“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
AI Summary.Domestic migration has historically added about 0.5% a year to the population of reliably Republican counties while reliably Democratic counties lost 0.6%, with international migration showing the reverse pattern. Internal Revenue Service data show the fastest-growing Republican counties draw many newcomers from Democratic and competitive areas, and Republican support in those faster-growing counties has weakened.
Economist StaffThe Economist
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An Economist analysis of more than 3,000 US counties finds that in reliably GOP counties, annual deaths now exceed births by 0.4 per 1k residents, while in reliably Democratic counties, births exceed deaths by 2.8 per 1k. Population growth in the GOP counties is largely driven by internal migration.
How is domestic migration reshaping politics in Republican counties?
Core argument: Domestic migration has historically added about 0.5% a year to the population of reliably Republican counties while subtracting 0.6% a year from reliably Democratic ones.
Our number crunching shows that domestic migration has historically boosted the population of reliably Republican counties by about 0.5% a year, while reliably Democratic ones have lost 0.6%. The opposite is true of international migration, which has historically added 0.5% a year to solid-blue counties, compared with just 0.1% in solid-red ones. Data from the IRS show that the fastest-growing red counties draw an unusually large share of newcomers from politically unfriendly territory. In 2022-23 more than 20% came from solid-blue places and around 40% from competitive ones. This may already be affecting voting patterns. Before 2016, fast-growing red counties leaned more Republican than slower-growing ones. That has now flipped: slower-growing red counties lean more Republican, and GOP support in faster-growing ones has weakened.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Domestic migration has historically added about 0.5% a year to the population of reliably Republican counties while subtracting 0.6% a year from reliably Democratic ones.
International migration has historically added about 0.5% a year to solid-blue counties versus just 0.1% in solid-red ones, reversing the pattern of domestic migration.
Internal Revenue Service data show that in 2022-23 more than 20% of newcomers to the fastest-growing red counties came from solid-blue places and around 40% from competitive ones.
Related Articles:
Where Americans Choose to Move and Where They Leave— County-level mapping of net domestic migration within the United States shows some counties gained net movers equal to 10% or more of their 2020 population while others lost an equivalent share, excluding international moves.
Americans Are Done With Being Put in Racial Boxes— Immigration from Asia and Latin America has been the chief driver of rising US diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White share of the population. Intermarriage across racial and ethnic lines is far more common among Hispanic and Asian Americans, and rising among Black and non-Hispanic White Americans, leaving more people outside single racial categories.
The Great “Transfer”-mation— Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
AI Summary.Across surveyed countries, intended fertility and the ideal number of children both declined, while children came to be seen more as a constraint on parental freedom and less as a source of status. Gender roles grew less traditional and housework more equally shared, yet the belief that a fulfilled life requires children weakened most of all attitudes measured.
Raquel Fernández, Inés Berniell and Milagros OnofriNational Bureau of Economic Research
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Fernández et al. cast doubt on Goldin’s hypothesis that men’s limited willingness to share domestic responsibilities is central to fertility decline, pointing instead to the erosion of the belief that children are necessary for a fulfilling life.
Are shifting attitudes about children behind falling fertility intentions?
Core argument: Intended fertility fell in every Generations and Gender Survey country, from 28% to 21% on average, while the ideal number of children fell in 17 of 22 International Social Survey Programme countries, from 2.42 to 2.31.
Figure 1 documents how fertility outcomes and attitudes changed over the decade. Intended fertility fell in every GGS country, from 28 to 21% on average (Figure 1a). The ideal number of children fell in 17 of the 22 ISSP countries, from 2.42 to 2.31 on average (Figure 1b). [Children] became more likely to be seen as constraining parental freedom and less likely to be seen as conferring status (Figure 1c). Gender roles became less traditional, and the division of household work became more equal [Figures 1i]. Despite this greater sharing of chores and care, work–family conflict rose sharply. The decade saw changes that might have been expected to make the burden of children lighter, at least for women. Simultaneously, however, children became less attractive and, above all, less necessary: the belief that a fulfilled life requires children lost more ground than any attitude we measure [Table 2, Part II, Panel B].
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Intended fertility fell in every Generations and Gender Survey country, from 28% to 21% on average, while the ideal number of children fell in 17 of 22 International Social Survey Programme countries, from 2.42 to 2.31.
Children became more likely to be seen as constraining parental freedom and less likely to be seen as conferring status, and the belief that a fulfilled life requires children lost more ground than any other attitude measured.
Gender roles became less traditional and household work was divided more equally, yet work–family conflict rose sharply.
Related Articles:
The Rise of Female Autonomy and the Decline of Fertility: The Role of Mismatch— Across 22 countries, the gap between women's and men's daily hours of housework and caregiving is strongly correlated with lower total fertility rates. Countries that modernized rapidly show larger gender gaps in home work and lower fertility than those with more continuous economic growth since 1920.
Babies and the Macroeconomy— Fertility rates have fallen in nearly every country, but timing differed: some developed nations fell below the 2.1 replacement level as early as the 1970s, while others dropped to "lowest low" levels below 1.3. The author argues nations with rapid, discontinuous growth saw sharper declines as women's expectations outpaced tradition-bound men's willingness to share family time.
The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences— The authors estimate the world total fertility rate is around 2.17, below the global replacement rate of roughly 2.21, meaning humanity is already below replacement, with fertility and births falling faster than anticipated. They project middle-income countries' fertility may fall below that of rich countries outside East Asia, with emigration compounding population decline.
AI Summary.Israel is the only affluent democracy where estimated fertility rose over the past generation, from 2.9 births per woman in 1991 to 3 in 2021, driven by a rise in Jewish fertility from about 2.6 in 1995 to 3.1 in 2024. Excluding the Haredi community, fertility among secular, traditional and national-religious Jews averages about 2.5.
Nicholas Eberstadt and Patrick NorrickAmerican Enterprise Institute
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The rise in Israeli Jewish fertility is an exception to the collapse across advanced economies. TFR is 1.9 among secular Jews, 2.1–2.7 among traditional Jews and 3.7 among Dati Jews. Eberstadt suggests mimetics—social imitation—may help explain it.
Is there an affluent democracy where fertility has risen?
Core argument: Israel is the only affluent democracy where estimated total fertility rose over the past generation, edging up from 2.9 in 1991 to 3 in 2021, powered wholly by Jewish fertility rising from about 2.6 in 1995 to 3.1 in 2024.
[Israel is] the lone affluent democracy where national fertility (estimated TFR) actually rose over the past generation (albeit slightly—from 2.9 in 1991 to 3 in 2021). This was powered wholly by a rise in Jewish fertility, from about 2.6 births per woman in 1995 to 3.1 in 2024. In 2022–24 fertility in Israel was over 20% higher for Jews than Muslims. Much has been made of Israel’s extraordinarily prolific Haredi community and its six-plus-children-per-woman estimated TFR. But fertility for the rest of Israeli Jewry is unique for modernity too. For secular, natural-religious and traditional Jews combined, the current average TFR is about 2.5 births per woman. And for secular Israeli Jews, per se, it is almost two births per woman.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Israel is the only affluent democracy where estimated total fertility rose over the past generation, edging up from 2.9 in 1991 to 3 in 2021, powered wholly by Jewish fertility rising from about 2.6 in 1995 to 3.1 in 2024.
Israeli Jewish fertility in 2022–24 ran over 20% higher than Israeli Muslim fertility.
Beyond Israel's Haredi community, whose estimated TFR exceeds six children per woman, secular, natural-religious and traditional Jews combined average about 2.5 births per woman, with secular Israeli Jews alone at almost two.
Related Articles:
Terra Incognita: The Economics of a Shrinking World— Global fertility is likely below the replacement level needed to keep population constant in the long run, though population momentum from large cohorts of women now having children means world population will keep growing for roughly another 30 years. Unless trends change, it is projected to peak near 9bn around 2056 and then decline.
Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come— Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
AI Summary.Global fertility is likely below the replacement level needed to keep population constant in the long run, though population momentum from large cohorts of women now having children means world population will keep growing for roughly another 30 years. Unless trends change, it is projected to peak near 9bn around 2056 and then decline.
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde and Patrick NorrickUniversity of Pennsylvania
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The UN appears to systematically overestimate births; e.g. 33 of 37 countries with high-quality statistics registered fewer births in 2024 than the UN had forecast. Fernández-Villaverde and Norrick infer humanity is below replacement fertility in 2026.
Will world population keep growing even as fertility falls below replacement?
Core argument: As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below replacement fertility, with fewer births than needed to keep population constant in the long run.
In Table A1 we compare the World Population Prospects (WPP) estimates of births in 2022-2023 with the official numbers reported by several countries. [A2 shows the full sample with the deviations.] As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below the replacement fertility level: we are having fewer births than we need to keep population constant in the long run. This astonishing fact does not mean that population has stopped growing. Because of momentum effects (the large cohorts of women born two or three decades ago are having their children now, and their own parents have not died yet), world population will keep growing for another 30 years or so. But unless trends change, it will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then start falling, first slowly, then fast.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below replacement fertility, with fewer births than needed to keep population constant in the long run.
World population is set to keep growing for roughly another 30 years because of momentum effects, as large cohorts of women born two or three decades ago have their children while their own parents are still alive.
Unless trends change, world population will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then start falling, first slowly, then fast.
Related Articles:
The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences— The authors estimate the world total fertility rate is around 2.17, below the global replacement rate of roughly 2.21, meaning humanity is already below replacement, with fertility and births falling faster than anticipated. They project middle-income countries' fertility may fall below that of rich countries outside East Asia, with emigration compounding population decline.
Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come— Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
The Wealth of Working Nations— Because of population aging, growth in GDP per capita and GDP per working-age adult have diverged across advanced economies; from 1998 to 2019 Japan's accumulated growth per working-age adult was 31.9% versus 29.5% in the US. The authors find a standard neoclassical growth model calibrated to each country's working-age population tracks output per working-age adult in most economies.
AI Summary.Japan's annual births have fallen to roughly a quarter of their 1947 peak — about 686,000 versus over 2.7m — and are also below the level recorded in 1873, when Japan first began collecting such numbers. Fertility levels around the world are still falling.
Nicholas EberstadtAmerican Enterprise Institute
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China’s total births in 2025 were about on par with those of the Qing Dynasty in the 1750s. Japan’s 2025 births were on par with those of the Tokugawa shogunate in the late 1600’s.
Have annual births fallen below levels recorded over 150 years ago?
Core argument: Japan recorded 686,000 births in 2024, barely a quarter of its 1947 peak of over 2.7 million.
The admirable Human Mortality Database, pioneered by researchers at Berkeley and Rostock, Germany, offers careful reconstructions of such historical birth numbers for dozens of developed countries. We can use their figures for our comparisons. Start with Japan. By 2024, the Japanese birth level was barely a quarter of its peak in 1947, 77 years earlier (686,000 vs. over 2.7 million). But Japan’s 2024 level was also significantly lower than the corresponding total for 1873—over 150 years earlier, at the dawn of the Meiji era, when Japan first started gathering such numbers. And remember—fertility levels around the world are still falling.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Japan recorded 686,000 births in 2024, barely a quarter of its 1947 peak of over 2.7 million.
Japan's 2024 birth total was also lower than its 1873 figure, at the dawn of the Meiji era when Japan first began gathering such numbers over 150 years earlier.
The Human Mortality Database, pioneered by researchers at Berkeley and Rostock, Germany, provides reconstructions of historical birth numbers for dozens of developed countries, and fertility levels worldwide continue to fall.
Related Articles:
Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come— Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences— The authors estimate the world total fertility rate is around 2.17, below the global replacement rate of roughly 2.21, meaning humanity is already below replacement, with fertility and births falling faster than anticipated. They project middle-income countries' fertility may fall below that of rich countries outside East Asia, with emigration compounding population decline.
Baby Busts and Growth Booms: Demographic Change and the Macroeconomy— A 1pp lower birth rate 20 years earlier is associated with 22 log points higher output per worker 20 years later and 29 log points higher after 40 years, about 0.73pp faster annual growth. The authors find lower birth rates are also associated with more labor-saving patents, larger high-tech shares, and higher productivity growth.
AI Summary.Across U.S. states and counties, income and life expectancy rose together from 1980 through 2010, but after 2010 incomes kept rising without commensurate longevity gains, and places diverged in life expectancy. The authors attribute this to a weakened relationship between socioeconomic conditions—income, education, wealth, insurance coverage—and longevity rather than deterioration in those conditions.
Ritikaa Khanna, Rourke O'Brien, Andrew Stokes, Atheendar Venkataramani, et al.National Bureau of Economic Research
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Between 2010 and 2019, states and counties became richer, but did not experience the commensurate longevity gains seen btw 1980 and 2009. This is not “because income, education, wealth, or insurance coverage simply moved in the wrong direction.”
Has rising income stopped translating into longer life expectancy?
Core argument: U.S. Preston curves relating life expectancy to log real per capita income shifted upward across states from 1980 to 2010 and across counties from 2000 to 2010, but stopped shifting upward between 2010 and 2019 even as incomes kept rising.
Figure 1 shows Preston curves relating life expectancy to log real per capita income across U.S. states and counties. Among states, the curves follow the classic pattern from 1980 through 2010: states became richer and longer-lived [as did counties from 2000 to 2010]. That pattern changed after 2010. Between 2010 and 2019, states and counties continued to become richer, but the curves did not shift upward: resource accumulation continued, but commensurate longevity gains did not. The post-2010 period involved both decoupling and divergence: rising income no longer translated into broad longevity improvement, and places became more unequal in their capacity to convert aggregate resources into longer lives. Figure 4 asks a simple counterfactual question: if earlier covariate–life expectancy relationships had persisted, how much life expectancy would later years have achieved, given the actual changes in these covariates? Together, the decomposition results sharpen the central interpretation. The 2010s mortality crisis did not occur because income, education, wealth, or insurance coverage simply moved in the wrong direction. In many respects, aggregate socioeconomic conditions improved. Instead, what changed was the relationship between those conditions and longevity. The United States became less successful at converting collective resources into population-level longevity gains.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
U.S. Preston curves relating life expectancy to log real per capita income shifted upward across states from 1980 to 2010 and across counties from 2000 to 2010, but stopped shifting upward between 2010 and 2019 even as incomes kept rising.
The post-2010 period combined decoupling and divergence: rising income no longer translated into broad longevity improvement, and places became more unequal in their capacity to convert aggregate resources into longer lives.
Decomposition results indicate the 2010s mortality crisis did not stem from income, education, wealth, or insurance coverage moving in the wrong direction — many aggregate socioeconomic conditions improved — but from a changed relationship between those conditions and longevity.
Related Articles:
The Geography of American Exceptionalism— The US population is split evenly among urban, suburban, and rural areas, but 64% of those living at suburban densities reside in prosperous or comfortable ZIP codes, versus 36% in rural and 38% in urban ones. County distress scores correlate strongly with life expectancy, with prosperous counties averaging 5.3 years longer.
Accounting for the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA— The mortality gap between American adults with and without a four-year college degree widened across three periods—falling mortality for both with larger gains for graduates, then diverging, then rising faster for the less educated during the pandemic—reaching an 8.5-year difference in adult life expectancy. Americans with a degree, treated as a separate country, would rank just below Japan.
AI Summary.Immigration from Asia and Latin America has been the chief driver of rising US diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White share of the population. Intermarriage across racial and ethnic lines is far more common among Hispanic and Asian Americans, and rising among Black and non-Hispanic White Americans, leaving more people outside single racial categories.
Justin FoxBloomberg
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Less than half of Americans < 29 years old are non-Hispanic whites. As of 2020, 33.8mm Americans – 10.2% of the population – identify as being of two or more races, largely driven by intermarriage between whites and either Hispanics or Asian Americans.
Are immigration and intermarriage making single racial categories obsolete?
Core argument: Immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of rising U.S. diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White share of the population.
The increase in immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of the rise in diversity and decline in the non-Hispanic White share of the population. But those immigrants have been doing what generations of immigrants before them did and, well, becoming Americans. Marriages across racial and ethnic lines are much more prevalent among Hispanic and Asian Americans than Black or non-Hispanic White Americans, while intermarriage rates have been rising steadily for the latter two groups, too. As a result, a growing share of Americans just isn’t going to fit neatly into any single racial or ethnic category that the US government can come up with.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of rising U.S. diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White share of the population.
Intermarriage across racial and ethnic lines is much more prevalent among Hispanic and Asian Americans than among Black or non-Hispanic White Americans, though rates have been rising steadily for the latter two groups as well.
A growing share of Americans does not fit neatly into any single racial or ethnic category the U.S. government defines, as recent immigrants follow earlier generations in becoming Americans.
Related Articles:
Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World?— An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.
Do Past Wealth Gaps Explain Modern Inequality? Evidence From Immigration To The United States— Historical records indicate immigrants arriving in the United States around the turn of the twentieth century came with almost no wealth, and by 1920 nearly half of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents. Households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry, who arrived later with fewer resources, are on average wealthier than those of Northwestern European ancestry.
America’s Immigration Mess: An Illustrated Guide— Current Population Survey estimates indicate America's foreign-born population surpassed 50m for the first time and exceeded 15% of the national population, above the prior peak of 14.8% recorded in 1890. Mass immigration during that earlier wave was associated in contemporary opinion with widening income and wealth gaps and depressed wages for less-skilled native-born men, and sweeping national restrictions followed.
AI Summary.The surge of baby boomers, women, and immigrants entering the US labor force between 1960 and 1980 was difficult for the economy to absorb, and young workers' wages fell sharply after peaking in the early 1970s. The author argues those entrants kept occupying jobs and suppressing demand for new workers until retirement.
Steven RugglesProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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Accounting for both inflows and the overhang of previous labor market entrants, Ruggles predicts a labor shortage such that “Americans born in the 2020s might be the first cohort in a half century that earns significantly more than their parents did.”
How does a large influx of workers affect young workers' wages?
Core argument: Wages for young U.S. workers declined sharply after peaking in 1973, as the economy struggled to absorb the influx of workers entering the labor force between 1960 and 1980 from the baby-boom cohort, rising female participation, and increased immigration.
Figure 3A highlights the influx of workers that occurred between 1960 and 1980, as the large baby-boom cohort entered the labor force, female labor-force participation expanded, and immigration rose [see Figure 2 for a detailed breakdown]. It was difficult for the economy to absorb all the new workers, and wages for young people declined sharply after peaking in 1973. Figure 3A does not, however, provide a valid measure of labor-market competition because the baby boomers and newly employed women and immigrants did not suddenly vanish after they entered the labor force; they kept working and occupying jobs until they eventually retired decades later. The glut of workers entering the labor force in the 1970s would continue to stifle demand for new workers until their eventual exit from the labor force, a process that is still in progress. The index of employment competition shown in Figure 3B is [a better] measure of relative cohort size than 3A. It represents the cumulative net labor-market entries over the previous five decades as a % of the working-age population in the current decade. As shown in Figure 1C, we are already seeing signs of an uptick in the wages of young workers, and as the demographic shortage accelerates we may finally see real wages of the young exceed the levels of the early 1970s.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Wages for young U.S. workers declined sharply after peaking in 1973, as the economy struggled to absorb the influx of workers entering the labor force between 1960 and 1980 from the baby-boom cohort, rising female participation, and increased immigration.
Decennial labor-force entries alone misstate labor-market competition, because baby boomers, newly employed women, and immigrants kept occupying jobs and stifling demand for new workers until their retirements, a process still in progress.
An index of employment competition measuring cumulative net labor-market entries over the previous five decades as a percentage of the current decade's working-age population is offered as a better gauge of relative cohort size, with young workers' wages already showing an uptick.
Related Articles:
Baby Busts and Growth Booms: Demographic Change and the Macroeconomy— A 1pp lower birth rate 20 years earlier is associated with 22 log points higher output per worker 20 years later and 29 log points higher after 40 years, about 0.73pp faster annual growth. The authors find lower birth rates are also associated with more labor-saving patents, larger high-tech shares, and higher productivity growth.
Technology and the Baby Bust Paradox— Aging populations create structural incentives to automate, and the argument is that demographic change could become one of the strongest long-run drivers of artificial intelligence deployment. Technology-producing economies may benefit twice, offsetting their own labor shortages while exporting automation, robotics, and AI to other aging societies.
Can A Depopulating America Still Flourish?— US labor force participation among women aged 25-54 has reached all-time highs, exceeding its previous 1999 peak, yet remains over 4 points below Europe's level and nearly 6 points below Japan's. About 3.5m prime-age American women are neither working nor looking for work, without children at home or husbands, compared with roughly 7m such men.
