“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
AI Summary.The Institute of International Finance reports global debt as a share of output rose less than 10 percentage points between 2018 and mid-2026, peaking at 337% in early 2021 before falling 27 percentage points by the end of 2023. Inflation eroded the debt burden, as it did in the UK after the Second World War.
Martin WolfFinancial Times
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Wolf notes that the global debt-to-GDP ratio rose by less than 10pp btw 2018 and June 2026: after peaking at 337% in early 2021, it fell by 27pp by the end of 2023, as inflation boosted nominal GDP and eroded the value of existing debt.
Does inflation reduce the global debt burden?
Core argument: IIF data show the global debt-to-output ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021 before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023, with inflation identified as the force that eroded it.
The IIF shows that between 2018 and June 2026, the rise in the ratio of global debt to output was less than 10 percentage points. The story is striking: the ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021, before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023. What was this magical “debt-buster”? Good old-fashioned (and supposedly “unexpected”) inflation. This is — to put it mildly — not the first time inflation has wiped out debt. It was, to take one of countless examples, an important part of the UK’s elimination of its post-second-world-war debt. For countries able to print the money in which their debt is denominated, that is often what happens.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
IIF data show the global debt-to-output ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021 before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023, with inflation identified as the force that eroded it.
Between 2018 and June 2026, the IIF shows the ratio of global debt to output rose by less than 10 percentage points.
Inflation has wiped out debt before, forming an important part of the UK’s elimination of its post-second-world-war debt, and often does so for countries able to print the currency in which their debt is denominated.
Related Articles:
Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic?— Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
The Coming Great Repression?— Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds, the opposite of standard risk-premium predictions. The authors estimate financial repression—making banks captive bond buyers and loading them with low-return reserves—contributed 90.7 percentage points of GDP to Britain's postwar debt reduction, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation.
Global Debt Report 2026— Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.
AI Summary.Wage gains have trailed inflation for five months, and consumer prices are 27% higher than at the start of 2021. The "misery index," the sum of the inflation and unemployment rates, stands at 7.5, up from 6.7 a year earlier.
David Uberti, Justin Lahart and Aaron ZitnerWall Street Journal
Date Posted:
Over the past five months, real wages as measured by average hourly earnings have declined. Okun’s “misery index” is now 7.5, just above its October 2024 level of 6.7.
Are wage gains falling behind rising consumer prices?
Core argument: Consumer prices are 27% higher than in January 2021, when Biden took office, and wage gains have failed to keep pace with inflation for five months.
For five months, wage gains haven’t kept pace with inflation and, especially with the sharp increase in gasoline prices over the past few weeks, they aren’t likely to keep up this month. University of Chicago Booth School of Business economist Christina Patterson said employees who achieve pay bumps often bear a burden. “You negotiate. You get an outside offer. You switch jobs. You threaten to leave,” she said. “All of those actions are costly. They disturb employer-employee relationships. You lose co-workers. You have to move.” Consumer prices are now 27% higher than they were in January 2021. One long-popular benchmark of economic conditions is the “misery index,” a simple summing up of the inflation and unemployment rate, it now stands at 7.5, higher than the 6.7 it was at in October 2024, just before Harris lost the presidency to Trump.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Consumer prices are 27% higher than in January 2021, when Biden took office, and wage gains have failed to keep pace with inflation for five months.
The “misery index,” a summing of the inflation and unemployment rates devised by economist Arthur Okun, stands at 7.5, above the 6.7 recorded in October 2024 before Kamala Harris lost to Trump.
University of Chicago Booth School of Business economist Christina Patterson said workers who win pay bumps often bear a burden through negotiating, obtaining outside offers, switching jobs, or threatening to leave, actions that disturb employer-employee relationships and can require moving.
Related Articles:
The Cost of Money is Part of the Cost of Living: New Evidence on the Consumer Sentiment Anomaly— Variation in the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index that inflation and unemployment cannot explain is strongly correlated with growth in consumer borrowing costs, such as mortgage and car loan rates. The authors estimate that including interest payments and homeownership costs in the consumer price index would raise measured inflation from 3% to 9%.
Sticky Wage Norms and the Real Wage Cost of Unexpected Inflation— Firms set nominal wage increases by round-number rules—about 42% of increases below 6% fell within 0.01 percentage points of a whole or half number—and these rules rose only from about 2.7% to 3.5% as inflation peaked near 7%, contributing to falling real wages for job stayers.
Do Voters Punish Inflation or Pay Cuts? Inflation and Real Wages in U.S. Elections— An analysis of U.S. counties estimates that where wages grew faster than prices, voters supported the incumbent party more, while counties with larger real wage losses than average shifted more toward the opposition. A one-standard-deviation larger real wage loss is associated with shifts of roughly 0.10 and 0.19 percentage points in vote share and margin.
AI Summary.Inflation-protected U.S. Treasury yields rose from about 3.5% in early 1997 to about 4.5% by 2000, compared with roughly 2.4% on the 10-year and 3% on the 30-year today. The author argues that this 1990s experience helps calibrate expectations if new software technologies produce a comparable acceleration in productivity growth.
Matt KleinThe Overshoot
Date Posted:
Klein compares measures of real rates from the 1990s productivity boom to today’s real rates, using TIPS, as well as “synthetic TIPS” derived by subtracting inflation expectations from nominal rates. Current real rates are very low by comparison.
Would faster productivity growth from new software technologies push real yields higher?
Core argument: Real yields on TIPS were roughly 3.5% when the securities were introduced at the start of 1997 and rose gradually to about 4.5% by the peak of the bubble in 2000.
Real yields on actual TIPS were ~3.5% when they first arrived at the beginning of 1997, and then rose gradually to ~4.5% by the peak of the bubble in 2000. Yields on “synthetic” TIPS derived by removing estimates of inflation expectations from nominal yields were also around 3.5% in early 1997 and 4.5% in the first half of 2000, though they were more volatile in between. The yield on the benchmark 10y TIPS is currently 2.4% while the yield on the 30y TIPS is around 3%. Knowing what actually happened in the 1990s is helpful for calibrating expectations about what could happen in the next decade, if new software technologies lead to a comparable acceleration in productivity growth.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Real yields on TIPS were roughly 3.5% when the securities were introduced at the start of 1997 and rose gradually to about 4.5% by the peak of the bubble in 2000.
"Synthetic" TIPS yields, derived by stripping estimates of inflation expectations out of nominal yields, also stood near 3.5% in early 1997 and 4.5% in the first half of 2000, with more volatility in between.
The benchmark 10-year TIPS yields 2.4% and the 30-year TIPS around 3%, while the 1990s experience offers a guide for calibrating expectations if new software technologies deliver a comparable acceleration in productivity growth.
Related Articles:
AI, Productivity, and Rates: Part I— A San Francisco Federal Reserve model estimates that the growth contribution from rising resource utilization in recent quarters has been larger than in almost any comparable five-quarter stretch since 1947 outside recoveries from downturns. That measure is based on a modified version of the average worker's weekly hours rather than unemployment or capacity utilization.
AI and Productivity— The recent pickup in US labor productivity appears driven by higher utilization of existing capital—running factories, server racks, and hotel rooms harder—rather than by firm-level efficiency gains from AI. Adoption remains too thin and the cross-sectional evidence too weak to conclude that AI-driven productivity gains are already widespread.
Have We Entered an Era of High Productivity Growth?— Labor productivity has grown solidly while the San Francisco Federal Reserve's total factor productivity index, which adjusts for the equipment and technology workers use, has grown modestly, suggesting gains so far reflect better tools rather than broader advances. A regime-switching model puts the probability of a high-productivity regime at 57% using labor productivity and 21% using total factor productivity.
AI Summary.Using 5.1m product listings from Sears catalogs, the authors construct a quality-adjusted price index implying much lower goods inflation for 1900–1990 than standard deflators, with real goods consumption growing 39x rather than 10.3x. They estimate faster growth before World War II (5.4% a year, 1900–1939) than after (4.2%, 1946–1980).
Verónica Bäcker-Peral and Benjamin WittenbrinkMassachusetts Institute of Technology
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important
Using 5.1mm Sears catalog listings and LLM-based hedonic estimation, this study finds real goods consumption grew 39-fold from 1900 to 1990, not 10.3-fold as official data imply, with the largest mismeasurement concentrated before WWII.
Does quality-adjusted pricing show faster goods consumption growth before the war?
Core argument: Using a quality-adjusted price index built from 5.1 million Sears catalog listings, the authors estimate real goods consumption grew by a factor of 39 between 1900 and 1990, compared with a factor of 10.3 using standard goods deflators.
Measuring real GDP growth requires distinguishing changes in prices from changes in product quality... systematic quality adjustment. price indexes are unavailable for much of the twentieth century. We construct a new quality-adjusted price index using 5.1 million product listings from Sears catalogs, 1900–1990. The resulting cost-of-living index implies substantially lower goods inflation than conventional deflators between 1900 and 1990, real goods consumption grew by a factor of 39 using our index,compared with a factor of 10.3 using standard goods deflators. Figure 5 shows our estimates of the cost-of-living index for consumer goods in the solid red line. The dashed black line shows average cumulated price changes for the same sample of consumer goods. The gap.is largest before World War II, reversing the conventional view that goods consumption growth was slower before 1945 than in the post-war decades.As Gordon puts it, 'the history of price changes from 1914 to 1947 [is] the black hole where little is known.' This paper sheds light on that black hole. We estimate average annual real goods consumption growth of 5.4% for 1900-1939 and 4.2% for 1946-1980... the era of fastest growth was in the prewar, not postwar, contrary to conventional estimates.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Using a quality-adjusted price index built from 5.1 million Sears catalog listings, the authors estimate real goods consumption grew by a factor of 39 between 1900 and 1990, compared with a factor of 10.3 using standard goods deflators.
The authors estimate average annual real goods consumption growth of 5.4% for 1900–1939 and 4.2% for 1946–1980, implying the fastest growth came in the prewar rather than postwar era, contrary to conventional estimates.
The new cost-of-living index implies substantially lower goods inflation than conventional deflators, with the gap largest before World War II, a period Gordon describes as "the black hole where little is known.".
Related Articles:
European vs. U.S. Economic Performance: An Update— Productivity growth from 2000-2019 was higher in the US than in western Europe, but almost half the gap disappears when information and communications technology is excluded, even though tech was 9.2% of US output versus 5.4% in the EU. The author estimates this difference in industrial mix accounts for roughly 40% of the overall productivity growth gap.
Is The Great Stagnation Actually Just a ‘So-So’ Stagnation?— Long-running U.S. tests show population average reading scores moved from 255 to 256 out of 500 and math from 266 to 271, despite educational attainment rising more than three years. The author argues that if added schooling has not raised productivity, measured total factor productivity growth has been understated, shrinking the apparent "Great Stagnation" by about a third.
AI Summary.Unemployment has stayed at or below the Federal Reserve's estimated non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment of under 4.5% for 57 months, tied for the longest such streak on record. The author argues this persistent labor market tightness is a key reason inflation has remained elevated and that keeping interest rates higher for longer is needed to reach the 2% target.
Torsten SløkApollo
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
US unemployment has been under the Fed’s 4.5% estimate of the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) for 57 months. Sløk argues “persistent tightness is a key reason inflation has remained elevated.”
Does a persistently tight labor market keep inflation above target?
Core argument: U.S. unemployment has stayed at or below the Fed's estimated NAIRU of under 4.5% for 57 months, tied for the longest such streak on record, leaving the labor market in excess-demand territory for an unusually long time.
With the Fed estimating the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) at below 4.5%, and unemployment having stayed at or below that level for 57 months, tied for the longest such streak on record, the labor market has been operating in excess-demand territory for an unusually long time. That persistent tightness is a key reason inflation has remained elevated: when unemployment runs below NAIRU, wages and prices face sustained upward pressure. Prior episodes of sub-4.5% unemployment were typically far shorter. The current one is one of the longest on record, which helps explain why the ongoing inflation overshoot since 2021 has been so stubborn. The bottom line is that a strong economy is the reason why inflation has been high, and only by keeping rates higher for longer can the Fed cool inflation down towards the FOMC’s 2% inflation target.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
U.S. unemployment has stayed at or below the Fed's estimated NAIRU of under 4.5% for 57 months, tied for the longest such streak on record, leaving the labor market in excess-demand territory for an unusually long time.
When unemployment runs below NAIRU, wages and prices face sustained upward pressure, which the author identifies as a key reason inflation has remained elevated since the overshoot began in 2021.
Prior episodes of sub-4.5% unemployment were typically far shorter, and the author argues that only by keeping rates higher for longer can the Fed cool inflation toward the FOMC's 2% target.
Related Articles:
The U.S. Job Market is (Still) Inflationary— Prices for locally produced U.S. services are rising about 1–1.5 percentage points faster than in the years just before the pandemic, leaving underlying inflation as far from the Federal Reserve's goals as it was three years ago. Prices for manufacturing components and data-center-related loaded circuit boards have also risen.
Labor Force Participation Is High If You Measure It Right— The headline labor force participation rate — the share of people 16 and older working or looking for work — is a limited gauge of labor market health because participation varies greatly by age. Aging baby boomers and the addition of nearly 1.7m Americans 65 and older to population estimates add distortion.
Baby Busts and Growth Booms: Demographic Change and the Macroeconomy— A 1pp lower birth rate 20 years earlier is associated with 22 log points higher output per worker 20 years later and 29 log points higher after 40 years, about 0.73pp faster annual growth. The authors find lower birth rates are also associated with more labor-saving patents, larger high-tech shares, and higher productivity growth.
AI Summary.Congressional Budget Office long-term projections show sustained primary deficits of 2% of GDP driving the debt-to-GDP ratio steadily higher, a path the agency itself labels unsustainable. Closing a 2% of GDP fiscal gap is economically straightforward for a growing country at peace, but inflation or default would not resolve the problem, since prospective deficits still require continued borrowing.
John CochraneStanford University
Date Posted:
Cochrane points out that neither inflation nor default will solve the real fiscal problem – prospective primary deficits and the interest to cover them. “If we wipe out all current debt, we still must finance endless primary deficits.”
Can inflation or default fix ongoing primary deficits?
Core argument: CBO long-term projections show steady primary deficits of 2% of GDP driving a slow explosion in the US debt-to-GDP ratio, a scenario the CBO itself labels "unsustainable.".
Figure 5.4 plots the Congressional Budget Office long-term projections for debt to GDP and deficits. The steady 2% of GDP primary deficits lead to a slow explosion of the debt to GDP ratio. These projections assume that nothing bad will happen again. Surely something bad will happen at some point in the next 30 years. The US will want to meet future crises with more borrowed or printed money. Yet, as forecasts, these projections are too pessimistic. This scenario will not happen. The CBO itself labels the scenario “unsustainable.” Debt to GDP cannot grow forever. The only question is how it will not happen. The good news is that fixing a 2% of GDP fiscal gap in a prosperous, growing country at peace is not that hard as an economic matter. As straightforward as a fiscal reform is as a matter of economics, it does seem to be beyond the capacity of the current US political system. Inflation or default will not cure the US or other advanced-country fiscal problems. The fiscal problem is prospective deficits; poor prospects for repayment, not so much current debt. If we wipe out all current debt, we still must finance endless primary deficits. And the day after a $36 trillion default or Weimar hyperinflation, who is going to lend a trillion or so new dollars to the US each year?
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
CBO long-term projections show steady primary deficits of 2% of GDP driving a slow explosion in the US debt-to-GDP ratio, a scenario the CBO itself labels "unsustainable.".
Closing a 2% of GDP fiscal gap in a prosperous, growing country at peace is not hard as an economic matter, yet such fiscal reform appears beyond the capacity of the current US political system.
Inflation or default will not cure US fiscal problems, because the issue is prospective deficits and poor prospects for repayment rather than current debt: even after a $36 trillion default, the US would still need to borrow about a trillion dollars a year.
Related Articles:
Fiscal Narratives for US Inflation— Fiscal theory attributes the deflation of the deep recession to a fall in real interest rates that lowered real interest costs on government debt, an effect that outweighed large deficits. The predicted deflation spiral and the hyperinflation forecast from quantitative easing both failed to materialize.
Fiscal Influences on Inflation in OECD Countries, 2020-2022— Across 21 economies, the authors find that headline and core inflation responded positively to a measure of government spending increases scaled by pre-pandemic debt-to-GDP and average debt duration. Estimated coefficients of 0.4–0.5 suggest 40–50% of the extra spending was financed through inflation, with the rest through conventional public finance.
The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036— The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal deficit will grow from $1.9tn (5.8% of GDP) to $3.1tn (6.7%) over a decade, above the 3.8% averaged over the past 50 years, with rising net interest costs driving much of the increase. Federal debt held by the public is projected to rise from 101% to 120% of GDP.
