“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
AI Summary.US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" hold postgraduate degrees but household incomes of $30,000–$60,000 a year, an unusual combination given that education and income are typically positively correlated. In the Democratic Socialists of America's most recent member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000.
Nate SilverSilver Bulletin
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Silver finds that the most liberal voters are highly educated and lower-income. Only 19% of Americans with a college degree had a household income of $60,000 or less, but responders to a DSA survey were ~ twice as likely to fall into that category.
Do highly educated, lower-income voters identify as very liberal?
Core argument: In the Democratic Socialists of America's 2021 member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older held bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000 per year.
The US voters most likely to identify as “very liberal” are those with postgraduate degrees but lower-to-middle household incomes of $30K to $60K per year. This is very much also the sweet spot for the DSA. In the DSA’s most recent member survey in 2021, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor’s degrees, but 45% had household incomes below $60,000 per year. This is unusual because education and income are usually substantially positively correlated. In the composite CES data, only 19% of Americans with bachelor’s degrees or higher had household incomes of $60K or below, while respondents to the most recent DSA survey [were twice as likely to fall into this category].
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
In the Democratic Socialists of America's 2021 member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older held bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000 per year.
Composite CES data show only 19% of Americans with bachelor's degrees or higher had household incomes of $60,000 or below, while DSA survey respondents were twice as likely to fall into that category.
US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" are those with postgraduate degrees and household incomes of $30,000 to $60,000 per year, an unusual pairing since education and income are usually substantially positively correlated.
Related Articles:
America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade— Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.
Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences— The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
Political Representation Gaps and Populism— A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.
AI Summary.Using survey data for 34 OECD countries, the authors estimate that higher real income per capita, social spending, decentralization, and economic freedom raise trust in government, while inflation, unemployment, debt per capita, human capital, and a larger elderly population share lower it. Their estimates place a heavier weight on inflation than unemployment.
Michael Boskin, Alexander Kleiner and Ian WhitonNational Bureau of Economic Research
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A Pew study finds that only 15% of Americans trust the Federal government to do what is right “most of the time,” down from ~75% in 1960. A secular drop occurred during the Johnson and Nixon years; economic fluctuations account for cyclical variation.
What economic factors raise and lower public trust in government?
Core argument: A 2024 Pew survey found fewer than one-in-six Americans trust Washington to do what is right, with 1% saying "just about always" and 15% "most of the time," amid an overall decline in trust since the 1960s.
A survey conducted by Pew in the United States in 2024 found that fewer than one-in-six Americans express trust in Washington to do what is right ”just about always” (1%) or ”most of the time” (15%). Figure 2 depicts the trust that Americans have had in their government since the 1960s. Trust has experienced a significant overall decline since that period, with ups and downs that roughly coincide with periods of economic booms and busts. Using consistent survey data for 34 OECD countries from 2007-2023, we estimate a model of factors determining levels of trust. We employ a series of econometric techniques of increasing sophistication. The level and growth rate of real income per capita, social spending per capita, the degree of decentralization, and economic freedom all exert positive effects on trust. Inflation, unemployment, and debt per capita negatively affect trust. Additionally, higher levels of human capital and the elderly share of the population negatively affect trust. In the context of trust in government, the estimates suggest a heavier weight on inflation than on unemployment when compared to Okun’s misery index, which weights them equally.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
A 2024 Pew survey found fewer than one-in-six Americans trust Washington to do what is right, with 1% saying "just about always" and 15% "most of the time," amid an overall decline in trust since the 1960s.
Using consistent survey data for 34 OECD countries over 2007–2023, the authors estimate that the level and growth rate of real income per capita, social spending per capita, decentralization, and economic freedom all exert positive effects on trust in government.
The authors estimate that inflation, unemployment, and debt per capita reduce trust in government, with the estimates suggesting a heavier weight on inflation than on unemployment, unlike Okun's misery index, which weights the two equally.
Related Articles:
Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides— Zero-sum thinking — viewing gains for one group as losses for another — is associated with greater support for liberal economic policies, stronger alignment with the Democratic Party, and weaker alignment with the Republican Party. The authors also find it linked to believing the QAnon conspiracy theory holds some truth and to sympathy for the attack on the U.S. Capitol.
Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity— The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
AI Summary.A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.
Laurenz GuentherSocial Science Research Network
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Surveys in 27 European countries show that MPs’ policy views generally match those of their voters on economic issues, but are systematically to the left on cultural issues. This “representation gap” is filled by right-wing populist parties.
Do cultural gaps between lawmakers and voters explain populism's rise?
Core argument: Comparing identical survey policy questions answered by citizens and parliamentarians in 27 European countries, the author finds the average parliamentarian is about 1 standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter.
Populists are often defined as those who claim that they fill "political representation gaps" —differences between the policymaking by established parties and the "popular will." I study descriptively whether representation gaps exist and their relationship with populism. To this end, I analyze the responses of citizens and parliamentarians from 27 European countries to identical survey policy questions, which I compile and verify to be indicative of voting in referendums. I find that policymaking represents the economic attitudes of citizens well. However, I document that the average parliamentarian is about 1SD more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. This cultural representation gap is systematic in four ways: i) it arises on nearly all cultural issues, ii) in nearly all countries, iii) nearly all established parties are more culturally liberal than the national mean voter, and iv) all major demographic groups tend to be more conservative than their parliamentarians. Demographic differences between voters and parliamentarians or lack of political knowledge cannot fully account for representation gaps. Finally, I show that right-wing populists fill the cultural representation gap.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Comparing identical survey policy questions answered by citizens and parliamentarians in 27 European countries, the author finds the average parliamentarian is about 1 standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter.
The cultural representation gap is systematic across nearly all cultural issues, nearly all countries, and nearly all established parties, with all major demographic groups tending to be more conservative than their parliamentarians.
Policymaking represents citizens' economic attitudes well, demographic differences and lack of political knowledge cannot fully account for the representation gaps, and right-wing populists fill the cultural gap, according to the author.
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The Rich World Revolts Against Sky-High Immigration— 15m people moved to rich countries over three years, the biggest surge in modern history, with net migration exceeding 3m to America, 1.3m to Canada and about 700,000 to Britain. As immigration surged, output per person fell in Britain and Germany, partly because recent arrivals are on average less skilled than residents.
Changing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Growth Trajectory— Sub-Saharan Africa's working-age population is growing nearly 3% a year, versus close to zero in much of the world, and is projected to exceed China's within about a decade and reach a quarter of the global total. With modest productivity growth near 2%, the region is likely among the world's fastest-growing.
Europe Grasps for Ways to Stop the Migrant Surge— Around 1.14m people filed asylum claims in Europe in a year, the highest since the 2015 migration crisis, with claims expected to top 1m again; these figures exclude more than 4m Ukrainian refugees granted temporary protection in the European Union. Asylum seekers tend to be less educated and lower skilled than other immigrant groups.
AI Summary.Across the 30 states and Washington, D.C. that register voters by party, Democrats lost about 2.1m registered voters over a recent four-year period while Republicans gained 2.4m, cutting the Democratic registration edge from nearly 11 percentage points to just over 6. Republicans have also overtaken Democrats among new registrants.
Shane Goldmacher and Jonah SmithNew York Times
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New voters are breaking Republican. In 2018, 34% of new voter registrations were Democrats and 20% GOP. By 2024, the GOP’s share of new voters rose 9pp relative to 2018 and the Democrats share declined 8pp, giving the GOP an edge among new registrants.
Are Democrats losing registered voters to Republicans across every party-registration state?
Core argument: Democrats lost about 2.1 million registered voters between the 2020 and 2024 elections across the 30 states plus Washington, D.C. with partisan registration, while Republicans gained 2.4 million, a four-year swing of 4.5 million voters.
Of the 30 states that track voter registration by political party, Democrats lost ground to Republicans in every single one between the 2020 and 2024 elections — and often by a lot. Democrats lost about 2.1 million registered voters between the 2020 and 2024 elections in the 30 states, along with Washington, D.C., that allow people to register with a political party. (In the remaining 20 states, voters do not register with a political party.) Republicans gained 2.4 million. That four-year swing toward the Republicans adds up to 4.5 million voters. Democrats went from nearly an 11-percentage-point edge over Republicans on Election Day 2020 in those places with partisan registration, to just over a 6-percentage-point edge in 2024. In 2018, Democrats accounted for 34% of new voter registrations nationwide, while Republicans were only 20%. Yet by 2024, Republicans had overtaken Democrats among new registrants. In six years, the G.O.P.’s share rose by 9 percentage points; the Democratic share dropped nearly 8 points. There are now roughly 160,000 fewer registered Democrats than on Election Day 2024, according to L2’s data, and 200,000 more Republicans.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Democrats lost about 2.1 million registered voters between the 2020 and 2024 elections across the 30 states plus Washington, D.C. with partisan registration, while Republicans gained 2.4 million, a four-year swing of 4.5 million voters.
The Democratic registration edge over Republicans in states with partisan registration narrowed from nearly 11 percentage points on Election Day 2020 to just over 6 points in 2024, with Democrats losing ground in all 30 states.
Democrats accounted for 34% of new voter registrations nationwide in 2018 against 20% for Republicans, but by 2024 Republicans had overtaken them, their share up 9 percentage points as the Democratic share fell nearly 8.
Related Articles:
Behind Trump’s 2024 Victory, a More Racially and Ethnically Diverse Voter Coalition— Republican support in the 2024 presidential election rose among Hispanic voters (48%, up from 36% in 2020), Black voters (15% from 8%), Asian voters (40% from 30%), and naturalized citizens (47% from 38%). Men backed Trump by 12 points (55%-43%) after splitting closely in 2020, with gains concentrated among men under 50.
What Happened In 2024— Democratic two-way presidential support fell 3 points from 52% to 49% between the two most recent elections, with larger declines among overlapping demographic groups: 12 points among young Latinos, 16 among young Latino men, and 17 among young Latino men who vote irregularly.
Democrats Need to Face Why Trump Won— Among American voters over 30, the gender gap in presidential support has held at roughly 10%, but among those under 30 it has widened dramatically, with 18-year-old men 23 percentage points more likely than 18-year-old women to support Donald Trump. Similar divides are appearing in other countries.
AI Summary.Democratic two-way presidential support fell 3 points from 52% to 49% between the two most recent elections, with larger declines among overlapping demographic groups: 12 points among young Latinos, 16 among young Latino men, and 17 among young Latino men who vote irregularly.
Yair Ghitza, Haris Aqeel and Josh YazmanCatalist
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“Two-way” (i.e. after netting our minor candidates and undervotes) support for Democrats among voters under the age of 30 dropped 6pp btw 2020 (61%) and 2024 (55%) nationally. Harris lost 16pp of support from 18–29 year old Latino men.
How concentrated was the Democratic vote decline among overlapping groups?
Core argument: Harris's two-way support fell 3 points nationally versus Biden in 2020, dropping from 52% to 49%.
Figure 4, shows how much support Harris lost compared to Biden in 2020 among a key set of groups. Across the country, she lost 3 points, going from 52% to 49% [two-way support] overall. Importantly, it would be a mistake to consider these demographic attributes one at a time. For instance, Latinos are more likely to be irregular voters than white voters, young people are less likely to vote in midterm elections, and Latinos are more likely to be young. In other words, these groups overlap considerably. Further, groups that had a combination of these traits were more likely to move away from Harris. Among young Latinos, Harris lost 12 points; among young Latino men, 16 points; among young Latino men who are irregular voters, 17 points. Similar trends are evident across other combinations of these groups and sub-groups, including along racial, gender, age and vote history lines.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Harris's two-way support fell 3 points nationally versus Biden in 2020, dropping from 52% to 49%.
Harris's losses were larger among overlapping groups: 12 points among young Latinos, 16 points among young Latino men, and 17 points among young Latino men who are irregular voters.
Treating demographic attributes one at a time is a mistake, since these groups overlap considerably, with Latinos more likely to be irregular voters and young, and similar trends appear across racial, gender, age, and vote-history combinations.
Related Articles:
Democrats Need to Face Why Trump Won— Among American voters over 30, the gender gap in presidential support has held at roughly 10%, but among those under 30 it has widened dramatically, with 18-year-old men 23 percentage points more likely than 18-year-old women to support Donald Trump. Similar divides are appearing in other countries.
How To Get Rich in 2025— Academic estimates compiled by The Economist indicate inheritances, after falling over the 20th century, were worth about 10% of GDP on average by the end of the 2010s, with roughly $6tn inherited across the rich world in a year. Falling family sizes mean each inheritance is spread across fewer heirs.
Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides— Zero-sum thinking — viewing gains for one group as losses for another — is associated with greater support for liberal economic policies, stronger alignment with the Democratic Party, and weaker alignment with the Republican Party. The authors also find it linked to believing the QAnon conspiracy theory holds some truth and to sympathy for the attack on the U.S. Capitol.
AI Summary.Incumbents' vote share across the developed world fell by an average of seven percentage points, an all-time record and more than double the decline seen after the global financial crisis, with inflation the likely common driver. The largest gains went to rightwing populist parties in France, Austria, Britain and Portugal, though some radical leftwing parties also gained ground.
John Burn-MurdochFinancial Times
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.@jburnmurdoch notes in 2024 the incumbent party lost vote share in every advanced economy, by an average of 7pp. The populist right was the largest beneficiary, while leftwing parties gained in countries with center-right incumbents like the UK.
Why did incumbent parties across the developed world lose record vote share?
Core argument: Incumbents' vote share across the developed world fell by an average of seven percentage points in 2024, an all-time record and more than double the decline suffered in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.
On average across the developed world, incumbents’ vote share fell by seven percentage points in 2024, an all-time record and more than double the decline as electorates punished elected officials in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The range of countries producing similar results points to a common undercurrent, with inflation the obvious culprit. Although ultimately falling narrowly short of its hoped-for victory, the 15-point swing achieved by France’s Rassemblement National in parliamentary elections was the largest recorded by any party in any developed country this year. The second, third and fourth-biggest gains of the year were all by fellow rightwing populists in the form of Austria’s Freedom party, Britain’s Reform UK and Portugal’s Chega. But anti-establishment successes were not limited to the right. The Greens in the UK were one of a smattering of radical leftwing parties that also gained ground as voters disillusioned with a stale centre broke in both directions.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Incumbents' vote share across the developed world fell by an average of seven percentage points in 2024, an all-time record and more than double the decline suffered in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.
France's Rassemblement National achieved a 15-point swing in parliamentary elections, the largest by any party in any developed country in 2024, though it fell narrowly short of victory; Austria's Freedom party, Britain's Reform UK and Portugal's Chega recorded the next three biggest gains.
The range of countries producing similar results points to a common undercurrent, with inflation the obvious culprit, while radical leftwing parties such as the UK Greens also gained ground as voters disillusioned with a stale centre broke in both directions.
Related Articles:
Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides— Zero-sum thinking — viewing gains for one group as losses for another — is associated with greater support for liberal economic policies, stronger alignment with the Democratic Party, and weaker alignment with the Republican Party. The authors also find it linked to believing the QAnon conspiracy theory holds some truth and to sympathy for the attack on the U.S. Capitol.
Democrats Join 2024’s Graveyard of Incumbents— Incumbent governing parties lost vote share in all 10 major countries tracked by the ParlGov research project that held national elections in the same year, the first such sweep in almost 120 years of records. The Democratic presidential ticket's popular-vote share fell nearly four percentage points, the steepest drop in Democratic support since 1980.
Migration To Rich Countries Hits Record High In 2023— About 6.5mn people moved to the 38 member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development through permanent migration routes in a record year, nearly 10% above the prior record of 6mn, with the US receiving 1.2mn permanent legal immigrants. New asylum seekers in those countries rose 30% to a record 2.7mn.
AI Summary.The authors argue that partisan realignment by education reflects Democrats' declining supply of "predistribution" policies such as job guarantees, higher minimum wages, protectionism, and stronger unions, which less-educated Americans favor while more-educated Americans prefer taxes and transfers. They estimate changing views of the parties' economic policies explain roughly half the shift.
Ilyana Kuziemko, Nicolas Longuet-Marx and Suresh NaiduNational Bureau of Economic Research
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.@ikuziemko et al. find that less-educated US voters have consistently favored “predistribution” policies such as protectionism and strong labor unions, while more-educated Democratic elites have reduced support for “predistribution” since the 1970s.
How does a party's shift away from predistribution explain educational realignment?
Core argument: The authors estimate that roughly half of the shift of less-educated Americans away from the Democratic Party since the 1970s can be explained by their changing views of the parties' economic policies.
We argue that the Democratic Party’s evolution on economic policy helps explain partisan realignment by education. We show that less-educated Americans differentially demand “predistribution” policies (e.g., a federal jobs guarantee, higher minimum wages, protectionism, and stronger unions), while more-educated Americans differentially favor redistribution (taxes and transfers). This educational gradient in policy preferences has been largely unchanged since the 1940s. We then show the Democrats’ supply of predistribution has declined since the 1970s. We tie this decline to the rise of a self-described “New Democrat” party faction who court more educated voters and are explicitly skeptical of predistribution. Less-educated Americans began to leave the Democratic Party in the 1970s, after decades of serving as the party’s base. Roughly half of the total shift can be explained by their changing views of the parties’ economic policies. We also show that in the crucial transition period of the 1970s and 1980s, New Democrat-aligned candidates draw disproportionately from more-educated voters in both survey questions and actual Congressional elections.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The authors estimate that roughly half of the shift of less-educated Americans away from the Democratic Party since the 1970s can be explained by their changing views of the parties' economic policies.
Less-educated Americans differentially demand predistribution policies such as a federal jobs guarantee, higher minimum wages, protectionism, and stronger unions, while more-educated Americans differentially favor redistribution through taxes and transfers, a gradient largely unchanged since the 1940s.
The authors tie the decline in Democrats' supply of predistribution since the 1970s to the rise of a self-described "New Democrat" faction skeptical of predistribution, whose aligned candidates drew disproportionately from more-educated voters in 1970s–1980s survey questions and Congressional elections.
Related Articles:
Welfare Is What’s Eating the Budget— The U.S. redistributes 29.4% of its gross domestic product through transfers and taxes, a larger share than any developed country except France at 30.1%. Counting transfers as income and taxes as income lost and adjusting for household size, average households in the bottom, second, and middle income fifths have roughly equal incomes despite large differences in work effort.
The Great “Transfer”-mation— Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
Americans Are More Reliant Than Ever on Government Aid— Research from the Economic Innovation Group finds that in 1970, fewer than 1% of US counties drew at least 25% of personal income from government safety-net and social programs, compared with 53% of counties by 2022, a shift the group associates with population aging.
AI Summary.The Democratic presidential margin among women narrowed from 12 points to 7 while the Republican margin among men widened from 5 points to 10, leaving the overall gender gap unchanged at 17 points. Women under 30 shifted 14 points toward Republicans and men under 30 shifted 29 points.
Ruy TeixeiraThe Liberal Patriot
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Ruy Teixeira notes that according to AP VoteCast data, the 17pp overall gender gap was unchanged from 2024. “The gender gap did widen among young voters, but it was because young men moved more sharply toward Trump than young women did.”
Did the gender gap widen as Democrats lost ground with women?
Core argument: Harris won women by 7 points in 2024 versus Biden's 12-point margin in 2020, while Trump's margin among men widened to 10 points from 5 points, leaving the overall gender gap unchanged at 17 points.
Contrary to much pre-election discussion, Harris’s margin among women was actually less than Biden’s in 2020, 7 points for Harris vs. 12 points for Biden. And the Trump margin was better among men, 10 points vs. 5 points in 2020. The overall gender gap went from 17 points in 2020 to….17 points in 2024. The Democrats invested so much hope in the women’s vote, especially the idea that the abortion issue would spike their margin among women, and it just did not pan out. Even more startling, Democrats believed with an almost religious fervor that young women would move sharply in their direction given liberal trends among this demographic and, again, the salience of the abortion issue. It did not happen. Women under 30 supported Biden by 32 points in 2020 but supported Harris by just 18 points in this election, a 14-point shift toward Trump. Among young men, the swing was even harder: these voters supported Biden by 15 points in 2020 but supported Trump by 14 points in 2024. That’s a 29-point pro-Republican swing.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Harris won women by 7 points in 2024 versus Biden's 12-point margin in 2020, while Trump's margin among men widened to 10 points from 5 points, leaving the overall gender gap unchanged at 17 points.
Women under 30 backed Biden by 32 points in 2020 but Harris by only 18 points in 2024, a 14-point shift toward Trump.
Men under 30 swung 29 points toward Republicans, moving from a 15-point Biden margin in 2020 to a 14-point Trump margin in 2024.
Related Articles:
How Trump Won In Maps and Charts— Election data show the Republican candidate improved on his prior presidential margin in nearly 90% of US counties, with rural turnout strong and urban support for the Democratic candidate falling short. Exit polls indicate Asian, Black, Hispanic, and white voters all shifted toward him, while the Democrat gained only among voters over 65 and white college-educated women.
Post-Pandemic Recovery for America’s Prime Age Labor Force: A Tale of Two Sexes— Prime-age women's labor force participation climbed about 5 points above its pre-pandemic level over a decade, while prime-age men's rose barely a point, only just regaining pre-pandemic levels. Despite economic expansion and labor shortages, work rates for prime-age American men are barely as high as at the trough of the severe Reagan-era recession.
Democrats Join 2024’s Graveyard of Incumbents— Incumbent governing parties lost vote share in all 10 major countries tracked by the ParlGov research project that held national elections in the same year, the first such sweep in almost 120 years of records. The Democratic presidential ticket's popular-vote share fell nearly four percentage points, the steepest drop in Democratic support since 1980.
