“Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
AI Summary.Iran's economy is on track for its largest annual contraction since the mid-1980s, with inflation above 50% — the highest in nearly 70 years of records — and food and other necessities costing double a year earlier. Its currency has fallen to a record low of about 1.85m rials per dollar on the black market.
Javier BlasBloomberg
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Inflation in Iran is running at at least ~69%, its highest annual rate in 70 years. The black market exchange value of a rial hit a record low of ~1.85mm rials to the dollar, relative to 50,000 per dollar five years ago.
Is Iran's economy contracting at its fastest rate in decades?
Core argument: Iran's economy is on track for its biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s.
[Iran's] economy is on track to suffer the biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s. Inflation is running well above 50%, the highest annual rate since records start nearly 70 years ago. Worse, the cost of food and other necessities has already doubled from a year ago. Its currency, the rial, is worthless. In the black market, the exchange rate has collapsed to a record low of about 1.85 million rials to the dollar; five years ago, roughly 50,000 rials were enough to buy a greenback.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Iran's economy is on track for its biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s.
Iranian inflation is running well above 50%, the highest annual rate since records began nearly 70 years ago, with the cost of food and other necessities already double year-ago levels.
The rial has fallen to a record low of about 1.85 million to the dollar on the black market, compared with roughly 50,000 rials per dollar five years ago.
Related Articles:
Soaring Diesel Prices Rip Across The US Economy— US diesel pump prices reached $5.47 a gallon, approaching a nominal record of $5.82 ($6.64 adjusted for inflation), after rising 8% in a month as wars in the Middle East and Europe constrain production and global supplies. The gap between diesel and crude oil prices has hit a record high.
For the Oil Market, the Strait of Hormuz Isn’t Closed— Tanker tracking data identify at least 5m barrels a day of oil still transiting the Strait of Hormuz, and allowing for vessels crossing undetected the true figure could reach 7m–9m. Growing oil spills visible on satellite imagery indicate attacks on tankers alongside efforts to keep the waterway open.
U.S. Economy Less Vulnerable To Geopolitical Oil Price Shocks Than In The Past— The United States became a net oil exporter in late 2019, and oil and oil product spending fell from near 8% of GDP in 1980 to 3% in 2024. The authors estimate a 15% global oil supply disruption would now cut annualized U.S. real GDP growth by 0.3pp, versus 1.7pp in the rest of the world.
AI Summary.The authors argue profits measure economic power because they show a firm can do what others can't, and by that metric U.S. firms dominate globally—with Japan and Europe significant and China second-tier—implying greater U.S. power than GDP or industrial output comparisons suggest. The gap favoring the U.S. is most pronounced in high-tech products.
Chris MillerChris Miller's Newsletter
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Citing Brooks and Vagle, Miller argues profits are a better measure of economic power than output, and the US and its allies are ahead, especially in high tech. But, Miller asks, “Is perhaps profitability the right metric in peace but not in war?”
Do corporate profits measure national economic power better than GDP?
Core argument: Brooks and Vagle argue profit is evidence that a firm can do something others cannot, and their measurement of profits finds U.S. firms dominate, with Japan and Europe significant players and China a second-tier player.
Profit, [Brooks and Vagle] argue, is evidence that one company can do something others can’t. Monopolists have the highest profit. Oligopolists make good money. Manufacturers of toys and textiles have razor thin margins. When Brooks and Vagle measure profits, they find that U.S. firms dominate, while Japan and Europe remain significant players. China is a second-tier player. The U.S. and allies lead in profits across the board. When it comes to high tech products, the imbalance in America’s favor is particularly pronounced. If profitability is the result of power dynamics, then the U.S. is far more powerful than comparing GDP or industrial output implies. There are a couple of potential counterarguments. Is China pursuing a loss-leading strategy, accepting low profits in the short run to win market share in the long run? In solar power, China has commoditized the sector and produced overcapacity that has led to losses, not profits. There’s no moat in solar the way there is around tech. Is perhaps profitability the right metric in peace but not in war? China is betting that its production advantage will create more durable CATL-style moats that eventually enable both profit and power.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Brooks and Vagle argue profit is evidence that a firm can do something others cannot, and their measurement of profits finds U.S. firms dominate, with Japan and Europe significant players and China a second-tier player.
The imbalance in America's favor is particularly pronounced in high-tech products, suggesting that, if profitability reflects power dynamics, the U.S. is far more powerful than comparisons of GDP or industrial output imply.
China has commoditized solar power and produced overcapacity that has led to losses rather than profits, without the moat that surrounds tech, while betting its production advantage will create more durable CATL-style moats enabling both profit and power.
Related Articles:
The Real China Trump Card— Among the world's 2,000 largest companies, U.S. firms generated 38% of global profits and firms based in allied countries 35%, while Chinese firms including Hong Kong generated 16%. The U.S. leads in 20 of 27 industries and China in three, with profits used as a measure of economic chokepoints.
Underestimating China— China's productive capacity is three times that of the United States and exceeds the next nine countries combined, with its share of global manufacturing quintupling to 30% while the U.S. share halved to about 15%. The authors argue Washington must convert its alliances into a platform for pooled capacity building.
China’s Next-Generation Industrial Policy— China's export growth is concentrated in upstream, higher-tech goods: exports of intermediate inputs rose 26% and capital goods 32% between 2021 and 2024, while consumption goods exports were broadly flat. This shift embeds China deeper in global production systems and aligns with its long-running import substitution strategy of localizing entire value chains.
AI Summary.The U.S. government has invested $20.9bn across sixteen deals taking direct ownership stakes, expanding beyond its traditional toolkit of grants, loans, and tax incentives. The Department of Defense leads with seven deals, the Department of Commerce has six including a 10% stake in Intel, and partners have mobilized an additional $4.75bn.
Jonathan HillmanCouncil On Foreign Relations
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Since January 2025, the USG has taken equity stakes totaling $20.9B in 16 American businesses. $8.6B, ~41% of the total, was invested in critical mineral miners and processors, while $8.9B, ~43% of the total, funded the government’s 10% stake in Intel.
Is the U.S. government taking direct equity stakes in companies?
Core argument: Since January 2025, the U.S. government has invested $20.9 billion across sixteen deals involving direct ownership, broadening a toolkit traditionally focused on grants, loans, and tax incentives.
Since January 2025, the U.S. government has invested $20.9 billion across sixteen deals involving direct ownership, broadening a toolkit that has traditionally focused on grants, loans, and tax incentives. The Department of Commerce has participated in six such deals, including taking a 10% stake in Intel. The Development Finance Corporation, the United States’ development bank, has executed three equity transactions in critical minerals, healthcare, and infrastructure. The Department of Defense leads the way with seven such deals. The U.S. government is also working with a range of partners and has mobilized an additional $4.75 billion in investment. Private co-investors include J.P. Morgan, Goldman Sachs, and others.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Since January 2025, the U.S. government has invested $20.9 billion across sixteen deals involving direct ownership, broadening a toolkit traditionally focused on grants, loans, and tax incentives.
The Department of Defense leads with seven direct-ownership deals, followed by the Department of Commerce with six, including a 10% stake in Intel, while the Development Finance Corporation has executed three equity transactions in critical minerals, healthcare, and infrastructure.
The U.S. government has mobilized an additional $4.75 billion in investment alongside private co-investors including J.P. Morgan and Goldman Sachs.
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Industrial Policy and Economic Security— Industrial policy justified on national security grounds requires weighing how much economic inefficiency is worth tolerating, since costs incurred today make a country poorer and therefore less able to project power later. The calculation is difficult because security gains are probabilistic and long-term economic costs are speculative.
The Cold War and the U.S. Labor Market— The authors estimate that declining U.S. military procurement spending from the 1950s to the 1990s explains roughly 18–30% of the decline in manufacturing employment and just under 10% of the rise in top-decile income inequality. They argue Cold War procurement raised demand for manufacturing workers and helped sustain tight labor markets for low-skill workers.
Capital Is Making a Comeback— Tangible investment in property, factories and equipment fell from 12.5% to 8.5% of private gross domestic product, while intangible investment in intellectual property, software and process knowledge rose from about 11.5% to 16.75%. The author argues demand for tangible capital investment will now have to rise.
AI Summary.The author estimates Iran earned about $100m a day from crude sales before the war and roughly $175m a day afterward, so a US-enforced blockade would deal its economy a heavy blow. An earlier US maximum-pressure sanctions campaign cut Iranian crude earnings to no more than $10m a day without forcing Iran to yield.
Javier BlasBloomberg
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Before the war, Iran was earning ~$100mm a day from oil exports, which rose to ~$175mm during the war, before the blockade. The US “maximum pressure” campaign of 2018–2021 had reduced Iran’s oil revenue to ~$10mm a day without changing Tehran’s behavior.
Would cutting off oil revenue force Iran to negotiate?
Core argument: Iran's crude sales earned roughly $100 million a day before the war and have risen to about $175 million a day since Feb. 27, by the author's back-of-the-envelope calculations.
According to my back-of-the-envelope calculations, Iran was making about $100 million a day selling its crude before the war. Since Feb. 27, that’s risen to around $175 million a day. If the US enforces the blockade, the Iranian economy will suffer an enormous blow on top of the war destruction. But whether that economic hit translates into a softer negotiation approach remains to be seen. Targeting Iranian oil revenue has been tried before — and it failed. In 2020-2021, when Trump launched a maximum pressure campaign of sanctions, Iranian crude exports dropped to fewer than 250,000 daily barrels for several months just as oil prices were depressed due to the impact of the pandemic. Even allowing for some exports slipping under the radar, Iran was earning no more than $10 million a day selling crude — and it still didn’t buckle.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Iran's crude sales earned roughly $100 million a day before the war and have risen to about $175 million a day since Feb. 27, by the author's back-of-the-envelope calculations.
Under Trump's 2020-2021 maximum pressure sanctions campaign, Iranian crude exports fell below 250,000 barrels a day for several months and revenue reached no more than $10 million a day, yet Iran did not buckle.
US enforcement of the Hormuz blockade would deal the Iranian economy an enormous blow on top of war destruction, though whether that translates into a softer negotiating approach remains to be seen.
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Are We Running Out Of Oil— An analysis of country- and product-specific oil markets identifies pockets of potential extreme tightness if the Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed, with critically low supplies of the petrochemical feedstocks naphtha and liquefied petroleum gas in Asia and cross-product scarcity in multiple Asian countries.
Salem’s Lot: Gulf War Update; The Purge Of Senior US Military Officers; A US Fossil Fuel Reliance Fever Dream— The US is not insulated from market effects of a Strait of Hormuz closure: while US natural gas prices have declined this year, most other hydrocarbon and refined product prices have risen materially, with US crude oil, wholesale gasoline, naphtha, shipping fuel and some petrochemical increases exceeding those in Europe and Asia.
Shattered Assumptions And The Energy Quandary— The author argues that energy, rather than fixed income, now serves as the true hedge to equity positions, pushing investors, companies and countries to review their energy allocations and policies. Chinese government bonds diversified equity risk when no other major bond market did, which the author attributes to China being the only major economy without a meaningful inflation problem.
AI Summary.China's energy security rests on coal rather than imported oil and gas: the country consumes more than half the world's coal, and coal powers its industry and electricity system. Coal consumption has risen since 2022, with roughly 95GW of new coal capacity added in one year, exceeding Vietnam's entire installed electricity capacity.
Damien MaCarnegie Endowment for International Peace
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Due to electrification, China’s energy security is not contingent on Hormuz. China is increasing its absolute coal generation capacity while coal’s share of domestic generation falls overall.
Does China's energy security depend on coal rather than oil imports?
Core argument: China added roughly 95GW of coal capacity in 2024, a decade high exceeding Vietnam's entire installed electricity capacity, with total coal consumption rising markedly since 2022 after Beijing's pivot to energy security following its domestic energy crisis.
[China's] energy security isn’t really tied to oil or gas, for which the country does depend on imports. It has always been inextricably linked to coal. China consumes more than half of the world’s coal, and it is the main commodity that powers Chinese industry and the electricity system. Total coal consumption has risen markedly since 2022, which aligns with the rebound in commissioned capacity resulting from Beijing’s hard pivot to energy security after the domestic energy crisis noted above. In 2024 alone, China added a staggering decade-high of ~95GW of coal capacity, which is larger than the entire installed electricity capacity of Vietnam. [While Chinese] solar power [has] achieved cost parity with coal, the country has a deep industrial base and a comprehensive electro-tech ecosystem that is intent on manufacturing a new energy landscape, or an “electro-state,” as some have come to call it. Peak coal is not only congruent with but is also a necessary condition for realizing this strategy.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
China added roughly 95GW of coal capacity in 2024, a decade high exceeding Vietnam's entire installed electricity capacity, with total coal consumption rising markedly since 2022 after Beijing's pivot to energy security following its domestic energy crisis.
China consumes more than half of the world's coal, the main commodity powering its industry and electricity system, and its energy security is linked to coal rather than to imported oil and gas.
Chinese solar power has reached cost parity with coal, and the country's industrial base and electro-tech ecosystem aim to build an "electro-state," a strategy for which peak coal is a necessary condition.
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The Real China Model— China generates more electricity annually than the United States and European Union combined, having added capacity equivalent to the United Kingdom's total supply each year. Electricity makes up nearly 30% of China's energy use, versus 22% in the US and 21% globally, and its share is growing about 6% a year.
Fighting Words: The Energy Transition in 2026— Estimates based on primary energy overstate how much electricity is needed to replace oil in passenger cars, since electric motors convert 80%-90% of electricity into motion versus about 18% for gasoline cars. Measuring useful final energy net of waste heat avoids this "primary energy fallacy": the US consumed 45 exajoules of useful final energy versus 95 exajoules of primary energy.
Power Politics: Energy Self-Sufficiency in a Modern Mercantilist World— China leads in adding power to the grid, with more than 30,000 miles of ultra-high-voltage transmission lines versus zero in the US and lead times for large transformers of 48 weeks against a US average of 143 weeks. This positions China to accommodate new demand sources such as artificial intelligence.
AI Summary.Peacetime defense spending booms—when the two-year average of defense outlays rises 1pp of GDP—are followed by sizable increases in real GDP, government consumption, investment, and the capital stock, with a short-lived rise in inflation. Imports accelerate while exports are broadly unchanged, widening current account and trade deficits.
Hippolyte Balima, Jared Bebee, Colombe Ladreit, Andresa Lagerborg, et al.International Monetary Fund
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An IMF report notes defense spending booms are associated with an increase in TFP “over longer horizons, consistent with evidence showing that the R&D component of defense spending can boost innovation and crowd in private R&D spending.”
How do defense spending booms affect output, inflation, and productivity?
Core argument: Peacetime defense spending booms, defined as a 1pp of GDP rise in the two-year moving average of defense spending, are followed by a sizable increase in real GDP, a short-lived rise in inflation, and a roughly 9% increase in government consumption within three years.
Defense spending booms [periods when the two-year moving average of defense spending increases 1pp of GDP] in peacetime are followed by a sizable increase in real GDP and by a short-lived rise in inflation. Consistent with a large share of the stimulus being allocated to personnel and operating expenses, government consumption rises by about 9% within three years. Total investment shows a comparable positive response, reflecting both higher public investment in defense equipment and infrastructure and increased private investment, particularly in defense-related industries. Turning to the external sector, stimulus-driven demand leads to wider external imbalances, as both the current account and trade balance deteriorate. Imports accelerate—reflecting leakages from defense spending and stronger demand for foreign goods—while exports remain broadly unchanged. Defense spending booms are associated with a subsequent increase in the stock of capital, in line with the documented boost to investment, and an increase in total factor productivity, which may be explained by changes in capacity utilization and learning by necessity, as firms adapt to surging demand by improving productivity when facing capacity constraints. Total factor productivity [loses] its statistical significance once capacity utilization is controlled for. However, defense spending booms are followed by greater total factor productivity over longer horizons, consistent with evidence showing that the R&D component of defense spending can boost innovation and crowd in private R&D spending.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Peacetime defense spending booms, defined as a 1pp of GDP rise in the two-year moving average of defense spending, are followed by a sizable increase in real GDP, a short-lived rise in inflation, and a roughly 9% increase in government consumption within three years.
Defense spending booms widen external imbalances, with both the current account and trade balance deteriorating as imports accelerate on leakages from defense spending and stronger demand for foreign goods while exports remain broadly unchanged.
Defense spending booms are associated with a subsequent increase in the capital stock and in total factor productivity, though the productivity effect loses statistical significance once capacity utilization is controlled for, while greater total factor productivity follows over longer horizons.
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The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense RD, Productivity and International Spillovers— The authors estimate that a 10% increase in government-financed R&D, largely defense, is associated with a 4.3% rise in privately funded R&D across OECD countries, indicating "crowding in" rather than "crowding out." They also find international spillovers raise private R&D abroad, though the overall effect on US productivity growth is modest.
The Cold War and the U.S. Labor Market— The authors estimate that declining U.S. military procurement spending from the 1950s to the 1990s explains roughly 18–30% of the decline in manufacturing employment and just under 10% of the rise in top-decile income inequality. They argue Cold War procurement raised demand for manufacturing workers and helped sustain tight labor markets for low-skill workers.
Will Higher Defence Spending Boost The European Economy?— Defense spending typically has a fiscal multiplier below one, meaning each euro spent raises GDP by less, so it is not a short-term growth strategy. One estimate holds that extra military spending worth 1% of GDP could lift output up to 2% long term if concentrated on research and development.
AI Summary.The authors estimate that declining U.S. military procurement spending from the 1950s to the 1990s explains roughly 18–30% of the decline in manufacturing employment and just under 10% of the rise in top-decile income inequality. They argue Cold War procurement raised demand for manufacturing workers and helped sustain tight labor markets for low-skill workers.
Ilyana Kuziemko, Donato Onorato and Suresh NaiduNational Bureau of Economic Research
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Defense spending played a major role in sustaining tight labor markets for low-skill workers following the Second World War. Drops in procurement spending between the 1950s and the 1990s explain between 18 and 30% of the decline in manufacturing employment.
How much did falling military procurement drive manufacturing decline and inequality?
Core argument: The authors estimate the 1950s–1990s decline in U.S. military procurement spending explains roughly 18–30% of the decline in manufacturing and just under 10% of the rise in top-ten inequality.
We have shown that in the decades immediately following World War II, the Cold War was a major factor sustaining tight labor markets. On the labor demand side, military procurement increased demand for manufacturing workers and put downward pressure on the share of income flowing to the richest households. We can explain roughly between 18 and 30% of the decline in manufacturing and just under ten percent of the rise in top-ten inequality by the 1950s to 1990s decline in procurement spending. We thus conclude that Cold War procurement—while under-studied in the modern, quantitative economics literature on inequality—played a major role in sustaining tight labor markets for low-skill workers in the decades immediately after World War II and creating political coalitions in support of hawkish foreign policy and military expenditure. Figure 8 panel (a) shows that manufacturing employment is highly sensitive to defense spending, consistent with our state-year evidence. As is well known, manufacturing booms during World War II, but, less discussed, plummets in the years between World War II and Korea. After bouncing back during Korea, it slowly declines alongside the declining defense share of GDP until both series experience an uptick during Vietnam. Overall, the relationship remains highly significant even after taking out a linear time trend and dropping the World War II period.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The authors estimate the 1950s–1990s decline in U.S. military procurement spending explains roughly 18–30% of the decline in manufacturing and just under 10% of the rise in top-ten inequality.
The authors conclude that Cold War military procurement raised demand for manufacturing workers, pressured the share of income flowing to the richest households downward, and sustained tight labor markets for low-skill workers after World War II.
U.S. manufacturing employment booms in World War II, plummets before Korea, rebounds during Korea, then declines alongside the defense share of GDP until an uptick during Vietnam, a relationship that remains highly significant after removing a linear time trend.
Related Articles:
The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense RD, Productivity and International Spillovers— The authors estimate that a 10% increase in government-financed R&D, largely defense, is associated with a 4.3% rise in privately funded R&D across OECD countries, indicating "crowding in" rather than "crowding out." They also find international spillovers raise private R&D abroad, though the overall effect on US productivity growth is modest.
The Old Economy Begins To Take Its Revenge— The author argues that capital rotates between the financial economy's asset-light booms and the physical economy, with commodity capacity constraints and the use of critical materials as geopolitical leverage now making returns on physical investment more attractive. In this view, higher interest rates reflect the better returns and capital spending needed to expand production capacity.
Capital Is Making a Comeback— Tangible investment in property, factories and equipment fell from 12.5% to 8.5% of private gross domestic product, while intangible investment in intellectual property, software and process knowledge rose from about 11.5% to 16.75%. The author argues demand for tangible capital investment will now have to rise.
AI Summary.The authors estimate replacing two destroyed U.S. radars would take five to eight years and $1.1bn for one and 12–24 months and $50m–$75m for the other, making supply-chain fragility and replacement timelines a greater constraint than materials cost. Both systems require gallium, of which China controls 98% of global supply.
Macdonald Amoah, Morgan Bazilian, and Jahara MatisekForeign Policy
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A Colorado School of Mines analysis of the munitions used in the first 36 hours of the war estimates the “mineral bill” and highlights the current and target timelines to replenish these systems, noting critical minerals “cannot be surged.”
Do replacement timelines constrain radar rebuilding more than materials cost?
Core argument: The first 36 hours of the war consumed over 3,000 U.S.-Israeli munitions, and two advanced U.S. radars were destroyed: the AN/FPS-132 in Qatar and the AN/TPS-59 in Bahrain.
Beyond the sheer volume of munitions, the loss of high-value assets introduces another layer of complexity. The destruction of two advanced U.S. radars, the AN/FPS-132 in Qatar and the AN/TPS-59 in Bahrain, highlights a problem where the total weight of the “mineral bill” is less of a concern than the extreme fragility of the supply chain and the extensive timelines for replacement. Per our analysis, for the AN/FPS-132, it will take five to eight years for Raytheon to build a new radar at a cost of $1.1 billion. Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin will require at least 12 to 24 months and an estimated $50 million to $75 million to replace the AN/TPS-59, based on the original Bahrain Foreign Military Sales contract adjusted for inflation. The biggest issue for the defense industrial base will be sourcing the 77.3 kilograms of gallium needed for both systems, a material for which China controls 98% of the global supply. This is not to mention the 30,610 kilograms of copper that will also be needed, a commodity facing surging demand from the technology sector.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The first 36 hours of the war consumed over 3,000 U.S.-Israeli munitions, and two advanced U.S. radars were destroyed: the AN/FPS-132 in Qatar and the AN/TPS-59 in Bahrain.
By the authors' analysis, replacing the AN/FPS-132 will take Raytheon five to eight years at a cost of $1.1 billion, while Lockheed Martin needs at least 12 to 24 months and an estimated $50 million to $75 million for the AN/TPS-59.
Sourcing the 77.3 kilograms of gallium needed for both radars is, by the authors' assessment, the biggest issue for the defense industrial base, since China controls 98% of global supply; the systems also require 30,610 kilograms of copper.
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Why China Keeps Winning The Trade War— Governments seeking supply-chain leverage face limited visibility into their own supply chains, and China's rare earth licensing requirements for multinationals may be partly intended to give Beijing that visibility and allow more precise targeting of future restrictions. Effective measures must impose asymmetric costs, and keeping foreign manufacturers dependent on drip-fed supply is central to Beijing's strategy.
China Hatches Plan to Keep U.S. Military From Getting Its Rare-Earth Magnets— China is designing a "validated end-user" system that would fast-track rare-earth and other restricted material export approvals for U.S. firms while excluding companies tied to the U.S. military. The arrangement would let China ease export flows while keeping the materials away from U.S. military suppliers.
How U.S. Defense Industry Dodged a Rare-Earth Shortage After China’s Curbs— A decades-old stockpile of samarium nitrate held at a chemical plant in France was refined into usable metal, allowing a U.S. maker of samarium-cobalt magnets to source the rare-earth material outside China. Samarium processed outside China costs 5–8x as much, and the French plant had stopped separating rare-earth elements as uneconomical.
