AI Summary. An "AI universe" index of 42 stocks groups companies into three categories: 28 direct AI firms including NVIDIA, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta and Broadcom; 8 AI-linked utilities such as Vistra, NextEra and Constellation; and 6 capital equipment makers including Eaton, Quanta and GE Vernova.

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As the probability of a Democrat-controlled Senate rose from 50% in online betting in early September to 100% after the election, the S&P 500 fell 4.7% lead by an 8.9% drop in AI-related stocks and a 1.1% decline in the rest of the market.

How is the AI universe index of stocks composed?

Core argument: Michael Cembalest's "AI universe" comprises 42 stocks across three categories: 28 direct AI names, 8 AI utilities, and 6 AI capital equipment companies.

As the probability of a Democrat-controlled Senate rose from 50% in online betting in early September to 100% after the election, the S&P 500 fell 4.7% lead by an 8.9% drop in AI-related stocks and a 1.1% decline in the rest of the market.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Michael Cembalest's "AI universe" comprises 42 stocks across three categories: 28 direct AI names, 8 AI utilities, and 6 AI capital equipment companies.
  2. The 28 direct AI stocks in Cembalest's universe include NVIDIA, Microsoft, Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Broadcom, Tesla, Oracle, Palantir, AMD, Salesforce, IBM, Intel, Micron, Dell and Super Micro Computer.
  3. Cembalest's AI universe includes 8 utilities, among them NRG, Vistra, NextEra and Constellation, and 6 capital equipment makers, among them Eaton, Trane, Quanta and GE Vernova.

AI Summary. US labor productivity, measured as nonfarm business output per hour, rose at a 3.6% annualized rate, up from an upwardly revised 2.1% pace, while unit labor costs fell 0.7%. The acceleration suggests a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data.

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Nonfarm business productivity grew at a 3.6% annualized rate in Q3, the fastest pace in a year. Real hourly compensation rose 1.1%, while the labor share fell to 53%, the lowest in data going back to 1947.

Is a capital spending boom lifting worker productivity?

Core argument: US nonfarm business output per hour rose at a 3.6% annualized rate in the third quarter, the fastest pace in a year, following an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

US labor productivity accelerated in the third quarter at the fastest pace in a year, suggesting a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency at a time when input costs have soared. Productivity, or nonfarm business output per hour, increased at a 3.6% annualized rate after an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics showed Thursday. Unit labor costs — what businesses pay employees to produce one unit of output — fell 0.7%, the first decline since the second quarter of 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US nonfarm business output per hour rose at a 3.6% annualized rate in the third quarter, the fastest pace in a year, following an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
  2. Unit labor costs, what businesses pay employees to produce one unit of output, fell 0.7% in the third quarter, the first decline since the second quarter of 2025.
  3. The third-quarter productivity acceleration suggests a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency at a time when input costs have soared.

AI Summary. US debt held by the public peaked at a record 106.1% of GDP after World War II and fell as a share of the economy through 1974, aided by rapid growth, deficits averaging just 0.4% of GDP, and more tax increases than cuts. The federal deficit was 6.2% of GDP in fiscal 2026.

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Both growth and fiscal restraint gradually erased the WWII debt burden. Tax increases in 1982–93 helped reverse the large deficits of the 1980s, contributing to surpluses in 1998–2001. In line with this history, growth alone is unlikely to stabilize the current debt trajectory.

Can economic growth alone bring down the national debt?

Core argument: US debt held by the public peaked at a record 106.1% of GDP in fiscal 1946 and fell as a share of GDP through 1974, aided by rapid growth and a fiscal balance averaging -0.4% of GDP from 1947 to 1974.

The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, also known as the Reagan tax cuts, is remembered variously as a budget-busting disaster and the driver of a new era of growth. There’s some truth to both portrayals, but what doesn’t come up nearly enough is that the 1981 tax cuts were followed by tax increases in 1982, 1983, 1984, 1986 (just barely; that year’s Tax Reform Act was supposed to be revenue-neutral), 1987, 1990 and 1993. Thanks in part to the end of the Cold War, Congress was also able to reduce spending growth in the 1990s, with federal outlays falling from 21.7% of GDP in 1991 to 17.7% in 2000 and 2001. The result: four straight years of budget surpluses, and a debt-to-GDP ratio that fell from 47.9% in 1993 to 31.5% in 2001.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US debt held by the public peaked at a record 106.1% of GDP in fiscal 1946 and fell as a share of GDP through 1974, aided by rapid growth and a fiscal balance averaging -0.4% of GDP from 1947 to 1974.
  2. The US fiscal balance in fiscal 2026 was -6.2% of GDP, compared with the -0.4% average that accompanied the postwar decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio.
  3. Federal spending tripled in inflation-adjusted terms from 1947 to 1974 and rose from 16.1% to 17.8% of GDP, with revenue rising almost as fast in a period with more tax increases than decreases, according to a 2013 Treasury Department accounting of major tax legislation.

AI Summary. Estimates of US voter behavior combine interviews with 26,706 voters nationally, re-interviews with more than 7,000 voters after they cast ballots, precinct- and county-level results, validated turnout for 44% of voters, and state voter registration files.

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Relative to the 2024 presidential vote, the NYT’s preliminary estimates show the 2026 House margin among white non-college voters (39% of the electorate) moving 14pp toward Democrats, and among nonwhite non-college voters (18%) moving 23pp. Among the main age, race, gender and education groups, the largest shift was among 18–29-year-olds (12% of voters), at 32pp.

How are estimates of voter behavior constructed?

Core argument: The New York Times’ Voter Trends estimates of how Americans voted in 2026 draw on interviews with 26,706 voters nationally conducted as part of The Times/Siena Poll, which forms the basis of its understanding of who voters backed.

Times Voter Trends relies on extensive, detailed data from the following sources. Our estimates will get even better as we get more data. Interviews with 26,706 voters nationally as part of The Times/Siena Poll. This data forms the basis of our understanding about who voters cast a ballot for. Re-interviews with more than 7,000 voters nationally after they cast their ballot. Recontacting poll respondents after they vote helps us better understand turnout and late shifts. Granular results from precincts and townships nationally. We collect the most detailed election results from as many states as possible to understand voting patterns in different communities. In areas without precinct-level results, we use precinct-level estimates from The Needle and county-level results from The Associated Press. Validated turnout for 44% of voters nationally. We will never know who everybody voted for, but knowing specifically who voted gives our estimates additional precision. Voter files for every state and district. The voter file is a list of all registered voters that is our starting point for The Times/Siena Poll and these estimates.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The New York Times’ Voter Trends estimates of how Americans voted in 2026 draw on interviews with 26,706 voters nationally conducted as part of The Times/Siena Poll, which forms the basis of its understanding of who voters backed.
  2. The Times re-interviewed more than 7,000 voters nationally after they cast ballots, which it says helps it better understand turnout and late shifts, and validated turnout for 44% of voters nationally to add precision to its estimates.
  3. The Times uses granular precinct and township results where available, and in areas without precinct-level results relies on precinct-level estimates from The Needle and county-level results from The Associated Press.

AI Summary. Nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won, putting an estimated 37.5 GW of planned capacity at risk of a pause and another 15 GW subject to conditions such as grid cost-sharing, water limits, and ended tax incentives. The 37 GW expected in 2027, 75% already under construction, is largely unaffected.

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Before the election, 96 GW of data center capacity was expected to come online in 2028. Based on the positions of incoming governors, Cembalest estimates 37.5 GW may be subject to a “pause” and another 15 GW to “conditions,” together more than half of the total.

Are local ballot measures putting planned data center capacity at risk?

Core argument: Nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won or is winning, with North Dakota the only exception, and based on those results 37.5 GW of planned capacity may face a “pause” and another 15 GW conditions.

The biggest market issue may be AI over the medium term; nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won or is winning, with only exception in North Dakota. What we’re now watching: governor imposed constraints on new builds. This is not an issue for the 37 GW expected to be delivered in 2027, 75% of which is under construction. It’s more an issue for the 96 GW expected in 2028. Based on election results, 37.5 GW may be subject to a “pause” with another 15 GW subject to “conditions”. While pauses are the more impactful outcome, conditions can be onerous: requiring data centers to pay grid costs to protect ratepayers, ending tax incentives, imposing water limits, setting requirements for onsite backup power, mandating labor requirements and banning non-disclosure agreements during permitting (most of which seem sensible to me). If the data center buildout starts to slow at some point, upgrading to better NVIDIA chips might be the only way to generate more tokens.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won or is winning, with North Dakota the only exception, and based on those results 37.5 GW of planned capacity may face a “pause” and another 15 GW conditions.
  2. The 37 GW of data center capacity expected in 2027, 75% of which is under construction, is less exposed to local opposition than the 96 GW expected in 2028.
  3. Conditions imposed on data centers can include paying grid costs to protect ratepayers, ending tax incentives, water limits, onsite backup power requirements, labor mandates, and bans on non-disclosure agreements during permitting.

AI Summary. The average premium in the Affordable Care Act insurance marketplaces is projected to rise 13%, according to an analysis by the health research group KFF. That increase is slightly higher than elsewhere, with consulting firms projecting roughly 10% increases for employer plans covering about 150m people and more than 10% for federal workers.

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According to a KFF analysis, the average benchmark health care premium on the Obamacare insurance marketplaces will increase 13% in 2027, compared to 10% for private insurance. This follows a 26% increase last year.

Are marketplace health premiums rising faster than employer plan premiums?

Core argument: Average premiums in the Obamacare marketplaces will rise 13% in 2027, according to an analysis by KFF that combined newly published federal prices for 30 states with state-level figures.

Obamacare premiums will rise an average of 13% in 2027, following a 26% increase in 2026. Much of the increase reflects rising medical costs, with employer-plan premiums also expected to climb about 10%. But the expiration of enhanced federal subsidies has left some Obamacare customers particularly exposed. Remaining income-based subsidies will shield most enrollees from next year’s premium increases by shifting the additional expense to taxpayers. Those ineligible for assistance—including many self-employed workers and early retirees—must absorb the full increase, sometimes after already paying over $1,000 more per month in 2026.Many customers have responded by buying cheaper coverage with higher deductibles, pushing the average deductible to nearly $4,000 this year. Having already traded down, they have less room to offset further increases. KFF estimates suggest enrollment had fallen by nearly five million by June, while a Commonwealth Fund survey indicates that the uninsured rate among working-age adults has risen.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Average premiums in the Obamacare marketplaces will rise 13% in 2027, according to an analysis by KFF that combined newly published federal prices for 30 states with state-level figures.
  2. Reports by several consulting firms project that 2027 premiums for employer plans, which cover around 150 million people, could rise by about 10%, below the 13% marketplace increase.
  3. Premiums for federal workers are increasing by more than 10%.

AI Summary. The growth boost from the artificial intelligence boom is projected to peak around late 2026 or early 2027, with AI investment as a share of GDP slowing and the estimated 0.4pp wealth-effect lift to US consumer spending fading. Across US nonmanufacturing industries, AI adoption shows a statistically significant negative correlation with employment growth and positive correlation with unemployment.

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GS’s Hatzius argues that AI’s growth impulse is nearing its peak, with the year-over-year increase in hyperscaler investment as a share of US GDP projected to peak in Q4 2026—even as AI investment continues to rise.

When will the AI boom's growth boost peak?

Core argument: The AI-driven wealth effect is estimated to have added 0.4pp (0.25% of GDP) to US consumer spending growth over the past year, an impact expected to decline gradually, or more sharply if AI-related stocks keep falling.

The growth impulse from the AI boom was set to peak in late 2026 or early 2027 even before concerns around the sustainability of the AI investment boom intensified in recent weeks. Although AI investment is still rising rapidly, we expect the increase as a share of GDP to slow over the next year. Alongside the fading boost from last year’s increase in US depreciation allowances, this will weigh on capital spending growth, especially in the US. AI has also boosted US consumer spending growth via a positive wealth effect worth an estimated 0.4pp (or 0.25% of GDP) over the past year. This impact is likely to decline over the next year, gradually if stocks perform in line with our strategists’ reasonably upbeat expectations but more sharply if AI-related stocks continue to decline. Our own base case remains that AI investment will ultimately pay off in terms of higher productivity and economywide profits. However, one key channel for this payoff is labor market disruption, which has negative near-term macroeconomic effects. And while DM labor markets still look solid in aggregate, we are starting to see clearer signs that the AI impact is spreading beyond the technology sector. Across nonmanufacturing industries, the share of US firms that have adopted AI in regular business functions now shows a statistically significant negative correlation with employment growth and a statistically significant positive correlation with unemployment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The AI-driven wealth effect is estimated to have added 0.4pp (0.25% of GDP) to US consumer spending growth over the past year, an impact expected to decline gradually, or more sharply if AI-related stocks keep falling.
  2. The growth impulse from the AI boom was set to peak in late 2026 or early 2027, with AI investment’s rise as a share of GDP expected to slow over the next year and weigh on capital spending growth, especially in the US.
  3. Across US nonmanufacturing industries, the share of firms adopting AI in regular business functions shows a statistically significant negative correlation with employment growth and a statistically significant positive correlation with unemployment.

AI Summary. Financial firms, companies and governments raised about $6.61tn through broadly syndicated investment-grade and junk-bond sales, up 15% year-over-year to a record. Cloud-computing giants and data-center developers sold almost $368bn of debt, more than 6x the prior year, accounting for roughly a third of the increase in borrowing.

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Bloomberg data shows that global investment-grade and high-yield bond sales, counting only governments’ syndicated deals and not their auctions, have hit a record ~$6.61T year-to-date, up 15%. AI-related issuers account for about a third of the increase.

Is AI borrowing driving global bond sales to a record?

Core argument: Global broadly syndicated investment-grade and junk-bond sales reached about $6.61 trillion so far this year, up 15% from a year earlier and eclipsing 2025’s record with two months still to go, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Financial firms, companies and governments have raised a combined ~$6.61 trillion through broadly syndicated investment-grade and junk-bond sales so far this year, up 15% from the same period a year earlier and eclipsing 2025’s record with two months still to go, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Cloud-computing giants and data-center developers alone sold almost $368 billion in debt, more than six times as much as a year ago, the data shows. The group has accounted for about a third of the increase in borrowing so far this year, outpacing every other non-financial sector and adding twice as much incremental debt as governments.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Global broadly syndicated investment-grade and junk-bond sales reached about $6.61 trillion so far this year, up 15% from a year earlier and eclipsing 2025’s record with two months still to go, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
  2. Cloud-computing giants and data-center developers sold almost $368 billion in debt, more than six times the amount a year earlier, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
  3. Cloud-computing and data-center borrowers accounted for about a third of this year’s increase in borrowing, outpacing every other non-financial sector and adding twice as much incremental debt as governments.