AI Summary. Racial disparities in US crime, arrest, and prison admission rates have declined across offence types, driven by reductions among Black Americans. Black-White disparity in drug-offence prison admissions fell from 12x to 2.9x, attributable to a 75% drop in the Black drug admission rate, while declines for violent and property offences were smaller.

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From their respective recent peaks in 2000 and 2006 to 2019, prison admissions for violent crime fell 20% for Whites and 43% for Blacks. Race-specific NIBRS estimates suggest actual violent crime fell 18% and 47%, respectively.

Why are racial gaps in US arrests and imprisonment narrowing?

Core argument: Black–White disparity in drug-offence prison admission rates fell from 12 to 1 in 2000 to 2.9 to 1 in 2019, attributed almost entirely to a 75% drop in the Black prison admission rate for drug offences.

From their respective peaks [2000 for whites, 2006 for blacks], prison admission rates for violent crime fell 20% for Whites and 43% for Blacks. [Because UCR crime totals do not identify offender race, the authors use the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), which records offender race as reported by victims, witnesses or police, to allocate national violent-crime totals by race. NIBRS contains about three times as many violent offenders as arrestees. As a check on crimes not reported to police, they use National Crime Victimization Survey victim reports; results are similar.] [Recorded violent crime fell 18% for Whites and 47% for Blacks See Table 2]. For Whites, the decline in prison admissions is primarily a function of a decline in crime and arrests, with case processing dampening the decline. For Blacks, the decline in violent prison admissions is exclusively attributed to a 47% reduction in violent crime, as policing and case processing trends worked against an otherwise larger decline. [Arrests per crime and prison admissions per arrest both rose slightly; See Table 2].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Black–White disparity in drug-offence prison admission rates fell from 12 to 1 in 2000 to 2.9 to 1 in 2019, attributed almost entirely to a 75% drop in the Black prison admission rate for drug offences.
  2. Racial disparities in crime, arrest, and prison admission rates have declined across all offence types since about 2000, largely attributable to reductions in crime, arrests, and imprisonment among Blacks.
  3. Declining drug admissions accounted for 53% of the overall drop in Black prison admission rates, while for Whites 62% of the decline came from property offences, with violent (20%) and drug (19%) admissions contributing roughly equally.

AI Summary. The official U.S. poverty rate fell 0.5 percentage points to 10.2%, a third consecutive annual decline and among the lowest on record, with 34.5m people in poverty. Poverty rates hit historic lows for Hispanic individuals, down 1.2 points to 13.9%, and children under 18, down 1.0 point to 13.4%.

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According to the Census Bureau, the poverty rate in the US fell .5pp in 2025 to 10.2%, one of the lowest rates on record. The poverty rate for children fell to a historical low of 13.4%. Census’s income measure does not include taxes or non-cash government transfers.

Is the U.S. poverty rate falling to record lows?

Core argument: The official U.S. poverty rate fell 0.5 percentage points to 10.2% in 2025, the third consecutive annual decline and one of the lowest rates on record, with 34.5 million people in poverty.

In 2025, the official poverty rate fell 0.5 percentage points to 10.2%, the third consecutive annual decline and one of the lowest rates on record. There were 34.5 million people in poverty in 2025. Poverty rates for Hispanic individuals and children under age 18 both fell to historic lows in 2025. Between 2024 and 2025, the poverty rate for Hispanic individuals fell 1.2 percentage points to 13.9%. The child poverty rate fell 1 percentage point to 13.4%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The official U.S. poverty rate fell 0.5 percentage points to 10.2% in 2025, the third consecutive annual decline and one of the lowest rates on record, with 34.5 million people in poverty.
  2. The poverty rate for Hispanic individuals fell 1.2 percentage points to 13.9% between 2024 and 2025, a historic low.
  3. The poverty rate for children under age 18 fell 1.0 percentage point to 13.4% in 2025, a historic low.

AI Summary. High school varsity athletes are absent about 1.37 percentage points less often than non-athletes over the school year, nearly 20% lower, after controlling for factors linked to both sports participation and attendance. Athletes' absence rates fall further while their sport is in season, which the authors argue suggests participation itself improves attendance.

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The absentee rate of Indiana high school students, ~23% of whom played a varsity sport, was ~20% lower for those who participated in varsity athletics than for non-athletes. The effect was stronger when an athlete’s particular sport was in season.

Does playing high school varsity sports reduce student absenteeism?

Core argument: High school varsity athletes' absence rate across the school year was 1.37 points lower than non-athletes', a reduction of almost 20%, after controlling for factors that matter for both sports participation and attendance.

We find that varsity sports participation is strongly associated with better student attendance, and we argue it is plausible that varsity sports participation causes better attendance. When we control for a number of factors that we know matter for both sports participation and attendance, we continue to find that varsity athletes are absent less often than their peers across the entire year. Across the school year, athletes’ absence rate was 1.37 points lower than non-athletes’. That’s a reduction of almost 20%. The broad pattern shown in Table 1 is that students from more advantaged groups were more likely to participate in varsity sports and less likely to be absent from school. It’s thus no surprise that, in the raw data, there is an association between playing varsity sports and having good attendance (Figure 3). But is that because students who attend school more reliably are more likely to play sports or because playing sports leads to better attendance? One way to tease out the answer is to compare varsity athletes' attendance during their sports seasons with their attendance the rest of the year. Not only do varsity athletes have lower annual absence rates—especially unexcused absences—than non-athletes, but [Figure 3 and Figure 4] show that their absence rates fall further when their sport is in season, [which suggests at least some causal effect].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. High school varsity athletes' absence rate across the school year was 1.37 points lower than non-athletes', a reduction of almost 20%, after controlling for factors that matter for both sports participation and attendance.
  2. Varsity athletes' absence rates fall further when their sport is in season, which the authors argue suggests at least some causal effect of participation on attendance.
  3. Students from more advantaged groups were more likely to play varsity sports and less likely to be absent, producing an association in the raw data between varsity participation and good attendance.

AI Summary. The authors estimate that state legalization of sports betting raises average quarterly betting spending per person by about $46 from a pre-legalization mean of $2.50, with spillover spending in nearby counties where betting is illegal. Three years later, median credit scores are one point lower and delinquency rates 0.31 percentage points higher.

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After the legalization of sports betting in 2018, delinquency rates on a wide range of consumer debts rose, increasing .31pp as of 2025. The delinquency rate for the ~3% of the population that were new gamblers increased by ~10pp driven by those under 40.

How does legalizing sports betting affect spending and consumer credit?

Core argument: State legalization of sports betting raises average quarterly betting spending per person by roughly $46 from a pre-treatment mean of $2.50 and lifts the share of the population with any sportsbook spending by 3.1 percentage points.

Exploiting the staggered roll-out of state-level legalization following the 2018 Murphy v. NCAA decision, we use an extended two-way fixed effects (ETWFE) framework that separately estimates direct treatment effects and cross-border spillover effects. Our first-stage estimates establish that legalization dramatically increases betting activity: average quarterly spending per person rises by roughly $46 from a pre-treatment mean of $2.50, and the share of the population with any sportsbook spending in a quarter increases by 3.1 percentage points. The effects on average spending grow continually over time with no clear evidence of saturation, suggesting the market for mobile sports betting continues to mature years after legalization. At the same time, substantial betting activity occurs in counties where sports betting is not legal but which lie near a legal state, with spillover effects on total spending roughly 14% of the direct effect for counties within 15 miles of a legal state, declining monotonically with distance and approaching zero by 60 miles. These spillovers have real consequences for consumer financial health. Three years after legalization, median credit scores are one point lower and overall delinquency rates increase by 0.31 percentage points following legalization. [Under-40 auto loan delinquency increases by half a percentage point and credit card delinquency by one percentage point, driving the overall increase in delinquency.] Since only about 3.1% of the population takes up betting after legalization, these intent-to-treat estimates would imply that those who are induced to bet due to legalization experience delinquency increases of 10 percentage points.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. State legalization of sports betting raises average quarterly betting spending per person by roughly $46 from a pre-treatment mean of $2.50 and lifts the share of the population with any sportsbook spending by 3.1 percentage points.
  2. Three years after legalization, median credit scores are one point lower and overall delinquency rates rise by 0.31 percentage points, with under-40 auto loan delinquency up half a percentage point and credit card delinquency up one percentage point.
  3. For counties within 15 miles of a legal state, spillover effects on total spending are roughly 14% of the direct effect, declining monotonically with distance and approaching zero by 60 miles.

AI Summary. New York City's unsheltered population rose 26% from 3,588 to 4,504, while spending on services for that population more than tripled from $102m to nearly $368m. That spending grew from just under 5% to nearly 9% of total Department of Homeless Services outlays.

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In 2025 New York City spent $81,705 per “street” homeless person, up 262% from 2019 whose numbers increased 26% during that period. This does not include spending on “sheltered” homeless, who are ~97% of the homeless population.

Has tripling spending on unsheltered services reduced the unsheltered population?

Core argument: New York City spending on services for the unsheltered rose 262%, from $102 million in FY 2019 to nearly $368 million in FY 2025, while the unsheltered population grew 26%, from 3,588 to 4,504.

New York City’s unsheltered population increased from 3,588 in FY 2019 to 4,504 in FY 2025 — a 26% increase from pre-pandemic levels. In that time, spending on services for this population has more than tripled, growing from $102 million in FY 2019 to nearly $368 million in FY 2025 (a 262% increase). Its share of spending has also increased, from just under 5% to nearly 9% of total Department of Homeless Services (DHS) spending.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. New York City spending on services for the unsheltered rose 262%, from $102 million in FY 2019 to nearly $368 million in FY 2025, while the unsheltered population grew 26%, from 3,588 to 4,504.
  2. Services for the unsheltered climbed from just under 5% to nearly 9% of total New York City Department of Homeless Services spending between FY 2019 and FY 2025.

AI Summary. Extending a consistent poverty measure back to 1939, the authors estimate US absolute poverty fell from 48.5% to 19.5% between 1939 and 1963, driven by growth in market income rather than government transfers net of taxes. Poverty fell no faster in the 24 years after the War on Poverty than before.

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Btw 1939 and 1963, the % of Americans below LBJ’s absolute poverty line (3× the cost of a minimal meal plan), fell from 48.5 to 19.5, driven by rising market income. Post-1964, most (for non-blacks, all) drops were the result of transfers, not earnings.

Did market income or government transfers drive the largest poverty declines?

Core argument: Absolute poverty in the United States fell from 48.5% to 19.5% between 1939 and 1963, a 29 percentage point reduction that occurred before the major expansion of safety net programs such as SNAP, Medicaid, and refundable tax credits.

The major innovation of this paper is to extend a comprehensive and consistent measure of poverty back to 1939, exploiting a quarter century of data before the War on Poverty began. From 1939-1963, absolute poverty fell from 48.5% to 19.5%, a 29 percentage point reduction. This pre-war progress provides important context for previously documented success in reducing poverty afterwards, since it occurred before the major expansion of safety net programs like SNAP, Medicaid, and refundable tax credits. During that 1939–1963 period, it was the growth of market income rather than government transfers net of taxes that reduced poverty rates. In fact, poverty fell no faster in the 24 years after the War on Poverty was declared than in the 24 years before, even when applying the same initial poverty rate to both periods. Our results do not imply that poverty would have necessarily continued to fall at the same rate after 1963 in the absence of the War on Poverty. A pre versus post comparison is conflated by contemporaneous macroeconomic and social changes, such as slower economic growth in the post-1963 period. Conversely, any claim that the War on Poverty was necessary for poverty to decline should be accompanied by an attempt to understand why it had already been falling in the quarter century before it was declared.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Absolute poverty in the United States fell from 48.5% to 19.5% between 1939 and 1963, a 29 percentage point reduction that occurred before the major expansion of safety net programs such as SNAP, Medicaid, and refundable tax credits.
  2. From 1939 to 1963, growth of market income rather than government transfers net of taxes reduced poverty rates, according to a poverty measure extended consistently back to 1939.
  3. Poverty fell no faster in the 24 years after the War on Poverty was declared than in the 24 years before, even applying the same initial poverty rate to both periods, though the authors note the comparison is conflated by contemporaneous macroeconomic and social changes, including slower post-1963 growth.

AI Summary. Because government benefits aren't counted as income, a single parent with two children earning $11,000 is officially in poverty yet can receive $53,128 in benefits—tax credits, food stamps, housing and utility aid, Medicaid, school meals, and cash assistance—for a total of $64,128, or 254% of the poverty level.

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Counting non-cash benefits as income would reduce the 19.8mm US households defined as poor by 90%. If the $1.4T in annual Federal poverty spending, including non-cash benefits, were distributed in cash to those households, each would receive $70,000.

Does excluding government benefits from income overstate poverty?

Core argument: A single parent with two school-age children earning $11,000 from part-time work is counted as in poverty because household income falls below $25,273, yet would qualify for $53,128 in benefits, bringing total income to $64,128, or 254% of the poverty level.

The government’s failure to count its largess as recipients’ income allows welfare households to blow past the income level above which a working family no longer qualifies for government help. Take a single parent with two school-age children who earns $11,000 annually from part-time work. The government considers this household in poverty because its income is below $25,273. But this family would qualify for benefits worth $53,128. It would receive Treasury checks of $3,400 in refundable child tax credits and $4,400 in refundable earned-income tax credits. The family would also receive Food Stamp debit cards worth $9,216 a year, $9,476 in housing subsidies, $877 of government payments for utility bills, $16,033 to fund Medicaid, $3,102 in free meals at school and $6,624 in Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. All this puts the family’s income at $64,128, or 254% of the poverty level. A hardworking family earning anything like $64,128 in salary wouldn’t be eligible for any of these welfare benefits in four-fifths of the states. Meanwhile, the welfare family would be eligible for another 90 small federal benefits and sundry state and local welfare programs.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A single parent with two school-age children earning $11,000 from part-time work is counted as in poverty because household income falls below $25,273, yet would qualify for $53,128 in benefits, bringing total income to $64,128, or 254% of the poverty level.
  2. The $53,128 benefit package includes $16,033 for Medicaid, $9,476 in housing subsidies, $9,216 in Food Stamps, $6,624 in Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, $4,400 in refundable earned-income tax credits, $3,400 in refundable child tax credits, $3,102 in school meals and $877 for utilities.
  3. A family earning about $64,128 in salary would be ineligible for any of these welfare benefits in four-fifths of the states, while the welfare household would remain eligible for another 90 small federal benefits plus state and local programs.

AI Summary. The US life expectancy gap between people with and without a college degree widened from 2.6 years to 6.3 years over roughly three decades, while mortality inequality across counties rose 30%. Using county- and state-level data, the authors attribute a key role to smoking rates, with secondary roles for income, other health behaviors, and state policies.

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The college/non-college life expectancy gap widened from 2.6–6.3 years btw 1992 and 2019, while county mortality inequality jumped 30% to the detriment of rural areas. Smoking by state predicts ~300 extra deaths per 100k for non-college grads, 0 for grads.

What explains the widening life expectancy gap by education?

Core argument: The US life expectancy gap between adults with and without a college degree widened from 2.6 years in 1992 to 6.3 years in 2019, while mortality inequality across counties rose 30%, accompanied by an increasing rural health penalty.

The education-mortality gradient has increased sharply in the last three decades, with the life expectancy gap btw people with and without a college degree widening from 2.6 years in 1992 to 6.3 years in 2019. During the same period, mortality inequality across counties rose 30%, accompanied by an increasing rural health penalty. Using county- and state-level data from the 1992–2019 period, we demonstrate that these three trends arose due to a fundamental shift in the geographic patterns of mortality among college and non-college populations. First, we find a sharp decline in both mortality rates and geographic inequality for college graduates. Second, the reverse was true for people without a college degree; spatial inequality became amplified. Third, we find that rates of smoking play a key role in explaining all three empirical puzzles, with secondary roles attributed to income, other health behaviors, and state policies. [An objection is that] the non-college smoking rate declined by somewhat more than the college rate from 1992 to 2019. [The resolution is that] college populations gave up smoking decades before non-college populations did. [The key] college/non-college comparison [is] among 55–64 year-olds, the age group for which the smoking mortality penalty is greatest.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US life expectancy gap between adults with and without a college degree widened from 2.6 years in 1992 to 6.3 years in 2019, while mortality inequality across counties rose 30%, accompanied by an increasing rural health penalty.
  2. Using county- and state-level data for 1992–2019, the authors find mortality rates and geographic inequality fell sharply for college graduates, while spatial inequality in mortality became amplified among people without a college degree.
  3. The authors attribute a key role in all three mortality trends to smoking rates, with secondary roles for income, other health behaviors, and state policies, noting that college populations gave up smoking decades before non-college populations did.