“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
AI Summary.In the US, Europe and Japan, pay growth has decoupled from productivity growth, with productivity pulling ahead. US labor productivity, measured as real GDP per hour worked, is more than 5x its 1947 level while real hourly compensation is only about 3x, and median wage growth lags even further behind.
Joel SussFinancial Times
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In advanced economies, increases in labor productivity growth have decoupled from real wage growth, especially post-1980.
Are wages falling further behind productivity growth in advanced economies?
Core argument: US labour productivity, measured as real GDP per hour worked, is more than five times its 1947 level, while real hourly compensation is only about three times greater.
In the US, Europe and Japan, pay growth has decoupled from productivity growth, with the latter having pulled ahead. US Labour productivity — measured as real GDP per hour worked — is now more than five times greater than in 1947, whereas real hourly compensation is only about three times greater. Median wage growth has lagged even further behind productivity growth, with inequality pushing the average wage higher than the median. (The figures above show average rather than median wages; plotting median wages would show an even greater divergence.)
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
US labour productivity, measured as real GDP per hour worked, is more than five times its 1947 level, while real hourly compensation is only about three times greater.
Pay growth has decoupled from productivity growth in the US, Europe and Japan, with productivity pulling ahead in all three.
Median wage growth has lagged productivity growth by even more than average wage growth, as inequality pushes the average wage above the median.
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The Record Divide Between Corporate Profits and Worker Pay— Labor's share of gross domestic income fell to 51%, the lowest since records began in 1947, while profits' share rose to 12.1%, the highest since 1950. Inflation-adjusted hourly wages are up 3% since the end of 2019, compared with a 50% rise in profits.
AI and Productivity— The recent pickup in US labor productivity appears driven by higher utilization of existing capital—running factories, server racks, and hotel rooms harder—rather than by firm-level efficiency gains from AI. Adoption remains too thin and the cross-sectional evidence too weak to conclude that AI-driven productivity gains are already widespread.
Understanding Trends in Worker Pay over the Past 50 Years— Productivity growth has been unequal across industries, across firms within industries, and across workers within firms, slowing growth in both the productivity and the pay of the median worker. The authors argue that working- and middle-class men earlier received "breadwinner rents"—pay above their marginal value to employers—and then endured slow wage growth as women's workforce participation rose.
AI Summary.About 73m US households hold retirement accounts, mostly defined-contribution plans whose balances have risen $6.7tn, and 45m households account for nearly $15tn in annual outlays, close to 3x Germany's economy and 70% of China's GDP. This group's spending has sustained faster growth than comparably wealthy economies.
Jason ThomasCarlyle
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Citing the spending of the top 45mm US households, Jason Thomas argues that US economic growth could be characterized less as ‘k-shaped’ than “travelling at two speeds, one roughly the same rate as Europe’s and another that’s racing far ahead.”
Does retirement wealth explain why US spending outpaces peer economies?
Core argument: Balances in US defined-contribution retirement plans have risen by $6.7tn since the start of 2019, a 12.7% annually compounded gain, with roughly 73 million US households holding retirement accounts.
Roughly 73 million US households have retirement accounts (primarily defined-contribution plans like 401ks) that consist primarily of claims on businesses whose revenue growth and market values provide another hedge against inflation. Balances in defined contribution plans have increased by $6.7 trillion (+12.7%, annually compounded) since the start of 2019. US personal savings rates have fallen sharply over the past year (from 5.5% in April 2025 to 3% in May 2026) but that seems entirely rational. If your retirement balance is far above where you expected it to be, why not spend a bit more of your current income than previously intended? If we net across these overlapping cohorts and exclude recent first-time home purchases, we’re left with 45 million households that combine to account for nearly $15 trillion in annual outlays. That’s an extraordinary sum, equal to nearly 3x the size of the entire German economy and 70% of the GDP of China. And this third of the population has not only been insulated from the inflation shock but also exhibits the propensity to spend out of wealth and income to an extent that’s sustained a far higher rate of GDP growth than observed in economies with comparable living standards.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Balances in US defined-contribution retirement plans have risen by $6.7tn since the start of 2019, a 12.7% annually compounded gain, with roughly 73 million US households holding retirement accounts.
Netting overlapping cohorts and excluding recent first-time home purchases leaves 45 million US households accounting for nearly $15tn in annual outlays, equal to nearly 3x the German economy and 70% of China's GDP.
The US personal savings rate fell from 5.5% in April 2025 to 3% in May 2026, a decline the article argues is rational when retirement balances sit far above expectations.
Related Articles:
K-Shaped Economy?— Available spending data does not support the narrative of a bifurcated "K-shaped" consumer economy: surveys show households earning under $50,000 reported spending growth of 5%, versus 4.6% for those earning over $100,000. Government data show the top income decile's share of aggregate spending at 22.8%, down from 23.4% a year earlier.
The K-Shaped Economy’s Defining Statistic Has Some Problems— The widely cited estimate that the top 10% of US earners account for 45% of consumer spending comes from a method combining Federal Reserve survey and financial-accounts data. Its author says he is more confident in the trajectory—a significant, consistent rise in the top 10% and 20% shares over 30–35 years—than the level.
The Two Europes— The International Monetary Fund projects Eastern European economies will close much of the gap with US per capita GDP — Poland from 34% to 67%, Romania 27% to 60%, Lithuania 29% to 69% — while Western Europe slips, with France falling from 86% to 71% and Italy from 93% to 68%.
AI Summary.Using 5.1m product listings from Sears catalogs, the authors construct a quality-adjusted price index implying much lower goods inflation for 1900–1990 than standard deflators, with real goods consumption growing 39x rather than 10.3x. They estimate faster growth before World War II (5.4% a year, 1900–1939) than after (4.2%, 1946–1980).
Verónica Bäcker-Peral and Benjamin WittenbrinkMassachusetts Institute of Technology
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Using 5.1mm Sears catalog listings and LLM-based hedonic estimation, this study finds real goods consumption grew 39-fold from 1900 to 1990, not 10.3-fold as official data imply, with the largest mismeasurement concentrated before WWII.
Does quality-adjusted pricing show faster goods consumption growth before the war?
Core argument: Using a quality-adjusted price index built from 5.1 million Sears catalog listings, the authors estimate real goods consumption grew by a factor of 39 between 1900 and 1990, compared with a factor of 10.3 using standard goods deflators.
Measuring real GDP growth requires distinguishing changes in prices from changes in product quality... systematic quality adjustment. price indexes are unavailable for much of the twentieth century. We construct a new quality-adjusted price index using 5.1 million product listings from Sears catalogs, 1900–1990. The resulting cost-of-living index implies substantially lower goods inflation than conventional deflators between 1900 and 1990, real goods consumption grew by a factor of 39 using our index,compared with a factor of 10.3 using standard goods deflators. Figure 5 shows our estimates of the cost-of-living index for consumer goods in the solid red line. The dashed black line shows average cumulated price changes for the same sample of consumer goods. The gap.is largest before World War II, reversing the conventional view that goods consumption growth was slower before 1945 than in the post-war decades.As Gordon puts it, 'the history of price changes from 1914 to 1947 [is] the black hole where little is known.' This paper sheds light on that black hole. We estimate average annual real goods consumption growth of 5.4% for 1900-1939 and 4.2% for 1946-1980... the era of fastest growth was in the prewar, not postwar, contrary to conventional estimates.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Using a quality-adjusted price index built from 5.1 million Sears catalog listings, the authors estimate real goods consumption grew by a factor of 39 between 1900 and 1990, compared with a factor of 10.3 using standard goods deflators.
The authors estimate average annual real goods consumption growth of 5.4% for 1900–1939 and 4.2% for 1946–1980, implying the fastest growth came in the prewar rather than postwar era, contrary to conventional estimates.
The new cost-of-living index implies substantially lower goods inflation than conventional deflators, with the gap largest before World War II, a period Gordon describes as "the black hole where little is known.".
Related Articles:
European vs. U.S. Economic Performance: An Update— Productivity growth from 2000-2019 was higher in the US than in western Europe, but almost half the gap disappears when information and communications technology is excluded, even though tech was 9.2% of US output versus 5.4% in the EU. The author estimates this difference in industrial mix accounts for roughly 40% of the overall productivity growth gap.
Is The Great Stagnation Actually Just a ‘So-So’ Stagnation?— Long-running U.S. tests show population average reading scores moved from 255 to 256 out of 500 and math from 266 to 271, despite educational attainment rising more than three years. The author argues that if added schooling has not raised productivity, measured total factor productivity growth has been understated, shrinking the apparent "Great Stagnation" by about a third.
AI Summary.Productivity growth from 2000-2019 was higher in the US than in western Europe, but almost half the gap disappears when information and communications technology is excluded, even though tech was 9.2% of US output versus 5.4% in the EU. The author estimates this difference in industrial mix accounts for roughly 40% of the overall productivity growth gap.
Paul KrugmanKrugman Wonks Out
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The superior productivity growth of the US relative to Europe from 2000–2019 is highly concentrated in the tech sector. Krugman computes the productivity growth differential excluding ICT and finds that it shrinks from .65 to .38 per year.
How much of the US-Europe productivity gap reflects tech sector size?
Core argument: Productivity growth over 2000–2019 was higher in the US than in the EU11, essentially western Europe, but almost half of that gap disappears when the ICT sector is excluded.
The [Draghi] report states that, apart from the ICT [information, communication and technology] sectors in the EU and the US, productivity performance across the rest of the two economies has been similar. Chart 5 shows what I find for productivity growth rates from 2000-2019 in the US and the EU11, basically western Europe. Overall productivity growth was higher in the US than in Europe, but almost half the difference goes away if one excludes ICT, even though the tech sector was only 9.2% of US GDP and 5.4% of EU GDP. It’s worth noting that, within the US, productivity rose much faster in tech than in the rest of the economy. When trying to model the US-EU paradox, I focused on the difference in the share of GDP accounted for by the tech sector. As noted above, the productivity gap outside tech is relatively small. How much of the US-EU paradox can this story, which emphasizes differences in industrial mix, explain? Industrial mix effect = (Share of tech in US GDP – share of tech in EU GDP) * (productivity growth rate in tech – productivity growth rate in non-tech). If I plug in the US-EU difference in ICT share — 3.8 percentage points — and the difference within the US between productivity growth in ICT and in the rest of the economy — 6.8 percentage points — I get 0.26 percentage points, or approximately 40% of the reported overall US-EU difference in productivity growth.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Productivity growth over 2000–2019 was higher in the US than in the EU11, essentially western Europe, but almost half of that gap disappears when the ICT sector is excluded.
The tech sector accounted for 9.2% of US GDP versus 5.4% of EU GDP, a 3.8-percentage-point difference, while US productivity growth in ICT exceeded that in the rest of the US economy by 6.8 percentage points.
Multiplying the 3.8-point ICT share gap by the 6.8-point within-US productivity growth gap yields an industrial mix effect of 0.26 percentage points, roughly 40% of the reported overall US-EU productivity growth difference.
Related Articles:
The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe— A European Union competitiveness report attributes the EU's labour productivity growth gap with the US largely to weaker activity in information and communications technology and large-scale digital services; excluding main ICT sectors, EU productivity was broadly at par with the US from 2000-2019. It estimates Europe's investment share must rise about 5 percentage points of GDP.
European Stagnation Is Real— Comparing the United States, France, and Germany at current purchasing power parity prices shows the European economies roughly constant relative to America since 2000, but current-price measures miss output gains in sectors where prices fall, such as software. The author argues constant-price comparisons, the standard approach for growth over time, reveal greater European stagnation.
Is Europe in Economic Decline?— French gross domestic product per person, adjusted for purchasing power, was 74% of the US level in 2001 and 73% in 2024, while Germany closed some of the gap, indicating European living standards have not fallen behind. Higher measured US growth is attributed to rapid productivity growth in information technology, a sector the US dominates.
AI Summary.European productivity growth has trailed the United States for three decades, and measures using current purchasing-power-parity conversions versus national price deflators answer different questions. The authors argue the flat current-purchasing-power-parity series reflects changing the price yardstick each year rather than showing Europe is keeping pace.
Philippe Aghion, Antonin Bergeaud, and Luis GaricanoSilicon Continent
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Aghion et al. note that Krugman does not dispute the claim that Europe’s productivity has lagged the US for 30 years, but sidestep his case for measuring the role of falling prices of US tech goods in cushioning the welfare impact on European consumers.
Does Europe's flat productivity gap reflect a shifting price yardstick?
Core argument: European productivity growth has trailed the United States for three decades, a point on which both Krugman and the authors agree, with Krugman stating explicitly that he is not arguing European productivity is mismeasured.
Krugman and we agree that (1) European productivity growth has trailed the United States for three decades, and Krugman says so clearly (”I am not arguing that European productivity is mismeasured, and never said that.”) (2) Current-PPP chain and a national deflator answer different questions. (3) The weighting mechanism by which an economy that produces goods with falling relative prices sees part of its volume gain valued away, is part of the channel to explain the paradox. We disagree still on one crucial question: Krugman reads the flat current-PPP line as evidence that Europe is not falling behind, while we see it as the product of moving the price measurement stick every year. Hence we do not see the current- PPP line as indicative of anything interpretable.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
European productivity growth has trailed the United States for three decades, a point on which both Krugman and the authors agree, with Krugman stating explicitly that he is not arguing European productivity is mismeasured.
Current-PPP chain measures and a national deflator answer different questions, and the authors argue the flat current-PPP line reflects moving the price measurement stick every year rather than evidence that Europe is not falling behind.
The authors identify a weighting mechanism, in which an economy producing goods with falling relative prices sees part of its volume gain valued away, as part of the channel explaining the paradox.
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How Should We Measure Economic Power?— The authors argue profits measure economic power because they show a firm can do what others can't, and by that metric U.S. firms dominate globally—with Japan and Europe significant and China second-tier—implying greater U.S. power than GDP or industrial output comparisons suggest. The gap favoring the U.S. is most pronounced in high-tech products.
Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking”— A debate on U.S. fiscal policy argues that spending increases, rather than the tax increases needed to fund them, slow growth, and that higher taxes would reduce the expected value of America's innovative risk-taking. The argument holds that cutting debt below 100% of GDP is critical.
Challenging the Narrative of European Decline, Continued— Euro-area income per person falls behind the US when measured in constant 2021 prices but gains on the US when measured using each year's prices, suggesting Europe is holding its own in applying technology. The author argues Europe's real risk is being cut off from strategically important technologies.
AI Summary.US growth in GDP per capita has outpaced Europe's on conventional measures, yet European relative GDP per capita measured at purchasing power parity has not fallen. A model in which the US produces all technology output, and technology alone enjoys productivity growth, generates rising US real GDP at chained constant prices while relative GDP at current prices stays unchanged.
Paul KrugmanKrugman Wonks Out
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Krugman presents an example in which US and European output growth diverge, yet relative GDPs in purchasing power terms remain constant, as the drop in the relative price of tech goods enriches Europe, even though its own output remains constant.
Why has US growth outpaced Europe's without changing relative purchasing-power income?
Core argument: Conventional measures show US GDP per capita growth outpacing Europe's since 2000, yet European relative GDP per capita measured at purchasing power parity has not declined — the US-Europe paradox.
Conventional measures of growth in GDP per capita have favored the United States since 2000. But European relative GDP per capita measured at PPP has not declined. Call all this the US-Europe paradox. Of course, it isn’t really a paradox. It makes perfect sense given US dominance of sectors that are experiencing rapid productivity growth, which leads to a rise in relative US GDP at constant prices but doesn’t translate into a rise in relative GDP at current prices. I assume that the US has a comparative advantage in T [Tech], and hence that all T is produced there. T experiences more rapid technological progress than N [nontech]. I assume that productivity in that sector rises at a rate ⍴, versus zero in N. Given these assumptions, what does the model imply for measured growth and relative performance? The model implies that all T will be concentrated. Because T attracts a share 𝜏 of world spending, it will also account for a share 𝜏 of world GDP, and hence 2𝜏 of US GDP. Given this, technological progress in T implies rising US real GDP, measured the way we actually calculate it — as growth in “chained” constant prices — at a rate of 2𝜏𝜌. Growth in EU real GDP is zero. Yet relative GDP at current prices remains 1.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Conventional measures show US GDP per capita growth outpacing Europe's since 2000, yet European relative GDP per capita measured at purchasing power parity has not declined — the US-Europe paradox.
The model assumes the United States holds a comparative advantage in tech and produces all of it, with tech productivity rising at rate ⍴ while nontech productivity growth is zero.
The model implies US real GDP in chained constant prices grows at twice tech's share of world spending times ⍴ while EU real GDP growth is zero, yet relative GDP at current prices remains 1.
Related Articles:
Is Europe in Economic Decline?— French gross domestic product per person, adjusted for purchasing power, was 74% of the US level in 2001 and 73% in 2024, while Germany closed some of the gap, indicating European living standards have not fallen behind. Higher measured US growth is attributed to rapid productivity growth in information technology, a sector the US dominates.
Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking”— A debate on U.S. fiscal policy argues that spending increases, rather than the tax increases needed to fund them, slow growth, and that higher taxes would reduce the expected value of America's innovative risk-taking. The argument holds that cutting debt below 100% of GDP is critical.
The Two Europes— The International Monetary Fund projects Eastern European economies will close much of the gap with US per capita GDP — Poland from 34% to 67%, Romania 27% to 60%, Lithuania 29% to 69% — while Western Europe slips, with France falling from 86% to 71% and Italy from 93% to 68%.
AI Summary.French gross domestic product per person, adjusted for purchasing power, was 74% of the US level in 2001 and 73% in 2024, while Germany closed some of the gap, indicating European living standards have not fallen behind. Higher measured US growth is attributed to rapid productivity growth in information technology, a sector the US dominates.
Paul KrugmanKrugman Wonks Out
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US outperformance in GDP growth relative to Europe is almost entirely due to the tech sector. Krugman argues the gains are passed on to Europe in the form of lower prices. In PPP terms, the ratio of Europe’s GDP to that of the US hasn’t fallen since 2002.
Have European living standards fallen behind the US over recent decades?
Core argument: French GDP per capita at PPP was 74% of the U.S. level in 2001 and 73% in 2024, while German GDP per capita closed some of the gap with the U.S.
European economies do produce less per person than the U.S. does. In 2001 French GDP per capita, measured at PPP was 74% of the US level. In 2024 the ratio was basically the same: 73%. German GDP per capita actually closed some of the gap with the US. By this measure, a comparison between European and US living standards look about the same today as it did 25 years ago: Europe is not falling behind. The key to understanding US-Europe comparisons is to realize that higher measured US growth is overwhelmingly driven by a small part of the American economy: “tech.” As the Draghi report acknowledges, essentially all of America’s productivity growth has been generated by rapid productivity growth in information technology, which the US currently dominates. Do the gains stay in America or are they shared with the tech sector’s customers, wherever they are? The answer to this question crucially depends upon whether there is competition among technology companies. If there is, then the answer to the question is no: rising productivity will be passed on to consumers in both countries through low prices.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
French GDP per capita at PPP was 74% of the U.S. level in 2001 and 73% in 2024, while German GDP per capita closed some of the gap with the U.S.
Higher measured U.S. growth is overwhelmingly driven by "tech," and the Draghi report acknowledges that essentially all of America's productivity growth comes from rapid productivity growth in information technology, which the U.S. currently dominates.
Whether U.S. tech productivity gains stay in America or reach customers abroad depends on competition among technology companies: with competition, rising productivity would be passed to consumers in both countries through low prices.
Related Articles:
The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe— A European Union competitiveness report attributes the EU's labour productivity growth gap with the US largely to weaker activity in information and communications technology and large-scale digital services; excluding main ICT sectors, EU productivity was broadly at par with the US from 2000-2019. It estimates Europe's investment share must rise about 5 percentage points of GDP.
Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking”— A debate on U.S. fiscal policy argues that spending increases, rather than the tax increases needed to fund them, slow growth, and that higher taxes would reduce the expected value of America's innovative risk-taking. The argument holds that cutting debt below 100% of GDP is critical.
Why Do Americans No Longer Work So Much More Than Non-Americans?— About half of the 1990s gap between American and European hours worked had reversed by the end of the 2010s. The authors estimate US hours per person declined after the 2000s because of rising benefits for the non-employed—especially health benefits like Medicaid—while non-US hours rose with higher wages and lower work costs.
AI Summary.The International Monetary Fund projects Eastern European economies will close much of the gap with US per capita GDP — Poland from 34% to 67%, Romania 27% to 60%, Lithuania 29% to 69% — while Western Europe slips, with France falling from 86% to 71% and Italy from 93% to 68%.
Luis GaricanoSilicon Continent
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Western Europe is losing ground to the US as measured by PPP-adjusted GDP per capita; e.g. France is projected to retreat from 86% of the US’s 2000 level to 71% in 2030. Eastern Europe is converging, with Poland approaching 67% of the US level, versus 34% in 2000.
Is Eastern Europe converging with the US while Western Europe falls behind?
Core argument: Western Europe moved the opposite way, with Italy falling from 93% of the US per capita GDP level to 68%, France from 86% to 71%, Spain from 72% to 61%, and Portugal from 64% to 57%.
While we have spent a decade complaining about Europe’s stagnation, a real positive convergence story has been unfolding at the eastern edge of the continent. Poland entered the millennium at 34% of US per capita GDP; by 2030, the IMF projects it will reach 67%. Romania rises from 27% to 60%. Lithuania moves from 29% to 69%. Bulgaria goes from 23% to 53%. These countries’ citizens are still significantly poorer than Americans. But they have closed a large part of the gap with the global frontier. Meanwhile, at the other end of the continent, the picture is almost the mirror image. Portugal slipped from 64% to 57%. Spain fell from 72% to 61%. The richer laggards are more striking: France dropped from 86% of the US level to 71%, and Italy fell from 93% to 68%. The hope in Europe after the Draghi report was that the Russian threat to the east would supply the political urgency the reform agendas in the “stuck” [Western] part of Europe lack. The correlation created by the crisis is the wrong one. The Russian shock is mobilising the countries where the Draghi problem is not most severe, and leaving the countries where it is most severe largely untouched. War is reforming Europe’s frontier. It is not reforming Europe’s rear, and on present evidence, it will not.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Western Europe moved the opposite way, with Italy falling from 93% of the US per capita GDP level to 68%, France from 86% to 71%, Spain from 72% to 61%, and Portugal from 64% to 57%.
The author argues the Russian shock is mobilising Europe's eastern frontier, where the Draghi reform problem is not most severe, while leaving largely untouched the Western countries where it is most severe.
Related Articles:
Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking”— A debate on U.S. fiscal policy argues that spending increases, rather than the tax increases needed to fund them, slow growth, and that higher taxes would reduce the expected value of America's innovative risk-taking. The argument holds that cutting debt below 100% of GDP is critical.
The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe— A European Union competitiveness report attributes the EU's labour productivity growth gap with the US largely to weaker activity in information and communications technology and large-scale digital services; excluding main ICT sectors, EU productivity was broadly at par with the US from 2000-2019. It estimates Europe's investment share must rise about 5 percentage points of GDP.
Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World?— An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.
