“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
AI Summary.US consumer prices have risen almost 29% over the past six years, about 3x the pace of the prior six years, and on average prices have risen faster than wages over that period.
Owen Tucker-SmithWall Street Journal
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Inflation outpaced real year-over-year average hourly earnings growth in the 5 months through August.
Have prices risen faster than wages over the past six years?
Core argument: U.S. consumer prices, as measured by the consumer-price index, have risen almost 29% over the past six years, about three times the pace of the preceding six years.
Overall prices, as measured by the consumer-price index, have risen almost 29% in the past six years. During the six years before that, prices crept up at a third of that pace. Over the past six years, prices have, on average, risen faster than wages. The trend has been pronounced recently: In both July and August, inflation outpaced average hourly wage growth.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
U.S. consumer prices, as measured by the consumer-price index, have risen almost 29% over the past six years, about three times the pace of the preceding six years.
Prices have on average risen faster than wages over the past six years, with inflation outpacing average hourly wage growth in both July and August.
Related Articles:
Sticky Wage Norms and the Real Wage Cost of Unexpected Inflation— Firms set nominal wage increases by round-number rules—about 42% of increases below 6% fell within 0.01 percentage points of a whole or half number—and these rules rose only from about 2.7% to 3.5% as inflation peaked near 7%, contributing to falling real wages for job stayers.
Do Voters Punish Inflation or Pay Cuts? Inflation and Real Wages in U.S. Elections— An analysis of U.S. counties estimates that where wages grew faster than prices, voters supported the incumbent party more, while counties with larger real wage losses than average shifted more toward the opposition. A one-standard-deviation larger real wage loss is associated with shifts of roughly 0.10 and 0.19 percentage points in vote share and margin.
The Cost of Money is Part of the Cost of Living: New Evidence on the Consumer Sentiment Anomaly— Variation in the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index that inflation and unemployment cannot explain is strongly correlated with growth in consumer borrowing costs, such as mortgage and car loan rates. The authors estimate that including interest payments and homeownership costs in the consumer price index would raise measured inflation from 3% to 9%.
AI Summary.Federal Reserve Bank of New York researchers estimate that about 26% of a uniform tariff passes through into non-oil consumer goods prices over twelve months, with roughly 64% of that effect coming directly from higher import prices and the rest through domestic producers' input costs and markups. Pass-through into import prices is nearly immediate, while domestic price responses build gradually.
Mary Amiti,Sebastian Heise and David WeinsteinFederal Reserve Bank of New York
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FRBNY estimates that a uniform 10% tariff raised consumer-goods prices 2.6% after 12 months: 1.7pp directly via imported final goods, and 0.9pp mainly via higher imported-input costs for domestically produced goods, with the latter effect building over 9–12 months.
How much of a tariff reaches consumer prices within a year?
Core argument: Amiti, Heise, and Weinstein estimate that a uniform tariff passes through to non-oil consumer goods prices at roughly 26 percent over twelve months, with a 10 percent tariff raising prices 2.6 percentage points, 1.7 points of it via the direct import channel.
Tariff pass-through into U.S. import prices is nearly complete. Instrumenting realized duty rates with statutory tariffs to account for endogenous sourcing and exemptions, tariff pass-through into consumer-goods import prices is about 90.5%; a 10% increase in the duty rate raises import prices about 9.1%. At twelve months, a uniform 10% tariff raises consumer-goods prices 2.639%: 1.694pp through the direct channel, 0.770pp through marginal costs, and 0.175pp through strategic complementarity. Import-price pass-through is essentially immediate, while domestic prices adjust gradually; the contribution of the two indirect channels roughly doubles between six and twelve months, with much of the overall adjustment occurring within nine to twelve months. For the actual 2025–26 tariffs, the direct channel accounts for about 70% of the estimated effect; the marginal-cost channel accounts for about 22%, with strategic complementarity accounting for the remainder. Because the regressions include date fixed effects, the tariff contribution is identified relative to less-exposed goods and should be read as illustrative rather than as the absolute contribution to aggregate goods CPI.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Amiti, Heise, and Weinstein estimate that a uniform tariff passes through to non-oil consumer goods prices at roughly 26 percent over twelve months, with a 10 percent tariff raising prices 2.6 percentage points, 1.7 points of it via the direct import channel.
The two indirect channels — marginal costs from imported inputs (0.77 percentage points) and strategic complementarity in domestic markups (0.17 points) — account for 36 percent of the total effect and roughly double between six and twelve months after tariff implementation.
Applied to the actual 2025–26 tariff schedule, the authors estimate the cumulative tariff contribution to goods CPI reached about 2.9 percentage points by February 2026, with import-price pass-through near 90 percent and retail pass-through of 0.56.
Related Articles:
The State of U.S. Tariffs July 24, 2026— The average statutory US tariff rate stands at 11.1% and, under current law including scheduled increases, is projected to reach 11.8% by year-end. The authors estimate current-law tariffs will raise consumer prices by about 0.7% and generate roughly $1.9tn over ten years, with revenue somewhat lower after accounting for tariffs' negative effect on economic output.
Who Is Paying for the 2025 U.S. Tariffs?— The authors estimate that 94% of U.S. tariff costs were borne domestically over the first eight months of 2025, with a 10% tariff associated with only a 0.6 percentage point decline in foreign export prices. Pass-through into U.S. import prices later declined to 86%, shifting more of the burden to foreign exporters.
Demand-Driven Inflation— Demand and supply curves estimated from pre-pandemic data imply relatively flat demand curves in the US and euro area, so adverse supply shifts would produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation. The authors argue explaining the observed combination of high inflation and output requires outward demand shifts, including accommodative monetary policy alongside fiscal expansion.
AI Summary.Demand and supply curves estimated from pre-pandemic data imply relatively flat demand curves in the US and euro area, so adverse supply shifts would produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation. The authors argue explaining the observed combination of high inflation and output requires outward demand shifts, including accommodative monetary policy alongside fiscal expansion.
Domenico Giannone and Giorgio PrimiceriBookings Papers on Economic Activity
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Giannone and Primiceri revisit the relative role of supply vs. demand shocks in generating the post-Covid inflation. Because aggregate demand curves estimated from pre-pandemic data are flat, supply shocks alone would not have generated large inflation in the absence of added demand stimulus.
Did outward demand shifts, not supply shocks alone, drive recent inflation?
Core argument: Demand curves estimated from pre-pandemic US and euro-area data are relatively flat, reflecting central banks’ strong pre-pandemic responses to inflation, so adverse supply shifts produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation.
Demand and supply curve slopes are estimated from pre-pandemic data using the essentially definitional restriction that supply shocks move prices and output in opposite directions along demand curves, while demand shocks move them together along supply curves; the plotted slopes represent Bayesian posterior medians rather than uniquely identified estimates. The estimated demand curves are relatively flat in both the US and euro area [Figure 7], reflecting the central banks’ strong pre-pandemic responses to inflation. With those slopes, adverse supply shifts cause large output losses but comparatively little inflation. [To successfully explain] the combination of inflation and output observed in 2022 therefore requires demand to shift outwards too. Strong demand, including unusually accommodative monetary policy [on top of strong fiscal expansion], cushioned the output losses while increasing inflation [Figure 7]. In 2021–22, both inflation and GDP as subsequently revised exceeded forecasts in the US and euro area. That combination is suggestive of unexpectedly strong demand, whereas an adverse supply surprise alone would raise inflation but lower output. [Figure 9].
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Demand curves estimated from pre-pandemic US and euro-area data are relatively flat, reflecting central banks’ strong pre-pandemic responses to inflation, so adverse supply shifts produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation.
Explaining the 2022 combination of inflation and output requires an outward shift in demand, with strong demand — including unusually accommodative monetary policy atop fiscal expansion — cushioning output losses while raising inflation.
In 2021–22, both inflation and GDP as subsequently revised exceeded forecasts in the US and euro area, a combination suggestive of unexpectedly strong demand, since an adverse supply surprise alone would raise inflation but lower output.
Related Articles:
Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic?— Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
Why Did Inflation Rise And Fall In 2021-24? Channels And Evidence From Expectations— Across countries, unexpectedly higher government deficits relative to earlier International Monetary Fund forecasts are associated with unexpectedly higher inflation, measured by each factor's contribution to the increase in public debt, a relationship the author finds statistically significant. This evidence is consistent with a fiscal channel for inflation.
Fiscal Influences on Inflation in OECD Countries, 2020-2022— Across 21 economies, the authors find that headline and core inflation responded positively to a measure of government spending increases scaled by pre-pandemic debt-to-GDP and average debt duration. Estimated coefficients of 0.4–0.5 suggest 40–50% of the extra spending was financed through inflation, with the rest through conventional public finance.
AI Summary.The Institute of International Finance reports global debt as a share of output rose less than 10 percentage points between 2018 and mid-2026, peaking at 337% in early 2021 before falling 27 percentage points by the end of 2023. Inflation eroded the debt burden, as it did in the UK after the Second World War.
Martin WolfFinancial Times
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Wolf notes that the global debt-to-GDP ratio rose by less than 10pp btw 2018 and June 2026: after peaking at 337% in early 2021, it fell by 27pp by the end of 2023, as inflation boosted nominal GDP and eroded the value of existing debt.
Does inflation reduce the global debt burden?
Core argument: IIF data show the global debt-to-output ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021 before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023, with inflation identified as the force that eroded it.
The IIF shows that between 2018 and June 2026, the rise in the ratio of global debt to output was less than 10 percentage points. The story is striking: the ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021, before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023. What was this magical “debt-buster”? Good old-fashioned (and supposedly “unexpected”) inflation. This is — to put it mildly — not the first time inflation has wiped out debt. It was, to take one of countless examples, an important part of the UK’s elimination of its post-second-world-war debt. For countries able to print the money in which their debt is denominated, that is often what happens.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
IIF data show the global debt-to-output ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021 before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023, with inflation identified as the force that eroded it.
Between 2018 and June 2026, the IIF shows the ratio of global debt to output rose by less than 10 percentage points.
Inflation has wiped out debt before, forming an important part of the UK’s elimination of its post-second-world-war debt, and often does so for countries able to print the currency in which their debt is denominated.
Related Articles:
Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic?— Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
The Coming Great Repression?— Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds, the opposite of standard risk-premium predictions. The authors estimate financial repression—making banks captive bond buyers and loading them with low-return reserves—contributed 90.7 percentage points of GDP to Britain's postwar debt reduction, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation.
Global Debt Report 2026— Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.
AI Summary.Firms set nominal wage increases by round-number rules—about 42% of increases below 6% fell within 0.01 percentage points of a whole or half number—and these rules rose only from about 2.7% to 3.5% as inflation peaked near 7%, contributing to falling real wages for job stayers.
Erik Hurst, Christina Patterson, Nela Richardson, and Ye Liv WangUniversity of Chicago
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ADP microdata from 2016–25 suggest firms set wages according to “wage norms” ~ invariant to inflation. The 2020–21 inflation surge mechanically reduced real wages. By the end of 2025, 34% of incumbent workers’ real wages were lower than in 2020.
Do round-number wage rules cause real wages to fall during inflation?
Core argument: Roughly 42% of all nominal wage increases below 6% fell within 0.01 percentage points of a whole or half number.
Roughly 42% of all nominal wage increases below 6% were within 0.01 percentage points of a whole or half number [Figure 6]. Figure 9 plots the employment-weighted average modal wage change across firms (solid line) alongside inflation rate (dashed line) from 2016 through 2025. In the pre-pandemic period, firm-level wage rules were relatively stable at a median of 2.7%, modestly above the rate of inflation. Beginning in 2021, inflation rose sharply, peaking at approximately seven percent in 2022. The average modal wage change also rose, reaching a peak of 3.5% in 2022 and 2023. By 2025, the median firm had a wage rule granting increases of three percent, roughly in line with inflation. The stickiness of firms’ wage rules in the face of inflationary pressure contributed to the systematic fall in real wages for job stayers. Evidence from Belgium [which has strong wage indexation], suggests that declining real wages, rather than inflation itself, helps explain the persistence of depressed consumer sentiment during the 2021–2024 period.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Roughly 42% of all nominal wage increases below 6% fell within 0.01 percentage points of a whole or half number.
Firm-level wage rules held near a median of 2.7% before the pandemic, and the employment-weighted average modal wage change peaked at 3.5% in 2022 and 2023 while inflation peaked near 7% in 2022; by 2025 the median firm granted 3%.
The stickiness of firms' wage rules amid inflationary pressure contributed to a systematic fall in real wages for job stayers, and evidence from Belgium, which has strong wage indexation, suggests falling real wages rather than inflation helps explain depressed consumer sentiment in 2021–2024.
Related Articles:
Do Voters Punish Inflation or Pay Cuts? Inflation and Real Wages in U.S. Elections— An analysis of U.S. counties estimates that where wages grew faster than prices, voters supported the incumbent party more, while counties with larger real wage losses than average shifted more toward the opposition. A one-standard-deviation larger real wage loss is associated with shifts of roughly 0.10 and 0.19 percentage points in vote share and margin.
Real Wages Start To Shrink In Developed Countries— US annual inflation of 3.8% outpaced average hourly earnings growth of 3.6%, leaving prices rising faster than pay for the first time in two years, while Eurozone workers face a fresh energy-driven setback. JPMorgan attributes the real wage decline to Middle East conflict and expects growth to resume if energy prices retreat.
The Post‑COVID Decline in the Labor Share— The share of US national income paid to workers fell 1.6 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level, reaching a post-war low. The authors find this decline stems mainly from changes within industries rather than shifts in activity across sectors, following cyclical patterns seen in earlier recessions.
AI Summary.A decomposition of the 2.54 percentage-point rise in the 10-year US Treasury yield attributes 1.56 points, nearly two-thirds, to a higher term premium rather than expected future short-term rates. The author argues the premium had earlier turned negative as the Federal Reserve absorbed long-dated Treasury and mortgage-backed issuance, removing interest-rate risk.
Hanno LustigThe Two Cents
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Lustig presents a decomposition that attributes 156bp of the 254bp rise in the 10-year yield since March 2022 to an increase in the term premium, which he associates with the additional duration risk borne by investors as the Fed reduced its balance sheet.
Is the term premium driving most of the yield increase?
Core argument: Of the 2.54 percentage point increase in the 10-year Treasury yield since March 2022, 1.56 points — nearly two-thirds — comes from a higher term premium, according to the author's decomposition.
I plot a decomposition of the increase in the 10-year yield into a term premium component and a future short rate component. According to this measure, a big chunk —1.56 pps (or nearly 2/3 rds)— of the 2.54 pps increase in the 10-year yield since March 2022 is actually due to an increase in the term premium. That premium (the red line in the figure) turned negative around 2015, and [when] it bottomed out in 2020, yields (black line) were trading 135 bps below the path of future short rates (blue line). That’s not entirely surprising: The Fed was absorbing a large share of Treasury issuance at the long end of the yield curve —as well as MBS issuance— effectively removing a great deal of interest rate risk from the market.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Of the 2.54 percentage point increase in the 10-year Treasury yield since March 2022, 1.56 points — nearly two-thirds — comes from a higher term premium, according to the author's decomposition.
The term premium turned negative around 2015 and bottomed in 2020, when 10-year yields traded 135 basis points below the path of future short rates.
The author attributes the 2020 trough in the term premium to the Fed absorbing a large share of long-end Treasury and MBS issuance, effectively removing interest rate risk from the market.
Related Articles:
What Are Bond Markets Telling Us?— There is little evidence that fears of a Greek-style solvency crisis are driving U.S. interest rates, since long-term "breakeven" inflation expectations have changed little. Prices for credit default swaps, which insure against a U.S. government default, have also moved little.
What Are US Treasury Markets Really Telling Us? Part I— Comparing US Treasury yields to AAA corporate bonds combined with credit default swap insurance creates a synthetic Treasury, and the resulting spread — the convenience yield investors give up for safety and liquidity — has disappeared, suggesting investors are indifferent between the two on safety and liquidity. The author argues this is bad news for US taxpayers.
America’s Risky Debt: What Markets See That Policymakers Don’t— Two market-based measures suggest the safety premium investors pay to hold US Treasuries has compressed toward zero and at times reversed: the spread between top-rated corporate bonds and Treasuries after stripping out default risk, and the gap between currency-hedged foreign G10 government yields and Treasury yields at the same maturity, where longer-maturity comparisons now favor foreign bonds.
AI Summary.Iran's economy is on track for its largest annual contraction since the mid-1980s, with inflation above 50% — the highest in nearly 70 years of records — and food and other necessities costing double a year earlier. Its currency has fallen to a record low of about 1.85m rials per dollar on the black market.
Javier BlasBloomberg
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Inflation in Iran is running at at least ~69%, its highest annual rate in 70 years. The black market exchange value of a rial hit a record low of ~1.85mm rials to the dollar, relative to 50,000 per dollar five years ago.
Is Iran's economy contracting at its fastest rate in decades?
Core argument: Iran's economy is on track for its biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s.
[Iran's] economy is on track to suffer the biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s. Inflation is running well above 50%, the highest annual rate since records start nearly 70 years ago. Worse, the cost of food and other necessities has already doubled from a year ago. Its currency, the rial, is worthless. In the black market, the exchange rate has collapsed to a record low of about 1.85 million rials to the dollar; five years ago, roughly 50,000 rials were enough to buy a greenback.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Iran's economy is on track for its biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s.
Iranian inflation is running well above 50%, the highest annual rate since records began nearly 70 years ago, with the cost of food and other necessities already double year-ago levels.
The rial has fallen to a record low of about 1.85 million to the dollar on the black market, compared with roughly 50,000 rials per dollar five years ago.
Related Articles:
Soaring Diesel Prices Rip Across The US Economy— US diesel pump prices reached $5.47 a gallon, approaching a nominal record of $5.82 ($6.64 adjusted for inflation), after rising 8% in a month as wars in the Middle East and Europe constrain production and global supplies. The gap between diesel and crude oil prices has hit a record high.
For the Oil Market, the Strait of Hormuz Isn’t Closed— Tanker tracking data identify at least 5m barrels a day of oil still transiting the Strait of Hormuz, and allowing for vessels crossing undetected the true figure could reach 7m–9m. Growing oil spills visible on satellite imagery indicate attacks on tankers alongside efforts to keep the waterway open.
U.S. Economy Less Vulnerable To Geopolitical Oil Price Shocks Than In The Past— The United States became a net oil exporter in late 2019, and oil and oil product spending fell from near 8% of GDP in 1980 to 3% in 2024. The authors estimate a 15% global oil supply disruption would now cut annualized U.S. real GDP growth by 0.3pp, versus 1.7pp in the rest of the world.
AI Summary.Using 5.1m product listings from Sears catalogs, the authors construct a quality-adjusted price index implying much lower goods inflation for 1900–1990 than standard deflators, with real goods consumption growing 39x rather than 10.3x. They estimate faster growth before World War II (5.4% a year, 1900–1939) than after (4.2%, 1946–1980).
Verónica Bäcker-Peral and Benjamin WittenbrinkMassachusetts Institute of Technology
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Using 5.1mm Sears catalog listings and LLM-based hedonic estimation, this study finds real goods consumption grew 39-fold from 1900 to 1990, not 10.3-fold as official data imply, with the largest mismeasurement concentrated before WWII.
Does quality-adjusted pricing show faster goods consumption growth before the war?
Core argument: Using a quality-adjusted price index built from 5.1 million Sears catalog listings, the authors estimate real goods consumption grew by a factor of 39 between 1900 and 1990, compared with a factor of 10.3 using standard goods deflators.
Measuring real GDP growth requires distinguishing changes in prices from changes in product quality... systematic quality adjustment. price indexes are unavailable for much of the twentieth century. We construct a new quality-adjusted price index using 5.1 million product listings from Sears catalogs, 1900–1990. The resulting cost-of-living index implies substantially lower goods inflation than conventional deflators between 1900 and 1990, real goods consumption grew by a factor of 39 using our index,compared with a factor of 10.3 using standard goods deflators. Figure 5 shows our estimates of the cost-of-living index for consumer goods in the solid red line. The dashed black line shows average cumulated price changes for the same sample of consumer goods. The gap.is largest before World War II, reversing the conventional view that goods consumption growth was slower before 1945 than in the post-war decades.As Gordon puts it, 'the history of price changes from 1914 to 1947 [is] the black hole where little is known.' This paper sheds light on that black hole. We estimate average annual real goods consumption growth of 5.4% for 1900-1939 and 4.2% for 1946-1980... the era of fastest growth was in the prewar, not postwar, contrary to conventional estimates.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Using a quality-adjusted price index built from 5.1 million Sears catalog listings, the authors estimate real goods consumption grew by a factor of 39 between 1900 and 1990, compared with a factor of 10.3 using standard goods deflators.
The authors estimate average annual real goods consumption growth of 5.4% for 1900–1939 and 4.2% for 1946–1980, implying the fastest growth came in the prewar rather than postwar era, contrary to conventional estimates.
The new cost-of-living index implies substantially lower goods inflation than conventional deflators, with the gap largest before World War II, a period Gordon describes as "the black hole where little is known.".
Related Articles:
European vs. U.S. Economic Performance: An Update— Productivity growth from 2000-2019 was higher in the US than in western Europe, but almost half the gap disappears when information and communications technology is excluded, even though tech was 9.2% of US output versus 5.4% in the EU. The author estimates this difference in industrial mix accounts for roughly 40% of the overall productivity growth gap.
Is The Great Stagnation Actually Just a ‘So-So’ Stagnation?— Long-running U.S. tests show population average reading scores moved from 255 to 256 out of 500 and math from 266 to 271, despite educational attainment rising more than three years. The author argues that if added schooling has not raised productivity, measured total factor productivity growth has been understated, shrinking the apparent "Great Stagnation" by about a third.
