AI Summary. The author argues the AI boom's economic significance lies more in stock market gains than in data center construction, and that the inability to monetize AI investments could end the boom. Simulations using the Federal Reserve's FRB/US model suggest that an end to the buildout plus a roughly 30% market decline would slow growth to about 1.5%, short of recession.

Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Furman estimates that the data-center buildout, which began in mid-2024, had raised US GDP by only ~0.3% by 2026Q3, as the equipment is largely imported and the US was already near full employment. Counting AI-driven stock market gains, the effect rises to ~0.6%. If the buildout ended and stocks fell ~30%, growth would slow to ~1.5%.

How would an end to the AI boom affect growth?

Core argument: If the AI data center buildout ended and the stock market fell about 30%, the FRB/US model predicts growth would slow to roughly 1½ percent, short of even a shallow recession.

The data center buildout is set to be among the largest investment expansions in peacetime American history. How different is our economy today because of it? The answer, based on a simulation using the large-scale macroeconomic model used by the Federal Reserve (FRB/US), is not much. The buildout by itself has raised GDP by only about 0.3%, because most of the investment is imported, and imports do not add to U.S. GDP or lower the unemployment rate. The stock market boom that came with it matters more—together they have raised GDP by about 0.6% and lowered the unemployment rate by about 0.3 percentage point.This analysis suggests that the economy could survive less data center buildout just fine. Investment would fall, but so would imports and interest rates, and GDP would be little changed. A broader fall in the stock market would be a bigger deal, The bottom line: so far the AI economy is less a story about data centers than about the stock market—and that is also where the risk is.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. If the AI data center buildout ended and the stock market fell about 30%, the FRB/US model predicts growth would slow to roughly 1½ percent, short of even a shallow recession.
  2. The economy could withstand less data center buildout, making the AI economy so far less a story about data centers than about the stock market, which is also where the risk lies.
  3. Public policy changes or an inability to monetize AI investments could stop the AI boom, and financial-system complexities such as unwinding leverage, absent from the FRB/US model, pose a tail risk resembling 2001 more than 2007–09.

AI Summary. Stocks rose broadly after a sweeping Democratic win in midterm elections, with health insurers tied to the Affordable Care Act and solar companies gaining while data-center firms and companies linked to Trump and Musk fell. The move reflects the increment beyond already-priced-in Democratic victories, from greater certainty and a larger-than-expected margin.

Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Furman notes that between election day and Wednesday’s close there were broad-based gains for the solar sector and health companies, particularly those with close ties to the ACA, even though substantial, while less dramatic, Democratic victories in the House and Senate were already priced in. [Note: Today saw technology stocks plunge, pushing the S&P 500 down ~4% and the Nasdaq down ~5%]. 

How do stock winners and losers reveal expected election policy impacts?

Core argument: The broader stock market rallied the day after Democrats won a sweeping victory in the midterm elections, and the composition of winners and losers indicates what the market expects the policy impact to be.

The broader stock market rallied the day after Democrats won a sweeping victory in the midterm elections. Perhaps more interesting, and more telling, was the composition, which shows what the market thinks the policy impact of the election will be: health companies (especially ones like Centene, with close ties to the Affordable Care Act) and solar companies were up, while data-center companies and Trump- and Musk-related companies were down. And remember, Democratic victories were already priced in, so this is just the additional increment from greater certainty as well as the larger-than-expected magnitude. 

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The broader stock market rallied the day after Democrats won a sweeping victory in the midterm elections, and the composition of winners and losers indicates what the market expects the policy impact to be.
  2. Health companies with close ties to the Affordable Care Act, such as Centene, and solar companies rose after the midterms, while data-center companies and Trump- and Musk-related companies fell.
  3. Democratic victories were already priced into the stock market, so the post-election move reflects only the added increment from greater certainty and the larger-than-expected magnitude.

AI Summary. An analysis of more than 31,000 global venture capital deals finds 62% lost money and over half lost 50–100% of invested capital, though the distribution of returns has much fatter tails than buyouts or public equities. Venture funds averaged a public market equivalent ratio of about 1.4, indicating returns above public markets.

Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Btw the mid-90s and 2018, 62% of global venture capital investments lost money, and more than half of the deals lost 50–100% of invested capital. Yet US VC returned ~40% higher mean wealth btw 1984 and 2020 than a parallel investment path in the S&P 500.

Do most venture deals lose money while funds outperform public markets?

Core argument: Across more than 31,000 global venture capital deals from the mid-1990s to 2018, 62% lost money and over half of all deals lost 50–100% of invested capital, measured as multiples of invested capital.

Exhibit 8 shows in excess of 31,000 observations of returns, measured as multiples of invested capital at the beginning of the period, for global venture capital deals. These results are from the mid-1990s to 2018. 62% lost money and more than one-half of all deals lost 50 to 100% of invested capital. The offset is that the tails are much fatter than those for buyouts or public equities. Public market equivalent (PME) is generally reflected as a ratio between private equity and public market returns. A ratio above 1 reveals relative outperformance and below 1 means underperformance. Here’s an example of how PME works. Say a fund drew $200 million from its investors in January 2021 and paid out $470 million in December 2025. An investor could have invested the $200 million in the S&P 500, which returned $392 million over the same period. The PME would be 1.2 ($470/$392). For venture funds, the average over [1984-2020] was about 1.4.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Across more than 31,000 global venture capital deals from the mid-1990s to 2018, 62% lost money and over half of all deals lost 50–100% of invested capital, measured as multiples of invested capital.
  2. Venture capital return distributions have much fatter tails than those of buyouts or public equities, offsetting the majority of deals that lose money.
  3. Public market equivalent, the ratio of private equity returns to public market returns, averaged about 1.4 for venture funds from 1984 to 2020, with a ratio above 1 reflecting relative outperformance.

AI Summary. Regression evidence suggests governments can buy current account surpluses: raising the fiscal balance by $1 tends to raise the current account by about $0.30, while issuing $1 of domestic-currency debt to buy foreign-currency assets raises it by roughly $0.50-$0.60. Combining a fiscal surplus with foreign-currency investment, as Norway and Singapore do, yields about $0.80 per $1.

Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Using annual data for 146 countries from 1985 – 2024, Gagnon and Agrawal find that a $1 increase in a country’s cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit is associated with a 22–38¢ increase in its current-account deficit, with most of the estimates ~30¢.

Can governments buy current account surpluses with fiscal and currency policy?

Core argument: Regression results suggest that raising the fiscal balance by $1 tends to raise the current account by about $0.30.

Table 1 presents regression results. The evidence strongly suggests that governments can buy current account surpluses. Raising the fiscal balance by $1 tends to raise the current account by $0.30 [Table 1, first row]. Issuing $1 of domestic currency debt to buy foreign-currency assets (foreign exchange intervention) raises the current account anywhere from $0.20 to $1.00, with a value around $0.50 to $0.60 most plausible [Rows 2 though 5]. NOF is Net Official Flows, and NOS is the stock of net official foreign assets. The most powerful policy, as exemplified by Norway and Singapore, is to run a fiscal surplus and invest the proceeds in foreign-currency assets. In that case, $1 buys a current account surplus of around $0.80 or so. The results are supported by annual panel regressions of current accounts and cross-country stock regressions of cumulated current accounts or stocks of net foreign assets. The estimated effects in the panel regressions may be biased down slightly by incomplete modeling of lagged effects.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Regression results suggest that raising the fiscal balance by $1 tends to raise the current account by about $0.30.
  2. Issuing $1 of domestic currency debt to buy foreign-currency assets is estimated to raise the current account by $0.20 to $1.00, with $0.50 to $0.60 most plausible.
  3. Combining a fiscal surplus with investment of the proceeds in foreign-currency assets, as Norway and Singapore do, is estimated to buy a current account surplus of around $0.80 per $1.

AI Summary. Only 20% of global household wealth growth came from net new investment in real assets such as machinery, housing, infrastructure and intellectual property, down from a 30% average over the prior quarter century. Nearly 60% came from asset prices rising faster than inflation and negative net worth in other sectors.

Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

A McKinsey analysis finds global wealth is increasingly composed of “paper wealth,” driven by the rise of US equity values to 2.4x the book value of net corporate assets, and the debt of Chinese corporations, which grew to 80% of their real asset value.

Is household wealth growth driven more by asset prices than investment?

Core argument: Only 20% of global household wealth growth in 2025 came from net new investment in real assets such as machinery, homes, infrastructure, and intellectual property less depreciation, versus a 30% average over 2000–2024.

In 2025, global wealth growth was driven to a greater extent by paper wealth, or nominal asset value growth decoupled from the real economy. Only 20% of household wealth growth was based on net new investment (real assets including machinery and equipment, homes and buildings, infrastructure, and intellectual property, less depreciation), compared to 30% on average from 2000 to 2024. Nearly 60% came from asset price growth above and beyond general inflation and negative net worth positions from other sectors. [For example, this includes equity value growth above net assets for corporations as well as government bonds greater than the book value of government assets]. This was a marked increase over the average from 2000 to 2024, when paper gains drove one-third of global wealth growth.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Only 20% of global household wealth growth in 2025 came from net new investment in real assets such as machinery, homes, infrastructure, and intellectual property less depreciation, versus a 30% average over 2000–2024.
  2. Nearly 60% of 2025 global household wealth growth came from asset price gains above general inflation plus negative net worth positions in other sectors, compared with about one-third on average over 2000–2024.
  3. Paper wealth, meaning nominal asset value growth decoupled from the real economy, drove a greater share of global wealth growth in 2025, including equity values above corporate net assets and government bonds exceeding the book value of government assets.

AI Summary. In the US, Europe and Japan, pay growth has decoupled from productivity growth, with productivity pulling ahead. US labor productivity, measured as real GDP per hour worked, is more than 5x its 1947 level while real hourly compensation is only about 3x, and median wage growth lags even further behind.

Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

In advanced economies, increases in labor productivity growth have decoupled from real wage growth, especially post-1980.

Are wages falling further behind productivity growth in advanced economies?

Core argument: US labour productivity, measured as real GDP per hour worked, is more than five times its 1947 level, while real hourly compensation is only about three times greater.

In the US, Europe and Japan, pay growth has decoupled from productivity growth, with the latter having pulled ahead. US Labour productivity — measured as real GDP per hour worked — is now more than five times greater than in 1947, whereas real hourly compensation is only about three times greater. Median wage growth has lagged even further behind productivity growth, with inequality pushing the average wage higher than the median. (The figures above show average rather than median wages; plotting median wages would show an even greater divergence.)

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US labour productivity, measured as real GDP per hour worked, is more than five times its 1947 level, while real hourly compensation is only about three times greater.
  2. Pay growth has decoupled from productivity growth in the US, Europe and Japan, with productivity pulling ahead in all three.
  3. Median wage growth has lagged productivity growth by even more than average wage growth, as inequality pushes the average wage above the median.

AI Summary. US after-tax non-financial corporate profit margins remain elevated by historical standards, estimated at 7.6% versus a post-1949 high of 8.2%, while employee pay as a share of non-financial corporate gross value added has fallen from 66% to 56%. One argument holds that subdued demographic growth leads companies to prioritize maximizing margins over expanding capacity.

Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

In Q1 2026, US after-tax non-financial margins were estimated at 7.6%, just short of the post-1949 high of 8.2% in Q2 of 2021. Tan Kai Xian argues US corporate profits may not mean revert due to increased automation as the workforce shrinks relative to the economy.

Does slower population growth push companies to maximize profit margins?

Core argument: US after-tax non-financial corporate profit margins were estimated at 7.6% in the first quarter of 2026, just below the post-1949 high of 8.2% set in the second quarter of 2021.

US corporate profit margins remain elevated by historical standards. In the first quarter of 2026, US after-tax non-financial margins were estimated at 7.6%, only just below the post-1949 high of 8.2% reached in the second quarter of 2021. The second-quarter earnings season has also begun strongly, according to FactSet data. Employee remuneration as a share of gross value added for US non-financial corporate businesses declined from 66% in the fourth quarter of 2001 to 56% in the first quarter of 2026. [Will Denyer argued] "When strong demographic growth powers rapid demand growth, companies concentrate on expanding capacity and sales—on growing along with the growing market. That means they tend to focus less on their margins—less on getting the biggest profit they can out of every dollar of revenues. In contrast, when demographic growth is subdued, and hence there is less potential demand growth, companies are not so bent on expanding capacity as fast as they can, and are far more interested in squeezing the maximum possible margin from every dollar of sales."

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US after-tax non-financial corporate profit margins were estimated at 7.6% in the first quarter of 2026, just below the post-1949 high of 8.2% set in the second quarter of 2021.
  2. Employee remuneration as a share of gross value added for US non-financial corporate businesses fell from 66% in the fourth quarter of 2001 to 56% in the first quarter of 2026.
  3. Will Denyer argued that strong demographic growth leads companies to prioritize expanding capacity and sales, while subdued demographic growth pushes them to squeeze the maximum possible margin from every dollar of sales.

AI Summary. The US 30-year Treasury yield has traded above 5% for its longest stretch since 2007, with roughly 19% of trading sessions above that level, reflecting investor concerns about a growing debt pile and sticky inflation.

Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

So far this year, the US 30-year has traded beyond 5% for 27 days ~19% of trading days, the most since 2007.

Are rising long-term bond yields signaling worries about debt and inflation?

Core argument: The US 30-year Treasury yield has traded above 5% for 27 days this year, about 19% of all sessions, the most since 2007, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

The US 30-year bond yield is trading above 5% for the longest stretch since the dawn of the financial crisis, echoing investor concerns about a growing debt pile and sticky inflation. So far this year, the 30-year has traded beyond 5% for 27 days — or about 19% of all sessions, the most since 2007, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. It traded above that level for 50 days that year.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US 30-year Treasury yield has traded above 5% for 27 days this year, about 19% of all sessions, the most since 2007, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
  2. The 30-year yield traded above 5% for 50 days in 2007, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
  3. The 30-year yield's longest run above 5% since the dawn of the financial crisis echoes investor concerns about a growing US debt pile and sticky inflation.