“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
AI Summary.The Congressional Budget Office projects that if interest rates rose to 1 percentage point above its baseline, federal debt held by the public would reach 222% of GDP by 2056, 47 percentage points above baseline, with primary deficits averaging 2.3% of GDP and annual growth 0.1 percentage point slower.
CBO StaffCongressional Budget OffIce
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If interest rates rise 1pp above CBO’s current extended baseline (a mean rate of 4% over 2026–2056), CBO projects federal debt held by the public will be 222% of GDP in 2056, versus 175% under the current baseline.
How much would higher interest rates raise projected federal debt?
Core argument: CBO projects that under a scenario in which interest rates rise to 1 percentage point above its extended baseline, debt held by the public would reach 222% of GDP in fiscal year 2056, 47 percentage points above the extended baseline.
Under a scenario in which interest rates increased until they were 1 percentage point higher than in CBO’s extended baseline, primary deficits—that is, deficits excluding net outlays for interest—would average 2.3% of GDP over the 2026–2056 period, 0.2 percentage points larger than in the extended baseline. Debt held by the public would grow to 222 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2056, 47 percentage points larger than in the extended baseline. Average annual GDP growth over the 2026–2056 period would be 0.1 percentage point slower than in CBO’s extended baseline, and the average interest rate on federal debt would be 0.7 percentage points higher.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
CBO projects that under a scenario in which interest rates rise to 1 percentage point above its extended baseline, debt held by the public would reach 222% of GDP in fiscal year 2056, 47 percentage points above the extended baseline.
Primary deficits, which exclude net outlays for interest, would average 2.3% of GDP over 2026–2056 in CBO’s higher-interest-rate scenario, 0.2 percentage points larger than in its extended baseline.
Under CBO’s higher-interest-rate scenario, average annual GDP growth over 2026–2056 would be 0.1 percentage point slower and the average interest rate on federal debt 0.7 percentage points higher than in its extended baseline.
Related Articles:
The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036— The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal deficit will grow from $1.9tn (5.8% of GDP) to $3.1tn (6.7%) over a decade, above the 3.8% averaged over the past 50 years, with rising net interest costs driving much of the increase. Federal debt held by the public is projected to rise from 101% to 120% of GDP.
How Might Fiscal Policy Respond to the Rise of Artificial Intelligence?— The Congressional Budget Office estimates that a permanent 0.5 percentage point increase in annual productivity growth would lower publicly held federal debt after 30 years by 39% of GDP, offsetting roughly half the projected rise from 101% of GDP to 175%. Higher revenue and slower spending growth outweigh higher interest costs.
Soaring Bond Yields, Gaping Deficits and Towering Debts: What Could Go Wrong?— An analysis of 22 rich countries estimates that if each refinanced its entire debt at current five-year bond yields, Britain would need the largest primary surplus to stabilize its debt-to-GDP ratio, about 1.5%, followed by Italy at 1.4%, France at 1.2% and America at 1%.
AI Summary.Estimated sustainable government net debt limits across 25 OECD countries average 234% of GDP under historical interest-rate and growth assumptions (221% for the US) and 214% under current rates (186% for the US). If interest rates rise systematically with debt, the model yields no solution for the US, UK, France, Italy, Greece, and Japan.
Mark WarshawskyAmerican Enterprise Institute
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Warshawsky calculates the US has a sustainable net debt limit, “the lowest level of debt at which a country can no longer service its sovereign debt and must effectively default,” of 186% of GDP, which he forecasts will be reached in ~15 years under current policy and economic conditions.
How high can government debt rise before it becomes unsustainable?
Core argument: Sustainable net debt limits across the US and 24 other OECD countries average 234% of GDP under historical interest rate–growth differentials and 221% for the US, falling to 214% on average and 186% for the US under current, higher interest rates and growth.
Using historical, current, and dynamic interest rate-to-economic growth differentials, countries’ sustainable debt limits are calculated on a net of central bank holdings of government debt basis. Sustainable net debt limits average 234% of GDP for these countries assuming historical rates and economic growth (221% for the US), 214% assuming (higher) current interest rates and economic growth (186% for the US). If, however, interest rates were to rise systematically with debt according to conservative assumptions, there is no model solution for France, Greece, Japan, Italy, the UK, and the US, given their current high debt levels; the average sustainable limit is 178% for the other countries. A reasonable conclusion to draw for the US is that the fiscal path under current policy and trends with rising interest rates is not sustainable in the short to intermediate term. A major fiscal consolidation package will be needed soon, as interest rates rise, unless significantly higher inflation or capital controls will result.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Sustainable net debt limits across the US and 24 other OECD countries average 234% of GDP under historical interest rate–growth differentials and 221% for the US, falling to 214% on average and 186% for the US under current, higher interest rates and growth.
If interest rates rise systematically with debt under conservative assumptions, the model yields no solution for France, Greece, Japan, Italy, the UK, and the US given their current high debt levels, while the average limit for the remaining countries is 178%.
A reasonable conclusion is that the US fiscal path under current policy and trends with rising interest rates is not sustainable in the short to intermediate term, and a major fiscal consolidation package will be needed soon unless significantly higher inflation or capital controls result.
Related Articles:
Soaring Bond Yields, Gaping Deficits and Towering Debts: What Could Go Wrong?— An analysis of 22 rich countries estimates that if each refinanced its entire debt at current five-year bond yields, Britain would need the largest primary surplus to stabilize its debt-to-GDP ratio, about 1.5%, followed by Italy at 1.4%, France at 1.2% and America at 1%.
How Might Fiscal Policy Respond to the Rise of Artificial Intelligence?— The Congressional Budget Office estimates that a permanent 0.5 percentage point increase in annual productivity growth would lower publicly held federal debt after 30 years by 39% of GDP, offsetting roughly half the projected rise from 101% of GDP to 175%. Higher revenue and slower spending growth outweigh higher interest costs.
Can AI Avert the Impending Federal Budget Crisis?— U.S. GDP per capita, about $87,000, is projected to reach $102,000 by 2035 with 1.8% annual productivity growth, or $110,000 with 2.7% growth. Because the healthcare sector has been slow to adopt AI, health spending is projected to rise from 18.3% of GDP to 21% under slower growth and 21.7% under faster growth.
AI Summary.An analysis of 22 rich countries estimates that if each refinanced its entire debt at current five-year bond yields, Britain would need the largest primary surplus to stabilize its debt-to-GDP ratio, about 1.5%, followed by Italy at 1.4%, France at 1.2% and America at 1%.
Economist StaffThe Economist
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Refinancing the entire US debt stock at the current five-year borrowing rate, on current growth forecasts, would require a primary surplus of 1% of GDP to hold the debt ratio stable, a fiscal consolidation of 4.7pp. In October 2025, it would have required 2.3pp.
How much belt tightening would rich countries need to stabilize debt?
Core argument: The Economist calculates that Britain would need the largest primary surplus of 22 rich countries, about 1.5% of GDP, to hold its debt-to-GDP ratio stable if it replaced its entire debt stock at today’s five-year yields.
The Economist calculated what would happen if rich countries had to replace their entire debt stocks at today’s five-year bond yields, using IMF forecasts for nominal growth. Out of 22 countries, Britain would need to run the largest primary surplus, of about 1.5% of GDP, merely to keep its debt-to-GDP ratio stable. Italy and France are next, needing surpluses of 1.4% and 1.2%, respectively. America is not far behind, requiring one of 1%. Japan can run a deficit of 0.8% since its growth is estimated to outpace the interest rate on its debt. America is running a primary deficit of nearly 4% of GDP, meaning significant belt tightening of nearly five percentage points of GDP is needed to stabilise its debt ratio at today’s borrowing costs. The situation is deteriorating fast as a result of persistent deficits and surging yields. Just a year ago America required an adjustment of more than two percentage points less than it does today.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The Economist calculates that Britain would need the largest primary surplus of 22 rich countries, about 1.5% of GDP, to hold its debt-to-GDP ratio stable if it replaced its entire debt stock at today’s five-year yields.
America requires a primary surplus of 1% of GDP to stabilise its debt ratio at today’s borrowing costs while running a primary deficit of nearly 4%, implying belt tightening of nearly five percentage points of GDP, by The Economist’s calculation.
Japan can run a primary deficit of 0.8% of GDP and still keep its debt burden stable because its growth is estimated to outpace the interest rate on its debt, while Italy and France need surpluses of 1.4% and 1.2%.
Related Articles:
America’s Risky Debt: What Markets See That Policymakers Don’t— Two market-based measures suggest the safety premium investors pay to hold US Treasuries has compressed toward zero and at times reversed: the spread between top-rated corporate bonds and Treasuries after stripping out default risk, and the gap between currency-hedged foreign G10 government yields and Treasury yields at the same maturity, where longer-maturity comparisons now favor foreign bonds.
The United States Capital Structure— Because Social Security and Medicare benefits are politically untouchable, retirees effectively hold the most senior claim on US government resources while Treasury bondholders hold the riskiest one. On this argument, bondholders absorb adverse fiscal shocks through surprise inflation, financial repression, or both.
How Might Fiscal Policy Respond to the Rise of Artificial Intelligence?— The Congressional Budget Office estimates that a permanent 0.5 percentage point increase in annual productivity growth would lower publicly held federal debt after 30 years by 39% of GDP, offsetting roughly half the projected rise from 101% of GDP to 175%. Higher revenue and slower spending growth outweigh higher interest costs.
AI Summary.Safe public debt is jointly produced: governments supply the promise while the financial system supplies the market-making and rollover capacity that makes it liquid. The authors argue this creates a limit beyond solvency—past a turning point, further issuance reduces both debt's contribution to demand and the equilibrium safe interest rate.
Ricardo CaballeroMassachusetts Institute of Technology
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Even with a solvent fiscal authority that credibly promises to repay, safety and liquidity require market-making, warehousing, and rollover support. A sufficiently large increase in Treasury supply can be contractionary if these constraints bind.
Is there a limit to safe government debt issuance beyond solvency?
Core argument: Safe public debt is jointly produced: the fiscal authority supplies the promise, while the financial system supplies the market-making, warehousing, and rollover capacity that makes the promise liquid and safe.
Safe public debt is jointly produced. The fiscal authority supplies the promise, but the financial system supplies the market-making, warehousing, and rollover capacity that makes the promise liquid and safe. Solvency therefore leaves open a second limit to issuance: the cost of mobilizing that capacity. The safe-debt Laffer curve follows from this cost. At low debt, the wealth created by an additional claim exceeds the fiscal cost of supporting it. As rollover pressure builds, the premium rises and so does the cost of refinancing the stock. The turning point is reached when this stock-wide marginal cost exhausts the finite-horizon wealth effect. Beyond it, further issuance lowers both debt’s contribution to aggregate demand and the equilibrium safe rate, even though the claims remain safe. Maturity changes the form of the exposure. Short debt puts more of the stock through rollover; long debt reduces that flow but magnifies the price response of the claims left outstanding.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Safe public debt is jointly produced: the fiscal authority supplies the promise, while the financial system supplies the market-making, warehousing, and rollover capacity that makes the promise liquid and safe.
The safe-debt Laffer curve turns when the stock-wide marginal cost of refinancing, driven by a premium that rises as rollover pressure builds, exhausts the finite-horizon wealth effect of an additional safe claim.
Beyond the turning point, further issuance lowers both debt's contribution to aggregate demand and the equilibrium safe rate even though the claims remain safe, with short debt pushing more of the stock through rollover and long debt magnifying the price response of the claims left outstanding.
Related Articles:
America’s Risky Debt: What Markets See That Policymakers Don’t— Two market-based measures suggest the safety premium investors pay to hold US Treasuries has compressed toward zero and at times reversed: the spread between top-rated corporate bonds and Treasuries after stripping out default risk, and the gap between currency-hedged foreign G10 government yields and Treasury yields at the same maturity, where longer-maturity comparisons now favor foreign bonds.
The Coming Great Repression?— Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds, the opposite of standard risk-premium predictions. The authors estimate financial repression—making banks captive bond buyers and loading them with low-return reserves—contributed 90.7 percentage points of GDP to Britain's postwar debt reduction, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation.
The United States Capital Structure— Because Social Security and Medicare benefits are politically untouchable, retirees effectively hold the most senior claim on US government resources while Treasury bondholders hold the riskiest one. On this argument, bondholders absorb adverse fiscal shocks through surprise inflation, financial repression, or both.
AI Summary.A US Treasury intervention in the bond market pushed the 30-year yield down eight basis points before it returned to roughly its prior level, while the dollar fell below its 200-day moving average and gold posted its best day in six months. The author argues only an unequivocal move to reduce the deficit will bring yields down.
John AuthersBloomberg
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Reacting to Bessent’s effort to bring down the long end of the yield curve, Authors warns that in the absence of fiscal consolidation, “yields aren’t coming down.”
Can Treasury intervention lower long-term yields without deficit reduction?
Core argument: The 30-year Treasury yield, at its highest since the eve of the 2007 crisis, fell eight basis points after Bessent's intervention before returning essentially to its prior level, leaving the upward trend intact.
The 30-year yield — at its highest since the eve of the crisis in 2007 — dropped eight basis points [in response to Bessent’s intervention, later returning essentially to its previous level.] But the upward trend remains intact. Investors heeded Bessent’s warning flare, but told him he would need to do much more to ease conditions substantially. The maneuver did have a dramatic impact on the dollar, which had its worst day in months and dropped below its 200-day moving average. Gold was the clearest tell that investors are concerned by Bessent’s move. Wednesday’s intervention drove the metal’s best day in six months, bringing it back up to the 200-day moving average. More maneuvers like this will likely weaken the dollar further and increase the pressure on a central bank whose independence is currently in question. It remains hard to see what gets bond yields down other than an unequivocal move to reduce the deficit. The more it hurts politically, the more seriously it will be taken. Without any pain, it appears, yields aren’t coming down.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The 30-year Treasury yield, at its highest since the eve of the 2007 crisis, fell eight basis points after Bessent's intervention before returning essentially to its prior level, leaving the upward trend intact.
The dollar had its worst day in months and dropped below its 200-day moving average following Bessent's maneuver, while gold posted its best day in six months, returning to its own 200-day moving average.
Further maneuvers of this kind will likely weaken the dollar and increase pressure on a central bank whose independence is in question, and it remains hard to see what lowers bond yields other than an unequivocal move to reduce the deficit.
Related Articles:
The Coming Great Repression?— Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds, the opposite of standard risk-premium predictions. The authors estimate financial repression—making banks captive bond buyers and loading them with low-return reserves—contributed 90.7 percentage points of GDP to Britain's postwar debt reduction, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation.
The United States Capital Structure— Because Social Security and Medicare benefits are politically untouchable, retirees effectively hold the most senior claim on US government resources while Treasury bondholders hold the riskiest one. On this argument, bondholders absorb adverse fiscal shocks through surprise inflation, financial repression, or both.
Fiscal Dominance and the Return of Zero-Interest Bank Reserve Requirements— Fiscal dominance requires governments to fund deficits at the margin with non-interest-bearing debt, and the revenue from inflation taxation—both expected and unexpected—is limited. The authors argue a US fiscal dominance episode could end the payment of interest on bank reserves and restore requirements that banks hold large zero-interest reserves against deposits.
AI Summary.A U.S. Treasury buyback of long-dated off-the-run bonds produced only a small decline in long-term yields that was subsequently reversed, leaving the upward trend in yields intact. The dollar fell steeply against both developed-market and emerging-market currencies while gold and other precious metals rose, suggesting markets are positioned for further dollar debasement.
Robin BrooksRobin Brooks Substack
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As Treasury intervened to lower long bond yields yesterday, the dollar fell against G10 and EM currencies. Brooks fears Treasury’s move is the “clearest sign yet that the US is following Japan on its path towards currency debasement.”
Do bond buybacks lower long-term yields or weaken the dollar?
Core argument: The Treasury's buyback of long-dated off-the-run bonds produced only a small decline in yields that was subsequently completely reversed, leaving the upward trend in long-term yields in place, in the author's assessment.
The key question is whether the Treasury got a good bang for the buck yesterday [from its intervention in the market for long-dated off-the-run bonds]. I’m not sure it did. This thing fell but the drop isn’t going to impress anyone. [It was subsequently completely reversed]. The upward trend in long-term yields is clearly still in place. The dollar absolutely cratered against the G10 (blue line) and EM (black line). Furthermore, gold jumped yesterday, as did other precious metals. Markets are primed for dollar debasement to resume and - as Japan shows - it can be next to impossible to stabilize a currency once it enters a devaluation spiral. The US is playing with fire with this buyback.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The Treasury's buyback of long-dated off-the-run bonds produced only a small decline in yields that was subsequently completely reversed, leaving the upward trend in long-term yields in place, in the author's assessment.
The dollar fell sharply against both G10 and emerging-market currencies following the Treasury's intervention, while gold and other precious metals jumped.
The author argues markets are primed for dollar debasement to resume and that, as Japan shows, stabilizing a currency once it enters a devaluation spiral is next to impossible.
Related Articles:
Peak Dollar Strength— Net positioning across major currencies shows markets are broadly long the US dollar. The author argues this bullishness is misplaced because the Federal Reserve is less hawkish than markets assume and falling oil prices should pull inflation down, leaving the dollar at peak strength.
The Dollar’s Hidden Dependence on the AI Trade— Net foreign inflows into US equities have reached a record high, driven in large part by overseas investors seeking artificial intelligence exposure unavailable in their home markets. Because most foreign equity investors leave currency risk unhedged, a pullback in these inflows if AI disappoints poses a significant downside risk to the US dollar.
The Real Message In The Yen Intervention— A US-backed intervention to support the yen was funded largely by selling euros rather than dollars, limiting the volume of dollar sales required. The author argues this signals that Washington, fearing the consequences for US financial markets, is reluctant to see foreign central banks deploy their dollar reserves in unlimited quantities.
AI Summary.US Treasuries erased nearly all gains that followed the Treasury Department's surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, with the 30-year yield rising above 5.27% and the 10-year touching 4.71%. The reversal signals the move has done little to ease concern about surging government debt.
Michael MacKenzie and Alice GledhillBloomberg
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The 30-year yield rose ~7bps to as much as 5.27%, and the 10-year yield hit 4.71%, erasing “almost all” the gains that followed Treasury’s surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds.
Do bigger bond buybacks ease concerns about surging government debt?
Core argument: The US 30-year Treasury yield rose more than seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, returning to where it stood just ahead of the Treasury Department's buyback announcement, before paring the gain.
US Treasuries erased almost all of the gains that followed the Trump administration’s surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, signaling the move has done little to alleviate the angst about the surging government debt that has pushed some yields to the highest in close to two decades. The 30-year yield on Thursday rose over seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, where it was just ahead of the US Treasury Department’s announcement early Wednesday, before paring the gain. The 10-year yield touched 4.71%, just shy of its highest level since early 2025.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The US 30-year Treasury yield rose more than seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, returning to where it stood just ahead of the Treasury Department's buyback announcement, before paring the gain.
US Treasuries erased almost all of the gains that followed the Trump administration's surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, suggesting the move has done little to alleviate angst about surging government debt.
The US 10-year yield touched 4.71%, just shy of its highest level since early 2025, as angst over government debt pushed some yields to the highest in close to two decades.
Related Articles:
Bessent Boosts Debt Buybacks After Climb in Treasury Yields— The US Treasury announced it is at least doubling the size of its liquidity support buyback operations for government debt maturing in 10 to 30 years, following long-dated yields reaching their highest levels in years. Yields on the longest bond fell nearly 10 basis points to 5.185%.
The Coming Great Repression?— Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds, the opposite of standard risk-premium predictions. The authors estimate financial repression—making banks captive bond buyers and loading them with low-return reserves—contributed 90.7 percentage points of GDP to Britain's postwar debt reduction, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation.
The United States Capital Structure— Because Social Security and Medicare benefits are politically untouchable, retirees effectively hold the most senior claim on US government resources while Treasury bondholders hold the riskiest one. On this argument, bondholders absorb adverse fiscal shocks through surprise inflation, financial repression, or both.
AI Summary.Ten-year forward yields ten years ahead have risen across major advanced economies, not just the US, a global theme the author attributes to the debt buildup during the pandemic. The author argues economies have begun shifting from a good to a bad debt equilibrium, which he sees behind the rally in precious metals prices tied to a "debasement trade.
Robin BrooksRobin Brooks Substack
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Citing the growing number of fiscal “accidents,” from the 2022 collapse of the Truss government in the UK to ongoing depreciation pressure on the Yen, Brooks argues a global debt crisis is underway.
Are rising long-term yields a global story driven by pandemic debt?
Core argument: 10y10y forward yields have risen across key G10 economies, with the US not standing out, a pattern attributed to the global debt binge during the pandemic.
The chart shows 10y10y forward yields across key G10 economies. The US doesn’t even stand out in this perspective. Rising longer-term yields are a global theme and stem from the global debt binge that happened during the pandemic. There are multiple equilibria when it comes to debt, and it’s one of my big convictions that - in the years since the COVID pandemic - we’ve begun to shift from a good to a bad equilibrium. This is, in my opinion, why seemingly innocuous things like Powell’s dovish keynote speech at Jackson Hole a year ago sparked the absolutely insane rally in precious metals prices we saw last year. That “debasement trade” in my mind is all about markets seeing the writing on the wall when it comes to fiscal policy.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
10y10y forward yields have risen across key G10 economies, with the US not standing out, a pattern attributed to the global debt binge during the pandemic.
The author argues that debt has multiple equilibria and that a shift from a good to a bad equilibrium has begun in the years since the COVID pandemic.
The author attributes the rally in precious metals prices after Powell's dovish Jackson Hole keynote to a "debasement trade" reflecting markets' view of fiscal policy.
Related Articles:
Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic?— Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
Global Debt Report 2026— Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.
Across The Rich World, Fiscal Crises Loom— An analysis estimates most rich countries could keep debt stable as a share of their economies with only small primary surpluses—Britain's required surplus is 0.3% of GDP—even if all debt were refinanced immediately at current rates, but the tightening needed to stabilize debt ratios exceeds 2% of GDP in Britain and America and 3% in France.
