“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
“Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
AI Summary.The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
Stijn Van NieuwerburghBrookings Papers on Economic Activity
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Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh projects ~$10.3T will be spent on the AI buildout over 2025–2032, averaging 3.63% of GDP. He estimates 2/3 of that spending reflects IT equipment and one-third real estate and associated power infrastructure.
How much of the planned data center pipeline gets built?
Core argument: Using Cleanview project-level data from July 2026, the authors estimate roughly 57 GW of operating U.S. data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of roughly 509 GW, which they stress is not a completion forecast.
The required investment is enormous. A representative 200 MW AI training campus costs roughly $8.2 billion, about two-thirds of which reflects IT equipment and one-third the real estate and associated power infrastructure. We estimate that 183 GW is completed by 2032 with a further 118 GW completed after 2032. This pipeline will trigger about $10.3 trillion dollars of investment over 2025–2032. At an average of 3.63% of GDP per year, the projected buildout would be larger relative to the economy than the major U.S. canal, railroad, electrification, highway, and telecommunications investment booms. It would double the electricity consumption of the entire U.S. residential sector.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Using Cleanview project-level data from July 2026, the authors estimate roughly 57 GW of operating U.S. data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of roughly 509 GW, which they stress is not a completion forecast.
The authors’ central scenario allocates the announced pipeline so that 182.8 GW of additional U.S. capacity becomes operational during 2025–32, including 19.0 GW tied to projects already operational in 2025 or 2026.
The authors’ scenario has 117.2 GW of planned data center capacity completed after 2032 and 226.9 GW never completed, applying lower realization rates to more distant and less fully documented projects.
Related Articles:
Rear Window— Major cloud providers posted annual revenue growth of 37% at Amazon Web Services, 43% at Microsoft Azure and 82% at Google Cloud, with rising revenue backlogs of $514bn and $496bn respectively at Google Cloud and Amazon Web Services. Earnings growth appears highly contingent on continued hyperscaler capital spending and research, which rose from $460bn to $870bn.
AI Set to be Largest CapEx Cycle Ever … and Soon Majority Externally Financed— Hyperscaler and data-center investment is tracking toward $1.5tn annually by 2030, which in real terms would exceed the 2005-06 housing boom, the 1990s fiber peak, and the 1882 railroad peak combined. External debt and equity are projected to fund close to 90% of the buildout, making it dependent on credit markets.
The Summer I Turned Pretty— A warning sign in a boom cycle is when companies closest to final demand weaken while capital spending beneficiaries keep thriving, as when telecom operators' shares rolled over while communications equipment stocks kept rising. Semiconductor stock prices and free cash flow are soaring while large cloud providers' shares stagnate and their free cash flow plummets.
AI Summary.Estimated sustainable government net debt limits across 25 OECD countries average 234% of GDP under historical interest-rate and growth assumptions (221% for the US) and 214% under current rates (186% for the US). If interest rates rise systematically with debt, the model yields no solution for the US, UK, France, Italy, Greece, and Japan.
Mark WarshawskyAmerican Enterprise Institute
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Warshawsky calculates the US has a sustainable net debt limit, “the lowest level of debt at which a country can no longer service its sovereign debt and must effectively default,” of 186% of GDP, which he forecasts will be reached in ~15 years under current policy and economic conditions.
How high can government debt rise before it becomes unsustainable?
Core argument: Sustainable net debt limits across the US and 24 other OECD countries average 234% of GDP under historical interest rate–growth differentials and 221% for the US, falling to 214% on average and 186% for the US under current, higher interest rates and growth.
Using historical, current, and dynamic interest rate-to-economic growth differentials, countries’ sustainable debt limits are calculated on a net of central bank holdings of government debt basis. Sustainable net debt limits average 234% of GDP for these countries assuming historical rates and economic growth (221% for the US), 214% assuming (higher) current interest rates and economic growth (186% for the US). If, however, interest rates were to rise systematically with debt according to conservative assumptions, there is no model solution for France, Greece, Japan, Italy, the UK, and the US, given their current high debt levels; the average sustainable limit is 178% for the other countries. A reasonable conclusion to draw for the US is that the fiscal path under current policy and trends with rising interest rates is not sustainable in the short to intermediate term. A major fiscal consolidation package will be needed soon, as interest rates rise, unless significantly higher inflation or capital controls will result.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Sustainable net debt limits across the US and 24 other OECD countries average 234% of GDP under historical interest rate–growth differentials and 221% for the US, falling to 214% on average and 186% for the US under current, higher interest rates and growth.
If interest rates rise systematically with debt under conservative assumptions, the model yields no solution for France, Greece, Japan, Italy, the UK, and the US given their current high debt levels, while the average limit for the remaining countries is 178%.
A reasonable conclusion is that the US fiscal path under current policy and trends with rising interest rates is not sustainable in the short to intermediate term, and a major fiscal consolidation package will be needed soon unless significantly higher inflation or capital controls result.
Related Articles:
Soaring Bond Yields, Gaping Deficits and Towering Debts: What Could Go Wrong?— An analysis of 22 rich countries estimates that if each refinanced its entire debt at current five-year bond yields, Britain would need the largest primary surplus to stabilize its debt-to-GDP ratio, about 1.5%, followed by Italy at 1.4%, France at 1.2% and America at 1%.
How Might Fiscal Policy Respond to the Rise of Artificial Intelligence?— The Congressional Budget Office estimates that a permanent 0.5 percentage point increase in annual productivity growth would lower publicly held federal debt after 30 years by 39% of GDP, offsetting roughly half the projected rise from 101% of GDP to 175%. Higher revenue and slower spending growth outweigh higher interest costs.
Can AI Avert the Impending Federal Budget Crisis?— U.S. GDP per capita, about $87,000, is projected to reach $102,000 by 2035 with 1.8% annual productivity growth, or $110,000 with 2.7% growth. Because the healthcare sector has been slow to adopt AI, health spending is projected to rise from 18.3% of GDP to 21% under slower growth and 21.7% under faster growth.
AI Summary.Prime-age adults aged 25–54 and older workers aged 55–64 have higher employment rates in Europe than in the US, while US youth employment is higher because Europeans spend longer in education. The share of young people not in education, employment or training is higher in the US than in Europe.
Chris GilesFinancial Times
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Despite Europe’s high social spending relative to the US, Chris Giles notes that prime-age adult (25–54) labor force participation in the Eurozone has overtaken that of the US, and there has been a dramatic convergence in the LFP of older workers.
Do Europeans work less than Americans?
Core argument: Prime-age adults aged 25–54 in Europe are more likely to be employed than their US counterparts, whether measured with EU or Eurozone data, and Europeans aged 55–64 also have higher employment rates than Americans.
It does not matter whether you use EU or Eurozone data, prime-age adults (between 25 and 54) in Europe are more likely to be in work than those in the US. Older people (between 55 and 64) also have higher employment rates in Europe. Younger people (between 15 and 24) are more likely to have a job in the US, but that results from Europeans educating themselves for longer. The proportion of young people not in education, employment or training is higher in the US than in Europe. So welfare is not stopping work. More than that, the higher-welfare north of Europe tends to have higher employment rates than the south, although there is convergence within the Eurozone. Spain, in particular, has enjoyed rapid improvements.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Prime-age adults aged 25–54 in Europe are more likely to be employed than their US counterparts, whether measured with EU or Eurozone data, and Europeans aged 55–64 also have higher employment rates than Americans.
Young people aged 15–24 are more likely to have a job in the US than in Europe, but that gap results from Europeans spending longer in education, and the share not in education, employment or training is higher in the US.
The higher-welfare north of Europe tends to have higher employment rates than the south, with convergence within the Eurozone and rapid improvement in Spain.
Related Articles:
Why Do Americans No Longer Work So Much More Than Non-Americans?— About half of the 1990s gap between American and European hours worked had reversed by the end of the 2010s. The authors estimate US hours per person declined after the 2000s because of rising benefits for the non-employed—especially health benefits like Medicaid—while non-US hours rose with higher wages and lower work costs.
The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe— A European Union competitiveness report attributes the EU's labour productivity growth gap with the US largely to weaker activity in information and communications technology and large-scale digital services; excluding main ICT sectors, EU productivity was broadly at par with the US from 2000-2019. It estimates Europe's investment share must rise about 5 percentage points of GDP.
Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking”— A debate on U.S. fiscal policy argues that spending increases, rather than the tax increases needed to fund them, slow growth, and that higher taxes would reduce the expected value of America's innovative risk-taking. The argument holds that cutting debt below 100% of GDP is critical.
AI Summary.An analysis of more than 31,000 global venture capital deals finds 62% lost money and over half lost 50–100% of invested capital, though the distribution of returns has much fatter tails than buyouts or public equities. Venture funds averaged a public market equivalent ratio of about 1.4, indicating returns above public markets.
Michael Mauboussin and Dan CallahanMorgan Stanley
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Btw the mid-90s and 2018, 62% of global venture capital investments lost money, and more than half of the deals lost 50–100% of invested capital. Yet US VC returned ~40% higher mean wealth btw 1984 and 2020 than a parallel investment path in the S&P 500.
Do most venture deals lose money while funds outperform public markets?
Core argument: Across more than 31,000 global venture capital deals from the mid-1990s to 2018, 62% lost money and over half of all deals lost 50–100% of invested capital, measured as multiples of invested capital.
Exhibit 8 shows in excess of 31,000 observations of returns, measured as multiples of invested capital at the beginning of the period, for global venture capital deals. These results are from the mid-1990s to 2018. 62% lost money and more than one-half of all deals lost 50 to 100% of invested capital. The offset is that the tails are much fatter than those for buyouts or public equities. Public market equivalent (PME) is generally reflected as a ratio between private equity and public market returns. A ratio above 1 reveals relative outperformance and below 1 means underperformance. Here’s an example of how PME works. Say a fund drew $200 million from its investors in January 2021 and paid out $470 million in December 2025. An investor could have invested the $200 million in the S&P 500, which returned $392 million over the same period. The PME would be 1.2 ($470/$392). For venture funds, the average over [1984-2020] was about 1.4.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Across more than 31,000 global venture capital deals from the mid-1990s to 2018, 62% lost money and over half of all deals lost 50–100% of invested capital, measured as multiples of invested capital.
Venture capital return distributions have much fatter tails than those of buyouts or public equities, offsetting the majority of deals that lose money.
Public market equivalent, the ratio of private equity returns to public market returns, averaged about 1.4 for venture funds from 1984 to 2020, with a ratio above 1 reflecting relative outperformance.
Related Articles:
Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance during World War II— Analysis of over 5,000 German World War II fighter pilots finds that public peer recognition was associated with higher victory scores among skilled pilots without higher mortality, while average pilots gained little in victories but died at higher rates. The authors conclude status-based awards can have uneven effects in high-risk settings.
The Deep End: 2025 Alternative Investments Review— In venture capital, only consistently investing with top-quartile managers outperformed the S&P 500, while the median manager at best matched public equity markets and fourth-quartile managers destroyed value relative to equities. Fees are part of the issue: an 11.7% annualized NASDAQ 100 return falls to 7.4% under a 2%/20% fee structure.
One Hundred Years in the U.S. Stock Markets— Over a century, U.S. publicly traded stocks generated roughly $91tn in shareholder wealth enhancement, with returns strongly positively skewed and dominated by a relatively small number of high-performing firms. Because most possible outcomes fall below the mean in a skewed distribution, the authors argue financial planning should focus on median outcomes or the full distribution.
AI Summary.US Treasuries erased nearly all gains that followed the Treasury Department's surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, with the 30-year yield rising above 5.27% and the 10-year touching 4.71%. The reversal signals the move has done little to ease concern about surging government debt.
Michael MacKenzie and Alice GledhillBloomberg
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The 30-year yield rose ~7bps to as much as 5.27%, and the 10-year yield hit 4.71%, erasing “almost all” the gains that followed Treasury’s surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds.
Do bigger bond buybacks ease concerns about surging government debt?
Core argument: The US 30-year Treasury yield rose more than seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, returning to where it stood just ahead of the Treasury Department's buyback announcement, before paring the gain.
US Treasuries erased almost all of the gains that followed the Trump administration’s surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, signaling the move has done little to alleviate the angst about the surging government debt that has pushed some yields to the highest in close to two decades. The 30-year yield on Thursday rose over seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, where it was just ahead of the US Treasury Department’s announcement early Wednesday, before paring the gain. The 10-year yield touched 4.71%, just shy of its highest level since early 2025.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The US 30-year Treasury yield rose more than seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, returning to where it stood just ahead of the Treasury Department's buyback announcement, before paring the gain.
US Treasuries erased almost all of the gains that followed the Trump administration's surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, suggesting the move has done little to alleviate angst about surging government debt.
The US 10-year yield touched 4.71%, just shy of its highest level since early 2025, as angst over government debt pushed some yields to the highest in close to two decades.
Related Articles:
Bessent Boosts Debt Buybacks After Climb in Treasury Yields— The US Treasury announced it is at least doubling the size of its liquidity support buyback operations for government debt maturing in 10 to 30 years, following long-dated yields reaching their highest levels in years. Yields on the longest bond fell nearly 10 basis points to 5.185%.
The Coming Great Repression?— Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds, the opposite of standard risk-premium predictions. The authors estimate financial repression—making banks captive bond buyers and loading them with low-return reserves—contributed 90.7 percentage points of GDP to Britain's postwar debt reduction, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation.
The United States Capital Structure— Because Social Security and Medicare benefits are politically untouchable, retirees effectively hold the most senior claim on US government resources while Treasury bondholders hold the riskiest one. On this argument, bondholders absorb adverse fiscal shocks through surprise inflation, financial repression, or both.
AI Summary.Global fertility is likely below the replacement level needed to keep population constant in the long run, though population momentum from large cohorts of women now having children means world population will keep growing for roughly another 30 years. Unless trends change, it is projected to peak near 9bn around 2056 and then decline.
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde and Patrick NorrickUniversity of Pennsylvania
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The UN appears to systematically overestimate births; e.g. 33 of 37 countries with high-quality statistics registered fewer births in 2024 than the UN had forecast. Fernández-Villaverde and Norrick infer humanity is below replacement fertility in 2026.
Will world population keep growing even as fertility falls below replacement?
Core argument: As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below replacement fertility, with fewer births than needed to keep population constant in the long run.
In Table A1 we compare the World Population Prospects (WPP) estimates of births in 2022-2023 with the official numbers reported by several countries. [A2 shows the full sample with the deviations.] As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below the replacement fertility level: we are having fewer births than we need to keep population constant in the long run. This astonishing fact does not mean that population has stopped growing. Because of momentum effects (the large cohorts of women born two or three decades ago are having their children now, and their own parents have not died yet), world population will keep growing for another 30 years or so. But unless trends change, it will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then start falling, first slowly, then fast.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below replacement fertility, with fewer births than needed to keep population constant in the long run.
World population is set to keep growing for roughly another 30 years because of momentum effects, as large cohorts of women born two or three decades ago have their children while their own parents are still alive.
Unless trends change, world population will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then start falling, first slowly, then fast.
Related Articles:
The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences— The authors estimate the world total fertility rate is around 2.17, below the global replacement rate of roughly 2.21, meaning humanity is already below replacement, with fertility and births falling faster than anticipated. They project middle-income countries' fertility may fall below that of rich countries outside East Asia, with emigration compounding population decline.
Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come— Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
The Wealth of Working Nations— Because of population aging, growth in GDP per capita and GDP per working-age adult have diverged across advanced economies; from 1998 to 2019 Japan's accumulated growth per working-age adult was 31.9% versus 29.5% in the US. The authors find a standard neoclassical growth model calibrated to each country's working-age population tracks output per working-age adult in most economies.
AI Summary.Regression evidence suggests governments can buy current account surpluses: raising the fiscal balance by $1 tends to raise the current account by about $0.30, while issuing $1 of domestic-currency debt to buy foreign-currency assets raises it by roughly $0.50-$0.60. Combining a fiscal surplus with foreign-currency investment, as Norway and Singapore do, yields about $0.80 per $1.
Joseph Gagnon and Nishtha AgrawalPeterson Institute For International Economics
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Using annual data for 146 countries from 1985 – 2024, Gagnon and Agrawal find that a $1 increase in a country’s cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit is associated with a 22–38¢ increase in its current-account deficit, with most of the estimates ~30¢.
Can governments buy current account surpluses with fiscal and currency policy?
Core argument: Regression results suggest that raising the fiscal balance by $1 tends to raise the current account by about $0.30.
Table 1 presents regression results. The evidence strongly suggests that governments can buy current account surpluses. Raising the fiscal balance by $1 tends to raise the current account by $0.30 [Table 1, first row]. Issuing $1 of domestic currency debt to buy foreign-currency assets (foreign exchange intervention) raises the current account anywhere from $0.20 to $1.00, with a value around $0.50 to $0.60 most plausible [Rows 2 though 5]. NOF is Net Official Flows, and NOS is the stock of net official foreign assets. The most powerful policy, as exemplified by Norway and Singapore, is to run a fiscal surplus and invest the proceeds in foreign-currency assets. In that case, $1 buys a current account surplus of around $0.80 or so. The results are supported by annual panel regressions of current accounts and cross-country stock regressions of cumulated current accounts or stocks of net foreign assets. The estimated effects in the panel regressions may be biased down slightly by incomplete modeling of lagged effects.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Regression results suggest that raising the fiscal balance by $1 tends to raise the current account by about $0.30.
Issuing $1 of domestic currency debt to buy foreign-currency assets is estimated to raise the current account by $0.20 to $1.00, with $0.50 to $0.60 most plausible.
Combining a fiscal surplus with investment of the proceeds in foreign-currency assets, as Norway and Singapore do, is estimated to buy a current account surplus of around $0.80 per $1.
Related Articles:
Understanding Global Imbalances— The US, China, Germany, and Japan account for roughly two-thirds of global current account imbalances, with the US deficit at 4% of GDP financed by capital inflows into dollar assets. The average duration of a surplus or deficit spell roughly doubled since the 1980s, building large net foreign asset and liability positions.
The U.S. Trade Deficit: Myths and Realities— Taxing capital inflows would weaken the dollar but could raise domestic interest rates and depress investment, harming long-term growth, while an interest rate cut absent recession would be inflationary and erode any real depreciation needed to durably improve the trade balance. Fiscal restraint could weaken the dollar and reduce the trade deficit.
The Dangerous Triumph Of Neo-Mercantilism— Neo-mercantilism is thriving in both China, which pairs infant-industry promotion with large trade surpluses, and in a United States focused on external deficits and protecting domestic markets. The author argues this will likely fracture the world economy, and that a new multilateral treaty could include a mechanism to combat large structural trade surpluses.
AI Summary.Only 20% of global household wealth growth came from net new investment in real assets such as machinery, housing, infrastructure and intellectual property, down from a 30% average over the prior quarter century. Nearly 60% came from asset prices rising faster than inflation and negative net worth in other sectors.
Rebecca Anderson, Jan Mischke, Arvind Govindarajan, Sylvain Johansson, et al.McKinsey
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A McKinsey analysis finds global wealth is increasingly composed of “paper wealth,” driven by the rise of US equity values to 2.4x the book value of net corporate assets, and the debt of Chinese corporations, which grew to 80% of their real asset value.
Is household wealth growth driven more by asset prices than investment?
Core argument: Only 20% of global household wealth growth in 2025 came from net new investment in real assets such as machinery, homes, infrastructure, and intellectual property less depreciation, versus a 30% average over 2000–2024.
In 2025, global wealth growth was driven to a greater extent by paper wealth, or nominal asset value growth decoupled from the real economy. Only 20% of household wealth growth was based on net new investment (real assets including machinery and equipment, homes and buildings, infrastructure, and intellectual property, less depreciation), compared to 30% on average from 2000 to 2024. Nearly 60% came from asset price growth above and beyond general inflation and negative net worth positions from other sectors. [For example, this includes equity value growth above net assets for corporations as well as government bonds greater than the book value of government assets]. This was a marked increase over the average from 2000 to 2024, when paper gains drove one-third of global wealth growth.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Only 20% of global household wealth growth in 2025 came from net new investment in real assets such as machinery, homes, infrastructure, and intellectual property less depreciation, versus a 30% average over 2000–2024.
Nearly 60% of 2025 global household wealth growth came from asset price gains above general inflation plus negative net worth positions in other sectors, compared with about one-third on average over 2000–2024.
Paper wealth, meaning nominal asset value growth decoupled from the real economy, drove a greater share of global wealth growth in 2025, including equity values above corporate net assets and government bonds exceeding the book value of government assets.
Related Articles:
The Next Crash: Why This Time Might Not Be Different— The "excess CAPE yield" — the gap between cyclically adjusted earnings yields on stocks and inflation-adjusted Treasury bond yields — stands at 1.4%, far below its long-run average of 4.7%. Historically, a low excess yield has been associated with poor subsequent 10-year excess returns on stocks, though it does not reliably predict an imminent crash.
The Summer I Turned Pretty— A warning sign in a boom cycle is when companies closest to final demand weaken while capital spending beneficiaries keep thriving, as when telecom operators' shares rolled over while communications equipment stocks kept rising. Semiconductor stock prices and free cash flow are soaring while large cloud providers' shares stagnate and their free cash flow plummets.
One Hundred Years in the U.S. Stock Markets— Over a century, U.S. publicly traded stocks generated roughly $91tn in shareholder wealth enhancement, with returns strongly positively skewed and dominated by a relatively small number of high-performing firms. Because most possible outcomes fall below the mean in a skewed distribution, the authors argue financial planning should focus on median outcomes or the full distribution.
