“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
AI Summary.Prime-age adults aged 25–54 and older workers aged 55–64 have higher employment rates in Europe than in the US, while US youth employment is higher because Europeans spend longer in education. The share of young people not in education, employment or training is higher in the US than in Europe.
Chris GilesFinancial Times
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Despite Europe’s high social spending relative to the US, Chris Giles notes that prime-age adult (25–54) labor force participation in the Eurozone has overtaken that of the US, and there has been a dramatic convergence in the LFP of older workers.
Do Europeans work less than Americans?
Core argument: Prime-age adults aged 25–54 in Europe are more likely to be employed than their US counterparts, whether measured with EU or Eurozone data, and Europeans aged 55–64 also have higher employment rates than Americans.
It does not matter whether you use EU or Eurozone data, prime-age adults (between 25 and 54) in Europe are more likely to be in work than those in the US. Older people (between 55 and 64) also have higher employment rates in Europe. Younger people (between 15 and 24) are more likely to have a job in the US, but that results from Europeans educating themselves for longer. The proportion of young people not in education, employment or training is higher in the US than in Europe. So welfare is not stopping work. More than that, the higher-welfare north of Europe tends to have higher employment rates than the south, although there is convergence within the Eurozone. Spain, in particular, has enjoyed rapid improvements.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Prime-age adults aged 25–54 in Europe are more likely to be employed than their US counterparts, whether measured with EU or Eurozone data, and Europeans aged 55–64 also have higher employment rates than Americans.
Young people aged 15–24 are more likely to have a job in the US than in Europe, but that gap results from Europeans spending longer in education, and the share not in education, employment or training is higher in the US.
The higher-welfare north of Europe tends to have higher employment rates than the south, with convergence within the Eurozone and rapid improvement in Spain.
Related Articles:
Why Do Americans No Longer Work So Much More Than Non-Americans?— About half of the 1990s gap between American and European hours worked had reversed by the end of the 2010s. The authors estimate US hours per person declined after the 2000s because of rising benefits for the non-employed—especially health benefits like Medicaid—while non-US hours rose with higher wages and lower work costs.
The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe— A European Union competitiveness report attributes the EU's labour productivity growth gap with the US largely to weaker activity in information and communications technology and large-scale digital services; excluding main ICT sectors, EU productivity was broadly at par with the US from 2000-2019. It estimates Europe's investment share must rise about 5 percentage points of GDP.
Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking”— A debate on U.S. fiscal policy argues that spending increases, rather than the tax increases needed to fund them, slow growth, and that higher taxes would reduce the expected value of America's innovative risk-taking. The argument holds that cutting debt below 100% of GDP is critical.
AI Summary.Employment in five industries tied to the data-centre build-out, including electrical contracting and equipment manufacturing, has risen roughly 320,000 above what broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest. Engineers, software developers, mathematicians and data scientists have added about 730,000 jobs above the trend for professional employment overall.
Economist StaffThe Economist
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The Economist estimates that so far the AI boom has created ~1mm new jobs in the US, exceeding their estimate of ~200,000 layoffs attributed to AI since mid-2023.
Is the AI build-out adding jobs above trend?
Core argument: Employment in five industries tied to the data-centre build-out, from electrical contracting to equipment manufacturing, has risen by roughly 320,000 more since 2023 than broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest.
[We] tracked five industries at the heart of the data-centre build-out, from electrical contracting to equipment manufacturing. Since 2023 employment in them has risen by roughly 320,000 more than broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest. Not all of those jobs owe their existence to AI—grid upgrades and other factory building matters too. [We also] tracked employment in professional occupations closest to the AI boom—engineers, software developers, mathematicians and data scientists—and compared their growth since 2022 with professional employment overall. These roles have added roughly 730,000 jobs above trend in recent years. AI will not have created every single one of them. But it has almost certainly created quite a few.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Employment in five industries tied to the data-centre build-out, from electrical contracting to equipment manufacturing, has risen by roughly 320,000 more since 2023 than broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest.
Professional occupations closest to the AI boom—engineers, software developers, mathematicians and data scientists—have added roughly 730,000 jobs above the trend for professional employment overall since 2022.
Not all of these above-trend gains are attributable to AI, since grid upgrades and other factory building also matter, though AI has almost certainly created quite a few of them.
Related Articles:
The College Wage Premium in the Generative AI Era— The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 to 0.575 after four decades of expansion, implying the first sustained negative growth in relative demand for college-educated labor. The authors estimate that weaker wage growth in occupations highly exposed to artificial intelligence accounts for roughly 28% of that decline, though the patterns are not causal.
Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence— Employment for workers aged 22–25 in the occupations most exposed to artificial intelligence has declined roughly 18pp relative to less-exposed peers, with no comparable decline in other age groups. The authors find this operates mainly through reduced hiring, concentrated where AI substitutes for human tasks rather than complements them.
Looking for the Ladder— The article argues that the hiring downturn in occupations most exposed to generative AI reflects interest-rate sensitivity rather than AI itself, since roughly 38% of workers in the most AI-exposed quintile work in information, finance and insurance, and professional and technical services, versus under 2% in the least-exposed quintile.
AI Summary.The headline labor force participation rate — the share of people 16 and older working or looking for work — is a limited gauge of labor market health because participation varies greatly by age. Aging baby boomers and the addition of nearly 1.7m Americans 65 and older to population estimates add distortion.
Justin FoxBloomberg
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Adjusted for the age composition of the population, US labor force participation, at 61.8%, is near an all-time high, reflecting delayed retirement of older workers.
Does the headline labor force participation rate accurately measure labor market health?
Core argument: The Bureau of Labor Statistics added nearly 1.7 million Americans aged 65 and older to its population estimates this year, reflecting belated adjustments stemming from the 2020 Census, which adds to distortions in the labor force participation rate.
The labor force participation rate is the number of people 16 and older who have jobs or are actively looking for them, divided by the civilian (that is, not uniformed military) noninstitutional (that is, not in prison or the like) population 16 and older. While this percentage can tell us useful things about, say, the sustainability of Social Security or the overall availability of labor, its validity as a gauge of the health of the labor market is limited by the reality that labor force participation varies greatly by age. It’s a flawed metric that is currently more flawed than usual as the youngest members of the giant baby boom generation age into their mid-60s. The addition this year of nearly 1.7 million 65-and-older Americans to the BLS population estimates, because of belated adjustments stemming from the 2020 Census, just adds to the distortions.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The Bureau of Labor Statistics added nearly 1.7 million Americans aged 65 and older to its population estimates this year, reflecting belated adjustments stemming from the 2020 Census, which adds to distortions in the labor force participation rate.
The labor force participation rate divides people 16 and older who are working or actively looking for work by the civilian noninstitutional population 16 and older, a measure whose validity as a gauge of labor market health is limited because participation varies greatly by age.
The aging of the youngest baby boomers into their mid-60s makes the participation rate more flawed than usual, though the measure still tells us useful things about Social Security sustainability and the overall availability of labor.
Related Articles:
Baby Busts and Growth Booms: Demographic Change and the Macroeconomy— A 1pp lower birth rate 20 years earlier is associated with 22 log points higher output per worker 20 years later and 29 log points higher after 40 years, about 0.73pp faster annual growth. The authors find lower birth rates are also associated with more labor-saving patents, larger high-tech shares, and higher productivity growth.
AI, Immigration, and Collapsing Labor Force Participation— As labor force participation falls, a shrinking group of workers generates the income, taxes, and innovation supporting a growing number of non-workers, leaving the economy more fragile because labor shocks are concentrated among fewer participants. Labor scarcity raises the return on automation, robotics, and software, making growth depend on productivity rather than participation.
How Labor Force Participation Has Diverged Across Genders— Between 1976 and 2024 the trend labor force participation rate fell 10.1 percentage points for men and rose 8.2 points for women. Population aging lowered participation by about 4 points for each gender and rising education raised it (+6 for women, +3 for men), but the divergence is dominated by participation trends within age-gender groups.
AI Summary.The authors argue that American men's lifetime experiences of the male labor market shape their beliefs about the returns to working, contributing to the long-run decline in male labor force participation, with recent cohorts participating less than earlier ones at every age. The effects are stronger for same-race labor markets and for conditions experienced in childhood.
Remy Levin and Daniela VidartNational Bureau of Economic Research
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Btw 1986 and 2019, prime-age males who grew up observing a one–SD lower male earnings history had a 7pp lower LFP rate in adulthood, holding current labor‑market conditions fixed.
How do lifetime labor market experiences shape male labor force participation?
Core argument: The authors propose that American men's lifetime experiences of the aggregate male labor market shape their beliefs about the returns to participation, influencing labor supply decisions in ways that persist even in the face of current market conditions.
We propose a new channel contributing to the long-run decline in [male labor force participation] (MLFP) in the United States: changes in American men’s lifetime experiences of the aggregate male labor market have shaped their beliefs about the returns to participation, influencing labor supply decisions in ways that persist even in the face of current market conditions. MLFP and national lifetime male labor market experiences, holding contemporaneous conditions fixed, are highly correlated over time (Figure 1, Panel A). Second, the decline in MLFP is largely driven by cohort-level differences: recent cohorts participate at lower rates than previous generations at every age (Figure 1, Panel B). These patterns suggest that men’s labor market participation is the history, embedded in each cohort’s memory, of the labor markets experienced by the men around them. The effects on MLFP are stronger for experiences of same-race male labor markets, demonstrating the central role of reference-group identity, and are driven by conditions experienced during men’s formative childhood years not explained by educational attainment of subjects or their fathers. Finally, we show that lifetime male labor market experiences are correlated with direct measures of men’s personal wage and employment expectations, but not their expectations for the macroeconomy as a whole.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The authors propose that American men's lifetime experiences of the aggregate male labor market shape their beliefs about the returns to participation, influencing labor supply decisions in ways that persist even in the face of current market conditions.
The decline in U.S. male labor force participation is largely driven by cohort-level differences, with recent cohorts participating at lower rates than previous generations at every age.
Effects on male labor force participation are stronger for experiences of same-race male labor markets and are driven by conditions experienced during men's formative childhood years, not explained by the educational attainment of subjects or their fathers.
Related Articles:
How Labor Force Participation Has Diverged Across Genders— Between 1976 and 2024 the trend labor force participation rate fell 10.1 percentage points for men and rose 8.2 points for women. Population aging lowered participation by about 4 points for each gender and rising education raised it (+6 for women, +3 for men), but the divergence is dominated by participation trends within age-gender groups.
Bachelors Without Bachelor’s: Gender Gaps in Education and Declining Marriage Rates— Marriage rates for college-educated women have remained stable over the past fifty years even as the relative supply of college-educated men declined, with the overall decline in marriage driven almost entirely by fewer marriages between non-college women and non-college men. The education gap in women's marriage rates is larger in areas where non-college men face the highest joblessness and incarceration.
Post-Pandemic Recovery for America’s Prime Age Labor Force: A Tale of Two Sexes— Prime-age women's labor force participation climbed about 5 points above its pre-pandemic level over a decade, while prime-age men's rose barely a point, only just regaining pre-pandemic levels. Despite economic expansion and labor shortages, work rates for prime-age American men are barely as high as at the trough of the severe Reagan-era recession.
AI Summary.Between 1976 and 2024 the trend labor force participation rate fell 10.1 percentage points for men and rose 8.2 points for women. Population aging lowered participation by about 4 points for each gender and rising education raised it (+6 for women, +3 for men), but the divergence is dominated by participation trends within age-gender groups.
Andreas Hornstein, Marianna Kudlyak, Greeshma Avaradi and Taerin KimFederal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
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~9pp of the ~23pp decline in US men’s LFP relative to that of women btw 1976 and 2024 is due to a negative group-specific trend among less-educated men and about 6pp is due to an analogous positive trend among high-education women.
What explains the divergence in male and female labor force participation?
Core argument: Trend labor force participation for men declined 10.1 percentage points between 1976 and 2024, while trend participation for women rose 8.2 percentage points.
Figure 2 unpacks the aggregate pattern [Figure 1 in the gallery] as separate participation trends for men and women. Each panel shows a smooth red line for the cumulative change in the gender-specific LFP trend from 1976 to 2024. The figure also shows contributions to this cumulative change from changes in age composition (green line), changes in education composition (light blue line), and changes in group-specific trend LFP (dark blue line). The figure shows how much of each gender’s change in its LFP trend since 1976 comes from each source. [It] shows that, btw 1976 and 2024, the trend LFP for men declined 10.1 percentage points while the trend LFP for women increased 8.2 percentage points. Population aging pushed down the LFP rate about the same amount for both genders, –4 points. Rising education pushed it up for both genders, though the contribution was somewhat more important for women (+6 points) than for men (+3 points). However, the divergent trends for men and women are dominated by the age-gender group-specific LFP trends rather than by changes in the education and age compositions for each gender.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Trend labor force participation for men declined 10.1 percentage points between 1976 and 2024, while trend participation for women rose 8.2 percentage points.
Population aging subtracted about 4 percentage points from trend participation for both men and women, while rising education added 6 points for women and 3 points for men.
The divergence between male and female participation trends is dominated by age-gender group-specific participation trends rather than by changes in each gender's age and education composition.
Related Articles:
Women, Men and Jobs— The share of U.S. prime-age men out of the labor force has more than quadrupled from about 2.5% to around 11%, with most supported by parents, wives, or partners rather than disability insurance. The shift toward knowledge and services has reduced male-coded jobs across all advanced countries, including Germany.
Bachelors Without Bachelor’s: Gender Gaps in Education and Declining Marriage Rates— Marriage rates for college-educated women have remained stable over the past fifty years even as the relative supply of college-educated men declined, with the overall decline in marriage driven almost entirely by fewer marriages between non-college women and non-college men. The education gap in women's marriage rates is larger in areas where non-college men face the highest joblessness and incarceration.
Post-Pandemic Recovery for America’s Prime Age Labor Force: A Tale of Two Sexes— Prime-age women's labor force participation climbed about 5 points above its pre-pandemic level over a decade, while prime-age men's rose barely a point, only just regaining pre-pandemic levels. Despite economic expansion and labor shortages, work rates for prime-age American men are barely as high as at the trough of the severe Reagan-era recession.
AI Summary.An analysis of industries that rely most heavily on noncitizen workers with a high-school degree or less—including construction, restaurants, food manufacturing and hotels—found hourly earnings in those 41 industries rose 3.5% from a year earlier, below the 3.8% increase for all workers. Employment in those industries fell by 90,400 over the same period, while overall employment grew by 298,000.
Paul Kiernan and Drew An-PhamWall Street Journal
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Industries most dependent on low-skilled immigrant workers saw wages rise 3.5% and employment fall by 90,400 Y/Y in Feb, underperforming the broader economy, where wages grew 3.8% and total employment rose by 298,000.
Have immigration-dependent industries seen wages rise faster than the broader economy?
Core argument: Hourly earnings across the 41 industries most reliant on low-skilled immigrants rose a weighted average of 3.5% in February from a year earlier, below the 3.8% gain for all workers and a slowdown from before Trump took office.
The analysis used 2024 census data to identify fields—including construction, restaurants, food manufacturing and hotels—that rely heavily on noncitizens with a high-school degree or less, a common proxy for people who entered the country illegally. The Journal excluded industries such as agriculture and the gig economy, for which the Labor Department doesn’t publish hourly earnings. The result: Across 41 industries that rely most heavily on low-skilled immigrants, hourly earnings rose by a weighted average of 3.5% in February from a year earlier, according to the latest figures. That was less than the 3.8% increase in average hourly earnings for all workers and marked a slowdown from before Trump took office. Employment in those 41 immigrant-dependent industries fell by 90,400 in February from a year earlier, while overall employment grew by 298,000 jobs in the same stretch. Preliminary March figures available for 23 of the sectors show a year-over-year gain of 39,400 jobs, boosted by hiring in construction and food service.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Hourly earnings across the 41 industries most reliant on low-skilled immigrants rose a weighted average of 3.5% in February from a year earlier, below the 3.8% gain for all workers and a slowdown from before Trump took office.
Employment in the 41 immigrant-dependent industries fell by 90,400 in February from a year earlier, while overall employment grew by 298,000 jobs over the same stretch.
Preliminary March figures available for 23 of the immigrant-dependent sectors show a year-over-year gain of 39,400 jobs, boosted by hiring in construction and food service.
Related Articles:
Macroeconomic Implications Of Immigration Flows In 2025 And 2026: January 2026 Update— The authors estimate that job growth consistent with full employment was 20,000–50,000 a month in the second half of 2025, while reported nonfarm payroll growth averaged about 14,500 and unemployment rose 0.3 percentage points. They project immigration policy changes will keep potential employment growth low, reducing GDP growth by roughly 0.2 percentage points in 2025 and 0.1 in 2026.
Labor Force Growth, Breakeven Employment, and Potential GDP Growth— Slowing net immigration could cut US labor force growth so much that the breakeven pace of job creation falls to nearly zero — under 10,000 jobs a month — far below any point in the past 65 years. Monthly payroll declines as large as 100,000 would then not be unusual even with output at potential.
Break-Even Employment Declines As Unauthorized Immigration Outflows Continue— Net outflows of unauthorized immigrants have lowered the break-even rate of U.S. payroll growth needed to hold the unemployment rate steady, so smaller job gains that once signalled economic slack are now consistent with a balanced labor market. Recent payroll growth has slightly exceeded that break-even rate on average.
AI Summary.Net outflows of unauthorized immigrants have lowered the break-even rate of U.S. payroll growth needed to hold the unemployment rate steady, so smaller job gains that once signalled economic slack are now consistent with a balanced labor market. Recent payroll growth has slightly exceeded that break-even rate on average.
Anton Cheremukhin, Daniel Wilson and Xiaoqing ZhouFederal Reserve Bank of Dallas
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A FRBD analysis finds immigration outflows lowered break-even employment growth to about -3,000 monthly, down from ~250,000 in 2023, “payroll gains that might historically have signaled economic slack are now consistent with a balanced labor market.”
Does immigration outflow lower the break-even rate for job growth?
Core argument: Payroll growth over December 2025–February 2026 slightly exceeded the estimated break-even rate on average, consistent with the unemployment rate remaining stable despite softer headline payroll numbers.
Comparing our break-even estimates with actual payroll growth (Chart 2, blue bars) suggests that job growth over the recent three months—December 2025–February 2026—has slightly exceeded the break-even rate on average, consistent with the unemployment rate remaining stable despite softer headline payroll numbers. Real-time data point to an important change in the U.S. labor market: The benchmark for evaluating payroll growth has moved significantly. As net outflows of unauthorized immigrants reduce employment growth in late 2025, payroll gains that might historically have signalled economic slack are now consistent with a balanced labor market.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Payroll growth over December 2025–February 2026 slightly exceeded the estimated break-even rate on average, consistent with the unemployment rate remaining stable despite softer headline payroll numbers.
Net outflows of unauthorized immigrants reduced employment growth in late 2025, lowering the break-even benchmark against which U.S. payroll gains are evaluated.
Payroll gains that would historically have signalled economic slack are now consistent with a balanced U.S. labor market, given the shift in break-even employment.
Related Articles:
New Data Show Intensifying Unauthorized Immigration Decline, With Large Local Variations— Individual-level immigration court and parole data indicate net unauthorized immigration has turned increasingly negative, averaging -48,000 per month over the first seven months of the year and reaching -89,000 in July. The authors estimate this pace implies an annual total of -576,000, compared with the Congressional Budget Office's projection of -290,000.
What Sweeping Revisions and a Blowout Month Tell Us About the U.S. Job Market— Labor Department revisions lowered previously estimated job gains for the past two calendar years, cutting the combined net change in construction, manufacturing, and retail by 115,000 jobs. Healthcare added about 437,000 jobs and social assistance about 321,000 over 12 months, while all other private-sector jobs combined shrank.
Trump’s Immigration Crackdown Fails to Deliver Jobs for US-Born Workers— Researchers at the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution estimate net migration into the US may have turned negative for the first time in at least 50 years. That decline coincided with rising joblessness among US-born workers, whose labor force participation has fallen in recent months to near its lowest level since 2021.
AI Summary.Local economic distress is associated with wider male-female gaps in educational attainment: men are 1–2% less likely than women to hold a high school diploma in the most prosperous places, versus 4–5% less likely in the most distressed places. In distressed counties, 53% of women but only 43% of men have at least some college education.
Sarah EckhardtAgglomerations
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American men in distressed counties are 24% less likely to be employed than their peers in prosperous counties, while women are 19% less likely. This is likely downstream from a widening gender gap in high school graduation rates in distressed counties.
Does local economic distress widen male-female gaps in educational attainment?
Core argument: In distressed counties, 53% of women have at least some college education versus 43% of men, a 10 percentage point difference, according to the Distressed Communities Index.
In our latest release of the Distressed Communities Index, we highlighted the very strong relationship between local economic distress and the gap in educational outcomes between men and women. Men in the most prosperous places are 1–2% less likely to have attained a high school diploma than women; men in mid-tier places are 2–3% less likely; and men in the most distressed places are 4–5% less likely. Nationally, 90% of women and 89% of men over 25 have a high school diploma — close to parity. But this relatively small gap in educational attainment is significantly larger in distressed places. When men and women with only a high school diploma, versus those with any college education, are separated out, the attainment gaps widen further. On average, 53% of women in distressed counties have received at least some college education, while only 43% of men have — a 10 percentage point difference.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
In distressed counties, 53% of women have at least some college education versus 43% of men, a 10 percentage point difference, according to the Distressed Communities Index.
Men are 1–2% less likely than women to have attained a high school diploma in the most prosperous places, 2–3% less likely in mid-tier places, and 4–5% less likely in the most distressed places.
Nationally, 90% of women and 89% of men over 25 hold a high school diploma, close to parity, but the gap is significantly larger in distressed places.
Related Articles:
The Geography of American Exceptionalism— The US population is split evenly among urban, suburban, and rural areas, but 64% of those living at suburban densities reside in prosperous or comfortable ZIP codes, versus 36% in rural and 38% in urban ones. County distress scores correlate strongly with life expectancy, with prosperous counties averaging 5.3 years longer.
The Great “Transfer”-mation— Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
“Compensate the Losers?” Economic Policy and Partisan Realignment in the US— The authors argue that partisan realignment by education reflects Democrats' declining supply of "predistribution" policies such as job guarantees, higher minimum wages, protectionism, and stronger unions, which less-educated Americans favor while more-educated Americans prefer taxes and transfers. They estimate changing views of the parties' economic policies explain roughly half the shift.
