Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
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  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
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  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

AI Summary. Global fertility is likely below the replacement level needed to keep population constant in the long run, though population momentum from large cohorts of women now having children means world population will keep growing for roughly another 30 years. Unless trends change, it is projected to peak near 9bn around 2056 and then decline.

Jesús Fernández-Villaverde and Patrick Norrick University of Pennsylvania
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The UN appears to systematically overestimate births; e.g. 33 of 37 countries with high-quality statistics registered fewer births in 2024 than the UN had forecast. Fernández-Villaverde and Norrick infer humanity is below replacement fertility in 2026.

Will world population keep growing even as fertility falls below replacement?

Core argument: As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below replacement fertility, with fewer births than needed to keep population constant in the long run.

In Table A1 we compare the World Population Prospects (WPP) estimates of births in 2022-2023 with the official numbers reported by several countries. [A2 shows the full sample with the deviations.] As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below the replacement fertility level: we are having fewer births than we need to keep population constant in the long run. This astonishing fact does not mean that population has stopped growing. Because of momentum effects (the large cohorts of women born two or three decades ago are having their children now, and their own parents have not died yet), world population will keep growing for another 30 years or so. But unless trends change, it will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then start falling, first slowly, then fast.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below replacement fertility, with fewer births than needed to keep population constant in the long run.
  2. World population is set to keep growing for roughly another 30 years because of momentum effects, as large cohorts of women born two or three decades ago have their children while their own parents are still alive.
  3. Unless trends change, world population will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then start falling, first slowly, then fast.

Related Articles:

  • The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences — The authors estimate the world total fertility rate is around 2.17, below the global replacement rate of roughly 2.21, meaning humanity is already below replacement, with fertility and births falling faster than anticipated. They project middle-income countries' fertility may fall below that of rich countries outside East Asia, with emigration compounding population decline.
  • Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come — Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
  • The Wealth of Working Nations — Because of population aging, growth in GDP per capita and GDP per working-age adult have diverged across advanced economies; from 1998 to 2019 Japan's accumulated growth per working-age adult was 31.9% versus 29.5% in the US. The authors find a standard neoclassical growth model calibrated to each country's working-age population tracks output per working-age adult in most economies.

AI Summary. Immigration from Asia and Latin America has been the chief driver of rising US diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White share of the population. Intermarriage across racial and ethnic lines is far more common among Hispanic and Asian Americans, and rising among Black and non-Hispanic White Americans, leaving more people outside single racial categories.

Justin Fox Bloomberg
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Less than half of Americans < 29 years old are non-Hispanic whites. As of 2020, 33.8mm Americans – 10.2% of the population – identify as being of two or more races, largely driven by intermarriage between whites and either Hispanics or Asian Americans.

Are immigration and intermarriage making single racial categories obsolete?

Core argument: Immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of rising U.S. diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White share of the population.

The increase in immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of the rise in diversity and decline in the non-Hispanic White share of the population. But those immigrants have been doing what generations of immigrants before them did and, well, becoming Americans. Marriages across racial and ethnic lines are much more prevalent among Hispanic and Asian Americans than Black or non-Hispanic White Americans, while intermarriage rates have been rising steadily for the latter two groups, too. As a result, a growing share of Americans just isn’t going to fit neatly into any single racial or ethnic category that the US government can come up with.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of rising U.S. diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White share of the population.
  2. Intermarriage across racial and ethnic lines is much more prevalent among Hispanic and Asian Americans than among Black or non-Hispanic White Americans, though rates have been rising steadily for the latter two groups as well.
  3. A growing share of Americans does not fit neatly into any single racial or ethnic category the U.S. government defines, as recent immigrants follow earlier generations in becoming Americans.

Related Articles:

  • Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World? — An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.
  • Do Past Wealth Gaps Explain Modern Inequality? Evidence From Immigration To The United States — Historical records indicate immigrants arriving in the United States around the turn of the twentieth century came with almost no wealth, and by 1920 nearly half of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents. Households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry, who arrived later with fewer resources, are on average wealthier than those of Northwestern European ancestry.
  • America’s Immigration Mess: An Illustrated Guide — Current Population Survey estimates indicate America's foreign-born population surpassed 50m for the first time and exceeded 15% of the national population, above the prior peak of 14.8% recorded in 1890. Mass immigration during that earlier wave was associated in contemporary opinion with widening income and wealth gaps and depressed wages for less-skilled native-born men, and sweeping national restrictions followed.

AI Summary. The surge of baby boomers, women, and immigrants entering the US labor force between 1960 and 1980 was difficult for the economy to absorb, and young workers' wages fell sharply after peaking in the early 1970s. The author argues those entrants kept occupying jobs and suppressing demand for new workers until retirement.

Steven Ruggles Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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Accounting for both inflows and the overhang of previous labor market entrants, Ruggles predicts a labor shortage such that “Americans born in the 2020s might be the first cohort in a half century that earns significantly more than their parents did.”

How does a large influx of workers affect young workers' wages?

Core argument: Wages for young U.S. workers declined sharply after peaking in 1973, as the economy struggled to absorb the influx of workers entering the labor force between 1960 and 1980 from the baby-boom cohort, rising female participation, and increased immigration.

Figure 3A highlights the influx of workers that occurred between 1960 and 1980, as the large baby-boom cohort entered the labor force, female labor-force participation expanded, and immigration rose [see Figure 2 for a detailed breakdown]. It was difficult for the economy to absorb all the new workers, and wages for young people declined sharply after peaking in 1973. Figure 3A does not, however, provide a valid measure of labor-market competition because the baby boomers and newly employed women and immigrants did not suddenly vanish after they entered the labor force; they kept working and occupying jobs until they eventually retired decades later. The glut of workers entering the labor force in the 1970s would continue to stifle demand for new workers until their eventual exit from the labor force, a process that is still in progress. The index of employment competition shown in Figure 3B is [a better] measure of relative cohort size than 3A. It represents the cumulative net labor-market entries over the previous five decades as a % of the working-age population in the current decade. As shown in Figure 1C, we are already seeing signs of an uptick in the wages of young workers, and as the demographic shortage accelerates we may finally see real wages of the young exceed the levels of the early 1970s.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Wages for young U.S. workers declined sharply after peaking in 1973, as the economy struggled to absorb the influx of workers entering the labor force between 1960 and 1980 from the baby-boom cohort, rising female participation, and increased immigration.
  2. Decennial labor-force entries alone misstate labor-market competition, because baby boomers, newly employed women, and immigrants kept occupying jobs and stifling demand for new workers until their retirements, a process still in progress.
  3. An index of employment competition measuring cumulative net labor-market entries over the previous five decades as a percentage of the current decade's working-age population is offered as a better gauge of relative cohort size, with young workers' wages already showing an uptick.

Related Articles:

  • Baby Busts and Growth Booms: Demographic Change and the Macroeconomy — A 1pp lower birth rate 20 years earlier is associated with 22 log points higher output per worker 20 years later and 29 log points higher after 40 years, about 0.73pp faster annual growth. The authors find lower birth rates are also associated with more labor-saving patents, larger high-tech shares, and higher productivity growth.
  • Technology and the Baby Bust Paradox — Aging populations create structural incentives to automate, and the argument is that demographic change could become one of the strongest long-run drivers of artificial intelligence deployment. Technology-producing economies may benefit twice, offsetting their own labor shortages while exporting automation, robotics, and AI to other aging societies.
  • Can A Depopulating America Still Flourish? — US labor force participation among women aged 25-54 has reached all-time highs, exceeding its previous 1999 peak, yet remains over 4 points below Europe's level and nearly 6 points below Japan's. About 3.5m prime-age American women are neither working nor looking for work, without children at home or husbands, compared with roughly 7m such men.

AI Summary. A 1pp lower birth rate 20 years earlier is associated with 22 log points higher output per worker 20 years later and 29 log points higher after 40 years, about 0.73pp faster annual growth. The authors find lower birth rates are also associated with more labor-saving patents, larger high-tech shares, and higher productivity growth.

Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, Keelan Beirne and Andrew Scott National Bureau of Economic Research
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Cross-country evidence from 1950 to 2020 shows that a 1pp lower birth rate is associated with 22 log points (~25%) higher GDP per worker 40 years later and 29 log points (~44%) after 60 years, likely driven by labor-saving technical change.

Do lower birth rates raise output per worker decades later?

Core argument: A 1pp lower birth rate 20 years earlier is associated with 22 log points higher GDP per worker at t+20 and 29 log points by t+40, roughly 0.73 percentage points faster annual growth over the 40-year interval.

Figure 3 traces out how GDP per worker evolves following a 1pp increase in birth rates at t−20. Since cohorts born at t−20 (e.g., 1970) do not enter the working-age population until t = 0 (e.g., 1990), we should observe no response before t = 0; [indeed] the estimated coefficients are ~0 and statistically insignificant before t = 0. Beginning at t = 0, however, higher birth rates are associated with lower GDP per worker, and the negative effects grow progressively larger over time. For example, a 1pp lower birth rate at t−20 is associated with 22 log points higher GDP per worker at t+20 and 29 log points higher by t+40. The latter corresponds to roughly 0.73 percentage points faster annual growth over the 40-year interval. We find that lower birth rates are associated with more labor-saving patents and a growing share of high-tech industries across countries and US commuting zones [Figure 11]. They are also predictive of higher TFP growth across countries and US industries and increased patenting in ICT and broader automation technology classes. Using cross-country variation in WWII-era military and civilian deaths, we present suggestive evidence that the positive growth effects of falling birth rates are primarily driven by the scarcity of younger workers rather than by reductions in population per se [Figure 14]. [Editor’s note: the paper does not grapple with the fiscal consequences of an aging population.]

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A 1pp lower birth rate 20 years earlier is associated with 22 log points higher GDP per worker at t+20 and 29 log points by t+40, roughly 0.73 percentage points faster annual growth over the 40-year interval.
  2. Estimated coefficients for GDP per worker are near zero and statistically insignificant before affected cohorts enter the working-age population at t = 0.
  3. Lower birth rates are associated with more labor-saving patents, a growing high-tech industry share across countries and US commuting zones, higher TFP growth, and more ICT and automation patenting, with WWII-era death variation offering suggestive evidence that scarcity of younger workers, rather than smaller population, drives the growth effects.

Related Articles:

  • Can A Depopulating America Still Flourish? — US labor force participation among women aged 25-54 has reached all-time highs, exceeding its previous 1999 peak, yet remains over 4 points below Europe's level and nearly 6 points below Japan's. About 3.5m prime-age American women are neither working nor looking for work, without children at home or husbands, compared with roughly 7m such men.
  • Capital Is Making a Comeback — Tangible investment in property, factories and equipment fell from 12.5% to 8.5% of private gross domestic product, while intangible investment in intellectual property, software and process knowledge rose from about 11.5% to 16.75%. The author argues demand for tangible capital investment will now have to rise.
  • America Is Missing The New Labor Economy – Robotics Part 1 — Building an identical robotic arm in the US costs about 2.2x more than in China, and US-labeled components still depend heavily on Chinese parts and materials with no scalable alternative. The author argues China is the only country positioned to capture full-scale intelligent robotic automation, which would let it outcompete the US across production.

AI Summary. The authors argue that American men's lifetime experiences of the male labor market shape their beliefs about the returns to working, contributing to the long-run decline in male labor force participation, with recent cohorts participating less than earlier ones at every age. The effects are stronger for same-race labor markets and for conditions experienced in childhood.

Remy Levin and Daniela Vidart National Bureau of Economic Research
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Btw 1986 and 2019, prime-age males who grew up observing a one–SD lower male earnings history had a 7pp lower LFP rate in adulthood, holding current labor‑market conditions fixed.

How do lifetime labor market experiences shape male labor force participation?

Core argument: The authors propose that American men's lifetime experiences of the aggregate male labor market shape their beliefs about the returns to participation, influencing labor supply decisions in ways that persist even in the face of current market conditions.

We propose a new channel contributing to the long-run decline in [male labor force participation] (MLFP) in the United States: changes in American men’s lifetime experiences of the aggregate male labor market have shaped their beliefs about the returns to participation, influencing labor supply decisions in ways that persist even in the face of current market conditions. MLFP and national lifetime male labor market experiences, holding contemporaneous conditions fixed, are highly correlated over time (Figure 1, Panel A). Second, the decline in MLFP is largely driven by cohort-level differences: recent cohorts participate at lower rates than previous generations at every age (Figure 1, Panel B). These patterns suggest that men’s labor market participation is the history, embedded in each cohort’s memory, of the labor markets experienced by the men around them. The effects on MLFP are stronger for experiences of same-race male labor markets, demonstrating the central role of reference-group identity, and are driven by conditions experienced during men’s formative childhood years not explained by educational attainment of subjects or their fathers. Finally, we show that lifetime male labor market experiences are correlated with direct measures of men’s personal wage and employment expectations, but not their expectations for the macroeconomy as a whole.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors propose that American men's lifetime experiences of the aggregate male labor market shape their beliefs about the returns to participation, influencing labor supply decisions in ways that persist even in the face of current market conditions.
  2. The decline in U.S. male labor force participation is largely driven by cohort-level differences, with recent cohorts participating at lower rates than previous generations at every age.
  3. Effects on male labor force participation are stronger for experiences of same-race male labor markets and are driven by conditions experienced during men's formative childhood years, not explained by the educational attainment of subjects or their fathers.

Related Articles:

  • How Labor Force Participation Has Diverged Across Genders — Between 1976 and 2024 the trend labor force participation rate fell 10.1 percentage points for men and rose 8.2 points for women. Population aging lowered participation by about 4 points for each gender and rising education raised it (+6 for women, +3 for men), but the divergence is dominated by participation trends within age-gender groups.
  • Bachelors Without Bachelor’s: Gender Gaps in Education and Declining Marriage Rates — Marriage rates for college-educated women have remained stable over the past fifty years even as the relative supply of college-educated men declined, with the overall decline in marriage driven almost entirely by fewer marriages between non-college women and non-college men. The education gap in women's marriage rates is larger in areas where non-college men face the highest joblessness and incarceration.
  • Post-Pandemic Recovery for America’s Prime Age Labor Force: A Tale of Two Sexes — Prime-age women's labor force participation climbed about 5 points above its pre-pandemic level over a decade, while prime-age men's rose barely a point, only just regaining pre-pandemic levels. Despite economic expansion and labor shortages, work rates for prime-age American men are barely as high as at the trough of the severe Reagan-era recession.

AI Summary. Census Bureau microdata analysis finds that in Illinois annual out-migration by households earning under $50K fell by 104K while out-migration by households earning over $200K rose by 54K. Across the Midwest, adults with a bachelor's degree or higher now make up 57% of out-migrants, up from around 40%.

Aziz Sunderji Home Economics
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The “Brain Drain” is ongoing in the Midwest. The fraction of adult out-migrants with at least a bachelor’s degree is now 57%, up from ~40% in 2005. “It’s the most educated and highest-earning that are still leaving in droves.”

Are the most educated and highest-earning residents leaving the Midwest?

Core argument: Annual out-migration by Illinois households earning over $200K rose by 54K between 2014–15 and 2023–24, according to the author's analysis of Census Bureau microdata.

Take Illinois, the most populous Midwestern state: my analysis of Census Bureau microdata shows that between 2014–15 and 2023–24, annual out-migration by households earning under $50K fell by 104K. Out-migration by Illinois households earning over $200K rose by 54K over the same period. Across the region, the trend along educational lines is the same: the bachelor’s-or-higher share of adult out-migrants is now 57%, up from around 40% in 2005. It’s the most educated and highest-earning that are still leaving in droves.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Annual out-migration by Illinois households earning over $200K rose by 54K between 2014–15 and 2023–24, according to the author's analysis of Census Bureau microdata.
  2. Annual out-migration by Illinois households earning under $50K fell by 104K between 2014–15 and 2023–24, according to the author's analysis of Census Bureau microdata.
  3. Adults with a bachelor's degree or higher make up 57% of out-migrants from the Midwest, up from around 40% in 2005.

Related Articles:

  • Housing and the American Worker — Wages net of housing costs were once substantially higher in high-density areas than low-density areas for workers both with and without college education, but over the past half-century that urban wage premium has persisted only for college-educated workers, not for those with a high school degree or less.
  • Where is Standard of Living the Highest? Local Prices and the Geography of Consumption — The authors estimate that geographical differences in cost of living are especially large for low-income US households, and that expensive cities offer college graduates a standard of living similar to affordable cities while offering less-educated households a lower one. A high school dropout household moving from the most affordable to the most expensive commuting zone would see consumption fall 18.5%.
  • The Determinants Of Declining Internal Migration — A 10% increase in wages where people live is associated with 3.5% less migration, while a 10% increase in destination wages is associated with 7.8% more migration; a 10% rise in destination home prices is associated with 2.6% less migration. The authors find wage responses alone would have raised migration rates, but housing-related factors more than offset them.

AI Summary. Net outflows of unauthorized immigrants have lowered the break-even rate of U.S. payroll growth needed to hold the unemployment rate steady, so smaller job gains that once signalled economic slack are now consistent with a balanced labor market. Recent payroll growth has slightly exceeded that break-even rate on average.

Anton Cheremukhin, Daniel Wilson and Xiaoqing Zhou Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
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A FRBD analysis finds immigration outflows lowered break-even employment growth to about -3,000 monthly, down from ~250,000 in 2023, “payroll gains that might historically have signaled economic slack are now consistent with a balanced labor market.”

Does immigration outflow lower the break-even rate for job growth?

Core argument: Payroll growth over December 2025–February 2026 slightly exceeded the estimated break-even rate on average, consistent with the unemployment rate remaining stable despite softer headline payroll numbers.

Comparing our break-even estimates with actual payroll growth (Chart 2, blue bars) suggests that job growth over the recent three months—December 2025–February 2026—has slightly exceeded the break-even rate on average, consistent with the unemployment rate remaining stable despite softer headline payroll numbers. Real-time data point to an important change in the U.S. labor market: The benchmark for evaluating payroll growth has moved significantly. As net outflows of unauthorized immigrants reduce employment growth in late 2025, payroll gains that might historically have signalled economic slack are now consistent with a balanced labor market.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Payroll growth over December 2025–February 2026 slightly exceeded the estimated break-even rate on average, consistent with the unemployment rate remaining stable despite softer headline payroll numbers.
  2. Net outflows of unauthorized immigrants reduced employment growth in late 2025, lowering the break-even benchmark against which U.S. payroll gains are evaluated.
  3. Payroll gains that would historically have signalled economic slack are now consistent with a balanced U.S. labor market, given the shift in break-even employment.

Related Articles:

  • New Data Show Intensifying Unauthorized Immigration Decline, With Large Local Variations — Individual-level immigration court and parole data indicate net unauthorized immigration has turned increasingly negative, averaging -48,000 per month over the first seven months of the year and reaching -89,000 in July. The authors estimate this pace implies an annual total of -576,000, compared with the Congressional Budget Office's projection of -290,000.
  • What Sweeping Revisions and a Blowout Month Tell Us About the U.S. Job Market — Labor Department revisions lowered previously estimated job gains for the past two calendar years, cutting the combined net change in construction, manufacturing, and retail by 115,000 jobs. Healthcare added about 437,000 jobs and social assistance about 321,000 over 12 months, while all other private-sector jobs combined shrank.
  • Trump’s Immigration Crackdown Fails to Deliver Jobs for US-Born Workers — Researchers at the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution estimate net migration into the US may have turned negative for the first time in at least 50 years. That decline coincided with rising joblessness among US-born workers, whose labor force participation has fallen in recent months to near its lowest level since 2021.

AI Summary. American workers over 50 earned roughly 35% more per week than workers under 30 in the late 1970s, a gap that widened to about 55% at its early-2010s peak before narrowing to 47%. Their advantage in access to top-quarter-paying management jobs also widened, from about 5 to 8.3 percentage points.

Nicola Bianchi and Matteo Paradisi Aspen Economic Strategy Group
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In the late 1970s, US workers over 50 earned ~35% more per week than those under 30. By 2024, older workers earned ~47% more. Longer working lives and entrenchment in managerial positions decreased opportunities for younger workers.

How has the pay gap between older and younger workers changed?

Core argument: U.S. workers over 50 earned 47% more per week than workers under 30 in 2024, down from a peak of about 55% in the early 2010s but up from roughly 35% in the late 1970s.

In the late 1970s, workers over 50 earned roughly 35% more per week than workers under 30. Over the following four decades, this gap widened steadily, reaching a peak in the early 2010s, when older workers earned about 55% more. It has narrowed somewhat in the last decade, as the oldest baby boomers have begun to retire and leave the very top of the wage distribution, but even in 2024, older workers still earned 47% more per week than younger workers on average. And because working lives are now longer, with many employees remaining in senior roles well into their late sixties, there is little reason to expect this pay gap to return to the more modest levels observed in the 1970s without intervention from firms or policymakers. Older workers have pulled further ahead of younger workers in access to desirable, higher-paying managerial jobs, as displayed in figure 4. In the mid-1970s, workers over 50 were about 5 percentage points more likely than workers under 30 to be employed in management occupations in the top quarter of the wage distribution. By 2024, this gap had widened to almost 8.3 percentage points. Over the same period, these higher-paying managerial roles grew from just over 5% to a little more than 7% of full-time private-sector jobs. 

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. workers over 50 earned 47% more per week than workers under 30 in 2024, down from a peak of about 55% in the early 2010s but up from roughly 35% in the late 1970s.
  2. The gap between workers over 50 and workers under 30 in holding management jobs in the top quarter of the wage distribution widened from about 5 percentage points in the mid-1970s to almost 8.3 percentage points by 2024.
  3. Higher-paying managerial roles grew from just over 5% to a little more than 7% of full-time private-sector jobs between the mid-1970s and 2024, while longer working lives leave little reason to expect the age pay gap to return to 1970s levels without action by firms or policymakers.

Related Articles:

  • Countries for Old Men: An Analysis of the Age Pay Gap — Administrative data on 38mm Italian and German workers show wages of older workers grew much faster than those of younger workers, a widening age pay gap the authors also find in fourteen other high-income countries. The authors argue workforce aging leaves fewer top hierarchy slots for younger workers, slowing promotions.
  • Changes in Milestones of Adulthood — Among US young adults aged 25–34, the share completing a high school or college degree rose 9 percentage points to 83%, while the share ever married fell 18 points to 44% and the share living with a child fell 16 points to 39%. Economic milestones became more common as family formation milestones became less common.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides — Zero-sum thinking — viewing gains for one group as losses for another — is associated with greater support for liberal economic policies, stronger alignment with the Democratic Party, and weaker alignment with the Republican Party. The authors also find it linked to believing the QAnon conspiracy theory holds some truth and to sympathy for the attack on the U.S. Capitol.