“Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
AI Summary.The Economist estimates artificial intelligence needs roughly $3tn in revenue by 2030 for the planned data-centre buildout to earn a conventional return, a figure other analysts have also reached. That equals almost a tenth of the roughly $35tn in total worker compensation across rich OECD countries.
Economist StaffThe Economist
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The Economist calculates that the US data center buildout needs ~$3T in revenue by 2030 to offer a competitive ROI. That amounts to ~18% of US annual labor compensation inclusive of health care or ~10% of labor compensation across the OECD.
How much revenue does the AI buildout need to pay off?
Core argument: The Economist calculates that AI needs roughly $3trn in revenue by 2030 for the planned data-centre buildout to deliver a conventional rate of return.
The Economist calculates that AI needs around $3trn in revenue by 2030 for the planned data-centre buildout to offer a conventional rate of return. Other analysts, including Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh of Columbia Business School and a duo at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, have reached similar figures. To put that number into perspective, all compensation for all workers—wages, plus perks like health insurance—adds up to around $16.5trn in America, or $35trn across the OECD, a club mostly of rich countries. So AI would need to lay claim to almost a tenth of today’s rich-world wages for the data-centre boom to pencil out. Of course, that could happen in a more benign fashion if the entire economy grows swiftly—and AI evangelists do also expect dramatic growth from here.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The Economist calculates that AI needs roughly $3trn in revenue by 2030 for the planned data-centre buildout to deliver a conventional rate of return.
The $3trn figure amounts to almost a tenth of the roughly $35trn in total worker compensation across the OECD, which compares with about $16.5trn in America alone.
Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh of Columbia Business School and a pair of researchers at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research have reached similar revenue figures, while AI evangelists expect dramatic economic growth from here.
Related Articles:
Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected— The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
No Signs of AI Payoff Outside the Tech Sector— Revenue per worker and profit margins are rising for the seven largest technology companies but flat for the rest of the S&P 500, with no signs of artificial intelligence boosting productivity growth. The author argues that as long as spending on artificial intelligence stays confined to a small part of the economy, its macroeconomic effects will remain very limited.
AI Summary.Occupations with higher work-from-home adoption are associated with slower employment growth for young college graduates relative to middle-aged workers, an accounting exercise attributing 56%–88% of the decline in young graduates' full-time-equivalent employment rate to remote work. Measures of artificial-intelligence exposure and adoption show statistically insignificant effects.
Ernie TedeschiStripe Economics
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Employment is down among less AI-exposed Americans 22-26 without a 4-year college degree, as well as young college graduates, complicating an AI-only explanation. Stripe’s analysis indicates that work from home better predicts young graduates’ employment losses relative to older workers than does AI.
Is remote work, not AI, behind weaker young-graduate hiring?
Core argument: Each additional 10 percentage points of occupational work-from-home adoption is associated with employment rates for young college graduates growing 3.9 to 6.6 percentage points more slowly than for middle-aged workers, a statistically significant relationship.
The left panel shows the relationship between the occupational WFH [Work from home] share (x-axis) and growth in our young-grad–mid-career employment spread (y-axis). The relationship is negative and statistically significant. Between 2023 and the last 12 months, for every extra 10pp of WFH adoption, employment rates for young college grads grew between 3.9 to 6.6pp more slowly than those for middle-aged workers. The middle panel replaces WFH adoption with AI exposure as a separate explanatory variable. As jobs become more exposed to AI, the effect on the new-grad employment spread is also negative but much shallower than with WFH and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The same is true of industry AI adoption, shown in the right panel: industries that self-reported a higher likelihood of using AI in 2026 H1 actually saw, if anything, slightly faster young-grad employment growth relative to mid-career, though again, this effect is statistically insignificant. Our model is suggestive rather than truly causal.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Each additional 10 percentage points of occupational work-from-home adoption is associated with employment rates for young college graduates growing 3.9 to 6.6 percentage points more slowly than for middle-aged workers, a statistically significant relationship.
In an accounting rather than causal exercise, work-from-home accounts for 0.69 to 1.08 percentage points of the 1.23-percentage-point decline in the young-grad full-time-equivalent employment-population ratio between 2023 and 2026, or 56% to 88% of the total.
AI exposure shows a negative but much shallower relationship with the young-grad employment spread that is statistically indistinguishable from zero, and industries self-reporting higher likely AI use in 2026 H1 saw, if anything, slightly faster young-grad employment growth relative to mid-career.
Related Articles:
August 2026: Adoption Rises to 22.4%— AI adoption has risen to 22.4%, with labor market effects visible but narrow: employment drags appear in marketing, graphic design, customer service, and some tech occupations, offset by 209k in added data center-exposed construction jobs. Corporate layoffs attributed to AI totaled 113k year-to-date, including 11k in a single month.
Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence— Employment for workers aged 22–25 in the occupations most exposed to artificial intelligence has declined roughly 18pp relative to less-exposed peers, with no comparable decline in other age groups. The authors find this operates mainly through reduced hiring, concentrated where AI substitutes for human tasks rather than complements them.
Looking for the Ladder— The article argues that the hiring downturn in occupations most exposed to generative AI reflects interest-rate sensitivity rather than AI itself, since roughly 38% of workers in the most AI-exposed quintile work in information, finance and insurance, and professional and technical services, versus under 2% in the least-exposed quintile.
AI Summary.European listed companies' capital spending relative to sales is approaching a 10-year high, with capital expenditure projected to be €77bn higher in 2028 than in 2025. Utilities account for about 40% (€31bn) of the increase, while defense spending is projected to rise 36%, industrials excluding defense 24% and information technology 78%.
Huw van SteenisApollo
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The ratio of capex to sales for the Euro STOXX 600 excluding financials is approaching its highest level since the crisis, driven by a spike in defense, industrial and IT spending.
Are utilities, defense and digitization lifting European capital spending?
Core argument: European listed companies are expected to spend €77 billion more on capital expenditure in 2028 than in 2025, with the capex-to-sales ratio approaching a 10-year high after a long period of underinvestment.
European companies are investing again. The capex-to-sales ratio is approaching a 10-year high, and European listed companies are expected to spend €77 billion more on capex in 2028 than in 2025. Utilities alone account for €31 billion, or around 40%, of the increase. Defense capex is expected to rise 36%, industrials excluding defense 24% and information technology 78%. This comes after a long period of underinvestment. Across Europe, higher spending on energy, grids, defense, reshoring, infrastructure and digitalization is now lifting capital intensity.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
European listed companies are expected to spend €77 billion more on capital expenditure in 2028 than in 2025, with the capex-to-sales ratio approaching a 10-year high after a long period of underinvestment.
Utilities account for €31 billion, or around 40%, of the expected increase in European capital expenditure between 2025 and 2028.
Defense capital expenditure in Europe is expected to rise 36%, industrials excluding defense 24% and information technology 78%, as higher spending on energy, grids, reshoring, infrastructure and digitalization lifts capital intensity.
Related Articles:
Economic Size and Economic Power— By manufacturing value added China has the world's largest manufacturing sector, with the US and European Union roughly co-equal and individually smaller; netting out intra-EU trade, the EU is the largest exporter of goods and services and the US a distant third. The author argues all three are vulnerable to weaponized interdependence, with China apparently least so.
Capital Is Making a Comeback— Tangible investment in property, factories and equipment fell from 12.5% to 8.5% of private gross domestic product, while intangible investment in intellectual property, software and process knowledge rose from about 11.5% to 16.75%. The author argues demand for tangible capital investment will now have to rise.
Carbon Pricing’s Impact on Global Industry Is Quietly Growing— Direct carbon pricing—carbon taxes and emissions trading systems—now covers about 30% of global emissions, with most coverage coming from emissions trading systems in China and the European Union. The EU complements its system with a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism that prices carbon on certain high-emitting imports regardless of where they are produced.
AI Summary.Countries that become dependent on increasingly uneconomic investment have found adjustment difficult, as in Japan, where average GDP growth fell from about 5% to under 1% after 1991 and its share of global manufacturing fell by nearly 60%. Rebalancing requires a larger role for consumption, and absent a sharp rise in consumption growth, it occurs through slower production growth.
Michael PettisChina Financial Markets
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Pettis argues that China faces the same dilemma as Japan after 1991: reducing uneconomic investment requires consumption to become a larger source of demand. But raising household income may undermine manufacturing competitiveness, while China’s higher debt limits its ability to cushion the adjustment.
How costly is rebalancing away from dependence on uneconomic investment?
Core argument: Japan’s average GDP growth fell from around 5% in the decade before 1991 to under 1% in the decade after, while its share of global GDP fell by nearly half between 1991 and 2008.
Every country that has become excessively dependent on increasingly uneconomic investment has found it difficult to begin an adjustment that its leaders knew was necessary. Japan in the 1980s, Brazil in the 1970s, and the Soviet Union in the 1960s all faced versions of this problem. The Japanese experience shows how costly that adjustment can be. Rebalancing meant for Japan, and means for China, increasing the role of consumption in driving GDP growth, and if an economy cannot rebalance through a sharp increase in consumption growth – and historical precedents suggest that this is extremely unlikely – it must, almost by definition, rebalance through slower growth in production. This is especially difficult when the international competitiveness of manufacturing depends on the same distribution of income that constrains consumption. Raising the role of consumption, in that case, requires raising household income relative to production, but this automatically reduces the cost advantages on which manufacturing depends.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Japan’s average GDP growth fell from around 5% in the decade before 1991 to under 1% in the decade after, while its share of global GDP fell by nearly half between 1991 and 2008.
Japan’s share of global manufacturing fell by nearly 60% over the broader period, illustrating how costly adjustment can be for an economy dependent on increasingly uneconomic investment.
Rebalancing means raising consumption’s role in driving GDP growth, and since historical precedents suggest a sharp increase in consumption growth is extremely unlikely, China would rebalance through slower growth in production.
Related Articles:
Two Asian Giants, One Economic Trap— China's combined public and private debt is estimated at about 300% of GDP, and an updated "Japanisation" index indicates China has scored as more Japanised than Japan for the past five years. Analysts attribute the 1.7% yield on 10-year Chinese government bonds to weak credit demand, with investors parking cash in government debt.
Why Global Imbalances Matter— Countries running persistent trade surpluses, such as China, Germany and Japan, have built their economies around an excess supply of tradeable goods and services, leaving them dependent on deficit countries to absorb it. That dependence gives deficit countries bargaining power and exposes surplus countries to pressure to expand domestic demand.
Is China’s High-Quality Investment Output Economically Viable?— China's technological progress and infrastructure do not refute claims of overinvestment, since overinvestment often produces real physical assets and technological gains yet still counts as overinvestment when it generates less real value than the resources, subsidies, and transfers it consumes. When such losses are capitalized, assets are carried above their real economic value.
AI Summary.China's leadership interprets weak consumption, slow household income growth, rising unemployment, persistent deflation, and growing external surpluses as acceptable costs of a development model that equates growth with capital accumulation and technology deployment. In this view, higher wages, consumption, and services follow naturally once productive industries mature.
Oliver Melton and Logan WrightForeign Affairs
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Oliver Melton and Logan Wright note that Zhongnanhai’s push to expand production amid weak consumer demand is entrenching deflation. The current leadership, they argue, views some deflation as a feature of “hard-won efficiency gains” and is not concerned about growing reliance on foreign demand.
Does China view weak consumption and deflation as acceptable development costs?
Core argument: China’s leadership sees the same data—rising external surpluses, weak consumption, slower household income growth, weak credit demand, rising unemployment and underemployment, and persistent deflation—but draws different conclusions about what these developments indicate and what Beijing should do in response.
The party is sticking to this path because the leadership believes it is working. It sees the same troubling data—including rising external surpluses, weak consumption, slower household income growth, weak credit demand, rising unemployment and underemployment, and persistent deflation—but it has reached wildly different conclusions about what these developments indicate and what Beijing should do in response. China’s worldview treats development as equivalent to capital accumulation and sees productivity as determined by the control and deployment of technology. It posits that the growth of the service sector, higher wages, and higher consumption are the consequences of that physical underlying foundation—they follow naturally in later stages of the development process once the productive industries have flourished. The resulting structural imbalance that weakens household income growth, the service sector, and public services was thus not an accident; in China’s economic development theory, this is seen as self-discipline that will pay off with more rapid long-term development.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
China’s leadership sees the same data—rising external surpluses, weak consumption, slower household income growth, weak credit demand, rising unemployment and underemployment, and persistent deflation—but draws different conclusions about what these developments indicate and what Beijing should do in response.
China’s economic worldview treats development as equivalent to capital accumulation and productivity as determined by the control and deployment of technology, with service-sector growth, higher wages, and higher consumption following once productive industries have flourished.
The structural imbalance weakening household income growth, the service sector, and public services is treated in China’s economic development theory not as an accident but as self-discipline that will pay off with more rapid long-term development.
Related Articles:
The Future, Made In China— China's economy runs on parallel tracks: a property crash, a booming high-tech manufacturing sector, and university graduates trained for traditional white-collar jobs entering a labor market geared toward advanced manufacturing. Researchers at Stanford and Harvard found a swing from optimism to pessimism, with about 28% of citizens expecting living standards to improve.
China Sees Nearly 10% Decline In Marriages in 2026 So Far, Foreshadowing Lower Birth Rate— China recorded 4.648m marriage registrations in the first nine months of the year, down 504,000 from a year earlier, a nearly 10% decline that points to a full-year drop. Marriages peaked at 13.469m in 2013 and have generally trended downward since, with divorce registrations at 2.082m.
The Year of the Trojan Fire Horse: China’s Imbalanced Economy and Unrelenting Mercantilism— About 30% of Chinese industrial companies are unprofitable "zombies" kept alive by subsidies far larger than those elsewhere, rather than exiting amid falling industrial producer prices. Countries with large increases in manufactured imports from China also saw slowdowns in domestic manufacturing, including declining manufacturing shares of output across most of Southeast Asia.
AI Summary.The author argues the AI boom's economic significance lies more in stock market gains than in data center construction, and that the inability to monetize AI investments could end the boom. Simulations using the Federal Reserve's FRB/US model suggest that an end to the buildout plus a roughly 30% market decline would slow growth to about 1.5%, short of recession.
Jason FurmanEconvitals
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Furman estimates that the data-center buildout, which began in mid-2024, had raised US GDP by only ~0.3% by 2026Q3, as the equipment is largely imported and the US was already near full employment. Counting AI-driven stock market gains, the effect rises to ~0.6%. If the buildout ended and stocks fell ~30%, growth would slow to ~1.5%.
How would an end to the AI boom affect growth?
Core argument: If the AI data center buildout ended and the stock market fell about 30%, the FRB/US model predicts growth would slow to roughly 1½ percent, short of even a shallow recession.
The data center buildout is set to be among the largest investment expansions in peacetime American history. How different is our economy today because of it? The answer, based on a simulation using the large-scale macroeconomic model used by the Federal Reserve (FRB/US), is not much. The buildout by itself has raised GDP by only about 0.3%, because most of the investment is imported, and imports do not add to U.S. GDP or lower the unemployment rate. The stock market boom that came with it matters more—together they have raised GDP by about 0.6% and lowered the unemployment rate by about 0.3 percentage point.This analysis suggests that the economy could survive less data center buildout just fine. Investment would fall, but so would imports and interest rates, and GDP would be little changed. A broader fall in the stock market would be a bigger deal, The bottom line: so far the AI economy is less a story about data centers than about the stock market—and that is also where the risk is.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
If the AI data center buildout ended and the stock market fell about 30%, the FRB/US model predicts growth would slow to roughly 1½ percent, short of even a shallow recession.
The economy could withstand less data center buildout, making the AI economy so far less a story about data centers than about the stock market, which is also where the risk lies.
Public policy changes or an inability to monetize AI investments could stop the AI boom, and financial-system complexities such as unwinding leverage, absent from the FRB/US model, pose a tail risk resembling 2001 more than 2007–09.
Related Articles:
Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected— The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
The S&P 500 And Cembalest’s “AI Universe” After The Midterms— An "AI universe" index of 42 stocks groups companies into three categories: 28 direct AI firms including NVIDIA, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta and Broadcom; 8 AI-linked utilities such as Vistra, NextEra and Constellation; and 6 capital equipment makers including Eaton, Quanta and GE Vernova.
US Labor Productivity Increases at Fastest Pace in a Year— US labor productivity, measured as nonfarm business output per hour, rose at a 3.6% annualized rate, up from an upwardly revised 2.1% pace, while unit labor costs fell 0.7%. The acceleration suggests a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
AI Summary.Anthropic has been expected to raise up to $100bn in an initial public offering valuing it near $1.5tn, but three major investors who plan to participate say the valuation will likely need to come down, with one suggesting closer to $1tn. One investor said the company could instead raise around $80bn.
Corrie Driebusch, Berber Jin, Kate Clark and Anissa GardizyWall Street Journal
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The WSJ reports that market participants are “increasingly skeptical” that Anthropic’s IPO can proceed at its proposed $1.5T valuation. Some major investors see the valuation falling sharply, perhaps to as low as ~$1T.
Will a leading AI company's IPO valuation fall short of expectations?
Core argument: Anthropic is targeting an IPO the week before Thanksgiving that has been expected to raise up to $100 billion at a valuation of around $1.5 trillion.
Anthropic is aiming to stage the IPO the week before Thanksgiving and has been expected to raise up to $100 billion in an offering that could value the company at around $1.5 trillion. But three major investors who plan to participate in the IPO say the valuation will likely need to come down, with one saying it could be closer to $1 trillion. The company could also decide to raise less money than anticipated, perhaps to around $80 billion, said one investor who plans to participate in the IPO. That same investor hopes for the company to have well over $200 billion on its balance sheet post-IPO. Anthropic had $146.6 billion cash on hand as of Sept. 30.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Anthropic is targeting an IPO the week before Thanksgiving that has been expected to raise up to $100 billion at a valuation of around $1.5 trillion.
Three major investors who plan to participate in the Anthropic IPO say the valuation will likely need to come down, with one putting it closer to $1 trillion.
One investor planning to participate says Anthropic could raise less than anticipated, perhaps around $80 billion, and hopes the company holds well over $200 billion on its balance sheet post-IPO, compared with $146.6 billion cash on hand as of Sept. 30.
Related Articles:
The Cage Fight for Capital— A slowdown in artificial intelligence financing could become self-reinforcing, as falling stock prices widen credit spreads, which further slows financing. The author argues the S&P 500's roughly 8% gain this year rests on a small number of stocks driven up by competition among deep-pocketed players betting on artificial intelligence.
Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected— The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
A Catalyst For The AI Bubble Break— Historically, controlling for valuations, a 1% rise in the share of the market represented by initial public offerings has been associated with roughly a 4% decline in prices. With large artificial-intelligence company listings expected and share issuance exceeding buybacks, equity supply could shift from shrinking about 1% a year to growing near 5%, implying returns roughly 20% below average.
AI Summary.US labor productivity, measured as nonfarm business output per hour, rose at a 3.6% annualized rate, up from an upwardly revised 2.1% pace, while unit labor costs fell 0.7%. The acceleration suggests a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
Julia FanzeresBloomberg
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Nonfarm business productivity grew at a 3.6% annualized rate in Q3, the fastest pace in a year. Real hourly compensation rose 1.1%, while the labor share fell to 53%, the lowest in data going back to 1947.
Is a capital spending boom lifting worker productivity?
Core argument: US nonfarm business output per hour rose at a 3.6% annualized rate in the third quarter, the fastest pace in a year, following an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
US labor productivity accelerated in the third quarter at the fastest pace in a year, suggesting a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency at a time when input costs have soared. Productivity, or nonfarm business output per hour, increased at a 3.6% annualized rate after an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics showed Thursday. Unit labor costs — what businesses pay employees to produce one unit of output — fell 0.7%, the first decline since the second quarter of 2025.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
US nonfarm business output per hour rose at a 3.6% annualized rate in the third quarter, the fastest pace in a year, following an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Unit labor costs, what businesses pay employees to produce one unit of output, fell 0.7% in the third quarter, the first decline since the second quarter of 2025.
The third-quarter productivity acceleration suggests a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency at a time when input costs have soared.
Related Articles:
Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected— The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
Higher Utilisation Explains The Recent Surge In Productivity Growth— Measured total factor productivity growth is estimated to come almost entirely from higher input utilisation rather than underlying efficiency gains, based on a method that infers unobserved capital and labour utilisation from movements in hours per worker. On this evidence, recent productivity gains reflect "working harder" rather than "working smarter.
US Focus: The Effect Of Soaring Profits— US nominal pre-tax corporate profits in the national accounts grew 23% over the past year, a pace not seen outside post-recession spikes since the mid-2000s. Wider margins were the key driver, as domestic profit growth far exceeded the 8% rise in corporate value added, pushing margins near all-time highs while the labor share hit new lows.