“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
AI Summary.Survey data indicate 60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans. Identification is highest among blue-collar workers at 77%, versus 61% in other occupations, and ranges from 52% of Asian adults to 62% of White adults.
Steven Shepard, Hannah Hartig, Andy Cerda and Jocelyn KileyPew Research Center
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60% of Americans say “working class” describes them “extremely” or “very” well. Republicans are more likely than Democrats to identify as working class – strikingly 61% of Republicans who have a family income of at least $155,600 identify as working class, compared to 38% of such Democrats.
Do most Americans identify as working class across income and education levels?
Core argument: 60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, an identity adopted across income and educational groups, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans.
Most Americans think of themselves as “working class” today: Overall, 60% of U.S. adults say the term describes them well. And the identity is widely adopted by people across all income and educational groups – including half of both Americans who have a bachelor’s degree and those who are upper-income. Those working in blue-collar occupations are particularly likely to identify as working class (77%), [as are] a majority of those working in other occupations (61%). White adults are more likely than Black adults to identify as working class. About six-in-ten White (62%) and Hispanic adults (59%) overall view themselves as working class, as do roughly half of Black (54%) and Asian adults (52%).
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, an identity adopted across income and educational groups, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans.
Workers in blue-collar occupations identify as working class at a rate of 77%, compared with 61% of those in other occupations.
About 62% of White and 59% of Hispanic adults view themselves as working class, as do roughly 54% of Black and 52% of Asian adults.
Related Articles:
America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade— Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.
Political Representation Gaps and Populism— A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.
The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile— US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" hold postgraduate degrees but household incomes of $30,000–$60,000 a year, an unusual combination given that education and income are typically positively correlated. In the Democratic Socialists of America's most recent member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000.
AI Summary.An analysis of X (formerly Twitter) posts finds that the share of sentences expressing anger rose among both Democratic- and Republican-affiliated users, with Republicans starting from a higher baseline of about 38% versus 27% for Democrats and reaching roughly 50%. The increase was larger among Democrats, narrowing the partisan gap.
Eva Davoine, Stefanie Stantcheva, Thomas Renault and Yann AlganHarvard University
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Davoine, et al. show that angry policy-related tweets among voters rose from 34% to 46% over 2013–2025. Angry posts got ~60% more retweets, and experiments that induced anger showed it can move views on trade, immigration, redistribution and climate.
Is anger rising among partisans on social media?
Core argument: Anger among Republican-affiliated X users reaches roughly 50% of sentences by 2025, up from about 38% at the start of the period, continuing to rise during Biden's presidency.
Figure 6 illustrates the monthly evolution of anger among Democratic- and Republican-affiliated X [Twitter] users. Each line reports the share of sentences classified as expressing anger within each political affiliation, and the plotted series are shown as six-month moving averages. It shows that Republican voters start with a higher baseline level of anger at the beginning of the period (about 38% compared to 27% for Democrats). Anger rises sharply for both groups after the 2016 election, but much more among Democrats. As a result, the initial partisan gap is much smaller by 2019. Both series then plateau from 2019 to 2022. Among Democratic partisans, anger declines slightly after Biden’s election but remains well above pre-2016 levels. Republican anger continues to rise during the Biden presidency, reaching approximately 50% by 2025.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Anger among Republican-affiliated X users reaches roughly 50% of sentences by 2025, up from about 38% at the start of the period, continuing to rise during Biden's presidency.
Democratic-affiliated X users start with anger in about 27% of sentences, then rise sharply after the 2016 election by much more than Republicans, narrowing the partisan gap by 2019.
Both partisan anger series plateau from 2019 to 2022, with Democratic anger declining slightly after Biden's election while remaining well above pre-2016 levels.
Related Articles:
Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences— The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity— The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile— US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" hold postgraduate degrees but household incomes of $30,000–$60,000 a year, an unusual combination given that education and income are typically positively correlated. In the Democratic Socialists of America's most recent member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000.
AI Summary.US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" hold postgraduate degrees but household incomes of $30,000–$60,000 a year, an unusual combination given that education and income are typically positively correlated. In the Democratic Socialists of America's most recent member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000.
Nate SilverSilver Bulletin
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Silver finds that the most liberal voters are highly educated and lower-income. Only 19% of Americans with a college degree had a household income of $60,000 or less, but responders to a DSA survey were ~ twice as likely to fall into that category.
Do highly educated, lower-income voters identify as very liberal?
Core argument: In the Democratic Socialists of America's 2021 member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older held bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000 per year.
The US voters most likely to identify as “very liberal” are those with postgraduate degrees but lower-to-middle household incomes of $30K to $60K per year. This is very much also the sweet spot for the DSA. In the DSA’s most recent member survey in 2021, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor’s degrees, but 45% had household incomes below $60,000 per year. This is unusual because education and income are usually substantially positively correlated. In the composite CES data, only 19% of Americans with bachelor’s degrees or higher had household incomes of $60K or below, while respondents to the most recent DSA survey [were twice as likely to fall into this category].
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
In the Democratic Socialists of America's 2021 member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older held bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000 per year.
Composite CES data show only 19% of Americans with bachelor's degrees or higher had household incomes of $60,000 or below, while DSA survey respondents were twice as likely to fall into that category.
US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" are those with postgraduate degrees and household incomes of $30,000 to $60,000 per year, an unusual pairing since education and income are usually substantially positively correlated.
Related Articles:
America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade— Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.
Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences— The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
Political Representation Gaps and Populism— A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.
AI Summary.Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.
Aaron ZitnerWall Street Journal
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A new WSJ poll finds only 35% of Americans think the assertion that “if you work hard, you’ll get ahead” still holds. Only 42% of respondents aged 18–34 think capitalism is working very or somewhat well, relative to 56% of those 65 or older.
Has American confidence in capitalism and democracy declined?
Core argument: Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey.
Americans are losing confidence in two main pillars of society: capitalism and democracy. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very well or even somewhat well, down from 60% who said so about a decade ago, according to a new Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 35% are even fairly sure that the nation offers people the ability to get good jobs and achieve the American dream. Confidence in the nation’s system of government is even lower. Only 12% say democracy is working very well or extremely well, and a mere 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics. Two-thirds of Republicans said they were very proud of American history, three times the share of Democrats who said so. And Republicans in the survey stood apart in their belief in American exceptionalism, the long-held idea that the U.S. is unique or superior among nations. Nearly half of Republicans said that America stands above all other countries in the world, compared with only 8% of Democrats and 13% of independents.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey.
Only 12% of Americans say democracy is working very or extremely well, 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics, and 35% are fairly sure the nation offers good jobs and the American dream.
Two-thirds of Republicans said they were very proud of American history, three times the Democratic share, and nearly half said America stands above all other countries, compared with 8% of Democrats and 13% of independents.
Related Articles:
Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity— The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences— The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
Political Representation Gaps and Populism— A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.
AI Summary.Gallup polling shows the share of Democrats who are extremely proud to be American has fallen from an average of 58% to 14%. Republicans report higher pride overall, but their responses also shift with which party holds the presidency, ranging from an average of 79% down to 60% and back to 74%.
Eli McKown-Dawson and Nate SilverSilver Bulletin
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Gallup finds only 17% of Democrats are “extremely proud” to be an American, versus 30% of independents and 74% of Republicans – notable declines from 2005–2009, when 58% of Democrats/independents and 79% of Republicans were “extremely proud” to be an American.
Has American pride declined and shifted with the ruling party?
Core argument: The share of Democrats extremely proud to be American fell from an average of 58% during George W. Bush's second term to 30% during Trump's first term and 14% in the most recent Gallup poll.
During George W. Bush’s second term, an average of 58% of Democrats were extremely proud to be American according to Gallup, as was an identical share of independents — though Republicans were higher. The rough parity between Democrats and independents lasted through Barack Obama’s second term, but the share of extremely proud Democrats fell to an average of 30% during Trump’s first term and was just 14% in the most recent Gallup poll. Although Republicans are generally more patriotic, their opinions can shift based on who occupies 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue too. The share of Republicans extremely proud to be American fell from 79% on average during Bush’s second term to 60% during Biden’s term. What happened after Trump retook office? It jumped right back up to 74%.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The share of Democrats extremely proud to be American fell from an average of 58% during George W. Bush's second term to 30% during Trump's first term and 14% in the most recent Gallup poll.
Republicans extremely proud to be American averaged 79% during Bush's second term, fell to 60% during Biden's term, and rebounded to 74% after Trump retook office, according to Gallup.
Gallup found Democrats and independents at an identical 58% extremely proud to be American during Bush's second term, with that rough parity lasting through Obama's second term.
Related Articles:
Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences— The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
A Note on Factors Influencing Trust in Government— Using survey data for 34 OECD countries, the authors estimate that higher real income per capita, social spending, decentralization, and economic freedom raise trust in government, while inflation, unemployment, debt per capita, human capital, and a larger elderly population share lower it. Their estimates place a heavier weight on inflation than unemployment.
Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity— The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
AI Summary.Texas leads all US states in business investment and population growth, created roughly a fifth of all net new US jobs from 2020 to 2025, and is on course to overtake California as America's largest state economy. Other states are copying its approach, including plans to eliminate corporate income taxes and offer shovel-ready mega-sites.
Economist StaffThe Economist
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According to CBRE, at least 184 American firms, including Tesla and Caterpillar, moved their headquarters to Austin, Dallas or Houston btw 2020 and 2025. During that period, Texas drove ~20% of all net job creation in the US.
Is Texas becoming the center of American business investment and growth?
Core argument: Texas created roughly a fifth of all net new jobs in the United States from 2020 to 2025, and no state receives more business investment or adds more people to its population.
On May 27th the shareholders of ExxonMobil approved a plan to cut its ties with New Jersey and reincorporate in Texas, where it has long had its headquarters. The oil giant is not alone. Texas is steadily establishing itself as America Inc’s new centre of gravity. No state receives more business investment or is adding more people to its population. From 2020 to 2025 it created roughly a fifth of all net new jobs in the country. It is only a matter of time before Texas overtakes California as the largest economy in America. Texas’s success should worry those in New York and California monitoring their tax take. At the same time it has spawned a raft of imitators. Legislators in North Carolina have passed a plan to get rid of its corporate-income tax by 2030. Tennessee has copied Texas’s strategy of offering firms shovel-ready mega-sites. Nevada is trying to launch its own business court.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Texas created roughly a fifth of all net new jobs in the United States from 2020 to 2025, and no state receives more business investment or adds more people to its population.
ExxonMobil's shareholders approved a plan to cut ties with New Jersey and reincorporate in Texas, where the oil giant has long had its headquarters.
Other states are imitating Texas: North Carolina's legislators passed a plan to eliminate its corporate-income tax by 2030, Tennessee offers firms shovel-ready mega-sites, and Nevada is trying to launch its own business court.
Related Articles:
Where Americans Choose to Move and Where They Leave— County-level mapping of net domestic migration within the United States shows some counties gained net movers equal to 10% or more of their 2020 population while others lost an equivalent share, excluding international moves.
Fifty Shades of Growth— Boom Belt" states combine high birth rates with low death rates, led by Utah at 13.2 births and 6.3 deaths per 1,000 residents for a natural increase of 6.9 per 1,000. Texas records about 12.7 births versus 9.1 deaths per 1,000, with roughly half its population growth from natural increase.
As New Jobs In Finance Dry Up, New York City’s Fiscal Model Is Wilting— New York state's share of US taxpayers reporting over $1m in income fell from 12.7% in 2010 to 8.7% in 2022, and the Citizens Budget Commission estimates state and city income tax receipts from that group would have been $13bn higher had the share held. Job growth has concentrated in lower-paid health care and social assistance.
AI Summary.The share of men aged 16 and over who are employed has fallen from a 1990s average of 70.9% to 64.1%, partly reflecting an aging population, while women's employment share has held up better at 54.5%. Healthcare and social assistance, where women outnumber men three to one, drove recent private-sector job gains.
Justin LahartWall Street Journal
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Since December 2024, male employment, as measured by US payrolls, has declined by ~1,000 workers, while the number of jobs held by women increased by ~421,000. This measure doesn’t capture the self-employed, who are disproportionately men.
Is men's employment falling faster than women's as healthcare drives hiring?
Core argument: The employment-to-population ratio for men aged 16 and over was 64.1% in April, down from a 2019 average of 66.6% and a 1990s average of 70.9%, a decline largely explained by an aging population with more male retirees.
Among men aged 16 and over, the employment-to-population ratio was 64.1% in April. That compared with an average of 66.6% in 2019, and 70.9% in the 1990s. A lot of that decline can be explained by an aging population: There are a lot more male retirees than there used to be. The share of women working has always been lower than men’s, but it has held up much better despite an aging population. Women’s employment-to-population ratio came to 54.5% in April, a bit below its 2019 and 1990s averages. More recently healthcare and social assistance, where women outnumber men three to one, has been the main bright spot in a dimming job market. The sector added 656,500 jobs over the year that ended in April, the Labor Department reported Friday. Absent that gain, the private sector would have shed 145,500 private-sector jobs. Among the sectors where employment has fallen over the past year: manufacturing, which has resumed its long decline after a brief, postpandemic pop, and which employs more than two men for every woman.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The employment-to-population ratio for men aged 16 and over was 64.1% in April, down from a 2019 average of 66.6% and a 1990s average of 70.9%, a decline largely explained by an aging population with more male retirees.
Women's employment-to-population ratio came to 54.5% in April, a bit below its 2019 and 1990s averages, holding up better than men's despite an aging population.
Healthcare and social assistance, where women outnumber men three to one, added 656,500 jobs in the year ended April, without which the private sector would have shed 145,500 jobs, the Labor Department reported.
Related Articles:
What Sweeping Revisions and a Blowout Month Tell Us About the U.S. Job Market— Labor Department revisions lowered previously estimated job gains for the past two calendar years, cutting the combined net change in construction, manufacturing, and retail by 115,000 jobs. Healthcare added about 437,000 jobs and social assistance about 321,000 over 12 months, while all other private-sector jobs combined shrank.
Post-Pandemic Recovery for America’s Prime Age Labor Force: A Tale of Two Sexes— Prime-age women's labor force participation climbed about 5 points above its pre-pandemic level over a decade, while prime-age men's rose barely a point, only just regaining pre-pandemic levels. Despite economic expansion and labor shortages, work rates for prime-age American men are barely as high as at the trough of the severe Reagan-era recession.
Bachelors Without Bachelor’s: Gender Gaps in Education and Declining Marriage Rates— Marriage rates for college-educated women have remained stable over the past fifty years even as the relative supply of college-educated men declined, with the overall decline in marriage driven almost entirely by fewer marriages between non-college women and non-college men. The education gap in women's marriage rates is larger in areas where non-college men face the highest joblessness and incarceration.
AI Summary.Research on "transformative entrepreneurs" argues that turning inventions into long-run growth depends on tycoons who control and popularize new technologies. An analysis of 11 American technological waves over 150 years, scoring leaders by company revenue, employment, market value, corporate control, and personal wealth, ranks Henry Ford as the most powerful.
Economist StaffThe Economist
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An Economist analysis concludes that history suggests “prosperity requires tycoons,” as transformational entrepreneurs have played a decisive role in diffusing new technologies and are “a necessary condition of innovation.”
How powerful are today's AI tycoons compared with past industrial titans?
Core argument: John D. Rockefeller's peak wealth equalled roughly 1.5% of American GDP, and Elon Musk may be richer still depending on how his wealth is calculated, though The Economist's ranking places Henry Ford as the most powerful mogul America has seen.
A paper by Ufuk Akcigit points to the crucial role of so-called “transformative entrepreneurs” in turning inventions into long-run economic growth. In short, prosperity requires tycoons. To understand how the AI magnates compare with business titans through history, The Economist examined 11 technological waves in America over the past 150 years, from railways to the internet. For each, we picked the top five people responsible for the control, distribution and popularisation of that technology. We quantified the power of each by looking at the revenue, employment and market value of their companies at their peak, as well as a subjective assessment of the degree of corporate control held by the tycoon, along with their personal wealth. Riches alone would not capture the full extent of a tycoon’s power. At his peak the wealth of John D. Rockefeller, founder of Standard Oil, was equivalent to around 1.5% of American GDP. Mr. Musk may be richer still, depending on how his wealth is calculated. By our ranking, however, Henry Ford is the most powerful mogul America has seen so far.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
John D. Rockefeller's peak wealth equalled roughly 1.5% of American GDP, and Elon Musk may be richer still depending on how his wealth is calculated, though The Economist's ranking places Henry Ford as the most powerful mogul America has seen.
The Economist examined 11 American technological waves over the past 150 years, from railways to the internet, picking the top five people responsible for each technology's control, distribution and popularisation.
The Economist quantified each tycoon's power using the revenue, employment and market value of their companies at their peak, plus a subjective assessment of corporate control and personal wealth, since riches alone would not capture a tycoon's full power.
Related Articles:
Transformative and Subsistence Entrepreneurs: Origins and Impacts on Economic Growth— Only 17% of firms are "transformative" entrepreneurs, defined as those hiring a research-and-development worker at some point; higher IQ and educational attainment strongly predict transformative entrepreneurship, though the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur overall declines with IQ. The authors argue education subsidies address financial constraints more effectively than uniform startup or research subsidies.
Which Entrepreneurs Boost Productivity?— The authors find that a minority of entrepreneurs are "transformative" — generating disproportionate productivity gains, scoring high on IQ tests, being well-educated, and hiring research and development workers. They argue that economies with more such entrepreneurs and R&D workers sustain higher long-run productivity growth.
The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies— Information technology created investment opportunities exceeding the supply of properly trained talent, while trade with low-wage economies, low-skilled immigration, trade deficits, and aging demographics eased constraints on low-skilled labor and risk-averse savings. The author argues this framework, rather than rising cronyism, explains high returns to success, slowing productivity growth, and low interest rates.
