AI Summary. Second-quarter real GDP growth was revised up 0.7 percentage points to +2.2% at an annual rate, reflecting upward revisions to consumption (to +3.8%) and investment (to +4.6%). Private fixed investment was revised up to +9.0%, driven by data center spending in nonresidential structures.

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GS forecasts that the FOMC will not hike in October, will do one 25bp hike in December and “ultimately conclude that additional rate hikes are unnecessary.”

What drove the upward revision to second-quarter GDP growth?

Core argument: U.S. real GDP growth in Q2 was revised up 0.7pp to +2.2% quarter-over-quarter annualized, led by upward revisions to consumption (+0.4pp to +3.8%) and investment (+1.9pp to +4.6%).

Real GDP was revised up by 0.7pp to +2.2% in Q2 (quarter-over-quarter annualized), largely reflecting upward revisions to consumption (+0.4pp to +3.8%) and investment (+1.9pp to +4.6%) growth. The strength in consumer spending in Q2 likely continued to reflect the boost to consumer cashflow from larger-than-usual tax refunds, but we continue to expect consumer spending growth to slow somewhat in 2026Q4 as the fiscal support fades and the headwind from higher energy prices remains. Stronger investment growth reflected an upward revision to private fixed investment (+0.5pp to +9.0%), driven by data center investment in the nonresidential structures category (+1.9pp to +0.1%), and an upward revision to the contribution from inventories (+0.2pp to -0.5pp).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. real GDP growth in Q2 was revised up 0.7pp to +2.2% quarter-over-quarter annualized, led by upward revisions to consumption (+0.4pp to +3.8%) and investment (+1.9pp to +4.6%).
  2. Private fixed investment growth in Q2 was revised up 0.5pp to +9.0%, driven by data center investment in nonresidential structures, revised up 1.9pp to +0.1%, alongside a +0.2pp revision to the inventory contribution, to -0.5pp.
  3. Q2 consumer spending strength likely reflected the cashflow boost from larger-than-usual tax refunds, with spending growth expected to slow somewhat in 2026Q4 as fiscal support fades and higher energy prices remain a headwind.

AI Summary. The author argues that a slowdown in artificial-intelligence capital spending would remove a stimulus that has been masking weakness, colliding with overcapacity, falling prices, refinancing needs and weaker labor income. On this view the main risk is deflationary, transmitting through investment, employment, consumption, credit, housing and asset prices at once.

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Kedrosky argues that the “inevitable transition” from the current inflationary AI-buildout regime to a new regime in which AI-driven productivity gains exert deflationary pressure is “where the real macro risk lies.”

Would an AI spending slowdown create deflationary rather than inflationary risk?

Core argument: The author argues the dangerous phase arrives when the AI capex boom slows, removing stimulus just as overcapacity, falling prices, refinancing needs and weaker labor income hit together, with a refinancing wall waiting in 2028.

If AI investment has been masking underlying weakness, a slowdown removes the stimulus just as overcapacity, falling prices, refinancing needs and weaker labor income hit together. A refinancing wall sits waiting in 2028. Failure is over-determined. This moment sits at the intersection of the four forces that have produced the most consequential boom-bust cycles in Western economic history: loose credit, government policy, technology, and real estate. There are, as a result, myriad catalysts, each with a low probability of happening, but which collectively guarantee collapse. That is why the principal risk is deflationary rather than inflationary. An AI bust could transmit through capex, employment, consumption, credit, housing, and asset prices simultaneously.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The author argues the dangerous phase arrives when the AI capex boom slows, removing stimulus just as overcapacity, falling prices, refinancing needs and weaker labor income hit together, with a refinancing wall waiting in 2028.
  2. The principal risk from an AI bust is deflationary rather than inflationary, according to the author, because it could transmit simultaneously through capex, employment, consumption, credit, housing, and asset prices.
  3. The author places this moment at the intersection of loose credit, government policy, technology, and real estate — the four forces behind the most consequential boom-bust cycles in Western economic history — and sees a plausible decade of Japan-style balance recession with fiscal stimulus constrained by massive deficits.

AI Summary. China faces three options as external demand weakens: shift a larger share of national income to households so consumption absorbs more output, keep relying on investment despite weak returns, or let production and growth slow. The first requires substantial changes in income distribution and saving incentives; the second risks more debt and excess capacity; the third implies higher unemployment.

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“Beijing cannot choose whether China will adjust; one way or another, it will.” Pettis warns Zhongnanhai against postponing rebalancing with another round of debt-financed investment “despite increasingly weak returns.”

What choices does China face as external demand weakens?

Core argument: China faces three options: shift a larger share of national income to households so consumption absorbs more output, keep relying on investment despite weak returns, or allow production and growth to slow.

What it can choose is how painful that adjustment will be. If weaker external demand is met by encouraging more borrowing and domestic investment, regardless of whether that investment is economically justified, China risks postponing the inevitable. China therefore faces the same basic choice Japan confronted, but with deeper imbalances and less accommodating global conditions. It can shift a larger share of national income toward households and allow consumption to absorb more of what the economy produces; or it can continue relying on investment, despite increasingly weak returns; or it can allow production and growth to slow. The first choice requires a substantial change in the domestic distribution of income and the incentives to save. The second risks still more debt and excess capacity and, ultimately, a more painful adjustment. The third implies higher unemployment and weaker growth.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China faces three options: shift a larger share of national income to households so consumption absorbs more output, keep relying on investment despite weak returns, or allow production and growth to slow.
  2. China confronts the same basic choice Japan faced, but with deeper imbalances and less accommodating global conditions, and can choose only how painful the adjustment will be.
  3. Meeting weaker external demand with more borrowing and domestic investment, regardless of whether it is economically justified, risks further debt and excess capacity and a more painful adjustment, while slower growth implies higher unemployment.

AI Summary. The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.

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Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh projects ~$10.3T will be spent on the AI buildout over 2025–2032, averaging 3.63% of GDP. He estimates 2/3 of that spending reflects IT equipment and one-third real estate and associated power infrastructure.

How much of the planned data center pipeline gets built?

Core argument: Using Cleanview project-level data from July 2026, the authors estimate roughly 57 GW of operating U.S. data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of roughly 509 GW, which they stress is not a completion forecast.

The required investment is enormous. A representative 200 MW AI training campus costs roughly $8.2 billion, about two-thirds of which reflects IT equipment and one-third the real estate and associated power infrastructure. We estimate that 183 GW is completed by 2032 with a further 118 GW completed after 2032. This pipeline will trigger about $10.3 trillion dollars of investment over 2025–2032. At an average of 3.63% of GDP per year, the projected buildout would be larger relative to the economy than the major U.S. canal, railroad, electrification, highway, and telecommunications investment booms. It would double the electricity consumption of the entire U.S. residential sector.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Using Cleanview project-level data from July 2026, the authors estimate roughly 57 GW of operating U.S. data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of roughly 509 GW, which they stress is not a completion forecast.
  2. The authors’ central scenario allocates the announced pipeline so that 182.8 GW of additional U.S. capacity becomes operational during 2025–32, including 19.0 GW tied to projects already operational in 2025 or 2026.
  3. The authors’ scenario has 117.2 GW of planned data center capacity completed after 2032 and 226.9 GW never completed, applying lower realization rates to more distant and less fully documented projects.

AI Summary. Prime-age adults aged 25–54 and older workers aged 55–64 have higher employment rates in Europe than in the US, while US youth employment is higher because Europeans spend longer in education. The share of young people not in education, employment or training is higher in the US than in Europe.

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Despite Europe’s high social spending relative to the US, Chris Giles notes that prime-age adult (25–54) labor force participation in the Eurozone has overtaken that of the US, and there has been a dramatic convergence in the LFP of older workers.

Do Europeans work less than Americans?

Core argument: Prime-age adults aged 25–54 in Europe are more likely to be employed than their US counterparts, whether measured with EU or Eurozone data, and Europeans aged 55–64 also have higher employment rates than Americans.

It does not matter whether you use EU or Eurozone data, prime-age adults (between 25 and 54) in Europe are more likely to be in work than those in the US. Older people (between 55 and 64) also have higher employment rates in Europe. Younger people (between 15 and 24) are more likely to have a job in the US, but that results from Europeans educating themselves for longer. The proportion of young people not in education, employment or training is higher in the US than in Europe. So welfare is not stopping work. More than that, the higher-welfare north of Europe tends to have higher employment rates than the south, although there is convergence within the Eurozone. Spain, in particular, has enjoyed rapid improvements.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Prime-age adults aged 25–54 in Europe are more likely to be employed than their US counterparts, whether measured with EU or Eurozone data, and Europeans aged 55–64 also have higher employment rates than Americans.
  2. Young people aged 15–24 are more likely to have a job in the US than in Europe, but that gap results from Europeans spending longer in education, and the share not in education, employment or training is higher in the US.
  3. The higher-welfare north of Europe tends to have higher employment rates than the south, with convergence within the Eurozone and rapid improvement in Spain.

AI Summary. Net US investment has fallen from roughly 40% of gross investment in the 1970s to about 25% in the past decade, meaning about three-quarters of gross investment now just replaces depreciating capital. The author attributes this gap to modern investment being more information-technology-related, which depreciates faster and requires more frequent replacement.

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U.S. real net private domestic investment—which adds to the American capital stock—is now only ~25% as large as gross investment, down from ~40% in the 1970s. Taylor suggests the widening gap between gross and net investment reflects the relatively rapid depreciation of IT-related capital.

Why does less of US gross investment add net capital?

Core argument: US net investment has run at about 25% of gross investment over the past decade, down from roughly 40% in the 1970s, meaning about three-quarters of gross investment merely replaces depreciated capital.

The figure divides net investment by gross investment. Back in the 1970s, net investment was often around 40% of gross investment, but the share has been slumping over time. For the last decade or so, net investment has been about 25% of the gross–that is, about three-quarters of gross investment is just making up for depreciation of the pre-existing capital stock. The likely reason for the growing gap between gross and net investment is that modern investment is more likely to be related to information technology [which] depreciates more rapidly and thus needs to be replaced and updated more often. If we want the average US worker to be using a greater amount of capital on the job–which was one of the key drivers of rising labor productivity in the past–it now takes a bigger rise in gross investment to lead to a given rise in net investment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US net investment has run at about 25% of gross investment over the past decade, down from roughly 40% in the 1970s, meaning about three-quarters of gross investment merely replaces depreciated capital.
  2. The likely reason for the widening gap between gross and net US investment is that modern investment is more tied to information technology, which depreciates more rapidly and must be replaced and updated more often.
  3. Raising the capital used by the average US worker—a key driver of past labor productivity growth—now requires a larger rise in gross investment to achieve a given rise in net investment.

AI Summary. Interest rates remain low relative to reasonable expectations of inflation and growth, with incomes and spending rising about 7% a year in dollar terms. Absent idle workers, machines, and materials, higher rates can help shift resources toward business equipment and nonresidential construction by discouraging consumer spending and housing or attracting foreign goods and services today.

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Klein argues that, far from indicating a panic-driven bond sell-off, higher bond yields are a necessary concomitant of persistent 7% growth in nominal income, which in turn reflects continued high inflation and robust real spending.

Do higher interest rates help shift resources toward business investment?

Core argument: Incomes and spending are rising about 7% a year in dollar terms, which the author argues leaves interest rates low relative to reasonable expectations of inflation and growth.

Rates are still low relative to reasonable expectations of inflation and growth. Incomes and spending are currently rising about 7% a year in dollar terms. But unless there are loads of unused workers, machines, and raw materials just lying around, the only way to spend relatively more on essential machinery, equipment, and nonresidential construction is if someone spends relatively less on consumer goods, services, and housing. Higher interest rates can help to the extent that they can discourage those lower-priority activities and/or encourage people in the rest of the world to accept promises of goods and services in the future in exchange for actual goods and services today. In this context, the current level of interest rates looks downright benign.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Incomes and spending are rising about 7% a year in dollar terms, which the author argues leaves interest rates low relative to reasonable expectations of inflation and growth.
  2. Absent idle workers, machines, and raw materials, spending relatively more on machinery, equipment, and nonresidential construction requires spending relatively less on consumer goods, services, and housing, according to the author.
  3. Higher interest rates can aid that shift by discouraging lower-priority activities and encouraging people abroad to accept promises of future goods and services in exchange for actual goods and services today, leaving current rates benign in the author's view.

AI Summary. Japan's 10-year government bond yield reached 3%, its highest since 1996, after years near zero. The yield was half that level a year earlier, and the speed of the shift is reverberating through Japan's economy and global financial markets.

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Japan’s 10-year government bond yield rose 6bp to hit 3% for the first time since 1996.

Are Japanese long-term bond yields rising sharply after years near zero?

Core argument: Japan's 10-year government bond yield rose as much as six basis points to touch 3%, its highest level since 1996 and the first time it has reached that level this century.

Japan’s 10-year government bond yield touched 3% for the first time this century, an important milestone for a debt market that is returning to normality after benchmark borrowing costs languished near zero for years. The yield rose as much as six basis points to 3% on Tuesday, the highest since 1996. It was half this level around this time last year, underscoring the speed of the change, which is reverberating through Japan’s economy and global financial markets.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Japan's 10-year government bond yield rose as much as six basis points to touch 3%, its highest level since 1996 and the first time it has reached that level this century.
  2. Japan's 10-year government bond yield stood at half its current level a year earlier, underscoring the speed of the shift in the country's benchmark borrowing costs.
  3. Japan's debt market is returning to normality after benchmark borrowing costs languished near zero for years, with the move reverberating through Japan's economy and global financial markets.