AI Summary. An expenditure-based poverty measure shows children are half as likely to live below the official poverty threshold as before the 1996 welfare reform, with deep child poverty—resources under half the threshold—falling from 2.4% to under 1%, and from about 5% to under 1% among single-parent families.

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Since the 1996 welfare reform, child poverty has significantly decreased, with children now half as likely to live below the official poverty threshold. Deep child poverty has dropped from 2.4% to under 1%, particularly among single-parent families.

Has child poverty fallen by half since welfare reform?

Core argument: Deep child poverty, defined as resources below half the official poverty threshold, fell from 2.4% before the 1996 welfare reform to under 1% today, and among single-parent families from about 5% to under 1%.

Since the 1996 welfare reform, children are half as likely to live below the official poverty threshold compared to 1996. Deep child poverty, defined as resources less than half the official poverty threshold, has been nearly eliminated, with rates dropping from 2.4% before reform to less than 1% today. Among single-parent families, deep poverty fell from around 5% to under 1%. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act introduced reciprocity, requiring beneficiaries to work towards self-support. While the official money income-based poverty measure showed little change, the expenditure-based measure indicates a significant reduction in child poverty post-reform. The official child poverty rate has fluctuated between 14% and 22.7% since the late 1960s, generally rising during economic downturns but recovering during expansions. However, the expenditure-based measure shows a consistent decline in child poverty since the reform.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Deep child poverty, defined as resources below half the official poverty threshold, fell from 2.4% before the 1996 welfare reform to under 1% today, and among single-parent families from about 5% to under 1%.
  2. Children are half as likely to live below the official poverty threshold as in 1996, and the expenditure-based measure shows a consistent decline in child poverty since the reform.
  3. The official money income-based poverty measure for children has fluctuated between 14% and 22.7% since the late 1960s, rising during downturns and recovering during expansions, while the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act required beneficiaries to work toward self-support.

Children today are half as likely to live below the official poverty threshold as were children in 1996. Deep child poverty (with resources less than half the official poverty threshold) has been nearly eliminated.Among single-parent families, deep poverty fell from around 5 percent before reform to less than 1 percent today....The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act introduced the principle of reciprocity to the welfare system, requiring beneficiaries to take positive steps toward self-support in exchange for assistance..According to the official “money income”-based poverty measure, welfare reform had little discernable effect on child poverty. Both before and after reform, the official child poverty rate was largely flat with modest fluctuations according to the business cycle. Overall, the official child poverty rate has hovered in a range between 14.0 percent and 22.7 percent since the late 1960s, generally increasing during economic downturns and for some time afterwards but eventually recovering as during the later stages of economic expansions. (See Chart 1.) By contrast, the more accurate expenditure-based poverty measure shows that welfare reform marked the beginning of a period of substantial reduction in child poverty. Before reform, the rate is largely flat; after reform, it generally moves down. Children today are half as likely to reside in families with reported spending below the official poverty threshold as were children in 1996....In reality, deep child poverty has been rare for a quarter of a century. It averaged 2.4 percent in the decade before welfare reform for all children and dropped sharply during the welfare reform period. Today less than 1 percent of children reside in families with reported spending below half of the official poverty threshold. (See Chart 3.)

Jamie Hall, "Child Poverty Has Been Cut in Half Since 1996 Welfare Reform,"The Heritage Foundation, March 14, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/welfare/report/child-poverty-has-been-cut-half-1996-welfare-reform

AI Summary. After accounting for housing costs, non-college workers now face an urban wage penalty rather than the wage premium that historically offset higher living expenses in dense cities. Housing costs in dense urban centers have risen disproportionately relative to wage growth, eroding the financial benefit of urban employment for these workers.

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Non-college workers now face an urban wage penalty after accounting for housing costs, reversing a historical trend where urban areas offered wage premia that offset higher living expenses.

Do housing costs erase the urban wage premium for non-college workers?

Core argument: Non-college workers face an urban wage penalty once housing costs are accounted for, reversing the historical pattern in which urban wage premia offset higher living expenses.

Recent data indicates a shift in economic dynamics for non-college workers, who now face an urban wage penalty after accounting for housing costs. Historically, urban areas offered wage premia that offset higher living expenses, but this trend has reversed. The cost of housing in dense urban centers has surged disproportionately compared to wage growth, eroding the financial benefits of urban employment for non-college workers. This shift suggests a reevaluation of the economic advantages traditionally associated with urban living, as the rising cost of housing outpaces wage increases, leading to a net financial disadvantage for this demographic.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Non-college workers face an urban wage penalty once housing costs are accounted for, reversing the historical pattern in which urban wage premia offset higher living expenses.
  2. Housing costs in dense urban centers have risen disproportionately relative to wage growth, eroding the financial benefit of urban employment for non-college workers.

Robert Armstrong, "Did QE Cause Inflation,"Financial Times, July 19, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/2c3fc086-b543-4efe-b696-8c84aa919b69

Did QE cause inflation?

QE, bank lending and inflation Did quantitative easing contribute to inflation, and how much? Will quantitative tightening have the opposite effect?

Important questions: it is generally thought that low rates did contribute to inflation, and the Federal Reserve is hoping like hell that higher rates will slow it. The role of QE and QT, as we’ve noted before, is trickier. There is little consensus among practitioners, academics and Fed officials about what central bank bond buying does to the economy and how it does it. It would be a lot better if we had a clear idea of what was going on.

Benn Steil and Benjamin Della Rocca, economists at the Council on Foreign Relations, have argued in a recent post that QE had a very important, perhaps even determining, role in creating inflation. I suspect they’re wrong, but it’s an important argument to consider.

Here’s how the argument goes (picky financial details incoming!).

When, in the course of QE, the Fed buys a Treasury bond from investors, the transaction is completed through an intermediary — a bank. The proceeds from the sale become a customer deposit at that bank, a liability. At the same time, the bank is credited with a reserve deposit at the Fed for the same amount, an asset.

Because a bank will always have fewer reserve assets at the Fed than deposit liabilities, the addition of the same amount to each will push the bank’s reserve/deposit ratio up. QE improved the bank’s liquidity in that sense.

A bank that has more liquidity has an incentive to lend. They don’t have to lend more, but they have reason to, in order to optimise their balance sheet. This is what Steil and Della Roca call the “credit channel” of QE.

In 2020, the Fed bought many billions in Treasuries, but banks’ reserves fell (they call them “excess reserves”; more on this shortly). This, Steil and Della Rocca say, is evidence that “QE was working as hoped” — that is, it was encouraging lending. When lending goes up, they argue, excess reserves fall.

But the gap between the Fed’s holding of Treasuries and reserves grew wider and wider, allowing Steil and Della Rocca to predict that inflation was coming. Here is their chart:

Moving to density: Half a century of housing costs and wage premia from Queens to King Salmon: Extended Excerpt Image 1


“As that gap began rising again in May 2021], with Core PCE inflation running at 3.5 per cent, the Fed should clearly have declared victory and ended its bond buying. Instead, it continued the binge for another 10 months. By that time, March 2022, Core PCE inflation was up to 5.2 per cent, and the Fed should have been well into hiking rates.”

I suspect that this argument is wrong for two reasons, one involving how banks behave, and one about financial plumbing.

I’ve been talking to bankers for several years, as an analyst and a reporter, and I have never heard of talk about the decision to lend or not in terms of having ample liquidity or being liquidity constrained. Instead, the effective constraint is loan demand — the availability of creditworthy borrowers who want money.

I asked my favourite bank analyst, Brian Foran of Autonomous Research, about this, and he confirmed my suspicions. “Ninety per cent of bank lending decisions are, do my customers want to borrow and are they in good shape to do so,” he told me. “I’ve never sat in a meeting with a bank CEO who said ‘I’ve got all these deposits and I have to figure out a way to lend them out’. They might say — I have a high loan to deposit ratio and I have to work that out over the long run,” for example by retaining more of the loans the bank makes rather than selling them on to the secondary market.

It could be that bankers either are unaware or hesitant to admit the role that liquidity plays in lending decisions. But there is another point, made to me by former Fed trader and the “Fed Guy” blogger Joseph Wang. Banks’ lending isn’t constrained by the volume of liquidity, but rather by its cost. If banks need cash they can always borrow it at some price. Reserves at the Fed, if they ever did matter, don’t matter now, because as Steil and Della Rocca point out in a footnote, the Fed eliminated all reserve requirements in March of 2020.

Now the financial plumbing point. Here is a version of the Steil and Della Rocca chart, with two other series added: total bank credit creation, and the balances in the Fed’s reverse repo programme (more on what that is momentarily).

Moving to density: Half a century of housing costs and wage premia from Queens to King Salmon: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Now, one thing in this chart fits very nicely with the Steil/Della Rocca account. The total amount of Treasuries the Fed has added to its balance sheet in the Covid era, $3.3tn (light blue line), at the moment very closely matches the new lending created by US banks (fuchsia line).

Here’s the problem, though. Lending does not track reserves (blue line) at all. Now, as argued above, I don’t think there is much reason that it should. And if those two don’t track, the Steil/Della Rocca argument does not work, because it depends on the idea that higher reserves, driven up by QE, incentivise lending.

And there is another explanation, other than higher lending, for why banks’ reserves have come down. It was, again, explained to me by Joseph Wang. The reserves are being funnelled, somewhat circuitously, into the Fed’s growing reverse repo programme (yellow line).

Here is how that funnelling would take place (now we are getting really technical, so feel free to skip the next two paragraphs). The Fed uses the reverse repo programme to sop up excess liquidity in the banking system that would otherwise force the overnight rate below the Fed’s target. Market participants, mostly money-market funds, can give the Fed their cash and receive an interest-paying Treasury security in return. It’s a collateralised overnight loan to the Fed.

In recent years banks have had more deposits than they wanted, which caused problems with their capital requirements. So they have pushed clients towards money market funds. The money market funds have, in turn, put more and more money into the RRP. The way that transaction takes place is that the money market fund that wants to participate in the RRP makes (another) deposit at a bank, and then that same sum is taken out of the bank’s reserve account at the Fed, and placed in a Fed RRP account. The bank’s reserves at the Fed fall.

I’m not totally confident in any of this, and look forward to hearing what Steil and Della Rocca have to say in response. But it seems to me that if QE encourages lending, the mechanism is much more indirect than the one they suggest.

Zooming back out to why all this matters. Unhedged’s best guess is that QE works primarily by injecting/sopping up liquidity in financial markets, not by encouraging lending. So QT will have its effect by withdrawing liquidity from markets, making them more volatile, diminishing investor risk appetites and increasing demand for cash and risk-free assets. That, rather than weaker lending, is what we should prepare for as QT proceeds.

Ed Comment:PS Foreign-born in NYC more than doubled from 18% in 1970 to 38% in 2010 (probably close to 40% today). 60% of that was Hispanic. Most of the rest was Asian, which is probably skewed low-skilled in the first generation. The share of non-Hispanic whites dropped from 63% to 31%—arguably a proxy for skill. The changes are not insignificant. My cursory take is that the share of lesser-skilled grew significantly. My guess is that this shift probably put downward pressure on lesser-skilled wages, upward pressure on the rents for unskilled workers, and shifted the composition of lesser-skilled jobs toward even lesser-skilled jobs at the margin as supply expanded relatively.

Ed Comment:See 2 graphs below and attached. Management-related/decision-related jobs have nearly doubled since the 1970s. It’s hard to believe that cities, of all places, ran counter to that trend. Perhaps the marginal worker in those additional positions previously didn’t go to college and now they do, but that would make the result a data comparability issue, not an actual change in the economics. What we care about are the economics for a person of a given inherent capability. Given how much your analysis shows the economics have changed, I find it hard to believe the economics haven’t changed, even if data capability perhaps makes the change less than it appears. But by the same token, I also believe that a shift away from middle management/middle capability (i.e. a hollowing out of the middle management in cities) as the explanation seems unlikely too given there was a large nationwide expansion in middle management.

Stan Comment:What David Autor would say on the wages side is that non-college urban adults disproportionately used to hold middle-skill, blue-collar production and white-collar office, administrative, and clerical jobs. This was the case when those jobs were overrepresented in the densest areas, but that is no longer the case -- probably because there's no real productivity advantage to doing them in dense areas anymore. So that puts downward pressure on urban wages for non-college workers. If urban housing prices go up in addition (because of the opposite trend on the college worker side of the economy), that makes it even less attractive to locate that kind of employment in dense areas (and for the people who used to hold those jobs to live there). The equilibration process is then a straightforward spatial one, with call centers and the people who work there ending up in low-density CZs. The non-college urban employment that remains there is then all sorts of relatively poorly paid services work that you can't do from afar -- leisure and hospitality, transportation, personal services, childcare, etc. The educational make-up of the immigrant population is more polarized (more graduate degrees and more folks with less than a 9th-grade education) than that of the native population, so you'd expect to see more immigrants (of both types) in the densest areas even if they didn't cause any of the labor or housing market developments. But I'd be curious to see cause and effect more disentangled for sure. (On a side note, this polarized composition of the immigrant population has really escalated. Immigrants since 2014 are about 50% college-educated versus 33% for native-born, and 10% 9th grade or less versus 2% for natives.)

Ed Comment:I agree with your thought about high-skilled workers driving up the price of real estate for low-skilled workers. But then why doesn't both low-skilled wages rise to compensate for the higher rents and/or the composition of low-skilled workers shift (upward) to equilibrate? Otherwise you have to believe that low-skilled workers would have accepted less in the past, which I find hard to believe. A supply shocks seems easier to reconcile, especially with 45 million foreign-born adults and their 20 million native-born adult children. That's not an insignificant amount, quite the contrary.

Stan Comment:“Ed, Thanks for these comments. We definitely have data on foreign-born migrants in the ACS. The reason why we look at native-born migrants is because that migration is much more driven by market forces than international migration, which is of course to a large extent the result of decisions by politicians. And in the context of looking at how wages and housing costs affect migration, we thought it might be more reasonable just to look at natives. But the data is definitely there and this may be something worth exploring. My intuition is as follows -- On the wages side: you're surely right if we think of one labor market -- high-skilled immigrants raise native wages on net, low-skilled immigrants probably do not and certainly not for the natives they compete with directly. On the housing side: I agree with you that home price variation in this period is basically all driven by the price of land, not by construction costs. My intuition is different from yours here though. I don't think there's a ton of segmentation between areas where college workers and non-college workers live, at least at the margin in the places where supply is constrained and on the time horizon we're looking at. Think of Brooklyn, Somerville (or Cambridge, to be honest), and Arlington, Va.(My favorite movie illustration of this is Remember the Titans, set in 1971, which presents Alexandria, Va, as practically rural Georgia and certainly blue-collar.)As a result, if housing is not segmented -- at least not at the margin -- high-skilled immigrants (or natives) will simply drive up housing prices more than low-skilled immigrants because they are richer. But I should think more about both issues!”

AI Summary. The authors estimate that reallocating business activity to its pre-1986 organizational form accounts for one-third of the decline in the corporate sector labor share, which fell from 62.9% to 57.9% between 1978 and 2017. US tax reform encouraged firms to organize as pass-through entities, letting income be characterized as profits rather than labor payments.

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Reallocating activity to its pre-1986 Tax Reform accounts for 1/3 decline in corporate sector labor share from 1978 to 2017.

Does the shift to pass-through businesses explain the falling labor share?

Core argument: Reallocating business activity to its pre-1986 Tax Reform form accounts for one-third of the decline in the corporate sector labor share, which fell from 62.9% to 57.9% between 1978 and 2017.

Reallocating business activity to its pre-1986 Tax Reform form accounts for one-third of the decline in the corporate sector labor share from 1978 to 2017. The labor share fell from 62.9% to 57.9% during this period, coinciding with a rise in pass-through entities, which now dominate business income. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 incentivized entrepreneurs to organize as pass-throughs, avoiding C-corporation taxes and benefiting from lower effective rates. This shift allowed income to be characterized as profits rather than labor payments, reducing the reported labor share. Skilled service firms in capital-light industries, such as law and financial services, disproportionately contribute to this trend. The 2017 tax reform further incentivizes firms to optimize tax strategies, suggesting future labor share trends will be influenced by tax code nuances. This reallocation highlights the need to consider tax policy's role in labor share dynamics and its broader economic implications.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Reallocating business activity to its pre-1986 Tax Reform form accounts for one-third of the decline in the corporate sector labor share, which fell from 62.9% to 57.9% between 1978 and 2017.
  2. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 incentivized entrepreneurs to organize as pass-throughs, avoiding C-corporation taxes and allowing income to be characterized as profits rather than labor payments, which reduced the reported labor share.
  3. Skilled service firms in capital-light industries such as law and financial services disproportionately contribute to the shift toward pass-throughs, which now dominate business income.

Updated research from Matthew Smith, Danny Yagan, Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick finds that reallocating activity to the form it would have taken prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 accounts for one third of the decline in the corporate sector labor share between 1978 and 2017. Bottomline“… Our key finding is that adjusting for pass-through growth raises the 2017 corporate-sector labor share by 1.6 percentage points and implies the 1978-2017 decline is overstated by 31.9%.While our emphasis on pass-throughs does not preclude the importance of other mechanisms, it does provide new evidence that can help guide future investigation….”

They note/speculate this phenomenon has current implications given the 2017 tax reform, “…Following the 2017 tax reform, firms face new incentives to select the tax-minimizing corporate form and owner-manager compensation due to, for example, the lower C-corporation tax rate and the qualified business income deduction for pass-through firms. As these incentives are understood, investigating future trends in the labor share will require grappling with the nuances of the tax code….”

“.. .In the past forty years in the United States, the share of corporate-sector value added accruing to labor in national accounts fell from 62.9% to 57.9% (Figure 1A). This period coincided with a striking rise in the share of business activity organized in “pass-through” form (Figure 1B).This paper shows that these trends are related. Why would growth of the pass-through sector, which now accounts for the majority of business income, matter for the corporate-sector labor share?The simple answer is taxes. First, entrepreneurs have flexibility to characterize their income as labor payments or as profits. They typically choose the label that minimizes taxes subject to the law. In recent years, that label has been pro t for a growing number of firms. Second, the composition of corporate-sector rms has changed: many labor-intensive rms are now organized outside the corporate sector as tax-preferred partnerships. The joint quantitative importance of these factors for falling labor shares and rising capital shares is an open question with implications for the analysis of technological change, inequality, and tax policy. The historical turning point for the rise of pass-throughs is the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86). TRA86 lowered personal income tax rates substantially and raised the tax burden on (non-pass-through) C-corporations. As a result, by organizing in pass-through form, entrepreneurs avoid C-corporation taxes and bene t from lower effective tax rates. Subsequent changes in payroll taxation and in the legal treatment of pass-throughs raised the benefits and feasibility of adopting pass-through form, accelerating the pace of this sector’s growth

The Rise of Pass-Throughs and the Decline of the Labor Share: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Effect by firm size, “…More than half of the adjustment comes from skilled service firms in capital-light industries. Firms in these industries include law firms, consultancies, doctors’ and dentists’ offices, and financial service rms such as hedge funds and private equity funds. Such medium-sized firms account for a disproportionate share of pass-through value added, while large, capital intensive manufacturers are more prominent as C-corporations (Figure 1D). By correcting for downward bias among mid-market service firms, our adjusted series implies a larger role for superstar firms and the manufacturing sector to drive the remaining decline in the labor share…….To map micro estimates to aggregate quantities, we depart from Smith et al. (2019) and estimate heterogeneous impacts by firms size. Figure 2A estimates the effects on labor payments for firms divided into groups based on mean firm sales. We partition firms based on mean sales with boundaries at $100K, $500K, $1M, $10M, and $100M in 2014 dollars. Scope for relabeled labor income is greater among smaller firms, as effect sizes monotonically decrease with firms size. Effect sizes exceed 2% of sales even among firms with $1M to $10M in sales and are meaningful (1.1% of sales) for rms in the $10M to $100M size group. Only the largest firms show no relabeling response upon switching. Other variables do not experience major declines following switching events (Appendix B). Among S-corporations, mid-market rms account for a substantial share of aggregate activity. Firms with less than $10M and rms with $10M to $100M in average sales respectively account for 51% and 30% of total S-corporation value added, 38% and 34% of total sales, and 65% and 25% of total owner pay in the most recent available years (Figure 2B)….”

The Rise of Pass-Throughs and the Decline of the Labor Share: Extended Excerpt Image 2

Matthew Smith, Danny Yagan, Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick, “The Rise of Pass-Throughs and the Decline of the Labor Share,” National Bureau Of Economic Research, October 2021, https://www.nber.org/papers/w29400

AI Summary. In US recoveries over the past 70 years, the unemployment rate has declined smoothly at a proportional pace of roughly one tenth of its current level each year, a pattern that holds across different economic shocks. The author attributes this to endogenous matching of job-seekers with available jobs.

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The US economy’s consistent recovery from recessions over the past 70 years is marked by a stable annual reduction in the unemployment rate, typically around one tenth of the current level of unemployment.

Why does unemployment fall at the same proportional pace in every recovery?

Core argument: US unemployment has fallen during recoveries at a stable annual rate of roughly one tenth of the current unemployment level, a pattern holding across recessions of the past 70 years and across varied economic shocks.

The US economy's consistent recovery from recessions over the past 70 years is marked by a stable annual reduction in the unemployment rate, typically around one tenth of the current level of unemployment. This pattern holds true across various economic shocks, with unemployment declining smoothly at a proportional rate during recoveries. The process is driven by endogenous factors, where job-seekers naturally match with available jobs, reducing unemployment. Despite structural headwinds like lower matching efficiency and changes in labor force participation, the recovery trajectory remains reliable. The initial surge in unemployment post-crisis creates negative feedback, moderating labor market tightness and influencing the pace of recovery. This consistent recovery pattern underscores the resilience of the US labor market and its ability to adapt to economic disruptions.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US unemployment has fallen during recoveries at a stable annual rate of roughly one tenth of the current unemployment level, a pattern holding across recessions of the past 70 years and across varied economic shocks.
  2. The recovery is driven by endogenous forces, with job-seekers matching to available jobs and unemployment declining smoothly at a proportional rate.
  3. Structural headwinds such as lower matching efficiency and changes in labor force participation have not disrupted the reliable US recovery trajectory, while the initial post-crisis surge in unemployment creates negative feedback that moderates labor market tightness.

Robert Hall and Marianna Kudlyak, "Why Has the US Economy Recovered So Consistently from Every Recession in the Past 70 Years?" Federal Reserve Bank Of San Francisco, June 2021, https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/wp2020-20.pdf

In terms of the LFP issue Ben noted, “…Variations in labor-force growth. The DMP model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) has a constant labor force. Extensions to endogenous participation may involve positive or negative co-movements of participation and unemployment. Figure 31 shows that participation rate grew during the years up to 1990 when the rising rate for women was a key factor for overall participation (to achieve a basic adjustment for demographic influences, the data refer to ages 25 through 54).In the recovery from the 2020 recession, participation was essentially unchanged. In the recovery from the 2007-09 recession, participation declined…”

To them this implies there are structural headwinds to increasing employment rapidly, they hypothesis (but don’t quantify) that it is a combination of negative feedback from unemployment to tightness, vacancy costs, recruiting process and externalities, composition effects, scarring effects, the separation rate act to bend employment recoveries into parallel paths, “…If employers find it potentially profitable, they will exert the same effort to lay on new workers if the unemployment rate is 10 percent or 4 percent—vacancy creation is infinitely elastic. Contagion may arise from the congestion that occurs in the recruiting process when employers are flooded with applicants. Or contagion may involve changes in the equilibrium search and recruiting strategies of job-seekers and employers that impede matching and lower the efficiency of the matching process. These modifications of the DMP model lower the elasticity of vacancy creation and slow down the rate of recovery of unemployment…We noted that part of the high level of unemployment soon after a crisis reflects a change in the composition of unemployment toward individuals with naturally lower job-finding rates. This is a source of lower matching efficiency, a decline in one of the DMP model’s driving forces. A related phenomenon is the lower incidence of on-the-job search when unemployment is high. Again, this is a source of lower matching efficiency….”

They establish that"...A remarkable fact about the historical US business cycle is that, after unemployment reached its peak in a recession, and a recovery begins, the annual reduction in the unemployment rate is stable at around one tenth of the current level of unemployment... Hall and Kudlyak (2020a), we study US business-cycle recoveries over the past 70 years. We focus on the unemployment rate. Our key results are (1) the recovery process takes place reliably, regardless of the nature of the shock that causes the preceding economic contraction, and (2) the recovery process is similar in all of the ten past recoveries—unemployment falls by about 0.1 log points per year. Figure 1 displays the log of the unemployment rate during the 10 recoveries since 1948, with the recession spells of sharply rising unemployment left blank. Throughout the paper we exclude the recovery from the pandemic recession that started in 2020. The key fact about recoveries is apparent in the figure: Unemployment declines smoothly but slowly throughout most recoveries most of the time, at close to the same proportional rate. In the log plot, the recoveries appear as impressively close to straight lines…”

Their takeaway, “…Why has the US economy recovered so consistently from every recession in the past 70 years? Our answer:Recoveries are endogenous—there is a natural force causing job-seekers to match with available jobs and to lower unemployment. The bulge of unemployment created by a crisis at the beginning of a recovery creates a negative feedback to labor market tightness, endogenously slowing the recovery…”

Ed Comment:“I thought I RSVP’ed to this when you sent it to me awhile back. I may have composed it in my head but then ran out of time to put it on paper, which I will do now. Their work may be sloppy, but I think it’s important because it refutes Keynesian economics, which has no natural recovery mechanism. Ben, you say recovery can be accelerated, but from what recovery baseline/model? Is there one? If so, what does it predict and why? My sense is there isn’t one. My own view is the following: The economy naturally expands to the private sector’s willingness and capacity to bear risk. Shocks largely reveal flawed allocations (of risk), often unidentified risk such as risks of terrorism, withdraw/liquidity risk, pandemic risk, etc. Equity (which underwrites risk) is destroyed in the process. Less equity causes less risk-taking. Risk-taking can grow as the economy better accesses the risk (i.e. comes to expect less risk than it initially expected). Risk-taking also grows as the economy creates or accumulates more equity. In part, the latter occurs naturally but often requires (is accelerated by) finding new resources allocations to replace old ones that now have lower/subpar expected risk-adjusted returns. Resources satisfying debt-fueled subprime consumption must be reallocated to other endeavors—restaurant work at lower wages than the counterfactual, which spurs increased demand, for example. Reallocations require experimentation by risk-taking entrepreneurs at a time when risk-taking constrains growth in recessions. Increased risk-taking also requires the risk-reducing good ideas of creative smart people, who are perennially in short supply. The pullback is exacerbated by my rodent in a hole (the private sector) who gradually travels further and further from its den in search of food when it encounters no risk, but then retreats to the den when it encounters risk before it gradually expands its search again from a more conservative range. The rodent may be systematically mistaken in its assessment of risk. Nevertheless, the underlying pattern of its behavior should be logically predictable. From my perspective, these are more logical explanations for both animal spirts and the predictable recovery pattern that Keynesian economics does not predict. I don’t believe the government can accelerate the recovery in practice. It merely misallocates resources at a time when the economy needs to search for new/more optimal allocations. That slows the reallocation of resources. It’s akin to cars in a traffic jam waiting to cross a bridge. You can get out of the line and drive the car faster. But the only thing that matters is whether you cross the bridge sooner. Theoretically, analysts could find the/a more optimal long-term allocation. But in practice, only random mutation and survival of the fittest can find them systematically.”

Ben Comment 2/2:I think the baseline depends very much on which model you believe in. Even in a fully Keynesian model the economy will *eventually* recover. In a real business cycle (RBC) model, government spending slows recovery. In a new Keynesian model it can speed recovery but we’re also talking about fully specified macro models so most of these will be solved numerically - so I wouldn’t take any of them as gospel in terms of how quickly the economy recovers after a shock.

Ben Comment 1/2:One thing worth highlighting, I think, is that they totally ignore changes in the labor market participation rate. I think this probably matters and discouraged workers (those no longer looking for a job) are not counted as unemployed.As the unemployed (active job seekers) find work, they are replaced by the non participants who start looking for jobs again. In my mind, the pull of a good labor market is likely as strong a reason for the job-finding rate to be higher than the declines in the unemployment rate. I’m not sure why they skip over this but it seems important when thinking about why the unemployment rate is change - there’s a numerator effect and a denominator effect. We have to tease ouch which one actually matters. Their conclusions about the effectiveness of policy are weird. Of course the economy has a “strong” self-correcting element. I don’t think anyone ever says “recovery is impossible without intervention.” Intervention is always about dampening the lows and speeding the recovery process - Koo’s debt overhang work gives a situation in which recovery will eventually happen but policy makes it faster and alleviates suffering among the populace. One of the quotes you pulled out discusses the composition of job seekers during a recession. As the recession goes on, lower match-propensity workers are left in the pool as higher match-propensity workers find matches. That’s sort of tautological. How does one become a high match-propensity worker? By finding jobs more quickly. I’m not really sure I see any reason this should be true. Bad luck could make you a low match-propensity worker as much as any sort of skill or productivity level (remember the Demings paper? The super talented are the worst hit!). I don’t know. DMP is a old model with a lot of flaws and there have been a lot of improvements on it since. I’m not really sure why Hall used this model as the basis of his analysis instead of something like Shimer’s model. It seems to me like he found a cool relic in the data (the similarities in recovery speeds) and wrote a paper around it without being particularly thoughtful.

We though you would want to take a closer look this research from Robert Hall and Marianna Kudlyak that finds that economic recoveries in the US largely mirror each other (note we looked at an earlier version of this last year at the start of the pandemic), "...we reach an important conclusion: the unemployment paths of the original job-losers are neither as high to begin with nor as persistent as the path of elevated unemployment in the wake of the crisis...."Note they exclude labor market correction associated with the pandemic from their evidence.

AI Summary. Research on advanced economies estimates that consumers capture $0.40 of surplus and $0.25 in wages and benefits per dollar of corporate revenue, with firms earning over $1bn accounting for 72% of GDP across OECD countries. Over 25 years the labor share of income fell from 67% to 59% while consumer surplus grew across income groups.

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Large firms in advanced economies significantly influence household economics, with consumers capturing $0.40 per dollar of corporate revenue as surplus and $0.25 in wages/benefits.

How much of corporate revenue reaches consumers and workers?

Core argument: Consumers capture $0.40 of surplus per dollar of corporate revenue in advanced economies, with another $0.25 going to wages and benefits.

In advanced economies, large firms significantly influence household economics, with consumers capturing $0.40 per dollar of corporate revenue as surplus and $0.25 in wages/benefits. Corporations with over $1bn in revenue contribute 72% of GDP in OECD countries, underpinning 85% of technology investment and labor productivity growth since 1995. However, the labor income share has declined from 67% to 59% over 25 years, pressuring lower-income households reliant on wages. Meanwhile, consumer surplus has grown, benefiting all income segments, though price hikes in essential services have reduced surplus for low-income households.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Consumers capture $0.40 of surplus per dollar of corporate revenue in advanced economies, with another $0.25 going to wages and benefits.
  2. Corporations with more than $1bn in revenue account for 72% of GDP across OECD countries and underpin 85% of technology investment and labor productivity growth since 1995.
  3. The labor income share has fallen from 67% to 59% over 25 years, pressuring lower-income households reliant on wages, while price increases in essential services have reduced consumer surplus for low-income households.

A new look at how corporations impact the economy and households: Extended Excerpt Image 1


James Manyika, Michael Birshan, Sven Smit, Jonathan Woetzel, Kevin Russell, Lindsay Purcell, Sree Ramaswamy, "A new look at how corporations impact the economy and households," McKinsey Global Institute, June 2021, https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/a-new-look-at-how-corporations-impact-the-economy-and-households

New McKinsey report breaks down large firms in OECD countries three large takeaways, first their impact on GDP, “…The business sector overall contributes 72 percent of GDP in the OECD, and corporations with more than $1 billion in revenue account for an increasingly large share of that.Measured in real GDP per capita, the contribution of the business sector— defined as for-profit companies of all types including corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietorships—has tripled since 1960 on average in major OECD economies, in proportion with those economies’ overall growth. Companies underpin 85 percent of technology investment and 85 percent of labor productivity growth since 1995, a larger proportion than their GDP contribution. The size of the business sector varies only modestly within each of the major economies, and its share has remained steady for the past 60 years. However, this steadiness masks significant underlying shifts, notably the growth of corporations with more than $1 billion in revenue, which increased their global value added by 60 percent relative to their home countries’ GDP since 1995….”
Their breakdown of how value flows from large firms to households largely via labor income and consumer surplus, “…Economic value flows from companies to households via eight pathways, ofwhich labor income and consumer surplus are the largest direct pathways. Our mapping work identifies eight pathways through which economic value from corporations flows to households and the economy. Five are directly measurable monetary flows: labor income, capital income, taxes, investment in capital assets, and payments to suppliers. The money flowing through the supplier and investment pathways passes through other companies to reach households and the economy. The sixth is consumer surplus (the difference between what consumers are prepared to pay and what they do pay), which we estimate. The final two pathways are negative and positive spillovers, which we do not assess comprehensively beyond the examples of environmental impact and contributions to total factor productivity growth (unaccounted for in additional labor or capital input). Based on our data set of about 5,000 corporations with more than $1 billion in revenue,we find that labor income is the largest direct measured pathway, with wages and benefits accounting for $0.25 flowing to households for each dollar of revenue. Just over half of every dollar, $0.58, goes to suppliers (themselves companies large and small), reflecting the role suppliers play in enabling corporations to create and deliver their products and services. The other significant pathway is consumer surplus, which we estimate to be about $0.40 per dollar of revenue….”
How the pathways have changed overtime, “…The size of the pathways has changed over the past 25 years, with capital income growing while labor income and supplier payments have declined. Between the periods 1994-96 and 2016-18, the biggest change has been a two-thirds increase in the capital income pathway, from $0.04 to $0.07 per revenue dollar. Applied to the $40 trillion in revenue represented by our large company data set, this $0.03 difference amounts to an increase in capital income of over $1 trillion. The labor income pathway shrank by $0.02, or 6 percent, as labor per dollar of revenue fell by 15 percent and wages grew only 11 percent. Productivity gains amounted to 25 percent in real terms, significantly more than wage growth, as gains from labor productivity went predominantly to capital income. Investment in intangible assets tripled as a proportion of revenue in this period, while investment in tangible assets dropped by half. Supplier payments fell by $0.02, or 4 percent. The decline was especially steep for suppliers that were small and midsize enterprises, which saw a 10 percent drop in share of payments to suppliers in the United States, with similar patterns in other countries. The share going to domestic suppliers in each country also fell; about half of the decrease in supplier payments moved to foreign OECD suppliers and the other half to non-OECD suppliers. The tax pathway held steady overall as decreases in corporate taxes, especially in the United Kingdom and the United States, were offset by slight increases in production taxes, especially in Japan, and in corporate income tax in France….Decline in the share of the labor income pathway. Labor income from the corporations with annual revenue above $1 billion grew from just under $4 trillion to almost $10 trillion over the past 25 years (in 2018 dollars). However, this represents a lower share of the value that these companies add to the economy, as the labor portion of household income attributable to these corporations declined from 67 percent to 59 percent of the total.That difference is the equivalent of $1.2 trillion. This represents a steeper overall decline than domestic economies in the OECD generally. Japan saw the biggest decrease at more than ten percentage points, followed by Germany (five), the United States (four), and France (three). The United Kingdom saw a rise of four percentage points. A declining labor share puts pressure on incomes of lower-income households, who rely predominantly on income from wages for their livelihoods…. 5. Two diverging trends in the consumer surplus. On one hand, consumers in all household income segments have benefited substantially from the consumer surplus generated by large corporations, especially that from Technologists and Makers. The gains to consumers in OECD countries from these two company archetypes in our data set over the past 25 years amount to about $8 trillion in consumer surplus, compared with a scenario under which their prices of products and services stayed constant. On the other hand, price increases by Experts and Discoverers in our data set, especially for health and education services, correspond to more than $2 trillion in lost consumer surplus. This puts some of these essential services out of the reach of low-income households, at a time when the need for them has risen…”

McKinsey’s description

Approach 2: (Require time series variation in prices)

  1. Assume price decrease is pure gain for consumers + additional gains because of more sales e.g. price falls from 5 to 4; assume consumers capture that whole dollar of value plus assume expanded sales because the price is now lower.
  2. Use “hedonic price deflators” to adjust products for quality changes (really feature changes).
  3. Bottom line - Consumer Surplus = (-1) * change in price * total quantity at new prices * quality adjustment …”

Ben Comment on McKinsey’s consumer surplus calculation: “A little bit of a black box but we can make some headway: Approach 1:

  1. Assume firms and consumers split value equally
  2. Look at firm's/industry’s value added and assume that this is the firm’s/industry’s portion of value (so consumer gets the same amount)
  3. Adjust value added (therefore consumer surplus) “based on evidence of markups above factor costs.” Factor costs are estimated as the WACC (within firms or across industries).
  4. Bottom line - looks like Consumer Surplus = price - WACC

So FRED uses the Penn World Tables For theirLabor Share,in 2019 US was.597 (in GDP at Current National Prices), in 2007 it stood at.604, down from.64 in 2001. McKinsey’s labor share number mirror that (This is from a2019McKinsey Note), not that 57% is likely lower than the 60% in the current report as the later looks only at large firms that are presumably more efficient than the broader economy.

Ed Comment:"It says 25% of each dollar of revenue is captured by labor and 58% is suppliers (of which presumably 25% is labor and 58% is suppliers ad infinitum, which rounds to about 60% labor. If approximately 8 percentage points of the remaining 40% is profit (= 40/ + )...and 40% is consumer surplus, then investors add 12.5 x more value to others per dollar than they capture as profits (= /8) What percent do they and the BER say each of my above estimated components are of GDP? Add that to the summary too."

AI Summary. Middle-class income after taxes and transfers has grown 3x faster than market income since 2000, with market income per person up 39% versus 57% after taxes and transfers over a longer span. The middle-class share of means-tested transfers rose from 27% to 49% while its share of federal taxes paid fell from 45% to 31%.

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Middle-class income support is a new phenomenon: prior to 2000, market income and after-tax income grew together. After 2000, taxes and transfers grew at 3x the rate of market income.

Do taxes and transfers now drive most middle-class income growth?

Core argument: Middle-class market income per person rose 39% between 1979 and 2016, while income after taxes and transfers rose 57%; since 2000, after-tax, after-transfer income has grown three times faster than market income.

Since 2000, middle-class income after taxes and transfers has grown three times faster than market income, marking a significant shift in income support for the middle class. Between 1979 and 2016, market income per person increased by 39%, but when accounting for taxes and transfers, it rose by 57%. The share of means-tested transfers received by middle-class households increased from 27% to 49%, while their share of federal taxes paid fell from 45% to 31%. Despite this, non-elderly middle-class households still pay slightly more in taxes than they receive in transfers. The net effect of federal income transfers and taxes reduces their after-tax, after-transfer income by only about 7%, a historically low burden. This shift highlights the growing role of tax and transfer policies in supporting middle-class incomes, especially during economic downturns.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Middle-class market income per person rose 39% between 1979 and 2016, while income after taxes and transfers rose 57%; since 2000, after-tax, after-transfer income has grown three times faster than market income.
  2. The middle class's share of means-tested transfers received rose from 27% to 49%, while its share of federal taxes paid fell from 45% to 31%.
  3. Federal taxes and transfers reduce middle-class after-tax, after-transfer income by about 7%, a historically low burden, though non-elderly middle-class households still pay slightly more in taxes than they receive in transfers.

Important Research from David Splinter (you will likely cite this) looks the impact of taxes and transfers on the middle of the income distribution (middle three quintiles of population, for a four person household the range is $31,400 to $168,200) and finds that since 1979 non-elderly middle-class market income increased 39 percent in real per person terms. The increase was 57 percent when accounting for taxes and transfers. He finds that income support for this group is a recent phenomenon as prior to 2000, market income and income after taxes and transfers grew together whereas since 2000,middle-class income after taxes and transfers grew three times faster than market income

In terms of their share of transfers/ the tax burden he finds, "...Focusing just on amounts for non-elderly households, between 1979 and 2016, the share of means-tested transfers received by middle-class households increased from 27 percent to 49 percent. Their share of federal taxes paid fell from 45 to 31 percent..."

However he also finds“on average, non-elderly, middle-class households pay slightly more in taxes than they receive in current transfers and social insurance benefit” though he notes that the payroll tax burden exaggerates the lifetime burden on these households and that“…Many in the middle class are net beneficiaries as well….”

Interestingly he finds a structural break in 2000. Prior to 2000 middle-class incomes grew at the same rate before and after taxes and transfers, and since then income after taxes and transfers grew three times faster (see Figure 6)"...In other words, between 1979 and the late 1990s, after-tax, after-transfer income and market income of the middle class grew at about the same rate. Since 2000, middleclass income after taxes and transfers grew three times faster than market income. In addition to boosting cumulative income growth over this period, Figure 6 shows that federal policy substantially mitigated the temporary sharp declines in middleclass market incomes that occurred during the 2001 and 2007 recessions. Increasing transfers to non-elderly middle-class households resulted from growth in Medicaid, disability, and other transfers. Between 1979 and 2016, Figure 7 shows that these transfers grew from about 4 to 11 percent of middle-class market income. For the non-elderly middle-class, average real per person transfers increased $1,360 for Medicaid, $250 for disability and other payments from Social Security, and $190 for SNAP and SSI transfers. These increases occurred throughout the middle class, but especially for the lower-middle class. Total transfers among non-elderly average households increased $3,500 for the second quintile, $1,800 for the middle quintile, and $1,000 for the fourth quintile (2016 dollars)..."

Middle Class Redistribution: Tax and Transfer Policy For Most Americans: Extended Excerpt Image 1

There is a good analysis of what sort of additional taxes would be required to fund new levels of transfers (see Table 2):“….For instance, raising the incomes of poor households by “taxing the rich” is straightforward when the number of poor households receiving transfers is a relatively small share of the population. As these poor households earn only a small share of total income, meaningful increases in income can be financed with modestly higher taxes on the remaining tax base. However, increasing the number of households that benefit from transfers (or tax cuts) is costly for two reasons: First, it mechanically increases the number of recipient households and reduces the number of paying households. Second, it requires higher marginal tax rates on paying households that cause a narrowing of the tax base due to avoidance and behavioral changes. Table 2 provides the results of a simple empirical exercise examining this tradeoff: If you raise the income of specified households by 10 percent and fund these transfers with taxes on higher-income households, what is the necessary tax rate?...”

Core findings, “…The “middle class” has benefitted from government redistribution in recent decades. For individuals in non-elderly households in the middle three income quintiles (the middle class), the share of federal taxes decreased, and the share of transfers increased. Between 1979 and 2016, market income per person increased 39 percent. But when accounting for taxes and transfers income increased 57 percent. Middleclass income support, however, is a recent phenomenon. Before 2000, market income and income after taxes and transfers grew together. Since 2000, middle-class income after taxes and transfers grew three times faster than market income. In a revenue neutral exercise, we explore the limits of further support to the middle class…In our analysis of taxes and transfers, we focus on individuals in non-elderly households in the middle three quintiles (60 percent) of the income distribution, whose material living standards provide a broad view of middle-class incomes and changes over time.1 Although the elderly middle-class is also important, we focus on non-elderly households in order to avoid the challenge of inferring the income class of non-working retirees. Doing so also allows us to examine the taxes paid and benefits received by households during their working and child-rearing years and to abstract from issues related to the aging of the population and the substantial growth in Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid benefits…. In 2016, according to estimates using data from the Congressional Budget Office (2019), the average income earned from market activities—like employment, business ownership, or interest—was about $71,900 per non-elderly middle-class household. Social insurance and means-tested transfers boosted this group’s average income by $7,900 per household, and they paid (or their employer paid on their behalf) $12,600 in federal income, payroll, corporate, and excise taxes—including their contributions to entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare. Hence, the net effect of federal income transfers and taxes is to reduce the after-tax, after-transfer income of middle-class households only by about 7 percent. That “net burden” of taxes and transfers is historically low and relieves the middle class from much of the cost of paying for federal public goods or income support to other groups (like poor, disadvantaged, or elderly households)….”

Adam Looney, Jeff Larrimore and David Splinter, "Middle Class Redistribution: Tax and Transfer Policy For Most Americans," Aspen Strategy Group, December 10, 2020, https://www.economicstrategygroup.org/publication/tax-and-transfer-policy/

AI Summary. Five firms—Exxon Mobil, Apple, Microsoft, General Electric, and IBM—accounted for 10% of total US stock market wealth creation from 1926 to 2016, and just 4% of firms generated all net stock market gains. Most listed firms had lifetime buy-and-hold returns below those of one-month Treasury bills.

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According to @HendrikBessembinder, 5 firms account for 10% of wealth creation btw 1926-2016, while 4% of firms account for all net stock market gains over the period.

Do most stocks outperform Treasury bills?

Core argument: Only 4% of listed firms accounted for all net stock market gains from 1926 to 2016, while most listed firms delivered lifetime buy-and-hold returns below those of one-month Treasury bills.

The analysis reveals a striking concentration of wealth creation in the stock market, with just five firms—Exxon Mobil, Apple, Microsoft, General Electric, and IBM—accounting for 10% of total wealth creation from 1926 to 2016. Furthermore, only 4% of firms were responsible for all net stock market gains during this period, highlighting a significant skewness in returns. This suggests that while stocks can outperform Treasury bills, the majority of listed firms have lifetime buy-and-hold returns that are less than one-month Treasuries. The data underscores the importance of selecting the right stocks for substantial returns, as a small fraction of firms drive the majority of market gains.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Only 4% of listed firms accounted for all net stock market gains from 1926 to 2016, while most listed firms delivered lifetime buy-and-hold returns below those of one-month Treasury bills.
  2. Five firms—Exxon Mobil, Apple, Microsoft, General Electric, and IBM—accounted for 10% of total stock market wealth creation from 1926 to 2016.

Hendrik Bessembinder,"Do Stocks Outperform Treasury Bills?" June 3, 2018, Journal of Financial Economics, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm

The paper finds the majority of listed firms have lifetime buy and hold returns of less than one-month Treasuries:

Great new paper finds a shocking high degree of skewness in returns. As of December 2016 5 individual firms accounted for 10% of wealth creation btw 1926-2016, Apple and Microsoft were two of them and another two Exxon and GE seem like they are in death rolls now: “…However, just five firms (Exxon Mobile, Apple, Microsoft, General Electric, and International Business Machines) account for 10% of the total wealth creation…”

Steve Comment: See table“Panel A of Table 2A reports summary statistics for the pooled distribution of 3,575,216 monthly common stock returns contained in theCRSP database from July 1926 to December 2016, as well as matched Treasury bill returns. The data confirm that the mean excess return is positive, as the average monthly return is 1.13%, compared toan average one-month Treasury bill return during the same month of 0.37%..”

Ed Comment::Speaking loosely 1:25 account for all the gain (since the one-month treasury is effectively inflation please zero return. What is the 1-month treasury return bench march he is using over the period?) 1:300 account for all the excess profits. And these are the companies that made it public!!! For every one of those, there are probably many that failed long before.

"....Themajority of common stocks that have appeared in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database since 1926 have lifetime buy-and-hold returns less than one-month Treasuries. When stated in terms of lifetime dollar wealth creation, the best-performing 4% of listed companies explain the net gain for the entire US stock market since 1926,as other stocks collectively matched Treasury bills.....Of all monthly common stock returns contained in the CRSP database from 1926 to 2016, only 47.8% are larger than the one-month Treasury rate in the same month. In fact, less than half of monthly CRSP common stock returns are positive. When focusing on stocks’ full lifetimes (from the beginning of the sample in 1926, or first appearance in CRSP, through the 2016 end of the sample, or delisting from CRSP), just 42.6% of common stocks, slightly less than three out of seven, have a buy-and-hold return (inclusive of reinvested dividends) that exceeds the return to holding one-month Treasury bills over the matched horizon. More than half of CRSP common stocks deliver negative lifetime returns. The single most frequent outcome (when returns are rounded to the nearest 5%) observed for individual common stocks over their full lifetimes is a loss of 100%.....Rates of underperformance are highest for small capitalization stocks and, as would be anticipated based on the evidence in Fama and French (2004), for stocks that have entered the database in recent decades.... approximately 25,300 companies that issued stocks appearing in the CRSP common stock database since 1926 are collectively responsible for lifetime shareholder wealth creation of nearly $35 trillion, measured as of December 2016. However, just five firms (Exxon Mobile, Apple, Microsoft, General Electric, and International Business Machines) account for 10% of the total wealth creation. The 90 topperforming companies, slightly more than one-third of 1% of the companies that have listed common stock, collectively account for over half of the wealth creation. The 1,092 topperforming companies, slightly more than 4% of the total, account for all of the net wealth creation. That is, the remaining 96% of companies whose common stock has appeared in the CRSP data collectively generate lifetime dollar gains that matched gains on one-month Treasury bills.... When stated in terms of lifetime dollar wealth creation to shareholders in aggregate, approximately one-third of 1% of the firms that issued common stocks contained in the CRSP database account for half of the net stock market gains, and slightly more than 4% of the firms account for all of the net stock market gains...."

AI Summary. Wage gaps between poorer and richer U.S. cities narrowed at about 1.4% a year between 1940 and 1980, but this regional convergence then stopped. Using a dynamic spatial equilibrium model that matches observed wage, skill-ratio, and migration patterns, the authors attribute much of the change in cross-city wage differences to skill-biased technical change and agglomeration economies.

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Prior to 1980, US wage gaps btw poorer & richer cities were shrinking at 1.4% annual rate. Post-1980, regional convergence ceased due to skill-biased technical change & agglomeration economies.

Why did wage convergence between poorer and richer U.S. cities stop?

Core argument: The wage gap between poorer and richer U.S. cities narrowed at roughly 1.4% a year between 1940 and 1980, but regional convergence ceased after 1980, attributed largely to skill-biased technical change and agglomeration economies.

Between 1940 and 1980, the wage gap between poorer and richer U.S. cities was shrinking at an annual rate of ~1.4%. However, post-1980, regional convergence ceased, largely due to skill-biased technical change (SBTC) and agglomeration economies. A dynamic spatial equilibrium model was developed to analyze these shifts, successfully matching the quantitative features of U.S. regional wage convergence and reproducing changes in skill ratios and migration patterns across cities. The model's counterfactual analysis indicates that SBTC significantly contributed to the change in cross-city wage differentials, highlighting its role in halting the convergence trend.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The wage gap between poorer and richer U.S. cities narrowed at roughly 1.4% a year between 1940 and 1980, but regional convergence ceased after 1980, attributed largely to skill-biased technical change and agglomeration economies.
  2. A dynamic spatial equilibrium model matches the quantitative features of U.S. regional wage convergence and reproduces observed changes in skill ratios and migration patterns across cities.
  3. Counterfactual analysis of the spatial equilibrium model indicates that skill-biased technical change contributed substantially to the change in cross-city wage differentials and to the halt in regional convergence.

“…. Between 1940 and 1980 the wage gap between poorer U.S. cities and richer ones was shrinking at an annual rate of roughly 1.4%. After 1980, however, there was no further regional convergence overall. This paper quantifies the contributions of skill-biased technical change (SBTC) and agglomeration economies to the end of cross-city wage convergence within the U.S. between 1980 and 2010. I develop and estimate a dynamic spatial equilibrium model that looks at the causes of regional convergence and divergence. The model choice is motivated by novel empirical regularities regarding the evolution of the skill premium and migration patterns over time and across space. The model successfully matches the quantitative features of the U.S. regional wage convergence. Moreover, the model also reproduces changes in the skill ratio across U.S. cities, as well as, migration patterns after 1980. Finally, the counterfactual analysis suggests that SBTC explains much of change in cross-city wage differentials….”

Giannone, Elisa. January 4, 2017. “Skilled-Biased Technical Change and Regional Convergence.” University of Chicago.https://home.uchicago.edu/~elisagiannone/files/JMP_ElisaG.pdf