compensation, that would account for about a third of the fall in the labor share since the late 1970s. Thus, if workers owned a bit above 10% of those corporate profits via stock compensation, then that would cover the difference. Distributing this amount across the top 10% of public company employees, of which there are 4.2 million, this ownership would imply an additional $40,000 or so in pay. The aggregate numbers are thus quite plausible in terms of how much pay might have shifted to corporate profits serving as tax-preferred payments to high earners.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The authors report 2017 employee compensation of $7.2 trillion against corporate value added of $12.2 trillion after adjusting for the rise of pass-throughs, with unadjusted corporate profits, which exclude partnership profits, at $1.7 trillion.
The authors estimate that roughly $200 billion of "missing" labor compensation would account for about a third of the fall in the labor share since the late 1970s, a sum covered if workers owned somewhat above 10% of corporate profits via stock compensation.
Spread across the 4.2 million employees in the top 10% of public company workforces, that amount would imply about $40,000 in additional pay each, which the authors consider plausible as pay shifted into corporate profits serving as tax-preferred payments to high earners.
Related Articles:
Why the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes!— The measured corporate labor share fell from 63% in 1978 to 58% in 2017, but the authors estimate that tax-driven reclassification of wages as S corporation profit and the shift of high-labor-share firms into partnerships account for about 1.6 percentage points, roughly a third of the decline.
Human Capitalists— Equity-based pay has grown to nearly 45% of total compensation for high-skilled workers, and counting it reduces the measured decline in labor share since the 1980s by over 60% while turning the high-skilled labor share decline into an increase of almost 1%. Such workers own 7% of public companies, earning over $85bn annually in equity compensation.
Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century— Most income at the top of the US distribution is non-wage income, primarily profits from closely-held, mid-market firms in skill-intensive industries owned by working-age individuals. The authors find private business profit falls by three-quarters after an owner retires or dies prematurely, indicating most top earners are "working rich" deriving income from human capital.
AI Summary.Europe trains more engineering graduates per capita than China and more STEM PhDs than any region outside the United States, yet the only EU-born companies to reach $100bn market value in the past fifty years, Spotify and BioNTech, listed on US exchanges. Europe captures 6% of global AI startup funding versus 61% for the United States.
Mario KeputaSocial Science Research Network
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Despite top STEM talent and high savings, Europe captures just 6% of AI funding and lacks trillion-dollar firms. Between 2008 and 2021, ~30% of EU-founded unicorns relocated abroad, largely to the US, seeking deeper liquidity, higher valuations, and pro-growth regulation.
Why does Europe's world-class STEM talent fail to produce giant companies?
Core argument: Europe captures just 6% of global AI startup funding, versus 61% for the United States and 17% for China, despite training more engineering graduates per capita than China and more STEM PhDs than any region outside the U.S.
Europe produces more engineering graduates per capita than China. It trains more PhDs in STEM fields than any region outside the United States. Europe's universities rank among the world's best in dozens of disciplines. Europe's household savings rate exceeds that of America. Europe's research output, measured by publications and citations, is world-class. And yet the only EU-born companies to reach a market capitalisation of $100 billion in the past fifty years, Spotify and BioNTech, did so on the NYSE and Nasdaq respectively. Both chose American exchanges over European ones. None of the world's trillion-dollar companies is European. Europe captures just 6% of global AI startup funding, compared with 61% for the United States and 17% for China. Between 2008 and 2021, nearly 30% of European-founded unicorns relocated their headquarters abroad, overwhelmingly to the United States. They did not leave for the weather. They left because U.S. capital markets offered deeper liquidity, broader analyst coverage, higher valuations, and a regulatory environment designed for growth.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Europe captures just 6% of global AI startup funding, versus 61% for the United States and 17% for China, despite training more engineering graduates per capita than China and more STEM PhDs than any region outside the U.S.
The only EU-born companies to reach $100bn market capitalisation in the past fifty years, Spotify and BioNTech, listed on the NYSE and Nasdaq respectively, and none of the world's trillion-dollar companies is European.
Nearly 30% of European-founded unicorns relocated their headquarters abroad between 2008 and 2021, overwhelmingly to the United States, where capital markets offered deeper liquidity, broader analyst coverage, higher valuations, and a regulatory environment designed for growth.
Related Articles:
Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking”— A debate on U.S. fiscal policy argues that spending increases, rather than the tax increases needed to fund them, slow growth, and that higher taxes would reduce the expected value of America's innovative risk-taking. The argument holds that cutting debt below 100% of GDP is critical.
Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World?— An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.
The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe— A European Union competitiveness report attributes the EU's labour productivity growth gap with the US largely to weaker activity in information and communications technology and large-scale digital services; excluding main ICT sectors, EU productivity was broadly at par with the US from 2000-2019. It estimates Europe's investment share must rise about 5 percentage points of GDP.
