“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
AI Summary.A global bond sell-off pushed long-term borrowing costs in the US, Europe and the UK to their highest levels in decades, with the 30-year US Treasury yield reaching 5.73%, its highest since 2002. Investors cited concerns over inflation and high public debt burdens, with French and Italian yields also rising.
Ian Smith, Emily Herbert and Kate DuguidFinancial Times
Date Posted:
The US 10-year Treasury yield fell to 5.29% from 5.36% after strong auction demand. The 30-year yield rose to as high as 5.73%, its highest level since 2002, before settling at 5.66%.
Are inflation and debt worries pushing long-term yields to decades-highs?
Core argument: The 30-year US Treasury yield rose as much as 0.09 percentage points to 5.73%, its highest level since 2002, before easing to 5.66% following a strong 10-year Treasury auction.
A sell-off in US government bonds eased after an auction of 10-year Treasuries drew strong demand in a sign that investors were seeking to lock in the highest yields since the turn of the millennium. US 10-year Treasury yields, a benchmark for borrowing costs in the world’s biggest economy, climbed as high as 5.36% in volatile trading early on Wednesday. But yields fell back sharply after a $39bn auction went smoothly, with the 10-year recently trading at 5.29%. France’s 10-year borrowing costs rose to 4.87%, heading back towards the post-2002 high reached this month, amid persistent worries that the Eurozone’s second-biggest economy was heading for a debt reckoning.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The 30-year US Treasury yield rose as much as 0.09 percentage points to 5.73%, its highest level since 2002, before easing to 5.66% following a strong 10-year Treasury auction.
A global bond sell-off pushed long-term borrowing costs in the US, Europe and the UK back to their highest levels in decades, as fears over inflation and high public debt burdens rattled investors.
French and Italian government bond yields each rose more than 0.1 percentage points, extending a series of wild swings in European government debt markets.
Related Articles:
France is the Biggest Loser in the Global Rates Reset— French government borrowing costs now exceed the country's nominal income growth by about 2 percentage points, the most unfavorable gap between borrowing costs and growth in the rich world. By contrast, Spanish and Greek bond yields remain about 2 percentage points below their income growth rates.
Soaring Bond Yields, Gaping Deficits and Towering Debts: What Could Go Wrong?— An analysis of 22 rich countries estimates that if each refinanced its entire debt at current five-year bond yields, Britain would need the largest primary surplus to stabilize its debt-to-GDP ratio, about 1.5%, followed by Italy at 1.4%, France at 1.2% and America at 1%.
How Might Fiscal Policy Respond to the Rise of Artificial Intelligence?— The Congressional Budget Office estimates that a permanent 0.5 percentage point increase in annual productivity growth would lower publicly held federal debt after 30 years by 39% of GDP, offsetting roughly half the projected rise from 101% of GDP to 175%. Higher revenue and slower spending growth outweigh higher interest costs.
AI Summary.The Bloomberg Dollar Spot Index rose as much as 0.5% alongside oil prices following a pickup in Iranian attacks on vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, approaching a new peak for the year. Nearly all Group of 10 currencies weakened against the dollar, with the euro lagging all its major peers.
Anya Andrianova and Melos AmbayeBloomberg
Date Posted:
The Bloomberg Dollar Spot Index is approaching a record high for the year as political risk from France weighs on the euro, though it remains ~4% under its pre-Liberation Day level.
Does rising shipping conflict strengthen the dollar against major currencies?
Core argument: The Bloomberg Dollar Spot Index rose as much as 0.5%, approaching a new peak for the year, alongside a rise in oil after a pickup in Iranian attacks on vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.
The Bloomberg Dollar Spot Index rose as much as 0.5% alongside oil after a pickup in Iranian attacks on vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. The gauge is approaching a new peak this year. Nearly all currencies in the Group of 10 have weakened against the greenback, with the euro lagging behind all its major peers.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The Bloomberg Dollar Spot Index rose as much as 0.5%, approaching a new peak for the year, alongside a rise in oil after a pickup in Iranian attacks on vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.
Nearly all Group of 10 currencies weakened against the dollar, with the euro lagging all of its major peers.
Related Articles:
Foreign Capital Flows Into US Stocks Hit Record As Appetite For Debt Fades— Foreign investors made a record $942bn in net purchases of US stocks and investment fund shares over 12 months, the highest rolling 12-month total in Treasury data going back to 1985. Foreign demand for US debt securities moved in the opposite direction, falling to a net $188bn in the second quarter from $314bn in the first.
World’s Unusually High Dollar Exposure Risks Fueling Selloff— Pension funds and insurers in Canada, Denmark, Australia, Taiwan, Japan and Finland hedged just 41% of their foreign-currency exposure, the lowest share since at least 2015. With some of the largest holders of US assets carrying little protection against a weaker dollar, the currency is at risk of steeper declines if sentiment turns.
Financing the AI Buildout— The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
AI Summary.Federal Reserve Bank of New York researchers estimate that about 26% of a uniform tariff passes through into non-oil consumer goods prices over twelve months, with roughly 64% of that effect coming directly from higher import prices and the rest through domestic producers' input costs and markups. Pass-through into import prices is nearly immediate, while domestic price responses build gradually.
Mary Amiti,Sebastian Heise and David WeinsteinFederal Reserve Bank of New York
Date Posted:
FRBNY estimates that a uniform 10% tariff raised consumer-goods prices 2.6% after 12 months: 1.7pp directly via imported final goods, and 0.9pp mainly via higher imported-input costs for domestically produced goods, with the latter effect building over 9–12 months.
How much of a tariff reaches consumer prices within a year?
Core argument: Amiti, Heise, and Weinstein estimate that a uniform tariff passes through to non-oil consumer goods prices at roughly 26 percent over twelve months, with a 10 percent tariff raising prices 2.6 percentage points, 1.7 points of it via the direct import channel.
Tariff pass-through into U.S. import prices is nearly complete. Instrumenting realized duty rates with statutory tariffs to account for endogenous sourcing and exemptions, tariff pass-through into consumer-goods import prices is about 90.5%; a 10% increase in the duty rate raises import prices about 9.1%. At twelve months, a uniform 10% tariff raises consumer-goods prices 2.639%: 1.694pp through the direct channel, 0.770pp through marginal costs, and 0.175pp through strategic complementarity. Import-price pass-through is essentially immediate, while domestic prices adjust gradually; the contribution of the two indirect channels roughly doubles between six and twelve months, with much of the overall adjustment occurring within nine to twelve months. For the actual 2025–26 tariffs, the direct channel accounts for about 70% of the estimated effect; the marginal-cost channel accounts for about 22%, with strategic complementarity accounting for the remainder. Because the regressions include date fixed effects, the tariff contribution is identified relative to less-exposed goods and should be read as illustrative rather than as the absolute contribution to aggregate goods CPI.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Amiti, Heise, and Weinstein estimate that a uniform tariff passes through to non-oil consumer goods prices at roughly 26 percent over twelve months, with a 10 percent tariff raising prices 2.6 percentage points, 1.7 points of it via the direct import channel.
The two indirect channels — marginal costs from imported inputs (0.77 percentage points) and strategic complementarity in domestic markups (0.17 points) — account for 36 percent of the total effect and roughly double between six and twelve months after tariff implementation.
Applied to the actual 2025–26 tariff schedule, the authors estimate the cumulative tariff contribution to goods CPI reached about 2.9 percentage points by February 2026, with import-price pass-through near 90 percent and retail pass-through of 0.56.
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The State of U.S. Tariffs July 24, 2026— The average statutory US tariff rate stands at 11.1% and, under current law including scheduled increases, is projected to reach 11.8% by year-end. The authors estimate current-law tariffs will raise consumer prices by about 0.7% and generate roughly $1.9tn over ten years, with revenue somewhat lower after accounting for tariffs' negative effect on economic output.
Who Is Paying for the 2025 U.S. Tariffs?— The authors estimate that 94% of U.S. tariff costs were borne domestically over the first eight months of 2025, with a 10% tariff associated with only a 0.6 percentage point decline in foreign export prices. Pass-through into U.S. import prices later declined to 86%, shifting more of the burden to foreign exporters.
Demand-Driven Inflation— Demand and supply curves estimated from pre-pandemic data imply relatively flat demand curves in the US and euro area, so adverse supply shifts would produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation. The authors argue explaining the observed combination of high inflation and output requires outward demand shifts, including accommodative monetary policy alongside fiscal expansion.
AI Summary.The 10-year US Treasury yield has risen past its 2007 high to its highest level since 2002, with the latest move driven by a US services survey showing services inflation proving intractable. The share of supply managers reporting rising prices climbed to its highest level since the post-pandemic surge.
John AuthersBloomberg
Date Posted:
The US 10-year Treasury yield is at its highest level since 2002. Authers notes: “A move of this magnitude should be a problem for equities. It hasn’t been…. On the face of it, the big tech companies are proving immune to the rising cost of money” likely due to rapidly growing earnings.
Are rising long-term bond yields driven by stubborn services inflation?
Core argument: The 10-year Treasury yield has broken above its 2007 high, the year a bond sell-off triggered the Global Financial Crisis, reaching its highest level since 2002.
The 10-year Treasury yield has now broken through its high from 2007, when a bond sell-off triggered the Global Financial Crisis. It’s now the highest since 2002. The latest impulse upward came from the ISM Services report for the US. Services inflation is proving intractable, and the proportion of supply managers complaining about rising prices climbed to its highest since the post-pandemic surge. With the exception of a few months at the top of the oil price spike in 2008, and in the brief spasm that followed Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the reading is the strongest since the series began in 1997.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The 10-year Treasury yield has broken above its 2007 high, the year a bond sell-off triggered the Global Financial Crisis, reaching its highest level since 2002.
The ISM Services report drove the latest upward move in yields, with services inflation proving intractable and the share of supply managers reporting rising prices climbing to its highest since the post-pandemic surge.
Apart from a few months at the peak of the 2008 oil price spike and the brief episode after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the ISM Services prices reading is the strongest since the series began in 1997.
Related Articles:
Foreign Capital Flows Into US Stocks Hit Record As Appetite For Debt Fades— Foreign investors made a record $942bn in net purchases of US stocks and investment fund shares over 12 months, the highest rolling 12-month total in Treasury data going back to 1985. Foreign demand for US debt securities moved in the opposite direction, falling to a net $188bn in the second quarter from $314bn in the first.
US Focus: The Effect Of Soaring Profits— US nominal pre-tax corporate profits in the national accounts grew 23% over the past year, a pace not seen outside post-recession spikes since the mid-2000s. Wider margins were the key driver, as domestic profit growth far exceeded the 8% rise in corporate value added, pushing margins near all-time highs while the labor share hit new lows.
A Catalyst For The AI Bubble Break— Historically, controlling for valuations, a 1% rise in the share of the market represented by initial public offerings has been associated with roughly a 4% decline in prices. With large artificial-intelligence company listings expected and share issuance exceeding buybacks, equity supply could shift from shrinking about 1% a year to growing near 5%, implying returns roughly 20% below average.
AI Summary.The U.S.-bound shipping network once turned about 89% of potential fleet capacity into effective service, but utilization fell below 70% as ships waited at anchor, slowed steaming, or sailed around maritime bottlenecks, and has not recovered. Diverting vessels around the Cape of Good Hope drives much of the loss.
Xiwen Bai, Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Yiliang Li, Ricardo Marto and Francesco ZanettiNational Bureau Of Economic Research
Date Posted:
US-bound shipping can fall far short of potential after disruptions. Pandemic queuing and slow steaming drove effective capacity from ~89% of potential to <70%. Later, Houthi attacks left it near 79% as ships rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope.
Why has shipping capacity to America not regained its prior utilization?
Core argument: The U.S.-bound shipping network converted about 89% of potential fleet capacity into effective service in 2016–2019, but aggregate utilization fell below 70% in 2021–2022 as ships waited at anchor, steamed slowly, or sailed around maritime bottlenecks.
In 2016–2019, the U.S.-bound shipping network turned about 89% of the fleet’s potential capacity into effective service [Figure 3.5]. During 2021–2022, effective capacity declined despite potential capacity reaching record highs. Pandemic-era port congestion and slower steaming pushed aggregate utilization below 70%. On the Asia-Pacific–U.S. West Coast route, utilization fell from about 92% before 2020 to 53% by late 2021. The route has since recovered but remains below its old peak. The network as a whole has not regained its pre-pandemic utilization. More recently, rerouting after the 2023–2024 Houthi attacks in the Red Sea held aggregate utilization near 79%. Utilization on the Middle East and Asia-Pacific routes to the U.S. East Coast via Suez fell to 48% and 61%, respectively, largely because diversion around the Cape of Good Hope lengthened voyages without increasing cargo delivered.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The U.S.-bound shipping network converted about 89% of potential fleet capacity into effective service in 2016–2019, but aggregate utilization fell below 70% in 2021–2022 as ships waited at anchor, steamed slowly, or sailed around maritime bottlenecks.
Utilization on the Asia-Pacific–U.S. West Coast route dropped from 92% before 2020 to 53% by late 2021 amid port congestion and slower steaming, recovering since but remaining well below its old peak.
Since late 2023, utilization on the Middle East and Asia-Pacific routes to the U.S. East Coast via the Suez Canal has fallen to 48% and 61%, with diversions around the Cape of Good Hope driving much of the loss as ships travel longer distances without delivering additional cargo.
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How to Fight an Economic War— China earned about $3.4bn from exporting rare-earth elements and magnets in a year, while the U.S. Geological Survey estimates a 30% disruption to U.S. supply of the rare-earth element neodymium alone would cut U.S. GDP by 2.2%, over $600bn. This asymmetry gives Chinese export controls their leverage.
Industrial Policy and Economic Security— Industrial policy justified on national security grounds requires weighing how much economic inefficiency is worth tolerating, since costs incurred today make a country poorer and therefore less able to project power later. The calculation is difficult because security gains are probabilistic and long-term economic costs are speculative.
The Rise Of The Security Premium— Energy security concerns, not environmentalism, are argued to drive the buildout of solar, wind, and nuclear power, since domestic generation avoids chokepoints like Hormuz, the Red Sea, and the Panama Canal. China and India are expected to demand higher strategic stockpiles of energy and other critical commodities, repricing security above efficiency.
AI Summary.Second-quarter real GDP growth was revised up 0.7 percentage points to +2.2% at an annual rate, reflecting upward revisions to consumption (to +3.8%) and investment (to +4.6%). Private fixed investment was revised up to +9.0%, driven by data center spending in nonresidential structures.
Jan Hatzius, David Mericle, Alec Phillips, Ronnie Walker, et al.Goldman Sachs
Date Posted:
GS forecasts that the FOMC will not hike in October, will do one 25bp hike in December and “ultimately conclude that additional rate hikes are unnecessary.”
What drove the upward revision to second-quarter GDP growth?
Core argument: U.S. real GDP growth in Q2 was revised up 0.7pp to +2.2% quarter-over-quarter annualized, led by upward revisions to consumption (+0.4pp to +3.8%) and investment (+1.9pp to +4.6%).
Real GDP was revised up by 0.7pp to +2.2% in Q2 (quarter-over-quarter annualized), largely reflecting upward revisions to consumption (+0.4pp to +3.8%) and investment (+1.9pp to +4.6%) growth. The strength in consumer spending in Q2 likely continued to reflect the boost to consumer cashflow from larger-than-usual tax refunds, but we continue to expect consumer spending growth to slow somewhat in 2026Q4 as the fiscal support fades and the headwind from higher energy prices remains. Stronger investment growth reflected an upward revision to private fixed investment (+0.5pp to +9.0%), driven by data center investment in the nonresidential structures category (+1.9pp to +0.1%), and an upward revision to the contribution from inventories (+0.2pp to -0.5pp).
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
U.S. real GDP growth in Q2 was revised up 0.7pp to +2.2% quarter-over-quarter annualized, led by upward revisions to consumption (+0.4pp to +3.8%) and investment (+1.9pp to +4.6%).
Private fixed investment growth in Q2 was revised up 0.5pp to +9.0%, driven by data center investment in nonresidential structures, revised up 1.9pp to +0.1%, alongside a +0.2pp revision to the inventory contribution, to -0.5pp.
Q2 consumer spending strength likely reflected the cashflow boost from larger-than-usual tax refunds, with spending growth expected to slow somewhat in 2026Q4 as fiscal support fades and higher energy prices remain a headwind.
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The Fed Finally Gets It— Federal Reserve officials' assessed risks to their employment and price stability mandates had tended to move together rather than inversely, suggesting common forces were driving both. That pattern has now shifted, with officials more optimistic on growth and employment and less concerned about downside risks than before the pandemic.
The Diesel Shock Is a Core Inflation Shock— The US Gulf Coast diesel crack spread cleared $100 per barrel for the first time on record, against a normal range of $15 to $30. Because diesel is an intermediate input embedded in the delivered cost of nearly every physical good, the author argues the increase migrates with a lag into core goods and services inflation.
Warsh’s Fed Soars Like a Hawk Into a Hiking Cycle— The Federal Reserve described its rate increase as having "removed a dose of accommodation" and as a start to showing it is serious, implying the policy rate remains accommodative and further increases are coming. Market-implied expectations have shifted to price in three additional hikes before the tightening cycle ends.
AI Summary.Japan, China, South Korea and Taiwan together hold just under $30tn in gross foreign assets, a five-fold rise over two decades, and about $10tn in net foreign assets. The author argues a current account surplus dominated by investment income, which tends to be reinvested abroad, generates less currency appreciation pressure than one driven by trade.
Udith SikandGavekal
Date Posted:
Northeast Asia’s ~$10T in net foreign assets would yield $400B annually at 4%, versus its ~$600B mean current-account surplus. Unlike export earnings, much investment income is reinvested abroad, creating less appreciation pressure.
Does investment income create less currency appreciation pressure than trade surpluses?
Core argument: Japan, China, South Korea and Taiwan together hold just under $30tn in gross foreign assets, a five-fold increase over the past two decades, with net foreign assets of about $10tn after liabilities to foreigners.
Japan, China, South Korea and Taiwan now hold nearly US10T net. At a 4% return, those net assets would generate roughly $600B over the past decade. The composition matters for exchange rates: exporters typically convert more of their foreign earnings into local currency to meet domestic costs, while foreign investment income is more likely to be reinvested abroad. A current-account surplus increasingly driven by investment income therefore creates less appreciation pressure than an equivalent trade surplus.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Japan, China, South Korea and Taiwan together hold just under $30tn in gross foreign assets, a five-fold increase over the past two decades, with net foreign assets of about $10tn after liabilities to foreigners.
At the current 4% federal funds rate, $10tn of net foreign assets would imply roughly $400bn a year in net investment income for the four Northeast Asian economies, against a combined current account surplus averaging about $600bn over the last decade.
A current account surplus dominated by investment income generates less appreciation pressure than one dominated by trade, as exporters are more likely to repatriate and convert dollar earnings to cover domestic input costs while investment-income earners are more likely to reinvest abroad.
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Understanding Global Imbalances— The US, China, Germany, and Japan account for roughly two-thirds of global current account imbalances, with the US deficit at 4% of GDP financed by capital inflows into dollar assets. The average duration of a surplus or deficit spell roughly doubled since the 1980s, building large net foreign asset and liability positions.
Who Will Win The War Of Neo-Mercantilists?— China's manufacturing export surplus is around 2% of world GDP, roughly twice the largest surplus Japan ever ran, while domestic demand has stalled. Unexplained negative net income of about $125bn on its $4tn in net foreign assets, versus an expected $100bn surplus, supports the argument that the renminbi is about 30% undervalued.
The Real Problem With Global Trade— Asia's $1.5tn trade surplus is larger as a share of world output than at any point since 1945 and is the only large surplus in the global economy. Exchange rates have a meaningful impact on trade balances: China's surplus reached about 10% of its output amid renminbi depreciation, then fell below 2% after a 40% real appreciation.
AI Summary.A rapid rise in long-term US Treasury yields has highlighted vulnerabilities elsewhere, notably France, where risks are elevated. Because France is in the euro zone, any crisis there would extend to the currency area, and European stocks have sold off alongside a weakening euro.
John AuthersBloomberg
Date Posted:
The spread between 10-year French OATs and German Bunds is pricing a second eurozone sovereign-debt crisis. Authers suggests that the recent surge in US long-term yields has “shone a light” on France’s fiscal weakness, raising its salience to investors.
Do rising US long-term yields expose vulnerabilities in Europe?
Core argument: The speed of the rise in US long-term Treasury yields has raised the risk of dislocations elsewhere, with France a point of elevated vulnerability that would extend to the rest of the euro zone.
The speed of [the upward move in US long yields] brought the risk of dislocations elsewhere, like in France. Much as a surprising hawkish shift from the Fed under Alan Greenspan in 1994 revealed underlying weaknesses in the Mexican financial system that led to the Tequila Crisis, so this Treasury scare has shone a light on where the world’s greatest vulnerabilities are to be found. As France is part of the euro zone, any crisis must naturally extend to the rest of the currency area, at a time when most of its members are moving in a nationalist direction and likely reluctant to help. That is beginning to have an impact on stocks. The main European bourses sold off even as US equities rallied on Thursday. In combination with a weakening euro, the continent’s stocks have now given up almost all their gains since Trump took office.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The speed of the rise in US long-term Treasury yields has raised the risk of dislocations elsewhere, with France a point of elevated vulnerability that would extend to the rest of the euro zone.
The Treasury scare echoes the Fed’s surprising hawkish shift under Alan Greenspan in 1994, which revealed weaknesses in Mexico’s financial system and led to the Tequila Crisis.
Europe’s main bourses sold off even as US equities rallied, and combined with a weakening euro, the continent’s stocks have given up almost all their gains since Trump took office.
Related Articles:
France Seeks To Rein In Pensions And State Salaries In 2027— France plans to narrow its budget deficit to 5% of GDP by cutting state spending, capping increases to pensions and civil servant salaries, and raising taxes. Deteriorating public finances have left France borrowing at higher interest rates than Italy and Greece, with 10-year bond yields reaching their highest since 2002.
Soaring Bond Yields, Gaping Deficits and Towering Debts: What Could Go Wrong?— An analysis of 22 rich countries estimates that if each refinanced its entire debt at current five-year bond yields, Britain would need the largest primary surplus to stabilize its debt-to-GDP ratio, about 1.5%, followed by Italy at 1.4%, France at 1.2% and America at 1%.
Global Debt Report 2026— Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.
