“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
AI Summary.The Institute of International Finance reports global debt as a share of output rose less than 10 percentage points between 2018 and mid-2026, peaking at 337% in early 2021 before falling 27 percentage points by the end of 2023. Inflation eroded the debt burden, as it did in the UK after the Second World War.
Martin WolfFinancial Times
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Wolf notes that the global debt-to-GDP ratio rose by less than 10pp btw 2018 and June 2026: after peaking at 337% in early 2021, it fell by 27pp by the end of 2023, as inflation boosted nominal GDP and eroded the value of existing debt.
Does inflation reduce the global debt burden?
Core argument: IIF data show the global debt-to-output ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021 before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023, with inflation identified as the force that eroded it.
The IIF shows that between 2018 and June 2026, the rise in the ratio of global debt to output was less than 10 percentage points. The story is striking: the ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021, before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023. What was this magical “debt-buster”? Good old-fashioned (and supposedly “unexpected”) inflation. This is — to put it mildly — not the first time inflation has wiped out debt. It was, to take one of countless examples, an important part of the UK’s elimination of its post-second-world-war debt. For countries able to print the money in which their debt is denominated, that is often what happens.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
IIF data show the global debt-to-output ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021 before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023, with inflation identified as the force that eroded it.
Between 2018 and June 2026, the IIF shows the ratio of global debt to output rose by less than 10 percentage points.
Inflation has wiped out debt before, forming an important part of the UK’s elimination of its post-second-world-war debt, and often does so for countries able to print the currency in which their debt is denominated.
Related Articles:
Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic?— Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
The Coming Great Repression?— Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds, the opposite of standard risk-premium predictions. The authors estimate financial repression—making banks captive bond buyers and loading them with low-return reserves—contributed 90.7 percentage points of GDP to Britain's postwar debt reduction, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation.
Global Debt Report 2026— Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.
AI Summary.Congressional Budget Office long-term projections show sustained primary deficits of 2% of GDP driving the debt-to-GDP ratio steadily higher, a path the agency itself labels unsustainable. Closing a 2% of GDP fiscal gap is economically straightforward for a growing country at peace, but inflation or default would not resolve the problem, since prospective deficits still require continued borrowing.
John CochraneStanford University
Date Posted:
Cochrane points out that neither inflation nor default will solve the real fiscal problem – prospective primary deficits and the interest to cover them. “If we wipe out all current debt, we still must finance endless primary deficits.”
Can inflation or default fix ongoing primary deficits?
Core argument: CBO long-term projections show steady primary deficits of 2% of GDP driving a slow explosion in the US debt-to-GDP ratio, a scenario the CBO itself labels "unsustainable.".
Figure 5.4 plots the Congressional Budget Office long-term projections for debt to GDP and deficits. The steady 2% of GDP primary deficits lead to a slow explosion of the debt to GDP ratio. These projections assume that nothing bad will happen again. Surely something bad will happen at some point in the next 30 years. The US will want to meet future crises with more borrowed or printed money. Yet, as forecasts, these projections are too pessimistic. This scenario will not happen. The CBO itself labels the scenario “unsustainable.” Debt to GDP cannot grow forever. The only question is how it will not happen. The good news is that fixing a 2% of GDP fiscal gap in a prosperous, growing country at peace is not that hard as an economic matter. As straightforward as a fiscal reform is as a matter of economics, it does seem to be beyond the capacity of the current US political system. Inflation or default will not cure the US or other advanced-country fiscal problems. The fiscal problem is prospective deficits; poor prospects for repayment, not so much current debt. If we wipe out all current debt, we still must finance endless primary deficits. And the day after a $36 trillion default or Weimar hyperinflation, who is going to lend a trillion or so new dollars to the US each year?
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
CBO long-term projections show steady primary deficits of 2% of GDP driving a slow explosion in the US debt-to-GDP ratio, a scenario the CBO itself labels "unsustainable.".
Closing a 2% of GDP fiscal gap in a prosperous, growing country at peace is not hard as an economic matter, yet such fiscal reform appears beyond the capacity of the current US political system.
Inflation or default will not cure US fiscal problems, because the issue is prospective deficits and poor prospects for repayment rather than current debt: even after a $36 trillion default, the US would still need to borrow about a trillion dollars a year.
Related Articles:
Fiscal Narratives for US Inflation— Fiscal theory attributes the deflation of the deep recession to a fall in real interest rates that lowered real interest costs on government debt, an effect that outweighed large deficits. The predicted deflation spiral and the hyperinflation forecast from quantitative easing both failed to materialize.
Fiscal Influences on Inflation in OECD Countries, 2020-2022— Across 21 economies, the authors find that headline and core inflation responded positively to a measure of government spending increases scaled by pre-pandemic debt-to-GDP and average debt duration. Estimated coefficients of 0.4–0.5 suggest 40–50% of the extra spending was financed through inflation, with the rest through conventional public finance.
The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036— The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal deficit will grow from $1.9tn (5.8% of GDP) to $3.1tn (6.7%) over a decade, above the 3.8% averaged over the past 50 years, with rising net interest costs driving much of the increase. Federal debt held by the public is projected to rise from 101% to 120% of GDP.
