Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

AI Summary. U.S. diesel prices have reached a record $6.06 per gallon, surpassing the previous record of $5.82 set after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Diesel's central role in freight, agriculture, and food transport is feeding producer price inflation at a critical harvest season, squeezing farm margins on fuel and fertilizer costs.

Stephanie Findlay and Jamie Smyth Financial Times
Date Posted:

US retail diesel prices have climbed to an all-time nominal high of $6.06 per gallon. The previous nominal high in January 2022 would be $6.54 in current dollars.

Does diesel supply shock threaten farm profitability during harvest season?

Core argument: U.S. diesel prices hit a record $6.06/gallon, surpassing the prior peak of $5.82 set after Russia’s 2022 Ukraine invasion, as an Iran-driven supply shock tightens global fuel markets.

The diesel pump price has surged this year and rose to $6.06 on Friday, motorist group AAA said, above the previous record high of $5.82 in 2022 following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Diesel’s critical role in the transport supply chain is also feeding into surging producer prices, which can stoke inflationary pressures at a time when Americans increasingly feel squeezed by affordability. The jump in diesel comes ahead of the autumn high season, where the fuel is used to power agricultural equipment to harvest and transport crops. Grain farmers in America’s Corn Belt have said they are facing a crisis with rising fuel and fertiliser prices eating into profits.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. diesel prices hit a record $6.06/gallon, surpassing the prior peak of $5.82 set after Russia’s 2022 Ukraine invasion, as an Iran-driven supply shock tightens global fuel markets.
  2. Diesel’s central role in freight and logistics transmits the price surge directly into producer prices, amplifying inflationary pressure on an already cost-squeezed American consumer.
  3. The price spike arrives ahead of the autumn harvest season, compounding input-cost pressure on Corn Belt grain farmers already facing a profit squeeze from elevated fuel and fertilizer costs.

Related Articles:

  • US Diesel Prices Soar To Record High — U.S. diesel prices have reached a record $5.85 per gallon, surpassing the previous record set after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Prices face further upward pressure from harvest season demand, early winter heating needs, and planned refinery maintenance, with transportation and agriculture accounting for the majority of diesel consumption.
  • U.S. Economy Less Vulnerable To Geopolitical Oil Price Shocks Than In The Past — Kilian, et al find that the impact of an energy shock on US real GDP growth has fallen to 1/20th of what it would have been in 1980, due both to the declining…
  • Fighting Words: The Energy Transition in 2026 — As measured by useful final energy consumption in 2024, nuclear provided 6% of America’s 44.5 exajoules, renewables 9%, and fossil fuels 85%. The corresponding…

AI Summary. Firms' wage-setting norms are sticky, rising only from 2.7% to 3.5% even as inflation peaked near 7%, causing real wages for workers who stayed in their jobs to fall systematically. By the time inflation subsided, the median firm's wage rule had converged to ~3%, roughly matching inflation.

Erik Hurst, Christina Patterson, Nela Richardson, and Ye Liv Wang University of Chicago
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

ADP microdata from 2016–25 suggest firms set wages according to “wage norms” ~ invariant to inflation. The 2020–21 inflation surge mechanically reduced real wages. By the end of 2025, 34% of incumbent workers’ real wages were lower than in 2020.

Do sticky wage norms systematically reduce real wages during inflation spikes?

Core argument: Firm-level modal wage rules peaked at 3.5% in 2022–2023 against roughly 7% inflation, meaning nominal rigidity systematically eroded real wages for job stayers throughout the inflationary episode.

Roughly 42% of all nominal wage increases below 6% were within 0.01 percentage points of a whole or half number [Figure 6]. Figure 9 plots the employment-weighted average modal wage change across firms (solid line) alongside inflation rate (dashed line) from 2016 through 2025. In the pre-pandemic period, firm-level wage rules were relatively stable at a median of 2.7%, modestly above the rate of inflation. Beginning in 2021, inflation rose sharply, peaking at approximately seven percent in 2022. The average modal wage change also rose, reaching a peak of 3.5% in 2022 and 2023. By 2025, the median firm had a wage rule granting increases of three percent, roughly in line with inflation. The stickiness of firms’ wage rules in the face of inflationary pressure contributed to the systematic fall in real wages for job stayers. Evidence from Belgium [which has strong wage indexation], suggests that declining real wages, rather than inflation itself, helps explain the persistence of depressed consumer sentiment during the 2021–2024 period.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Firm-level modal wage rules peaked at 3.5% in 2022–2023 against roughly 7% inflation, meaning nominal rigidity systematically eroded real wages for job stayers throughout the inflationary episode.
  2. The median firm’s modal wage increase converged to 3% by 2025—matching inflation rather than exceeding it—marking a reversal from the pre-pandemic norm of 2.7% modestly above price growth.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. New York City's top 1% captured nearly two-thirds of real income growth between 2019 and 2024, versus under 40% nationally, driven by capital gains, dividends, and business income rather than wages.

Jonathan Siegel and Jason Bram Office of the New York City Comptroller
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Btw 2019 and 2024, pre-tax, pre-transfer real median income in New York City fell 3.2%. The top .1% tax units, ~ households, (mean income ~$24mm) saw real growth of ~25%, whereas the bottom 90% (mean income ~$45,000) fell 0.8%.

Is capital income concentration widening faster in major cities than nationally?

Core argument: Nearly two-thirds of New York City’s real income growth from 2019–2024 accrued to the top 1%, versus under 40% nationally, driven by faster-rising capital gains, dividends, and business income rather than wage divergence.

Between 2019 and 2024, the New York City’s income shares at the top of the distribution rose faster than the nation's, and nearly two-thirds of the real income growth over the period accrued to the top 1%, compared with under 40% nationally. The result also holds when volatile capital gains are excluded. Real median income fell over the period, and real average income for the bottom 90% of tax units was essentially flat. Adjusted for local prices (but not for transfer programs), the purchasing power of income for the lower 90% of New Yorkers is close to one-fifth below that of the bottom 90% nationally. The divergence at the top is predominantly a story of non-wage income. Wage and salary income shows a much milder widening, and occupational wage data that exclude bonuses show base pay growing faster in lower-wage occupations than in higher-wage ones, and within many occupational groups wages are converging rather than growing more unequal.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nearly two-thirds of New York City’s real income growth from 2019–2024 accrued to the top 1%, versus under 40% nationally, driven by faster-rising capital gains, dividends, and business income rather than wage divergence.
  2. The bottom 90% of New York City earners hold purchasing power roughly one-fifth below their national counterparts after adjusting for local prices, even before accounting for transfer programs.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. Chinese social media is saturated with viral posts about low wages, job scarcity, falling property values, and economic despair, despite increasingly aggressive censorship. The volume of pessimistic and satirical content surviving China's censorship apparatus signals the depth of public anxiety about the economy.

Li Yuan New York Times
Date Posted:

Attitudes expressed on Chinese social media are increasingly negative. Given that the “censorship apparatus still controls the internet,” the increasingly negative online sentiment, much of it about “economic despair,” is “striking,” Li Yuan remarks.

Is China's censorship failing to contain economic despair online?

Core argument: Viral feeds on RedNote, Douyin, and Weibo are saturated with posts about meager wages, scarce jobs, and falling property values, signaling that economic despair has become the dominant register of Chinese social media.

Across RedNote, Douyin, Weibo and other popular platforms, you can scroll endless posts about meager wages, scarce jobs, falling property values and fear about the future. Some turn their hardships into dark humor. Others hijack official posts and hashtags and turn propaganda into spectacles of mockery. China’s internet censorship has grown increasingly ruthless over the past decade. That makes the sheer volume of the pessimistic posts and sarcastic comments all the more striking. When [Li Yuan opened her] RedNote in recent weeks, [she] was surprised to find that the first 30 or so posts were nearly all about economic despair, many with hundreds or thousands of likes. The suggested searches could be even gloomier. “Is there a future for employment in China?” read one.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Viral feeds on RedNote, Douyin, and Weibo are saturated with posts about meager wages, scarce jobs, and falling property values, signaling that economic despair has become the dominant register of Chinese social media.
  2. Chinese citizens are hijacking official hashtags and propaganda posts to stage public mockery, converting state messaging into vehicles for dissent despite a decade of increasingly ruthless censorship.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. U.S. diesel prices have reached a record $5.85 per gallon, surpassing the previous record set after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Prices face further upward pressure from harvest season demand, early winter heating needs, and planned refinery maintenance, with transportation and agriculture accounting for the majority of diesel consumption.

Malcolm Moore Financial Times
Date Posted:

US retail diesel prices have climbed to an all-time nominal high of $5.85 per gallon. The previous nominal high in January 2022 would be $6.54 in current dollars.

Are record diesel prices threatening transportation and agriculture costs?

Core argument: With roughly 75% of U.S. diesel consumed by transportation and trucking, the record price feeds directly into goods costs across virtually every supply chain in the economy.

[Diesel] pump prices hit an average of $5.85 a gallon for the first time ever on Friday, according to the American Automobile Association, eclipsing the previous record level that was reached in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. From October, diesel is likely to be squeezed further by the harvest season, early winter heating demand and planned maintenance by US refineries. About three-quarters of diesel in the US is used for transportation and trucking goods, and the fuel is also essential for agriculture, powering much of the farm equipment used in the upcoming harvest season.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

    1. With roughly 75% of U.S. diesel consumed by transportation and trucking, the record price feeds directly into goods costs across virtually every supply chain in the economy.
    2. Harvest-season demand, early winter heating requirements, and planned refinery maintenance converging in October point to further diesel price increases beyond the record level already reached.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. Wholesale diesel prices jumped ~7% to $4.71/gallon following U.S. air strikes on Iran, threatening higher costs for American industry, agriculture, and consumers. The White House convened major refiners — including Chevron, Valero, and Marathon Petroleum — to pressure the industry to contain fuel price inflation.

Stephanie Findlay, Claire Jones and Jamie Smyth Financial Times
Date Posted:

Wholesale diesel for sale in New York harbor has risen ~7% to $4.71, largely reflecting a record-high “crack” spread, the premium of diesel over crude. US refinery utilisation had been at or above 95% for 12 consecutive weeks, the longest streak since 2000.

Does refinery pressure work when geopolitical shocks drive diesel prices up?

Core argument: Wholesale diesel at New York harbour surged nearly 7% to $4.71/gallon following U.S. air strikes on Iran, with pass-through to consumer fuel costs arriving months before congressional elections—prompting the White House to summon major refiners including Marathon Petroleum, Chevron, and Valero.

Wholesale diesel for sale in New York harbour jumped almost 7% to $4.71 a gallon after the US president ordered extensive air strikes on Iran. Diesel powers American industry and agriculture and the wholesale contract’s price surge will translate into higher consumer costs just months ahead of congressional elections. Trump on Tuesday held talks with industry in the White House to press them to beat back the fuel price inflation. Marathon Petroleum, Phillips 66, Chevron, Delek US Holdings, PBF Energy and Valero Energy were among the companies summoned to Washington, according to people with knowledge of the event.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Wholesale diesel at New York harbour surged nearly 7% to $4.71/gallon following U.S. air strikes on Iran, with pass-through to consumer fuel costs arriving months before congressional elections—prompting the White House to summon major refiners including Marathon Petroleum, Chevron, and Valero.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. Countries with high debt and low productive capacity face the greatest adjustment costs when trade imbalances unwind. If the U.S. reduces its trade deficit while China maintains surpluses, a politically fragmented Europe risks absorbing larger deficits by default, accelerating deindustrialization and weaker growth.

Michael Pettis Foreign Affairs
Date Posted:

Pettis suggests that if the US reduces its trade deficit while China maintains huge surpluses, a politically fragmented Europe will likely end up absorbing larger deficits, driving reduced competitiveness, deindustrialization, and weaker growth.

Will Europe bear the cost of global trade rebalancing?

Core argument: Nations where debt has risen without a corresponding expansion in productive capacity face the steepest adjustment costs when global trade imbalances correct, making fiscal and industrial composition the primary vulnerability indicators.

The eurozone is the world’s third-largest economy and its second-largest source of demand, it has economic power at its disposal, but [likely not] the political ability to exercise this power, given its fragmented policymaking institutions and the often divergent interests of its member states. If the United States is able to reduce its trade deficit and expand its share of global manufacturing while China resists an equivalent contraction in its surpluses, a politically divided Europe could be forced to take on larger deficits almost by default. The costs could include deindustrialization, rising debt, and weaker growth. This process may have begun already.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nations where debt has risen without a corresponding expansion in productive capacity face the steepest adjustment costs when global trade imbalances correct, making fiscal and industrial composition the primary vulnerability indicators.
  2. As the world’s third-largest economy and second-largest source of demand, the eurozone holds meaningful economic leverage in trade rebalancing but fragmented policymaking and divergent member-state interests severely limit its ability to deploy that power.
  3. If the U.S. shrinks its trade deficit while China resists equivalent surplus contraction, a politically divided Europe risks absorbing larger deficits by default, with deindustrialization, rising debt, and weaker growth as the likely consequences.

Related Articles:

  • Understanding Global Imbalances — Four economies—the United States, China, Germany, and Japan—account for roughly two-thirds of global imbalances, with current account surpluses and deficits now lasting twice as long as they did in the 1980s. Persistent imbalances have accumulated into large foreign asset and liability positions, with the United States holding net foreign liabilities
  • Imbalances Are Back On The Global Agenda — Global trade imbalances have returned as a major economic concern, with US net foreign liabilities rising to 24% of global output in 2024 from 6% in 2008, now financed by government borrowing rather than private debt. Historical patterns show current account imbalances reliably precede both protectionist policy and financial crisis.
  • Trade Intervention for Freer Trade — China comprises 17% of global GDP but 29% of manufacturing and 13% of consumption while the US is 26% of GDP, 16% of manufacturing, and 26% of consumption…

AI Summary. 60% of U.S. adults identify as working class, including half of college graduates and upper-income earners, making the label broadly adopted across economic lines rather than confined to lower-income or blue-collar workers.

Steven Shepard, Hannah Hartig, Andy Cerda and Jocelyn Kiley Pew Research Center
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

60% of Americans say “working class” describes them “extremely” or “very” well. Republicans are more likely than Democrats to identify as working class – strikingly 61% of Republicans who have a family income of at least $155,600 identify as working class, compared to 38% of such Democrats.

Does working class identity reflect actual economic status or cultural values?

Core argument: Sixty percent of U.S. adults identify as working class, a label adopted across income and education lines — including half of upper-income Americans and half of bachelor’s degree holders — signaling the term has lost its traditional socioeconomic boundaries.

Most Americans think of themselves as “working class” today: Overall, 60% of U.S. adults say the term describes them well. And the identity is widely adopted by people across all income and educational groups – including half of both Americans who have a bachelor’s degree and those who are upper-income. Those working in blue-collar occupations are particularly likely to identify as working class (77%), [as are] a majority of those working in other occupations (61%). White adults are more likely than Black adults to identify as working class. About six-in-ten White (62%) and Hispanic adults (59%) overall view themselves as working class, as do roughly half of Black (54%) and Asian adults (52%).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Sixty percent of U.S. adults identify as working class, a label adopted across income and education lines — including half of upper-income Americans and half of bachelor’s degree holders — signaling the term has lost its traditional socioeconomic boundaries.
  2. Blue-collar workers identify as working class at the highest rate (77%), yet a majority of workers in other occupations (61%) claim the same identity, indicating occupational type is a weak predictor of class self-perception.
  3. White adults identify as working class at a higher rate (62%) than Black (54%) or Asian adults (52%), with Hispanic adults (59%) closely tracking the White share.

Related Articles: