AI Summary. Analysis allocating US federal spending by age group estimates that Americans over 65 received about 10x as much federal money per person as younger groups until the 2010s, falling to about 6x by 2024 as the elderly population grew. Similar trends appear in most of 29 other rich countries.

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An Economist analysis finds that in most advanced economies it examined (26 of 32), elderly incomes are now falling relative to those of working-age people. By its estimates, Americans over 65 received ~10x as much federal spending per person as other age groups until the 2010s, falling to ~6x by 2024. That drop mostly reflects the elderly population growth outpacing spending increases, not spending cuts.

Is federal spending per elderly person falling relative to younger groups?

Core argument: Using a University of Pennsylvania methodology, The Economist estimates Americans over 65 received ten times as much federal money per person as other age groups until the 2010s, falling to six times by 2024.

Wonks at the University of Pennsylvania allocate federal spending in America to different age groups. Using their methodology, we estimate that until the 2010s Americans over 65 received ten times as much federal money per person as other age groups did. Outlays on Social Security and Medicare, the health-care programme for the elderly, vastly outweighed spending on child benefits (lots of education spending is within the purview of states and cities rather than the federal government). Pots of money continue to flow to the elderly. But because so many people are ageing so fast, individual oldsters are losing out. By 2024 the American old were getting six times as much government largesse as younger cohorts rather than ten times. In the majority of the other 29 rich countries we examine, we find similar trends. In Italy old-age spending has gone from almost 15 times as much as spending on families and children before the pandemic to less than ten times as much.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Using a University of Pennsylvania methodology, The Economist estimates Americans over 65 received ten times as much federal money per person as other age groups until the 2010s, falling to six times by 2024.
  2. Social Security and Medicare outlays vastly outweighed federal spending on child benefits in the United States, where much education spending falls to states and cities rather than the federal government.
  3. Similar trends appear in most of the 29 other rich countries examined, with Italy’s old-age spending falling from almost 15 times spending on families and children before the pandemic to less than ten times.

AI Summary. US debt held by the public peaked at a record 106.1% of GDP after World War II and fell as a share of the economy through 1974, aided by rapid growth, deficits averaging just 0.4% of GDP, and more tax increases than cuts. The federal deficit was 6.2% of GDP in fiscal 2026.

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Both growth and fiscal restraint gradually erased the WWII debt burden. Tax increases in 1982–93 helped reverse the large deficits of the 1980s, contributing to surpluses in 1998–2001. In line with this history, growth alone is unlikely to stabilize the current debt trajectory.

Can economic growth alone bring down the national debt?

Core argument: US debt held by the public peaked at a record 106.1% of GDP in fiscal 1946 and fell as a share of GDP through 1974, aided by rapid growth and a fiscal balance averaging -0.4% of GDP from 1947 to 1974.

The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, also known as the Reagan tax cuts, is remembered variously as a budget-busting disaster and the driver of a new era of growth. There’s some truth to both portrayals, but what doesn’t come up nearly enough is that the 1981 tax cuts were followed by tax increases in 1982, 1983, 1984, 1986 (just barely; that year’s Tax Reform Act was supposed to be revenue-neutral), 1987, 1990 and 1993. Thanks in part to the end of the Cold War, Congress was also able to reduce spending growth in the 1990s, with federal outlays falling from 21.7% of GDP in 1991 to 17.7% in 2000 and 2001. The result: four straight years of budget surpluses, and a debt-to-GDP ratio that fell from 47.9% in 1993 to 31.5% in 2001.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US debt held by the public peaked at a record 106.1% of GDP in fiscal 1946 and fell as a share of GDP through 1974, aided by rapid growth and a fiscal balance averaging -0.4% of GDP from 1947 to 1974.
  2. The US fiscal balance in fiscal 2026 was -6.2% of GDP, compared with the -0.4% average that accompanied the postwar decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio.
  3. Federal spending tripled in inflation-adjusted terms from 1947 to 1974 and rose from 16.1% to 17.8% of GDP, with revenue rising almost as fast in a period with more tax increases than decreases, according to a 2013 Treasury Department accounting of major tax legislation.

AI Summary. French government borrowing costs now exceed the country's nominal income growth by about 2 percentage points, the most unfavorable gap between borrowing costs and growth in the rich world. By contrast, Spanish and Greek bond yields remain about 2 percentage points below their income growth rates.

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The change in a country’s interest rate, Klein argues, should be measured against the change in nominal income growth. By that metric, France has moved from “core Europe” into the periphery – while Italy, Spain and especially Greece have moved in the opposite direction.

Do French borrowing costs now exceed its income growth?

Core argument: France’s borrowing costs exceeded its nominal income growth rate by about 2pp as of 2026Q2, and by roughly 3pp at current yields, the most unfavorable such spread in the rich world.

The problem for France is that its bond yields are surging even as its nominal income growth has slowed relative to the 2017-2019 pace, to the point that, almost uniquely among rich countries, borrowing costs there now substantially exceed growth rates. In fact, the spread between French sovereign borrowing costs and French growth rates is now the most unfavorable anywhere in the rich world. The French economy was not quite growing by 2% a year in euro terms as of 2026Q2, which was even worse than the anemic 3% yearly average nominal growth rate recorded in 2017Q1-2019Q4. As of 2026Q2, France’s cost of borrowing was therefore about 2pp higher than its income growth rate. (At current yields, the penalty is more like 3pp.) By contrast, Spanish and Greek bond yields are still about 2pp lower than their income growth rates.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. France’s borrowing costs exceeded its nominal income growth rate by about 2pp as of 2026Q2, and by roughly 3pp at current yields, the most unfavorable such spread in the rich world.
  2. French nominal growth was running just under 2% a year in euro terms as of 2026Q2, below the 3% yearly average recorded in 2017Q1–2019Q4, even as French bond yields surged.
  3. Spanish and Greek bond yields remain about 2pp below their nominal income growth rates, in contrast to France’s unfavorable gap.

AI Summary. The Congressional Budget Office projects that if interest rates rose to 1 percentage point above its baseline, federal debt held by the public would reach 222% of GDP by 2056, 47 percentage points above baseline, with primary deficits averaging 2.3% of GDP and annual growth 0.1 percentage point slower.

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If interest rates rise 1pp above CBO’s current extended baseline (a mean rate of 4% over 2026–2056), CBO projects federal debt held by the public will be 222% of GDP in 2056, versus 175% under the current baseline.

How much would higher interest rates raise projected federal debt?

Core argument: CBO projects that under a scenario in which interest rates rise to 1 percentage point above its extended baseline, debt held by the public would reach 222% of GDP in fiscal year 2056, 47 percentage points above the extended baseline.

Under a scenario in which interest rates increased until they were 1 percentage point higher than in CBO’s extended baseline, primary deficits—that is, deficits excluding net outlays for interest—would average 2.3% of GDP over the 2026–2056 period, 0.2 percentage points larger than in the extended baseline. Debt held by the public would grow to 222 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2056, 47 percentage points larger than in the extended baseline. Average annual GDP growth over the 2026–2056 period would be 0.1 percentage point slower than in CBO’s extended baseline, and the average interest rate on federal debt would be 0.7 percentage points higher.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. CBO projects that under a scenario in which interest rates rise to 1 percentage point above its extended baseline, debt held by the public would reach 222% of GDP in fiscal year 2056, 47 percentage points above the extended baseline.
  2. Primary deficits, which exclude net outlays for interest, would average 2.3% of GDP over 2026–2056 in CBO’s higher-interest-rate scenario, 0.2 percentage points larger than in its extended baseline.
  3. Under CBO’s higher-interest-rate scenario, average annual GDP growth over 2026–2056 would be 0.1 percentage point slower and the average interest rate on federal debt 0.7 percentage points higher than in its extended baseline.

AI Summary. Estimated sustainable government net debt limits across 25 OECD countries average 234% of GDP under historical interest-rate and growth assumptions (221% for the US) and 214% under current rates (186% for the US). If interest rates rise systematically with debt, the model yields no solution for the US, UK, France, Italy, Greece, and Japan.

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Warshawsky calculates the US has a sustainable net debt limit, “the lowest level of debt at which a country can no longer service its sovereign debt and must effectively default,” of 186% of GDP, which he forecasts will be reached in ~15 years under current policy and economic conditions.

How high can government debt rise before it becomes unsustainable?

Core argument: Sustainable net debt limits across the US and 24 other OECD countries average 234% of GDP under historical interest rate–growth differentials and 221% for the US, falling to 214% on average and 186% for the US under current, higher interest rates and growth.

Using historical, current, and dynamic interest rate-to-economic growth differentials, countries’ sustainable debt limits are calculated on a net of central bank holdings of government debt basis. Sustainable net debt limits average 234% of GDP for these countries assuming historical rates and economic growth (221% for the US), 214% assuming (higher) current interest rates and economic growth (186% for the US). If, however, interest rates were to rise systematically with debt according to conservative assumptions, there is no model solution for France, Greece, Japan, Italy, the UK, and the US, given their current high debt levels; the average sustainable limit is 178% for the other countries. A reasonable conclusion to draw for the US is that the fiscal path under current policy and trends with rising interest rates is not sustainable in the short to intermediate term. A major fiscal consolidation package will be needed soon, as interest rates rise, unless significantly higher inflation or capital controls will result.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Sustainable net debt limits across the US and 24 other OECD countries average 234% of GDP under historical interest rate–growth differentials and 221% for the US, falling to 214% on average and 186% for the US under current, higher interest rates and growth.
  2. If interest rates rise systematically with debt under conservative assumptions, the model yields no solution for France, Greece, Japan, Italy, the UK, and the US given their current high debt levels, while the average limit for the remaining countries is 178%.
  3. A reasonable conclusion is that the US fiscal path under current policy and trends with rising interest rates is not sustainable in the short to intermediate term, and a major fiscal consolidation package will be needed soon unless significantly higher inflation or capital controls result.

AI Summary. A U.S. Treasury buyback of long-dated off-the-run bonds produced only a small decline in long-term yields that was subsequently reversed, leaving the upward trend in yields intact. The dollar fell steeply against both developed-market and emerging-market currencies while gold and other precious metals rose, suggesting markets are positioned for further dollar debasement.

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As Treasury intervened to lower long bond yields yesterday, the dollar fell against G10 and EM currencies. Brooks fears Treasury’s move is the “clearest sign yet that the US is following Japan on its path towards currency debasement.”

Do bond buybacks lower long-term yields or weaken the dollar?

Core argument: The Treasury's buyback of long-dated off-the-run bonds produced only a small decline in yields that was subsequently completely reversed, leaving the upward trend in long-term yields in place, in the author's assessment.

The key question is whether the Treasury got a good bang for the buck yesterday [from its intervention in the market for long-dated off-the-run bonds]. I’m not sure it did. This thing fell but the drop isn’t going to impress anyone. [It was subsequently completely reversed]. The upward trend in long-term yields is clearly still in place. The dollar absolutely cratered against the G10 (blue line) and EM (black line). Furthermore, gold jumped yesterday, as did other precious metals. Markets are primed for dollar debasement to resume and - as Japan shows - it can be next to impossible to stabilize a currency once it enters a devaluation spiral. The US is playing with fire with this buyback.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Treasury's buyback of long-dated off-the-run bonds produced only a small decline in yields that was subsequently completely reversed, leaving the upward trend in long-term yields in place, in the author's assessment.
  2. The dollar fell sharply against both G10 and emerging-market currencies following the Treasury's intervention, while gold and other precious metals jumped.
  3. The author argues markets are primed for dollar debasement to resume and that, as Japan shows, stabilizing a currency once it enters a devaluation spiral is next to impossible.

AI Summary. US Treasuries erased nearly all gains that followed the Treasury Department's surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, with the 30-year yield rising above 5.27% and the 10-year touching 4.71%. The reversal signals the move has done little to ease concern about surging government debt.

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The 30-year yield rose ~7bps to as much as 5.27%, and the 10-year yield hit 4.71%, erasing “almost all” the gains that followed Treasury’s surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds.

Do bigger bond buybacks ease concerns about surging government debt?

Core argument: The US 30-year Treasury yield rose more than seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, returning to where it stood just ahead of the Treasury Department's buyback announcement, before paring the gain.

US Treasuries erased almost all of the gains that followed the Trump administration’s surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, signaling the move has done little to alleviate the angst about the surging government debt that has pushed some yields to the highest in close to two decades. The 30-year yield on Thursday rose over seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, where it was just ahead of the US Treasury Department’s announcement early Wednesday, before paring the gain. The 10-year yield touched 4.71%, just shy of its highest level since early 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US 30-year Treasury yield rose more than seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, returning to where it stood just ahead of the Treasury Department's buyback announcement, before paring the gain.
  2. US Treasuries erased almost all of the gains that followed the Trump administration's surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, suggesting the move has done little to alleviate angst about surging government debt.
  3. The US 10-year yield touched 4.71%, just shy of its highest level since early 2025, as angst over government debt pushed some yields to the highest in close to two decades.

AI Summary. Ten-year forward yields ten years ahead have risen across major advanced economies, not just the US, a global theme the author attributes to the debt buildup during the pandemic. The author argues economies have begun shifting from a good to a bad debt equilibrium, which he sees behind the rally in precious metals prices tied to a "debasement trade.

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Citing the growing number of fiscal “accidents,” from the 2022 collapse of the Truss government in the UK to ongoing depreciation pressure on the Yen, Brooks argues a global debt crisis is underway.

Are rising long-term yields a global story driven by pandemic debt?

Core argument: 10y10y forward yields have risen across key G10 economies, with the US not standing out, a pattern attributed to the global debt binge during the pandemic.

The chart shows 10y10y forward yields across key G10 economies. The US doesn’t even stand out in this perspective. Rising longer-term yields are a global theme and stem from the global debt binge that happened during the pandemic. There are multiple equilibria when it comes to debt, and it’s one of my big convictions that - in the years since the COVID pandemic - we’ve begun to shift from a good to a bad equilibrium. This is, in my opinion, why seemingly innocuous things like Powell’s dovish keynote speech at Jackson Hole a year ago sparked the absolutely insane rally in precious metals prices we saw last year. That “debasement trade” in my mind is all about markets seeing the writing on the wall when it comes to fiscal policy.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. 10y10y forward yields have risen across key G10 economies, with the US not standing out, a pattern attributed to the global debt binge during the pandemic.
  2. The author argues that debt has multiple equilibria and that a shift from a good to a bad equilibrium has begun in the years since the COVID pandemic.
  3. The author attributes the rally in precious metals prices after Powell's dovish Jackson Hole keynote to a "debasement trade" reflecting markets' view of fiscal policy.