“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
AI Summary.The International Monetary Fund calculates that global current-account deficits plus surpluses reached 3.7% of world gross domestic product, after fluctuating between 1% and 3% until the early 2000s. The US deficit of $1.1tn is the largest single imbalance, and the Fund estimates a budget deficit of 2% of GDP raises the current-account deficit by 0.5% of GDP.
Greg IpThe Wall Street Journal
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Greg Ip warns that while global imbalances are “narrower” than they were pre-crisis, “they are more persistent and more entrenched in national behavior,” pointing to China’s trade surplus and chronic US fiscal deficits.
How large have global current-account imbalances grown relative to world output?
Core argument: The IMF calculates that global current-account deficits plus surpluses reached 3.7% of global GDP last year after falling steadily from around the global financial crisis; until the early 2000s they fluctuated between 1% and 3%.
The IMF calculates that deficits plus surpluses reached 3.7% of global gross domestic product last year after falling steadily from around the global financial crisis. Until the early 2000s, they fluctuated between 1% and 3%. This is worrisome. Current-account deficits played a part in the crises that swept Latin America in the early 1980s, East and Southeast Asia in the late 1990s, the U.S. in 2007-09, and the eurozone from 2009 on. Today’s imbalances look different. While annual deficits are narrower than 15 years ago, they are more persistent and more entrenched in national behaviour. Take the U.S., whose current-account deficit of $1.1 trillion is by far the largest single imbalance. Last year, tariffs did reduce some imports, but because the AI boom sucked in foreign-made tech equipment, the current-account deficit narrowed only slightly. The bigger contributor to the U.S. current-account deficit is its budget deficit, which sustains excessive U.S. spending and inadequate saving. The IMF estimates a budget deficit of 2% of GDP increases the current-account deficit by 0.5% of GDP.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The IMF calculates that global current-account deficits plus surpluses reached 3.7% of global GDP last year after falling steadily from around the global financial crisis; until the early 2000s they fluctuated between 1% and 3%.
The U.S. current-account deficit of $1.1 trillion is by far the largest single imbalance, narrowing only slightly last year as tariffs reduced some imports while the AI boom drew in foreign-made tech equipment.
The IMF estimates that a budget deficit of 2% of GDP increases the current-account deficit by 0.5% of GDP, and the U.S. budget deficit sustains excessive spending and inadequate saving.
Related Articles:
Understanding Global Imbalances— The US, China, Germany, and Japan account for roughly two-thirds of global current account imbalances, with the US deficit at 4% of GDP financed by capital inflows into dollar assets. The average duration of a surplus or deficit spell roughly doubled since the 1980s, building large net foreign asset and liability positions.
Why Global Imbalances Matter— Countries running persistent trade surpluses, such as China, Germany and Japan, have built their economies around an excess supply of tradeable goods and services, leaving them dependent on deficit countries to absorb it. That dependence gives deficit countries bargaining power and exposes surplus countries to pressure to expand domestic demand.
The U.S. Trade Deficit: Myths and Realities— Taxing capital inflows would weaken the dollar but could raise domestic interest rates and depress investment, harming long-term growth, while an interest rate cut absent recession would be inflationary and erode any real depreciation needed to durably improve the trade balance. Fiscal restraint could weaken the dollar and reduce the trade deficit.
AI Summary.Manufacturing in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan has narrowed around artificial intelligence: chips and AI-related gear account for over 40% of South Korean exports and 80% of Taiwan's, both up sharply from earlier shares. The Economist estimates the region's entire rise in industrial output is attributable to AI, with non-AI factory output shrinking.
Economist StaffThe Economist
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The industrial production of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan has risen 15% since 2019 – entirely driven by AI-related demand. Apart from chip-making, IP has shown no trend since 2011. The fall in non-chip output is likely due to Chinese competition.
Is all industrial growth in north-east Asia coming from AI?
Core argument: The Economist finds that all of the 15% rise in north-east Asian industrial output since 2019 is attributable to AI, after counting firms not classified as AI-linked in official statistics, such as Japan's Advantest and Taiwan's Foxconn.
North-east Asian manufacturing is getting narrower. Chips and other gear related to AI make up over 40% of South Korean exports, more than double their share just two years ago. In Taiwan it is 80% of exports, compared with about half before the pandemic. After accounting for firms not neatly captured as AI-linked in official statistics, like Japan’s Advantest (which makes chip-testing gear) and Taiwan’s Foxconn (which produces data-centre servers, among other electronics), The Economist finds that all 15% of the region’s rise in industrial output since 2019 is thanks to AI. In Japan, South Korea and Taiwan output at factories unrelated to AI has shrunk in recent years.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The Economist finds that all of the 15% rise in north-east Asian industrial output since 2019 is attributable to AI, after counting firms not classified as AI-linked in official statistics, such as Japan's Advantest and Taiwan's Foxconn.
Chips and other AI-related gear account for over 40% of South Korean exports, more than double their share two years earlier, and 80% of Taiwan's exports, compared with about half before the pandemic.
Factory output unrelated to AI has shrunk in recent years in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, leaving north-east Asian manufacturing narrower.
Related Articles:
China’s Next-Generation Industrial Policy— China's export growth is concentrated in upstream, higher-tech goods: exports of intermediate inputs rose 26% and capital goods 32% between 2021 and 2024, while consumption goods exports were broadly flat. This shift embeds China deeper in global production systems and aligns with its long-running import substitution strategy of localizing entire value chains.
China Is Making Trade Impossible— Interviews with Chinese economists, technologists and business leaders yielded no clear answer to what products China would want to buy from the rest of the world in future, beyond commodities, luxury goods and higher education. The author argues China sees nothing it cannot eventually make better and cheaper itself, undermining trade as a two-way exchange.
Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push— Stronger Chinese growth driven by export-oriented manufacturing may not produce net positive spillovers: for every 1pp export-driven boost to China's GDP, other economies may see a 0.1–0.3pp drag, with high-tech producers such as Europe and Japan facing greater pressure. Cheaper Chinese goods continue to exert a disinflationary impulse.
AI Summary.The Budget Lab estimates the average effective US tariff rate faced by consumers reached 16%, the highest since 1936, before court-struck tariffs cut it to 9.1%, with new 15% Section 122 tariffs lifting it to 13.7%. If those tariffs expire after 150 days, the authors project $1.3tn in revenue over 2026-35, or $1.1tn after accounting for slower growth.
John IselinYale University
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The new 15% tariffs under Section 122 bring the mean effective tariff rate to 13.7%, down from 16.9% prior to the SCOTUS ruling that the IEEPA tariffs were illegal. Section 122 tariffs will expire in 150 days unless extended by Congress.
How have court rulings and new tariffs changed effective tariff rates?
Core argument: The Budget Lab estimates the US average effective tariff rate facing consumers at 13.7%, down from 16% before the IEEPA-based tariffs were struck down — the highest since 1936 — and up from the 9.1% reached immediately after that ruling.
The Budget Lab (TBL) estimates the effects of all US tariffs and foreign retaliation implemented through February 20, 2026, including the new 15% Section 122 tariffs and the elimination of IEEPA-based tariffs. Under our baseline case, the Section 122 tariffs expire after 150 days. Before the IEEPA tariffs were struck down, consumers faced an overall average effective tariff rate of 16%, the highest since 1936. Immediately following the IEEPA ruling, the rate fell to 9.1%. After the Section 122 tariffs were imposed, the rate rose to its current level of 13.7%. If those tariffs expire in 150 days, the rate will fall again to 9.1%. Assuming Section 122 tariffs expire in 150 days, the administration’s tariffs will raise about $1.3 trillion over 2026-35, though slower economic growth reduces revenues and brings the net dynamic revenue to $1.1 trillion. (If they are instead made permanent, these figures would be $2.2 trillion and $1.9 trillion.)
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The Budget Lab estimates the US average effective tariff rate facing consumers at 13.7%, down from 16% before the IEEPA-based tariffs were struck down — the highest since 1936 — and up from the 9.1% reached immediately after that ruling.
The Budget Lab projects the administration's tariffs will raise about $1.3 trillion over 2026–35 if the new 15% Section 122 tariffs expire after 150 days, with net dynamic revenue of $1.1 trillion after slower economic growth reduces receipts.
Should the Section 122 tariffs be made permanent, The Budget Lab estimates revenue of $2.2 trillion over 2026–35 and $1.9 trillion on a net dynamic basis; if they expire after 150 days, the effective tariff rate falls to 9.1%.
Related Articles:
US Notches One of Its Biggest Annual Trade Gaps Since 1960— The US goods and services trade deficit reached $901.5bn for the year, one of the largest in data going back to 1960. US companies increased imports of computers and accessories by nearly $145bn from the prior year, an acceleration in demand that reflects large-scale artificial intelligence investment.
Help for the Heartland? The Employment and Electoral Effects of the Trump Tariffs in the United States— The authors find that the combined effect of U.S.-China trade war import tariffs, retaliatory tariffs, and farm subsidies on employment in exposed U.S. locations was at best a wash and possibly mildly negative, while residents of tariff-protected areas became less likely to identify as Democrats and more likely to vote Republican.
Did Tariffs Make American Manufacturing Great? New Evidence from the Gilded Age— Using digitized industry-level US tariff data from 1870–1900 matched to state-level manufacturing census data for over 80 industries, the authors estimate that tariffs reduced labor productivity. They argue the results are consistent with weaker international competition allowing less efficient firms to survive, reduced incentives to innovate, and lobbying for protection misallocating resources.
AI Summary.After the US Supreme Court ruled the president cannot use a 1977 emergency law to impose import taxes, other statutes remain available, including Section 338 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which permits tariffs on countries found to discriminate against US commerce without any agency investigation. Never previously used, invoking it could invite legal challenges.
Isabel GottliebBloomberg
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Trump has at least five tools he can use to offset the IEEPA tariffs; however, none of them offer the latitude that Trump’s interpretation of IEEPA allowed. Section 338 of Smoot-Hawley, which has never been used, likely has the broadest scope.
What other laws allow tariffs after the emergency law ruling?
Core argument: The US Supreme Court ruled that President Donald Trump cannot use a 1977 emergency law to impose import taxes, leaving him to rely on alternative legislation to rebuild his tariff wall.
President Donald Trump can lean on alternative legislation to try to rebuild his tariff wall, after the US Supreme Court ruled that he can’t use a 1977 emergency law to impose import taxes. [Notably], Section 338 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. The Depression-era provision empowers the president to introduce tariffs on imports from nations “whenever he shall find as a fact” that these countries impose unreasonable charges or limitations, or engage in discriminatory behavior against US commerce. There’s no prerequisite for a federal agency to conduct an investigation before the president can apply tariffs. Section 338 has never been used before to impose tariffs. If Trump were to lean on this provision, such an unprecedented move may invite legal challenges. The possibility that Trump could tap Section 338 has alarmed some Democrats in the House of Representatives — five lawmakers introduced a resolution in March 2025 to repeal this section of the 1930 law.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The US Supreme Court ruled that President Donald Trump cannot use a 1977 emergency law to impose import taxes, leaving him to rely on alternative legislation to rebuild his tariff wall.
Section 338 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 lets the president impose tariffs whenever he "shall find as a fact" that a country imposes unreasonable charges or limitations or discriminates against US commerce, with no prior federal agency investigation required.
Section 338 has never been used to impose tariffs, and five House Democrats introduced a resolution in March 2025 to repeal the provision.
Related Articles:
Help for the Heartland? The Employment and Electoral Effects of the Trump Tariffs in the United States— The authors find that the combined effect of U.S.-China trade war import tariffs, retaliatory tariffs, and farm subsidies on employment in exposed U.S. locations was at best a wash and possibly mildly negative, while residents of tariff-protected areas became less likely to identify as Democrats and more likely to vote Republican.
The Incidence of Tariffs: Rates and Reality— The authors estimate that tariff pass-through into US import prices was 80% in 2018–2019 and 94% more recently, while exchange-rate pass-through was low in both periods. Because imported inputs matter for US manufacturing, they argue much of the tariff burden falls on US producers, roughly a 1–2 percentage-point tax on manufacturing.
Who Is Paying for the 2025 U.S. Tariffs?— The authors estimate that 94% of U.S. tariff costs were borne domestically over the first eight months of 2025, with a 10% tariff associated with only a 0.6 percentage point decline in foreign export prices. Pass-through into U.S. import prices later declined to 86%, shifting more of the burden to foreign exporters.
AI Summary.The Budget Lab estimates that with tariffs imposed under the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act struck down, US consumers face an average effective tariff rate of 9.1%, versus 16.9% had those tariffs remained. Remaining tariffs are projected to raise about $1.2tn over 2026-35, or $1tn accounting for slower growth.
John IselinYale University
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Without the IEEPA tariffs, the mean effective tariff rate is 9.1%, down from 16.9%. The previous tariff regime was projected to raise ~$2.7T over 2026–35 ($2.3T dynamically). The SCOTUS decision will cut revenue by about 50% to ~$1-1.2T with or without refunds.
How much do remaining tariffs cost consumers after emergency powers struck down?
Core argument: The Budget Lab estimates that without IEEPA tariffs, U.S. consumers face an average effective tariff rate of 9.1%, the highest since 1946 excluding 2025, versus 16.9% had IEEPA tariffs remained in effect.
The Budget Lab estimates the effects of all US tariffs and foreign retaliation implemented in 2025 after the decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that President Trump exceeded his authority to invoke the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose reciprocal tariffs. Without IEEPA tariffs, consumers will face an overall average effective tariff rate of 9.1%, which remains the highest since 1946 excluding 2025. (If IEEPA tariffs had been allowed to stay in effect, this figure would have been 16.9%.) All tariffs to date as of February 2026 are projected to raise about $1.2 trillion over 2026-35, though slower economic growth reduces revenues and brings the net dynamic revenue to $1 trillion. (With IEEPA, these figures would be more than twice as large.) The economic implications of the SCOTUS decision are complicated by two major factors. First, in the short-term, firms will be aggressively seeking refunds on tariffs paid in 2025, which has large revenue effects and uncertain distributional effects. Second, the current Administration has stated its intent to replace IEEPA tariffs with tariffs using other authorities, but there remain timing and other questions regarding these steps.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The Budget Lab estimates that without IEEPA tariffs, U.S. consumers face an average effective tariff rate of 9.1%, the highest since 1946 excluding 2025, versus 16.9% had IEEPA tariffs remained in effect.
All U.S. tariffs in place as of February 2026 are projected to raise about $1.2 trillion over 2026–35, falling to $1 trillion on a net dynamic basis as slower economic growth reduces revenues.
The Budget Lab identifies two complications from the Supreme Court decision that President Trump exceeded his IEEPA authority: firms seeking refunds on tariffs paid in 2025, with uncertain distributional effects, and the Administration's stated intent to replace IEEPA tariffs using other authorities.
Related Articles:
US Notches One of Its Biggest Annual Trade Gaps Since 1960— The US goods and services trade deficit reached $901.5bn for the year, one of the largest in data going back to 1960. US companies increased imports of computers and accessories by nearly $145bn from the prior year, an acceleration in demand that reflects large-scale artificial intelligence investment.
China Is Making Trade Impossible— Interviews with Chinese economists, technologists and business leaders yielded no clear answer to what products China would want to buy from the rest of the world in future, beyond commodities, luxury goods and higher education. The author argues China sees nothing it cannot eventually make better and cheaper itself, undermining trade as a two-way exchange.
Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push— Stronger Chinese growth driven by export-oriented manufacturing may not produce net positive spillovers: for every 1pp export-driven boost to China's GDP, other economies may see a 0.1–0.3pp drag, with high-tech producers such as Europe and Japan facing greater pressure. Cheaper Chinese goods continue to exert a disinflationary impulse.
AI Summary.Across countries, greater use of industrial policies is associated with larger increases (or smaller declines) in manufacturing employment shares (correlation 0.52) and faster total factor productivity growth (0.48), with East-Asian economies prominent in driving these relationships. The association with export growth is weaker (0.30), and no relationship appears with current account balances as a share of GDP.
Ambrogio Cesa-Bianchi, Andrea Ferrero, Luca Fornar, and Martin WolfBank of England
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Cesa-Bianchi et al show that countries (primarily in East Asia) that make more intensive use of industrial policies have had more rapid growth in manufacturing employment, total factor productivity, and exports, but not larger trade surpluses.
Do industrial policies correlate with manufacturing employment and productivity growth?
Core argument: Greater use of industrial policies correlates 0.52 with rises (or smaller drops) in manufacturing employment shares across countries, and 0.48 with total factor productivity growth, both highly statistically significant.
Figure 5 [see image gallery] reports scatter plots together with correlation coefficients (ρ) and associated t-statistics. The data reveal strong and interesting correlations. The left panel shows that countries with higher use of industrial policies experienced larger rises (or smaller drops) in manufacturing employment shares. The correlation is 0.52 and highly statistically significant. The right panel shows that an analogous result applies to TFP growth, with a similar correlation (0.48) and high statistical significance. As one would expect, East-Asian countries play an important role in driving these correlations. This conforms with the popular view that East-Asian countries have adopted a strategy of outward-oriented growth, characterized by policies that promote tradable sectors. Figure 6 shows the relationship between industrial policies and export growth (left panel) and the current account to GDP ratio (right panel), both averaged over the 2002- 2019 period. The results show a positive relation between industrial policies and exports, though with a smaller coefficient (0.30) and lower statistical significance than for TFP or manufacturing employment shares. Industrial policy does not appear to be related to current account to GDP ratio in the raw cross-country data.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Greater use of industrial policies correlates 0.52 with rises (or smaller drops) in manufacturing employment shares across countries, and 0.48 with total factor productivity growth, both highly statistically significant.
Industrial policy use is positively related to export growth averaged over 2002–2019, with a smaller correlation of 0.30 and lower statistical significance than for TFP growth or manufacturing employment shares.
Industrial policy shows no relationship with the current account to GDP ratio in the raw cross-country data, while East-Asian countries play an important role in driving the manufacturing employment and TFP correlations.
Related Articles:
The Dangerous Triumph Of Neo-Mercantilism— Neo-mercantilism is thriving in both China, which pairs infant-industry promotion with large trade surpluses, and in a United States focused on external deficits and protecting domestic markets. The author argues this will likely fracture the world economy, and that a new multilateral treaty could include a mechanism to combat large structural trade surpluses.
Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push— Stronger Chinese growth driven by export-oriented manufacturing may not produce net positive spillovers: for every 1pp export-driven boost to China's GDP, other economies may see a 0.1–0.3pp drag, with high-tech producers such as Europe and Japan facing greater pressure. Cheaper Chinese goods continue to exert a disinflationary impulse.
Europe Has No Choice But To Intervene On Trade— Manufacturing competitiveness is argued to stem largely from lower labor costs relative to productivity, so policies that raise the household share of income weaken competitiveness while countries that suppress wages gain at trade partners' expense. The author argues Europe must therefore intervene in its external accounts to offset foreign trade intervention rather than cut wages and welfare.
AI Summary.Purchasing managers' surveys show the US manufacturing contraction has extended into a third year, with factory employment down 0.6% over the year to November. Surveys indicate manufacturing export orders and import volumes contracted strongly following the announcement of high tariffs, and factory managers report confusion and difficulty making long-term plans.
Economist StaffThe Economist
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There is little evidence of reshoring as measured by the US manufacturing purchasing managers’ index, which shows that new export orders and imports have been contracting since 2022, and have downticked sharply since Liberation Day.
Have tariffs revived US manufacturing?
Core argument: U.S. manufacturing employment fell 0.6% in the year to November, and the manufacturing contraction indicated by purchasing managers' surveys is entering its third year after the two-year recession that preceded Trump's January inauguration.
By the time Mr. Trump took office in January, America had been in a two-year manufacturing recession, according to purchasing managers’ surveys. Nearly a year on, however, the Trumpian manufacturing renaissance is conspicuous by its absence. The two-year manufacturing contraction is now hitting its third year, and factories have continued to shed jobs; employment fell by 0.6% in the year to November. Surveys suggest that export orders and import volumes for manufacturing have registered a strong contraction since Mr. Trump announced high tariffs on “Liberation Day” in April, one that goes beyond the wider weakness in manufacturing. Factory bosses report confusion and difficulty making long-term plans.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
U.S. manufacturing employment fell 0.6% in the year to November, and the manufacturing contraction indicated by purchasing managers' surveys is entering its third year after the two-year recession that preceded Trump's January inauguration.
Surveys indicate manufacturing export orders and import volumes have contracted strongly since Trump announced high tariffs on "Liberation Day" in April, a decline beyond the broader weakness in manufacturing.
Factory bosses report confusion and difficulty making long-term plans, and the Trumpian manufacturing renaissance is absent nearly a year into Trump's term.
Related Articles:
Does Manufacturing Matter?— Manufacturing capacity carries military and geopolitical importance, as shown by economic warfare over products like semiconductors and magnets. The policy-relevant question is not whether manufacturing is geopolitically useful but how much should be spent boosting it given resource constraints, and whether to target defense, dual-use, chokepoint, or broad civilian production.
The Incidence of Tariffs: Rates and Reality— The authors estimate that tariff pass-through into US import prices was 80% in 2018–2019 and 94% more recently, while exchange-rate pass-through was low in both periods. Because imported inputs matter for US manufacturing, they argue much of the tariff burden falls on US producers, roughly a 1–2 percentage-point tax on manufacturing.
America is Losing Blue Collar Jobs— US industrial employment has fallen by 65,000 over the past year and is down 123,000 from its early-2025 peak, with manufacturing and transportation accounting for most losses and construction job gains slowing to 52,000 from 191,000 the prior year. The author attributes the decline to tariffs raising input costs, immigration enforcement hitting construction, and cuts to industrial policy subsidies.
AI Summary.Mexico's growth has fallen to near zero as an investment boom from recent years faded into a drag on growth and private consumption returned to the weakness seen in the five years before the pandemic. Despite strong exports to the US, the gains from trade are not reaching enough of the population, making the stagnation a structural problem.
Robin BrooksRobin Brooks Substack
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The temporary increase in GDP growth due to investment driven by the nearshoring boom has receded, while exports to the US rose. Private consumption in Mexico has completely stagnated, driving GDP growth close to zero.
Why has Mexico's growth stalled despite booming exports to the US?
Core argument: Mexico's GDP growth has fallen to near zero as the investment boom that lifted growth between 2022 and 2024 faded and turned into a drag on growth.
The chart shows what’s going on in terms of the different components of GDP. You can clearly see the investment boom (red bars), which lifted growth in the years between 2022 - 2024. But that investment boom has faded - it was never sustainable - and has turned into a drag on growth. The key reason why growth has fallen back to near zero is private consumption (blue bars), which is back to being as weak as it was in the five year period before the pandemic. The reasons for Mexico’s stagnation are complex, but what’s clear is that the lack of growth should at this point be regarded as a structural problem. For some reason, the gains from globalization - Mexico’s exports to the US are doing extremely well - are not benefitting the broader population, which is why private consumption stagnates. This is the basic problem. The gains from trade aren’t benefitting enough people.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Mexico's GDP growth has fallen to near zero as the investment boom that lifted growth between 2022 and 2024 faded and turned into a drag on growth.
Private consumption in Mexico is as weak as it was in the five years before the pandemic, the key reason growth has fallen back to near zero.
Mexico's exports to the United States are doing extremely well, yet the gains from trade are not benefiting enough people, and the lack of growth should be regarded as a structural problem.
Related Articles:
Mexico Is Not Just the Top Supplier to the U.S. Now It Is the Top Buyer— Mexico is now both the largest buyer of U.S. exports and the largest source of U.S. imports, with U.S. goods exports to Mexico at $226.4bn versus $225.6bn to Canada and imports from Mexico totaling $354.9bn. Mexico's growth, including its middle class, has increased demand for U.S. goods among its more than 130 million people.
China Launches Sweeping Probe Into Mexican Tariffs As Trade War Widens— China has opened an investigation into Mexico's tariffs and trade restrictions on Chinese exports, including a proposed 50% tariff on Chinese cars and levies on about 1,400 products from countries lacking a trade deal with Mexico. China's commerce ministry says the measures would seriously damage Chinese companies' trade and investment interests.
China Delays Approval of BYD’s Mexico Plant Amid Fears Tech Could Leak to US— China's commerce ministry has withheld the approval that domestic automakers need to manufacture abroad, holding up BYD's planned Mexican car plant, which the company said would create 10,000 jobs and build 150,000 vehicles a year. Officials are concerned that Mexico's proximity to the US could give Mexico, and possibly the US, access to BYD's advanced technology and knowhow.
