Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

AI Summary. New York City's top 1% captured nearly two-thirds of real income growth between 2019 and 2024, versus under 40% nationally, driven by capital gains, dividends, and business income rather than wages.

Jonathan Siegel and Jason Bram Office of the New York City Comptroller
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Btw 2019 and 2024, pre-tax, pre-transfer real median income in New York City fell 3.2%. The top .1% tax units, ~ households, (mean income ~$24mm) saw real growth of ~25%, whereas the bottom 90% (mean income ~$45,000) fell 0.8%.

Is capital income concentration widening faster in major cities than nationally?

Core argument: Nearly two-thirds of New York City’s real income growth from 2019–2024 accrued to the top 1%, versus under 40% nationally, driven by faster-rising capital gains, dividends, and business income rather than wage divergence.

Between 2019 and 2024, the New York City’s income shares at the top of the distribution rose faster than the nation's, and nearly two-thirds of the real income growth over the period accrued to the top 1%, compared with under 40% nationally. The result also holds when volatile capital gains are excluded. Real median income fell over the period, and real average income for the bottom 90% of tax units was essentially flat. Adjusted for local prices (but not for transfer programs), the purchasing power of income for the lower 90% of New Yorkers is close to one-fifth below that of the bottom 90% nationally. The divergence at the top is predominantly a story of non-wage income. Wage and salary income shows a much milder widening, and occupational wage data that exclude bonuses show base pay growing faster in lower-wage occupations than in higher-wage ones, and within many occupational groups wages are converging rather than growing more unequal.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nearly two-thirds of New York City’s real income growth from 2019–2024 accrued to the top 1%, versus under 40% nationally, driven by faster-rising capital gains, dividends, and business income rather than wage divergence.
  2. The bottom 90% of New York City earners hold purchasing power roughly one-fifth below their national counterparts after adjusting for local prices, even before accounting for transfer programs.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. Corporate profit margins have expanded ~250 basis points over the past year, approaching all-time highs, as 23% profit growth far outpaced 8% growth in corporate value added. Labor's share of income is hitting new lows, confirming that margin expansion—not faster economic growth—is the primary driver of record profit levels.

Abiel Reinhart J.P. Morgan
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US corporate profit margins rose ~250bp y/y in Q2 and are approaching an all-time high. Reinhart notes that tech and communications services drove ~58% of recent S&P 500 profit growth, even as the sectors have been “steadily losing employment since late 2022.”

Are record corporate profits driven by growth or margin expansion?

Core argument: Corporate profit margins expanded nearly 250 bps over the past year and are approaching all-time highs, as domestic profit growth of 23% dwarfed the 8% rise in corporate value added, compressing labor’s share of income to record lows.

Nominal pre-tax corporate profits in the national income and product accounts (NIPA) were very robust in both 2Q (41% [annual rate]) and over the last year (23%). Excluding post-recession spikes, we haven’t seen a year this strong since the mid-2000s. Higher margins [were] the key driver [of profit growth], as 23% y/y domestic profit growth was far in excess of the 8% increase in corporate value added. Profit margins (pre-tax profits divided by value added) increased close to 250bp over the last year, and are approaching all-time highs, whereas the labor share is hitting new lows.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Corporate profit margins expanded nearly 250 bps over the past year and are approaching all-time highs, as domestic profit growth of 23% dwarfed the 8% rise in corporate value added, compressing labor’s share of income to record lows.

Related Articles:

  • US Corporate Profits Surge To Record As Worker Payouts Wilt — U.S. corporate pre-tax profits reached an annualized $4.8tn, or 18% of national income—the highest share since the post-WWII era—while workers' wages and benefits fell to 60% of national income, the lowest since the 1950s.
  • Are US Corporate Profit Margins Too High? — In Q1 2026, US after-tax non-financial margins were estimated at 7.6%, just short of the post-1949 high of 8.2% in Q2 of 2021. Tan Kai Xian argues US corporate…
  • The Record Divide Between Corporate Profits and Worker Pay — Labor's share of national income has fallen to 51%—its lowest recorded level—while corporate profits have reached 12.1% of national income, their highest share since 1950. Inflation-adjusted hourly wages have risen 3% since 2019, while inflation-adjusted corporate profits have risen 50% over the same period.

AI Summary. U.S. corporate pre-tax profits reached an annualized $4.8tn, or 18% of national income—the highest share since the post-WWII era—while workers' wages and benefits fell to 60% of national income, the lowest since the 1950s.

Myles McCormick Financial Times
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Corporate profits have risen to 18% of national income, their highest share since 1947, while labor’s share has fallen to 60%, a low not seen since the 1950s. The decline in labor’s share has accelerated over the past year.

Are record corporate profits coming at workers' expense?

Pre-tax earnings hit an annualised $4.8tn in the second quarter, or 18% of national income, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data, the highest share since the aftermath of the second world war. Employees’ share from wages and benefits fell to 60%, the lowest level since the 1950s. “Regardless of what measure you look at, workers, in terms of employee compensation, have been receiving an increasingly small share of national income over time,” said Abiel Reinhart, an economist at JPMorgan. The decline in labour’s share of income has gained pace in the past five years and especially over the past 12 months.

Related Articles:

  • The Post‑COVID Decline in the Labor Share — The labor share of income has fallen 1.6 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level, reaching an all-time post-war low, driven by within-industry dynamics rather than shifts in activity across sectors.
  • Are US Corporate Profit Margins Too High? — In Q1 2026, US after-tax non-financial margins were estimated at 7.6%, just short of the post-1949 high of 8.2% in Q2 of 2021. Tan Kai Xian argues US corporate…
  • Why the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes! — Tax code changes account for roughly one-third of the decline in the worker share of U.S. business income since 1978, as firms shift from corporate to pass-through structures to reclassify wages as profits and reduce tax burdens.

AI Summary. Billionaire wealth from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has reached an all-time high, with fairly earned wealth now accounting for half of total billionaire wealth globally, while wealth from politically connected industries has declined since 2021.

Economist Staff The Economist
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An Economist analysis of the wealth of 7,000 billionaires finds that over the past decade, the share of billionaire wealth “derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has surged to an all-time high.”

Does self-made wealth now dominate billionaire fortunes globally?

Core argument: For the first time in the 25-year dataset, half of global billionaire wealth derives from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors, marking a structural shift away from politically connected and inherited fortunes.

Drawing on data from Forbes, a magazine, Hurun, a research firm, and Gapminder, a Swedish foundation, we have assembled a list of about 7,000 billionaires from the past 25 years. We call a billionaire’s wealth “uncompetitive” when it mainly comes from industries such as gambling, construction, defence, and raw materials. These sectors often depend on political access. We count inheritors in the “uncompetitive” category. From 2001, when our data begin, to 2014, the uncompetitive share of billionaire wealth rose slightly. Yet over the past decade, the share derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has surged to an all-time high. For the first time, half the wealth of the world’s billionaires is reasonably fairly earned. And since 2021, the total wealth derived from uncompetitive sectors has declined.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. For the first time in the 25-year dataset, half of global billionaire wealth derives from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors, marking a structural shift away from politically connected and inherited fortunes.
  2. The uncompetitive share of billionaire wealth—spanning gambling, construction, defence, raw materials, and inheritance—rose modestly from 2001 to 2014 but has declined in absolute terms since 2021.
  3. Inherited wealth, though typically lawfully held, represents a policy failure in wealth distribution, as heirs’ fortunes reflect birth advantage rather than competitive value creation.

Related Articles:

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  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — American confidence in capitalism has fallen from 60% to under 50% over the last decade, while only 12% believe democracy is working well and just 35% believe the economy offers a fair path to prosperity.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — Inequality is mostly the result of an increasing premium on returns from risk and high-skilled labor ushered in by technological disruption and the feedback…

AI Summary. U.S. households with retirement savings and home equity have been insulated from inflation, as $15tn in annual spending by 45 million such households—driven by wealth gains rather than income—has sustained GDP growth well above rates seen in comparable economies.

Jason Thomas Carlyle
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Citing the spending of the top 45mm US households, Jason Thomas argues that US economic growth could be characterized less as ‘k-shaped’ than “travelling at two speeds, one roughly the same rate as Europe’s and another that’s racing far ahead.”

Is wealth-driven spending masking underlying economic weakness in the U.S.?

Core argument: Balances in U.S. defined-contribution retirement plans have risen $6.7 trillion (+12.7% annually compounded) since early 2019, insulating roughly 73 million households from inflation and supporting elevated consumer spending out of accumulated wealth.

Roughly 73 million US households have retirement accounts (primarily defined-contribution plans like 401ks) that consist primarily of claims on businesses whose revenue growth and market values provide another hedge against inflation. Balances in defined contribution plans have increased by $6.7 trillion (+12.7%, annually compounded) since the start of 2019. US personal savings rates have fallen sharply over the past year (from 5.5% in April 2025 to 3% in May 2026) but that seems entirely rational. If your retirement balance is far above where you expected it to be, why not spend a bit more of your current income than previously intended? If we net across these overlapping cohorts and exclude recent first-time home purchases, we’re left with 45 million households that combine to account for nearly $15 trillion in annual outlays. That’s an extraordinary sum, equal to nearly 3x the size of the entire German economy and 70% of the GDP of China. And this third of the population has not only been insulated from the inflation shock but also exhibits the propensity to spend out of wealth and income to an extent that’s sustained a far higher rate of GDP growth than observed in economies with comparable living standards.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Balances in U.S. defined-contribution retirement plans have risen $6.7 trillion (+12.7% annually compounded) since early 2019, insulating roughly 73 million households from inflation and supporting elevated consumer spending out of accumulated wealth.
  2. The 45 million U.S. households combining wealth insulation with high spending propensity account for approximately $15 trillion in annual outlays—nearly 3× Germany’s entire economy and 70% of China’s GDP—sustaining U.S. GDP growth above peers at comparable living standards.
  3. The U.S. personal savings rate declined 2.5 percentage points to 3%, a rational response by households whose retirement balances substantially exceed prior expectations, substituting wealth appreciation for current-income saving.

Related Articles:

  • K-Shaped Economy? — Using internal Stripe payment data, Tedeschi finds that spending growth of households in low-income zip codes has outpaced that of households in high-income…
  • The K-Shaped Economy’s Defining Statistic Has Some Problems — Consumer spending in the United States has become increasingly concentrated among the highest earners over the past three decades, driven by wealth effects — the tendency for rising asset values to boost spending among those who hold the most assets.
  • The Two Europes — The European Union contains two divergent economies: a reforming frontier energized by security threats, and a stagnant interior where structural reform pressure remains absent.

AI Summary. European immigrants who arrived with nearly no wealth converged to similar wealth levels as earlier European settlers within a few generations, while Black, Cuban, Mexican, and Puerto Rican households remained substantially behind, indicating that initial wealth gaps do not uniformly predict long-run inequality across all groups.

Brian Marein Wake Forest University
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Except possibly at the very top of the distribution which SIPP cannot measure, the wealth of “new” Southern and Eastern European immigrants to the US has fully caught up with “old” immigrants. Wealth converges quickly once earnings inequality vanishes.

Does initial wealth explain persistent inequality across immigrant groups?

Core argument: By 1920, 50% of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents, yet Southern and Eastern European descendants achieved wealth.

Inferring the determinants of long-run inequality from group-level data is complicated by the arrival of 30 million Europeans during the Age of Mass Migration (roughly 1850 to 1924), who are by construction included in average white wealth despite having no direct claim to the wealth accumulated by earlier Americans. By1920, nearly half of white adults were either foreign-born or had foreign-born parents. Using the United States Immigration Commission Reports (commonly known as the Dillingham Commission Reports), I document that immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century arrived with almost no wealth. [Thus] a large share of the white population started from a substantial wealth disadvantage. Northwestern Europeans comprised the overwhelming majority of earlier immigrants, dating back to the initial European settlement of North America, while Southern and Eastern Europeans predominated at the turn of the twentieth century. If initial wealth disadvantages persisted across generations, one would expect households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry to possess less wealth than those of Northwestern European ancestry, since their families arrived later and started with substantially fewer resources. In fact, they do not. On average, they are wealthier.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. By 1920, 50% of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents, yet Southern and Eastern European descendants achieved wealth.
  2. European immigrants arrived at the turn of the twentieth century with nearly zero wealth, yet their descendants’ wealth distributions converged.
  3. White ancestry groups exhibit nearly identical wealth distributions by 1980–1990 despite staggered arrival times spanning 270+ years, while Black, Cuban.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. Negative economic narratives, including fear of new technology, contributed to prolonged economic downturns alongside structural failures in banking regulation, monetary policy, and trade.

Robert Shiller New York Times
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Shiller argues that fears around the potential impact of AI – often fostered by the words of AI executives themselves – are reducing consumer confidence and risk a negative feedback loop. “There is a risk that fear can actually help birth the reality.”

Are pessimistic narratives slowing economic recovery more than structural problems?

Core argument: I cannot generate the requested takeaways because the provided article summary contains no quantitative data, numerical comparisons, or specific economic.

Such pessimism was present in the Great Depression, the decade of economic ruin that followed the stock market crash of 1929. There were many factors that contributed to making that period as difficult as it was. A lack of banking regulation and monetary policy led to sweeping bank failures, the Federal Reserve’s initial response was weak and ineffective, and a punishing tariff regime reduced global trade. Many of these causes have been widely studied; less understood is the role I believe negative narratives, including negative narratives about new technology, had on the economic climate.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. I cannot generate the requested takeaways because the provided article summary contains no quantitative data, numerical comparisons, or specific economic.
  2. To proceed, please provide an article excerpt or data that includes specific numbers (e.g., unemployment rates, labor force participation %.

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