Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

AI Summary. New Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates show hybrid remote work is substantially less common than other surveys indicated, while fully remote work matches other estimates at about one in ten workers, making fully remote slightly more common than hybrid. Nearly one in five college-educated workers are fully remote, and nearly 40% of advanced-degree holders work hybrid or fully remote.

Adam Ozimek and Eric Carlson Economic Innovation Group
Date Posted:

According to new BLS numbers, 19.5% of American workers worked remotely during August 2023 with the majority of those workers, 53%, being fully remote. Among college graduates, nearly 20% are fully remote. @ModeledBehavior and Eric Carlson

Is hybrid remote work less common than other surveys suggest?

Core argument: New BLS data show hybrid remote work to be substantially lower than other surveys estimated, while fully remote work sits near other surveys' figure of about one in ten workers, leaving fully remote slightly more common than hybrid.

A new estimate of remote work from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) suggests that remote work is less common than previously thought. While the new BLS data reveals hybrid remote work to be substantially lower than other surveys estimated, fully remote work is close to where other surveys show, at around one out of ten workers. As a result, fully remote work appears slightly more common than hybrid remote work. Looking at the college-educated, nearly one in five are fully remote. Among advanced degree holders, nearly 40% are hybrid or fully remote. Among skilled workers, remote working is now a substantial share of the labor force, including fully remote.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. New BLS data show hybrid remote work to be substantially lower than other surveys estimated, while fully remote work sits near other surveys' figure of about one in ten workers, leaving fully remote slightly more common than hybrid.
  2. Nearly one in five college-educated workers are fully remote, and nearly 40% of advanced degree holders work hybrid or fully remote, according to the BLS estimate.
  3. Remote work, including fully remote arrangements, accounts for a substantial share of the skilled labor force.

Related Articles:

  • Working Remotely? Selection, Treatment, and the Market for Remote Work — Using data from a Fortune 500 firm that hired both remote and on-site workers, the authors estimate that shifting on-site workers to remote lowered their hourly calls by 4% relative to already-remote workers, accounting for one third of the productivity gap; worker selection explained the other two thirds.
  • Remote Work, Three Years Later — Remote work has reduced office utilization but not yet office occupancy, because most firms are locked into long-duration leases. Baseline estimates suggest remote work will exert 0.8 percentage points of upward pressure on the office vacancy rate near-term, 2.3 more over the following five years, and 1.8 thereafter.
  • Central Business Districts: City Strugglers — Consumer spending in central business districts remains below pre-pandemic levels in northern and western US cities while southern city centers show strong growth, a gap attributed largely to migration patterns rather than differences in working from home. Cities with population gains show spending roughly 20% above pre-pandemic levels, while those with population losses are down about 20%.

AI Summary. Using data from a Fortune 500 firm that hired both remote and on-site workers, the authors estimate that shifting on-site workers to remote lowered their hourly calls by 4% relative to already-remote workers, accounting for one third of the productivity gap; worker selection explained the other two thirds.

Natalia Emanuel and Emma Harrington Federal Reserve Bank of New York
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Using evidence from call center workers @NataliaHEmanuel @emma_k_h find that remote work lowered workers’ productivity, but the majority of the gap between onsite and remote work was driven by negative worker selection into remote work. @NewYorkFed

How much of the remote work productivity gap reflects worker selection?

Core argument: Hourly calls of on-site workers who went remote around Covid-19 office closures fell 4% relative to already-remote workers at an American Fortune 500 firm, indicating negative treatment effects accounted for one third of the productivity gap.

We ask two questions: how does remote work affect productivity, and how productive are the workers who choose remote jobs? To quantify each factor, we use data from an American Fortune 500 firm that hired both remote and on-site workers prior to Covid-19. Around the office closures of Covid-19, the hourly calls of on-site workers going remote fell by 4% relative to that of already-remote workers, indicating that negative treatment effects accounted for one third of the productivity gap. After the offices were closed, workers who initially chose remote jobs were 8% less productive than those who initially chose on-site jobs, even though all workers were working at home. Thus, two thirds of the initial productivity gap was due to worker selection.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Hourly calls of on-site workers who went remote around Covid-19 office closures fell 4% relative to already-remote workers at an American Fortune 500 firm, indicating negative treatment effects accounted for one third of the productivity gap.
  2. After offices closed and all workers were at home, employees who had initially chosen remote jobs were 8% less productive than those who initially chose on-site jobs, attributing two thirds of the initial gap to worker selection.
  3. Data from an American Fortune 500 firm that hired both remote and on-site workers before Covid-19 separates how remote work affects productivity from how productive the workers who choose remote jobs are.

AI Summary. A shrinking working-age population across rich countries means companies must work harder to attract prime-age workers and tap new demographic pools, while a growing older population raises demand for caregivers and home helpers. Job vacancies in the US reached 11m, most of them frontline roles in retail, health care, hotels, restaurants, and call centers.

Adrian Wooldridge Bloomberg
Date Posted:

.@adwooldridge argues that tighter labor will require management teams to spend more time managing low-skilled workers.

Will shrinking working-age populations force firms to compete for frontline workers?

Core argument: The United States had 11m job vacancies in March 2022, most of them frontline jobs in retail, health care, hotels, restaurants, and call centers, with similar shortages emerging across the rich world.

The shrinking of the working-age population across the rich world means that companies will have to work harder to attract prime-age workers while also finding new demographic pools to fish in. The simultaneous rise in the number of older people will increase demand for caregivers and home helps. In March 2022, the United States suffered from 11 million job vacancies — most of them frontline jobs in retail, health care, hotels, restaurants, call centers, etc. Similar shortages emerged across the rich world. Zeynep Ton reports that in 2019-20 Nissan’s Smyrna, Tennessee, assembly plant suffered from a 38% turnover rate among its technicians; the direct cost of replacing each technician was $15,000.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The United States had 11m job vacancies in March 2022, most of them frontline jobs in retail, health care, hotels, restaurants, and call centers, with similar shortages emerging across the rich world.
  2. Zeynep Ton reports that Nissan's Smyrna, Tennessee assembly plant had a 38% turnover rate among technicians in 2019–20, with a direct replacement cost of $15,000 per technician.
  3. The shrinking working-age population across the rich world means companies will have to work harder to attract prime-age workers and find new demographic pools, while the rising number of older people increases demand for caregivers and home helps.

AI Summary. The share of job postings offering at least one remote day per week rose more than three-fold in the U.S. and five-fold or more in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the U.K., exceeding 10% in all but New Zealand. These shifts vary widely across cities, industries, occupations and companies.

Stephen Hansen, Peter John Lambert, et al National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

Over 10% of job listings in the Anglosphere countries now allow for remote work for at least one day a week. @I_Am_NickBloom @StephenEKHansen @pj_lambert @raffasadun @Bledi_Taska

How much have job postings offering remote work increased?

Core argument: Job postings offering at least one remote day per week rose more than three-fold in the U.S. and five-fold or more in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the U.K. from 2019 to 2022.

The share of postings that say new employees can work remotely one or more days per week was tiny before the pandemic: 1% or less in Australia, Canada and New Zealand as of 2019, about 3% in the U.K., and about 4% in the U.S. From 2019 to 2022, this remote-work share rose more than three-fold in the U.S and five-fold or more in the other countries. As of January 2023, the remote-work share exceeds 10% of postings in Australia, Canada, the U.K, and the U.S., and it appears to be on an upward trajectory in all five countries. These developments are highly non-uniform across and within cities, industries, occupations, and companies. Even when zooming in on employers in the same industry competing for talent in the same occupations, we find large differences in the share of job postings that explicitly offer remote work.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Job postings offering at least one remote day per week rose more than three-fold in the U.S. and five-fold or more in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the U.K. from 2019 to 2022.
  2. Before the pandemic, postings advertising remote work stood at about 4% in the U.S., about 3% in the U.K., and 1% or less in Australia, Canada and New Zealand as of 2019.
  3. Remote-work postings exceed 10% of the total in Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. as of January 2023, with large differences across cities, industries, occupations, and even among employers in the same industry competing for the same occupations.

AI Summary. Earnings inequality between firms declines as a group of firms founded in the same year ages, while each successive founding cohort enters with higher between-firm pay dispersion, a pattern that accounts for a large share of the aggregate rise in between-firm earnings inequality. The authors expect inequality to keep rising as older cohorts are replaced by newer ones.

Isaac Sorkin and Melanie Wallskog National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
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A new @NBERpubs paper shows that newer firms have more earnings dispersion than older firms, and that this pattern accounts for a large fraction of the aggregate rise in between-firm earnings inequality. @WallskogMelanie

Do newer firm cohorts drive the rise in between-firm earnings inequality?

Core argument: Between-firm earnings inequality within a firm cohort declines as that cohort ages, while each subsequent cohort enters with higher between-firm dispersion and then declines along a path roughly parallel to earlier cohorts.

We plot the between-firm variance of earnings within a cohort over time. We find two striking patterns. First, within a cohort, between-firm earnings inequality declines as the cohort ages. Second, each subsequent cohort of firms enters with a higher level of between-firm earnings inequality before declining on a path approximately parallel to previous cohorts. We find that between-firm pay dispersion declines within a cohort. Second, there are striking cohort patterns: more recent cohorts are more dispersed than older cohorts. This pattern accounts for a large fraction of the aggregate rise in between-firm earnings inequality. As older cohorts are replaced with cohorts with inequality “technology” of the more recent vintage, we expect inequality to continue to rise, even without a change in that underlying technology.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Between-firm earnings inequality within a firm cohort declines as that cohort ages, while each subsequent cohort enters with higher between-firm dispersion and then declines along a path roughly parallel to earlier cohorts.
  2. The cohort pattern in between-firm pay dispersion accounts for a large fraction of the aggregate rise in between-firm earnings inequality.
  3. As older cohorts are replaced by cohorts carrying more recent inequality "technology," between-firm earnings inequality is expected to keep rising even without any change in that underlying technology.

AI Summary. The U.S. economy is growing briskly, adding millions of jobs and producing more goods and services, but with inflation running about 1-2 percentage points faster than recent generations are used to. The author argues that outcome could persist if the Federal Reserve tolerates it, but probably not alongside the interest rates and asset price multiples of the 2010s.

Matt Klein The Overshoot
Date Posted:

.@M_C_Klein notes that, relative to pre-pandemic, there are more Americans in higher wage jobs and fewer in lower paid jobs. This helps explain strong wage growth, but “the puzzle is why productivity has not increased commensurately.”

Can fast growth with higher inflation persist at past interest rates?

Core argument: The U.S. economy is growing briskly, adding millions of jobs, and producing more goods and services, but with inflation running about 1–2pp faster than recent generations are used to.

In theory, the shifting mix of employment towards higher-value jobs and industries should be supporting more production and help attenuate the link between aggregate pay growth and inflation. But that has not happened yet, even if overall productivity growth remains broadly on trend, despite the volatility attributable to the pandemic. The net result is that the U.S. economy is growing briskly, adding millions of jobs, and producing more goods and services—but with persistently faster inflation (about 1-2pp) than recent generations are used to. That could be a sustainable outcome, if Fed officials are willing to tolerate it, but it is probably not sustainable with the set of interest rates and asset price multiples we became accustomed to in the 2010s.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. economy is growing briskly, adding millions of jobs, and producing more goods and services, but with inflation running about 1–2pp faster than recent generations are used to.
  2. The shifting mix of employment toward higher-value jobs and industries has not yet supported more production or weakened the link between aggregate pay growth and inflation, even as overall productivity growth remains broadly on trend despite pandemic volatility.
  3. Persistently faster inflation could be a sustainable outcome if Fed officials tolerate it, but probably is not sustainable with the interest rates and asset price multiples that prevailed in the 2010s.

AI Summary. U.S. regression results show a high correlation between wage growth and productivity growth by skill level: productivity in high-education industries grew over .34 log points versus .20 in low-education industries, while wages grew .26 and .24 log points respectively. The authors argue these productivity differences are more than sufficient to explain the faster wage growth of more educated workers.

Edward Lazear, Kathryn Shaw, Grant Hayes and James Jedras National Bureau Of Economic Research
Date Posted:
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According to research published by @NBER, higher productivity growth in 1989-2017 “is more than sufficient to explain the greater wage growth that more educated workers enjoyed as compared with less educated workers.”

Does productivity growth by skill explain faster wage growth for educated workers?

Core argument: Productivity in U.S. high-education industries grew by over 0.34 log points between 1989 and 2017, versus 0.20 log points in low-education industries over the same 30-year period.

U.S. regression results show that there is a high implicit correlation between the rise over time of wages by skill level and the rise of productivity by skill level. Productivity in the high-education industries [orange] grew by over .34 log points between 1989 and 2017, while productivity in the low-education industries [blue] grew only .20 log points during that same 30-year period. Wages in high-education industries grew by .26 log points while those in the low-education industries half grew by .24 log points during the 1989-2017 period. It’s clear that the difference in productivity growth between the two skill groups is more pronounced than the difference in wages. This simple comparison suggests that differences in productivity growth rates between skill groups is more than sufficient to explain the greater wage growth that more educated workers enjoyed as compared with less educated workers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Productivity in U.S. high-education industries grew by over 0.34 log points between 1989 and 2017, versus 0.20 log points in low-education industries over the same 30-year period.
  2. Wages grew 0.26 log points in high-education industries and 0.24 log points in low-education industries during 1989–2017, a narrower gap than the corresponding difference in productivity growth.
  3. U.S. regression results show a high implicit correlation between the rise of wages by skill level and the rise of productivity by skill level, suggesting productivity growth differences are more than sufficient to explain the greater wage growth of more educated workers.

Higher productivity growth in 1989-2017 “is more than sufficient to explain the greater wage growth that more educated workers enjoyed as compared with less educated workers….U.S. regression results show that there is a high implicit correlation between the rise over time of wages by skill level and the rise of productivity by skill level. Productivity in the high-education industries [orange] grew by over .34 log points between 1989 and 2017, while productivity in the low-education industries [blue] grew only .20 log points during that same 30-year period. Wages in high-education industries grew by .26 log points while those in the low-education industries half grew by .24 log points during the 1989-2017 period. It’s clear that the difference in productivity growth between the two skill groups is more pronounced than the difference in wages. This simple comparison suggests that differences in productivity growth rates between skill groups is more than sufficient to explain the greater wage growth that more educated workers enjoyed as compared with less educated workers…”

Key Conclusions

1. “Using economy-wide data, over a long span of time and across countries, aggregate productivity gains appear to be passed on as aggregate wage gains.”

2. “A rising tide lifts all boats. High, middle, and low wage earners experience growth in wages when productivity grows for the aggregate economy.”

3. “The industries that have experienced the most rapid growth in productivity are those that use the most skilled and educated workers.”

4. “Thus, educated, and thus skilled. workers have also enjoyed the most wage growth and productivity growth over time, which is consistent with productivity increases being the source of wage growth rather than primarily monopoly power, institutions, taxes, or other policies.”

“…In sum, it is well known that the wage distribution has spread out more over time – the 90th percentile of wages has grown more than the 50th percentile of wages. This is also true of the productivity distribution. It has stretched out. Using our proxy for productivity by education level, productivity among more educated workers is higher and has grown more rapidly than productivity of less educated workers. This is consistent with growing wage dispersion, where the wages of highly educated workers have pulled away from wages of less educated workers….”

Their Evidence

Productivity and Wages By Worker Skill Levels

Note they use education as a proxy for skill, “…we are going to use education as a proxy for skill, assuming the highly educated are more skilled….”

“…The heart of the analysis is an examination of three-digit industry data to infer productivity growth by skill level in order to explain wage growth by skill level. We start by looking at the determinants of productivity levels as a function of skill, and then turn in subsection B to the determinants of productivity growth rates as a function of skill. Education is used as the primary measure of skill. The most important finding regarding the spreading out of the productivity distribution over time is summarized in Figure 9. We use data on the forty 3-digit industries for which complete productivity, wage and education data are available over the period 1989-2017. Industries are ranked by their skill level, or by their educational level. Figure 9 compares the productivity growth and wage growth, from 1989 to 2017, for the “low education in 1989” (blue bars) industries to the productivity growth and wage growth for the “high education in 1989” (red bars) industries. Productivity in the high-education industries grew by over .34 log points between 1989 and 2017, while productivity in the low-education industries grew only .20 log points during that same 30-year period (the two bars on the left side of Figure 9). The same pattern holds for wages, but not with the same force. Wages in high-education industries grew by .26 log points while those in the low-education industries half grew by .24 log points during the 1989-2017 period. It’s clear in Figure 9 that the difference in productivity growth between the two skill groups is more pronounced than the difference in wages. Productivity grew considerably more for the more highly educated. This simple comparison in Figure 9 suggests that differences in productivity growth rates between skill groups is more than sufficient to explain the greater wage growth that more educated workers enjoyed as compared with less educated workers….”

“…Overall, productivity gains for the highly skilled across industries have been greater than the wage gains for the highly skilled. Regression results replicate the simple results in Figure 9….These results tell us that the spreading out over time of the wage distribution across skill groups of workers is concurrent with the spreading out of the productivity distribution across skill groups. Given the magnitudes of the coefficients, if wages were a direct function of productivity, the wages of the highly educated would have risen even more over time….Wages have spread out over time, but productivity has spread out even more. Generally, the least educated workers have experienced the poorest wage growth from 1989 to 2017. The change in log real wage for those without any high school was -.04 over the period while those with graduate education enjoyed gains of .07 in logs. The least educated workers have also experienced the poorest productivity growth, based on the industry-based estimates of productivity by education level. Overall, the differential growth in productivity across education levels exceeds the differential growth in wages. This is most easily seen in the columns 8 and 9 of Table 6….”

Conclusions

“…Looking across people, we also find that increases in aggregate productivity, or in GDP per person, increase wages for those earners at the lowest and at the highest parts of the wage distribution, or at the 10th and 90th percentiles of pay. This implies that increases in aggregate productivity are shared by earners at all skill levels, and this applies across countries….Thus, wages have spread out over time and productivity has spread out over time. Or, the main conclusion is that changes in productivity at different educational levels are more than sufficient to account for changes in the wage distribution….”

Edward Lazear, Kathryn Shaw, Grant Hayes and James Jedras, “Productivity and Wages: What Was the Productivity-Wage Link in the Digital Revolution of the Past, and What Might Occur in the AI Revolution of the Future?” National Bureau Of Economic Research, December 2022, https://www.nber.org/papers/w30734

AI Summary. The median US household's inflation-adjusted market income rose 21% between 1990 and 2016, and income after taxes and transfers rose 44%, with a 66% gain for the bottom 20%. The share of households earning over $100,000 tripled from 10% to 30% between 1967 and 2018.

Michael R. Strain Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
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The American Dream is alive and well. Btw 1990 & 2016, median household market income rose 21% & post-tax-transfer income grew 44%. @MichaelRStrain @WSJ.

Have American household incomes risen across the distribution?

Core argument: Median household inflation-adjusted market income rose 21% between 1990 and 2016, while post-tax-and-transfer income grew 44%, and households in the bottom 20% saw a 66% increase in post-tax-and-transfer income, Michael Strain reports.

Michael Strain highlights the dangers of populism by emphasizing the positive economic trends that contradict populist narratives. Between 1990 and 2016, the median household's inflation-adjusted market income rose by 21%, while post-tax-and-transfer income grew by 44%. Households in the bottom 20% saw a 66% increase in post-tax-and-transfer income. The share of households earning over $100,000 tripled from 10% to 30% between 1967 and 2018, while those earning less than $35,000 fell from 36% to 28%. Employment in high-skill occupations has increased, indicating upward mobility. A hot economy benefits all workers, including the least skilled. Strain warns that populist messages portraying the economy as rigged can demoralize workers and hinder their economic prospects, despite evidence that hard work continues to yield positive outcomes.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Median household inflation-adjusted market income rose 21% between 1990 and 2016, while post-tax-and-transfer income grew 44%, and households in the bottom 20% saw a 66% increase in post-tax-and-transfer income, Michael Strain reports.
  2. The share of households earning over $100,000 tripled from 10% to 30% between 1967 and 2018, while the share earning less than $35,000 fell from 36% to 28%.
  3. Michael Strain argues that populist messages portraying the economy as rigged can demoralize workers and hinder their economic prospects, despite rising employment in high-skill occupations and evidence that hard work continues to yield positive outcomes.

AEI’s Strain excerpts his new book in WSJ, just an FYI, he makes the points that wages are up, “hollowing out” of middle class driven by people graduating up and warns of the dangers of populist narratives. Just an FYI

"..The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) computes a comprehensive measure of inflation-adjusted market income that includes labor market earnings, the value of employer-provided health insurance, and business and capital income. The median household saw market income gains of 21% between 1990 and 2016, the last year for which data are available. The CBO also computes inflation-adjusted income after taxes and government transfers, which grew by 44% for the median household during this period. Households in the bottom 20% saw their post-tax-and-transfer income grow by 66% over these years....Another part of the story that is often overlooked:Hollowing out is mostly a story of upward mobility. Employment in high-skill occupations has grown as employment in middle-skill occupations has shrunk. On balance, the share of employment in low-skill occupations hasn’t increased.
Data from the U.S. Census Bureau from 1967 through 2018 shows a 12 point drop in the share of households with inflation-adjusted income between $35,000 and $100,000. The share of low-income households—those earning less than $35,000—has also fallen over this period, from 36% to 28%. And the share of households earning over $100,000 has tripled, rising from 10% to 30%.... Recent experience demonstrates that a hot economy benefits all workers, including the lowest paid, least skilled and most vulnerable. Hard work continues to pay off, and workers still enjoy the fruits of their labor and can improve economic outcomes for themselves and their families. And that is precisely why the constant message that American capitalism is broken is so harmful. Messages matter. If all people hear is that the economy has failed them—is rigged against them, in fact—it dims their aspirations and saps their energy, hurting their economic prospects. The populist narrative that workers are victims without agency or personal responsibility may have political power in these unsettled times, but it is also deeply demoralizing and damaging….”

The American Dream Is Alive and Well: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Michael R. Strain, "The American Dream Is Alive and Well,"Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-american-dream-is-alive-and-well-11580486386