“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
AI Summary.US labor productivity, measured as nonfarm business output per hour, rose at a 3.6% annualized rate, up from an upwardly revised 2.1% pace, while unit labor costs fell 0.7%. The acceleration suggests a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
Julia FanzeresBloomberg
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Nonfarm business productivity grew at a 3.6% annualized rate in Q3, the fastest pace in a year. Real hourly compensation rose 1.1%, while the labor share fell to 53%, the lowest in data going back to 1947.
Is a capital spending boom lifting worker productivity?
Core argument: US nonfarm business output per hour rose at a 3.6% annualized rate in the third quarter, the fastest pace in a year, following an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
US labor productivity accelerated in the third quarter at the fastest pace in a year, suggesting a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency at a time when input costs have soared. Productivity, or nonfarm business output per hour, increased at a 3.6% annualized rate after an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics showed Thursday. Unit labor costs — what businesses pay employees to produce one unit of output — fell 0.7%, the first decline since the second quarter of 2025.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
US nonfarm business output per hour rose at a 3.6% annualized rate in the third quarter, the fastest pace in a year, following an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Unit labor costs, what businesses pay employees to produce one unit of output, fell 0.7% in the third quarter, the first decline since the second quarter of 2025.
The third-quarter productivity acceleration suggests a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency at a time when input costs have soared.
Related Articles:
Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected— The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
Higher Utilisation Explains The Recent Surge In Productivity Growth— Measured total factor productivity growth is estimated to come almost entirely from higher input utilisation rather than underlying efficiency gains, based on a method that infers unobserved capital and labour utilisation from movements in hours per worker. On this evidence, recent productivity gains reflect "working harder" rather than "working smarter.
US Focus: The Effect Of Soaring Profits— US nominal pre-tax corporate profits in the national accounts grew 23% over the past year, a pace not seen outside post-recession spikes since the mid-2000s. Wider margins were the key driver, as domestic profit growth far exceeded the 8% rise in corporate value added, pushing margins near all-time highs while the labor share hit new lows.
AI Summary.Nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won, putting an estimated 37.5 GW of planned capacity at risk of a pause and another 15 GW subject to conditions such as grid cost-sharing, water limits, and ended tax incentives. The 37 GW expected in 2027, 75% already under construction, is largely unaffected.
Michael CembalestJ.P. Morgan
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Before the election, 96 GW of data center capacity was expected to come online in 2028. Based on the positions of incoming governors, Cembalest estimates 37.5 GW may be subject to a “pause” and another 15 GW to “conditions,” together more than half of the total.
Are local ballot measures putting planned data center capacity at risk?
Core argument: Nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won or is winning, with North Dakota the only exception, and based on those results 37.5 GW of planned capacity may face a “pause” and another 15 GW conditions.
The biggest market issue may be AI over the medium term; nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won or is winning, with only exception in North Dakota. What we’re now watching: governor imposed constraints on new builds. This is not an issue for the 37 GW expected to be delivered in 2027, 75% of which is under construction. It’s more an issue for the 96 GW expected in 2028. Based on election results, 37.5 GW may be subject to a “pause” with another 15 GW subject to “conditions”. While pauses are the more impactful outcome, conditions can be onerous: requiring data centers to pay grid costs to protect ratepayers, ending tax incentives, imposing water limits, setting requirements for onsite backup power, mandating labor requirements and banning non-disclosure agreements during permitting (most of which seem sensible to me). If the data center buildout starts to slow at some point, upgrading to better NVIDIA chips might be the only way to generate more tokens.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won or is winning, with North Dakota the only exception, and based on those results 37.5 GW of planned capacity may face a “pause” and another 15 GW conditions.
The 37 GW of data center capacity expected in 2027, 75% of which is under construction, is less exposed to local opposition than the 96 GW expected in 2028.
Conditions imposed on data centers can include paying grid costs to protect ratepayers, ending tax incentives, water limits, onsite backup power requirements, labor mandates, and bans on non-disclosure agreements during permitting.
Related Articles:
Financing the AI Buildout— The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
Global Views: Downside Growth Risks— The growth boost from the artificial intelligence boom is projected to peak around late 2026 or early 2027, with AI investment as a share of GDP slowing and the estimated 0.4pp wealth-effect lift to US consumer spending fading. Across US nonmanufacturing industries, AI adoption shows a statistically significant negative correlation with employment growth and positive correlation with unemployment.
Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected— The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
AI Summary.The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
Greg JensenBridgewater Associates
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Bridgewater estimates that AI equities are pricing in ~3.5% annual productivity growth, while real growth and productivity implied by breakeven earnings in the broader stock market are slightly below current levels. They conclude: “Either AI stocks or broader macro markets are very meaningfully mispriced.”
Do AI stock valuations and broader markets imply incompatible growth expectations?
Core argument: AI equities are priced for roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth, more than is estimated as needed to make US debts sustainable, and across a reasonable range of assumptions imply trend nominal GDP growth well above the recent past.
Different markets are pricing very different futures; most are far from pricing an unrecognizable world. The AI boom has contributed tens of trillions of dollars of market cap in AI companies. As in any gold rush, trillions of dollars of “picks and shovels” only make sense if a great deal of gold (profits) is found. The pricing of a broader universe of AI companies tells us something about the scale of transformation that is discounted. If we calculate the incremental revenue required to sustain the valuation of AI companies and estimate how much of that can be earned by cannibalizing the revenue of existing companies, we can back out a productivity boost required to generate the rest of the incremental revenues. Today, we estimate that AI equities are discounting something like 3.5% annual productivity growth. That’s more than we estimate is needed for the US to make its debts sustainable. Across a reasonable range of assumptions, we assess AI stocks to be pricing trend nominal GDP growth well above the recent past. By contrast, consensus estimates and broader markets imply a world that looks more like the recent past. Making sense of the pricing in AI stocks requires a boom in productivity and growth. Consensus estimates for growth and productivity (from economist and Fed estimates) are slightly lower than current measures, as are rates of real growth and productivity implied by breakeven earnings in the broader stock market.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
AI equities are priced for roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth, more than is estimated as needed to make US debts sustainable, and across a reasonable range of assumptions imply trend nominal GDP growth well above the recent past.
Consensus growth and productivity estimates from economists and the Fed, along with real growth and productivity implied by breakeven earnings in the broader stock market, sit slightly below current measures, describing a world resembling the recent past.
Either AI stocks or broader macro markets are very meaningfully mispriced, since the AI boom has added tens of trillions of dollars of market cap that only makes sense if a great deal of profit is found.
Related Articles:
No Signs of AI Payoff Outside the Tech Sector— Revenue per worker and profit margins are rising for the seven largest technology companies but flat for the rest of the S&P 500, with no signs of artificial intelligence boosting productivity growth. The author argues that as long as spending on artificial intelligence stays confined to a small part of the economy, its macroeconomic effects will remain very limited.
Califoreboding— A basket of 42 AI stocks accounts for 60%-80% of all S&P 500 earnings growth, price returns and capital spending, while 60% of S&P 500 stocks sit 20% or more below their highs and only 30% outperform the index. AI-related construction spending has risen 38%, the only positive trend as manufacturing, commercial real estate and residential construction decline.
AI and Productivity— The recent pickup in US labor productivity appears driven by higher utilization of existing capital—running factories, server racks, and hotel rooms harder—rather than by firm-level efficiency gains from AI. Adoption remains too thin and the cross-sectional evidence too weak to conclude that AI-driven productivity gains are already widespread.
AI Summary.The cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio for the S&P 500 stands at 40.7, implying an earnings yield of 2.46% and, combined with an estimated 1.8% annual real per-share earnings growth, a real expected return near 3% a year. Against a 2.75% inflation-protected 10-year Treasury yield, that leaves an equity premium of roughly 25 basis points, assuming the elevated multiple holds.
Hanno LustigThe Two Cents
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At 40.7, CAPE is nearing its December 1999 peak of 44.2. For the S&P 500 to beat TIPS over the next decade, today’s near-record P/E multiple must persist for ten years, or real earnings must grow more than 5.8% a year—a pace exceeded in only two decades since 1880: the 1920s and 2010s.
How much do stock valuations offer over inflation-protected Treasuries?
Core argument: The S&P 500’s cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio stands at 40.7, close to an all-time high, implying an earnings yield of just 2.46% for buyers of the index.
The CAPE is currently trading at 40.7, which is close to an all-time high. You’re paying close to 41 times annual earnings when you buy the S&P 500. The implied earnings yield is only 2.46%. According to AQR, a reasonable estimate for real earnings growth (on a per share basis) is 1.8% per annum. If you plug in today’s numbers, you end up with a real expected return of around 3% per year for U.S. equity. That’s a surprisingly low number. When you compare it to the 10-year TIPS yield of 2.75%, you’re left with a razor-thin equity premium. The stock market will only yield an extra 25 basis points per annum over the next, say, 10 years to compensate you for taking on equity risk. You might think this is a very conservative estimate, but it’s actually not, because we’re implicitly assuming that the CAPE stays at 40.7 over the next 10 years. That’s quite a lofty multiple. Even casual eyeball econometrics suggests that that’s not a great assumption, because the price-earnings ratio tends to revert back to its mean.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The S&P 500’s cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio stands at 40.7, close to an all-time high, implying an earnings yield of just 2.46% for buyers of the index.
Combining the 2.46% earnings yield with AQR’s estimate of 1.8% annual real per-share earnings growth yields a real expected return of roughly 3% per year for U.S. equity.
Against a 10-year TIPS yield of 2.75%, U.S. equities offer an equity premium of about 25 basis points per year, an estimate that assumes the CAPE stays at 40.7 for a decade despite the price-earnings ratio’s tendency to revert to its mean.
Related Articles:
Financing the AI Buildout— The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
A Catalyst For The AI Bubble Break— Historically, controlling for valuations, a 1% rise in the share of the market represented by initial public offerings has been associated with roughly a 4% decline in prices. With large artificial-intelligence company listings expected and share issuance exceeding buybacks, equity supply could shift from shrinking about 1% a year to growing near 5%, implying returns roughly 20% below average.
One Hundred Years in the U.S. Stock Markets— Over a century, U.S. publicly traded stocks generated roughly $91tn in shareholder wealth enhancement, with returns strongly positively skewed and dominated by a relatively small number of high-performing firms. Because most possible outcomes fall below the mean in a skewed distribution, the authors argue financial planning should focus on median outcomes or the full distribution.
AI Summary.Payment-data analysis finds 80% of the largest corporate AI spenders are venture-backed, versus 13% of the median spender, indicating that much token spending is funded by venture capital rather than earnings. If AI payoffs are slow, venture returns could suffer and a funding pullback could weaken demand for computing power.
Torsten SlokApollo
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According to Ramp data, 80% of firms in the top 1% of AI spending are VC-backed, compared with just 13% of firms at the median. This suggests that the largest purchasers of AI computing capacity rely heavily on venture capital rather than internally generated earnings.
Is venture capital funding most corporate AI token spending?
Core argument: Ramp data show 80% of the top 1% of AI spenders are venture-backed, versus 13% of the median spender, suggesting the largest buyers of compute are funding token spending with venture capital rather than organic earnings.
Ramp data show that 80% of the top 1% of AI spenders are VC-backed, compared with only 13% of the median spender, suggesting that the circularity seen among AI hyperscalers and model providers also extends to token spending, as the startups buying the most compute are paying for it with venture capital rather than organic earnings. If the AI payoff is slow to materialize or never arrives, VC returns would come under pressure, since the capital funding today’s token spending would have little to show for it, and a pullback in venture funding could in turn weaken demand for compute.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Ramp data show 80% of the top 1% of AI spenders are venture-backed, versus 13% of the median spender, suggesting the largest buyers of compute are funding token spending with venture capital rather than organic earnings.
Ramp’s data on the venture backing of the heaviest AI spenders suggest the circularity seen among AI hyperscalers and model providers also extends to token spending.
If the AI payoff is slow to materialize or never arrives, venture capital returns would come under pressure, and a pullback in venture funding could in turn weaken demand for compute.
Related Articles:
Slowing Token Spend Shows Compute Demand Isn’t Unlimited— Demand for computing power appears highly price-sensitive, with modest increases in token prices pushing buyers to cut usage or switch to cheap open-source alternatives, undercutting claims that demand is unlimited. Return on invested capital at the five largest cloud providers is declining as invested capital grows faster than the earnings it generates.
AI Capex, Required Revenues, And What’s Priced In The AI Trade— Goldman Sachs projects the largest US hyperscalers' capital spending reaches $1.2tn in 2027 and $1.4tn in 2028, with growth decelerating, and estimates they need roughly $300bn in annual AI revenues to break even. AI infrastructure stocks have de-rated, with hyperscalers at their smallest recorded premium to the median S&P 500 company.
Financing the AI Buildout— The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
AI Summary.Publicly listed firms' profit margins were roughly flat through the 2010s, with gross margins growing about 0.4% a year from 2010 to 2019, then turned up: average gross margins rose from about 34% of sales in 2019 to 37% in 2025, and operating margins from 16% to 18%.
Jeremy PearceFederal Reserve Bank of New York
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Nonfarm business output per hour grew 2.2% annually between 2019 and 2025, up from 1% in 2010–19. Among public firms, growth in real revenue per worker accelerated from 0.7% to 2.2%. Operating margins rose from 16% to 18% of sales (2.4% annual growth).
Have corporate profit margins risen after a flat decade?
Core argument: Average operating margins rose from about 16% of sales in 2019 to 18% in 2025, growth of 2.4% a year, after being roughly flat through the 2010s.
A profit margin is profit divided by sales: the share of each sales dollar the firm keeps after paying its costs. The gross margin subtracts the direct cost of production (cost of goods sold), while the operating margin also subtracts overhead (selling, general, and administrative expense, which in Compustat typically includes R&D). If productivity gains were flowing to firms’ profits, margins should show it. Through the 2010s margins were flat: gross margins grew about 0.4% a year from 2010 to 2019, and operating margins were roughly flat. Both then turned up: on average, gross margins went from about 34% of sales in 2019 to 37% in 2025 (1.3% growth per year), and operating margins from 16% to 18% (2.4% growth per year). Part of the gains surfaced with wider profit margins: on a reasonable baseline, the operating margin rose over 2% a year from 2019 to 2025.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Average operating margins rose from about 16% of sales in 2019 to 18% in 2025, growth of 2.4% a year, after being roughly flat through the 2010s.
Average gross margins increased from about 34% of sales in 2019 to 37% in 2025, growth of 1.3% a year, up from about 0.4% a year over 2010–2019.
On a reasonable baseline, the operating margin rose over 2% a year from 2019 to 2025, indicating part of the productivity gains surfaced as wider profit margins.
Related Articles:
Higher Utilisation Explains The Recent Surge In Productivity Growth— Measured total factor productivity growth is estimated to come almost entirely from higher input utilisation rather than underlying efficiency gains, based on a method that infers unobserved capital and labour utilisation from movements in hours per worker. On this evidence, recent productivity gains reflect "working harder" rather than "working smarter.
Have We Entered an Era of High Productivity Growth?— Labor productivity has grown solidly while the San Francisco Federal Reserve's total factor productivity index, which adjusts for the equipment and technology workers use, has grown modestly, suggesting gains so far reflect better tools rather than broader advances. A regime-switching model puts the probability of a high-productivity regime at 57% using labor productivity and 21% using total factor productivity.
Why Wages And Productivity Look Set To Diverge Further— In the US, Europe and Japan, pay growth has decoupled from productivity growth, with productivity pulling ahead. US labor productivity, measured as real GDP per hour worked, is more than 5x its 1947 level while real hourly compensation is only about 3x, and median wage growth lags even further behind.
AI Summary.The United States generates almost twice as much economic output per dollar invested as China, the opposite of what would be expected from a mature developed economy versus a fast-growing economy catching up. The gap points to overexuberance in Chinese investment.
Robin Rivaton and Ben SouthwoodWorks In Progress
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The US generates ~2x as much output per dollar of capital as China. Rivaton and Southwood argue that relentless competition among Chinese subnational governments, who account for ~85% of public expenditure, drives industrial growth at the cost of reduced capital efficiency.
Does China get less economic output per dollar invested than America?
Core argument: The United States obtains nearly twice as much GDP from every dollar invested as China does, measured by the capital efficiency ratio of output to invested capital stock.
Overexuberance is visible in economic data. Interest rates that banks pay to depositors are capped, giving banks artificially cheap capital. Entrepreneurs may be backed to attempt extremely unlikely, borderline schemes. The capital efficiency ratio measures how much output a country gets out of the capital stock it has invested – how many dollars of GDP a country can buy with a dollar of investment. The United States gets almost twice as much economic output out of every dollar it invests as China does, precisely the opposite of what we would expect from a developed country with a mature economy versus a rapidly growing country playing catch up.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The United States obtains nearly twice as much GDP from every dollar invested as China does, measured by the capital efficiency ratio of output to invested capital stock.
China’s capital efficiency inverts the expected pattern, in which a rapidly growing catch-up economy would extract more output per dollar of investment than a mature developed economy.
Overexuberance is visible in Chinese macroeconomic data, with China’s investment generating less economic output per dollar than that of the United States.
Related Articles:
The Year of the Trojan Fire Horse: China’s Imbalanced Economy and Unrelenting Mercantilism— About 30% of Chinese industrial companies are unprofitable "zombies" kept alive by subsidies far larger than those elsewhere, rather than exiting amid falling industrial producer prices. Countries with large increases in manufactured imports from China also saw slowdowns in domestic manufacturing, including declining manufacturing shares of output across most of Southeast Asia.
Xi’s Superpower Ambitions Fuel a Dangerous Debt Spiral in China— China's credit to the nonfinancial sector—corporate, government and household borrowing—topped 300% of gross domestic product, 60 percentage points above its end-2019 level and larger than in the US, according to the Bank for International Settlements. The International Monetary Fund estimates broad Chinese government debt, including local financing vehicles, reached 127% of GDP, up from 98% in 2020.
Is China’s High-Quality Investment Output Economically Viable?— China's technological progress and infrastructure do not refute claims of overinvestment, since overinvestment often produces real physical assets and technological gains yet still counts as overinvestment when it generates less real value than the resources, subsidies, and transfers it consumes. When such losses are capitalized, assets are carried above their real economic value.
AI Summary.Incorporating tariffs into the standard cost-of-capital framework, researchers estimate US tariffs raised the economy-wide marginal effective tax rate on new investment by 4.2 percentage points to 17.0%, with equipment hit hardest at 26.1 percentage points. That increase offsets the 3.5 percentage point reduction from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act.
Kyle Pomerleau, Thomas Brosy, Robert McClelland and John WongAmerican Enterprise Institute
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The IEEPA tariffs through January 2026 raised equipment’s user cost of capital 9%, from 17.7% to 19.3%. With depreciation unchanged, the required pre-tax net return rose 1.6pp, 4.3% to 5.9%, a tax at purchase that expensing cannot eliminate.
Do tariffs raise the effective tax rate on new investment?
Core argument: Tariffs in force before the February 20, 2026 Supreme Court ruling in Learning Resources v. Trump raised the economy-wide marginal effective tax rate on new US investment by 4.2 points, from 12.8 percent to 17.0 percent, and the cost of capital by 2.7 percent, the AEI authors estimate.
The standard Hall-Jorgenson user cost of capital framework defines the minimum gross required return on an additional unit of capital. The service price of capital (SS) is the minimum pretax gross return required on a new investment; the minimum pretax net return (ρrho) equals SS minus economic depreciation. Consider imported equipment requiring a 25% gross return: 20% to cover depreciation and 5% shareholders’ demanded return. A 10% tariff raises the cost of capital to 27.5%. [Thus the minimum pretax net return—the hurdle rate—rises from 5% to 7.5%]. For equipment, tariffs raise the cost of capital 9%, from 17.7% to 19.3%: 86% of the burden is direct, 14% indirect. 100% bonus depreciation reduced the equipment METR from 19.1% to 4.1%; tariffs raised it to 30.3%, more than offsetting the tax cut.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Tariffs in force before the February 20, 2026 Supreme Court ruling in Learning Resources v. Trump raised the economy-wide marginal effective tax rate on new US investment by 4.2 points, from 12.8 percent to 17.0 percent, and the cost of capital by 2.7 percent, the AEI authors estimate.
Equipment bore the largest estimated burden, with its marginal effective tax rate rising 26.1 points from 4.1 percent to 30.3 percent and its cost of capital up 9.0 percent, while mainframes and PCs saw a 26.6 percent cost-of-capital increase.
The estimated 4.2 point tariff-driven increase in the marginal effective tax rate offset the One Big Beautiful Bill Act’s 3.5 point reduction, leaving a net 0.8 point rise economy-wide and an 11.1 point net increase for equipment.
Related Articles:
Blunt Tariffs Undermine Efforts To Reshore High-Tech Manufacturing— Computer and electronic products manufacturers import 37% of their intermediate inputs and capital equipment, chemical manufacturers 33%, and transportation equipment manufacturers 27%. Broad tariffs may push some sourcing domestically over time, but many inputs will simply cost more, making American manufacturers less competitive globally.
Help for the Heartland? The Employment and Electoral Effects of the Trump Tariffs in the United States— The authors find that the combined effect of U.S.-China trade war import tariffs, retaliatory tariffs, and farm subsidies on employment in exposed U.S. locations was at best a wash and possibly mildly negative, while residents of tariff-protected areas became less likely to identify as Democrats and more likely to vote Republican.
Tariffs are Dumb Enough to (Almost) Work— A universal 15% tariff on imported goods could raise roughly $300–$400bn annually, a fraction of what a value-added tax would generate but real revenue given U.S. imports of about $4tn. The author argues tariffs are a poorly designed form of consumption tax that could build political groundwork for replacing them with a more efficient value-added tax.