AI Summary. 60% of U.S. adults identify as working class, including half of college graduates and upper-income earners, making the label broadly adopted across economic lines rather than confined to lower-income or blue-collar workers.

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60% of Americans say “working class” describes them “extremely” or “very” well. Republicans are more likely than Democrats to identify as working class – strikingly 61% of Republicans who have a family income of at least $155,600 identify as working class, compared to 38% of such Democrats.

Does working class identity reflect actual economic status or cultural values?

Core argument: Sixty percent of U.S. adults identify as working class, a label adopted across income and education lines — including half of upper-income Americans and half of bachelor’s degree holders — signaling the term has lost its traditional socioeconomic boundaries.

Most Americans think of themselves as “working class” today: Overall, 60% of U.S. adults say the term describes them well. And the identity is widely adopted by people across all income and educational groups – including half of both Americans who have a bachelor’s degree and those who are upper-income. Those working in blue-collar occupations are particularly likely to identify as working class (77%), [as are] a majority of those working in other occupations (61%). White adults are more likely than Black adults to identify as working class. About six-in-ten White (62%) and Hispanic adults (59%) overall view themselves as working class, as do roughly half of Black (54%) and Asian adults (52%).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Sixty percent of U.S. adults identify as working class, a label adopted across income and education lines — including half of upper-income Americans and half of bachelor’s degree holders — signaling the term has lost its traditional socioeconomic boundaries.
  2. Blue-collar workers identify as working class at the highest rate (77%), yet a majority of workers in other occupations (61%) claim the same identity, indicating occupational type is a weak predictor of class self-perception.
  3. White adults identify as working class at a higher rate (62%) than Black (54%) or Asian adults (52%), with Hispanic adults (59%) closely tracking the White share.

AI Summary. Public opposition to new data centers has risen above 60%, prompting bans or pauses on projects across dozens of states and localities, threatening the infrastructure investment required to sustain AI development.

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A UPenn survey found ~60% of Americans oppose new data centers in their area, up from 49% in March. In Texas, previously supportive governor Greg Abbott halted approval of ~1,800 datacenters in the state.

Are data centers becoming too costly for communities to accept?

In November Greg Abbott declared his state the “epicenter of AI development” while announcing a $40 billion investment by Google. Less than a year later, the Republican said he halted approvals of some 1,800 new data centers worth billions of dollars. More than 60% of Americans now oppose new data centers in their area, up from 49% in March, a University of Pennsylvania poll found. The backlash is a crisis for AI companies, which are facing bans or pauses on new projects in dozens of states and localities. [The bans or pauses] pose a risk to investors heading into the 2028 presidential election, analysts at Evercore ISI said in a note to clients.

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Davoine, et al. show that angry policy-related tweets among voters rose from 34% to 46% over 2013–2025. Angry posts got ~60% more retweets, and experiments that induced anger showed it can move views on trade, immigration, redistribution and climate.

Figure 6 illustrates the monthly evolution of anger among Democratic- and Republican-affiliated X [Twitter] users. Each line reports the share of sentences classified as expressing anger within each political affiliation, and the plotted series are shown as six-month moving averages. It shows that Republican voters start with a higher baseline level of anger at the beginning of the period (about 38% compared to 27% for Democrats). Anger rises sharply for both groups after the 2016 election, but much more among Democrats. As a result, the initial partisan gap is much smaller by 2019. Both series then plateau from 2019 to 2022. Among Democratic partisans, anger declines slightly after Biden’s election but remains well above pre-2016 levels. Republican anger continues to rise during the Biden presidency, reaching approximately 50% by 2025.

AI Summary. Incumbent political parties face structural disadvantages when voter anger toward the status quo is high, making approval ratings and economic conditions more decisive than internal party organization in determining electoral outcomes.

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Nate Silver’s midterm election model gives the Democrats an ~86% chance of flipping the House and a ~56% chance of flipping the Senate though Silver notes, “I’ll admit to being slightly surprised by that [Senate] number.”

Does voter anger toward the status quo matter more than party organization?

Core argument: Incumbent parties worldwide face persistent voter backlash against the status quo, compounding the electoral liability of an 80-year-old lame-duck president heading into a midterm cycle.

The Democratic Party has a whole host of problems; turning out their voters in midterms isn’t one of them. For midterm election purposes, you’d rather have a little internal disarray than have a president with a 38% approval rating on the basis of an unpopular quagmire in the Middle East and understandable voter anxiety about spiking gas prices. Not to mention voter fatigue over an 80-year-old, lame duck president at a time when the incumbency “advantage” has turned into persistent anger all around the world toward the status quo and whoever is in charge of it.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Incumbent parties worldwide face persistent voter backlash against the status quo, compounding the electoral liability of an 80-year-old lame-duck president heading into a midterm cycle.

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Silver finds that the most liberal voters are highly educated and lower-income. Only 19% of Americans with a college degree had a household income of $60,000 or less, but responders to a DSA survey were ~ twice as likely to fall into that category.

The US voters most likely to identify as “very liberal” are those with postgraduate degrees but lower-to-middle household incomes of $30K to $60K per year. This is very much also the sweet spot for the DSA. In the DSA’s most recent member survey in 2021, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor’s degrees, but 45% had household incomes below $60,000 per year. This is unusual because education and income are usually substantially positively correlated. In the composite CES data, only 19% of Americans with bachelor’s degrees or higher had household incomes of $60K or below, while respondents to the most recent DSA survey [were twice as likely to fall into this category].

AI Summary. Anti-AI rhetoric is emerging in Democratic fundraising messaging at the same adoption rate that anti-billionaire language showed in 2019, driven by the party's progressive wing and framed not as a jobs or safety concern but as an extension of billionaire power.

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An analysis of Democratic party fundraising emails finds mentions of billionaires spiked in 2025 and remained elevated. Hall argues, “AI is currently entering Democratic rhetoric through the anti-billionaire frame—the oligarchy story makes AI legible as a villain.”

Is artificial intelligence becoming the Democratic Party's new wealth inequality narrative?

Core argument: Billionaire mentions in Democratic fundraising emails quadrupled to 20% post-January 2025, up from ~5% during Biden's presidency, driving economic populism.

For most of the past decade, anti-billionaire language was a niche product. Then came January 2025. In the weeks after an inauguration billionaire mentions in Democratic emails quadrupled, peaking above 20% of all emails sent and holding around 15% ever since. Anti-billionaire fundraising tactics are now a mainstay of Democratic messaging. Economic populism is widespread, particularly in the form of billionaire bashing; anti-AI populism is much, much smaller, but just starting to show signs of growth. And the way it’s growing matters. AI is not currently entering Democratic rhetoric as a jobs issue or a safety issue—it’s entering as the newest thing the billionaires are building, pushed first by the same progressive members who pioneered billionaire bashing before it conquered the rest of the party. Today, AI sits in Democratic fundraising rhetoric almost exactly where the billionaire sat in 2019—a message popular mostly with the party’s left flank, and not commonplace in the party as a whole.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Billionaire mentions in Democratic fundraising emails quadrupled to 20% post-January 2025, up from ~5% during Biden's presidency, driving economic populism.
  2. For most of the past decade, anti-billionaire language was a niche product.
  3. Democratic emails invoked billionaires in the mid-single digits through 2017 and 2018, spiked briefly to around 14% during the Warren.

AI Summary. American confidence in capitalism has fallen from 60% to under 50% over the last decade, while only 12% believe democracy is working well and just 35% believe the economy offers a fair path to prosperity.

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A new WSJ poll finds only 35% of Americans think the assertion that “if you work hard, you’ll get ahead” still holds. Only 42% of respondents aged 18–34 think capitalism is working very or somewhat well, relative to 56% of those 65 or older.

Is capitalism losing support among Americans?

Core argument: Capitalism approval fell 10 pts to 50% over the past decade, driving erosion in confidence across core American institutions.

Americans are losing confidence in two main pillars of society: capitalism and democracy. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very well or even somewhat well, down from 60% who said so about a decade ago, according to a new Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 35% are even fairly sure that the nation offers people the ability to get good jobs and achieve the American dream. Confidence in the nation’s system of government is even lower. Only 12% say democracy is working very well or extremely well, and a mere 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics. Two-thirds of Republicans said they were very proud of American history, three times the share of Democrats who said so. And Republicans in the survey stood apart in their belief in American exceptionalism, the long-held idea that the U.S. is unique or superior among nations. Nearly half of Republicans said that America stands above all other countries in the world, compared with only 8% of Democrats and 13% of independents.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Capitalism approval fell 10 pts to 50% over the past decade, driving erosion in confidence across core American institutions.
  2. Only 35% believe the U.S. offers pathways to good jobs and economic mobility, down from prior confidence levels, leading to.
  3. Republicans express 3x greater pride in American history than Democrats (67% vs. 22%), with 48% of Republicans believing America surpasses.

AI Summary. American patriotism, measured by those "extremely proud" to be American, tracks closely with which party controls the presidency, with partisan gaps widening sharply over time. Republican pride swings ~14 points between administrations, while Democratic pride has collapsed from 58% to 14% across the same period.

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Gallup finds only 17% of Democrats are “extremely proud” to be an American, versus 30% of independents and 74% of Republicans – notable declines from 2005–2009, when 58% of Democrats/independents and 79% of Republicans were “extremely proud” to be an American.

Is American patriotism becoming a partisan identity rather than national sentiment?

Core argument: Democratic extreme pride fell 75% from 58% (2004–2008) to 14%, driving a 44-pt partisan gap vs. Republicans’ 74%, the widest.

During George W. Bush’s second term, an average of 58% of Democrats were extremely proud to be American according to Gallup, as was an identical share of independents — though Republicans were higher. The rough parity between Democrats and independents lasted through Barack Obama’s second term, but the share of extremely proud Democrats fell to an average of 30% during Trump’s first term and was just 14% in the most recent Gallup poll. Although Republicans are generally more patriotic, their opinions can shift based on who occupies 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue too. The share of Republicans extremely proud to be American fell from 79% on average during Bush’s second term to 60% during Biden’s term. What happened after Trump retook office? It jumped right back up to 74%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Democratic extreme pride fell 75% from 58% (2004–2008) to 14%, driving a 44-pt partisan gap vs. Republicans’ 74%, the widest.
  2. Republican extreme pride dropped 24 pts from 79% under Bush to 60% under Biden, then rebounded 14 pts to 74%.
  3. Independents’ extreme pride collapsed from 58% parity with Democrats in 2008 to unmeasured levels, indicating depolarization of patriotic expression across.