“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
AI Summary.European listed companies' capital spending relative to sales is approaching a 10-year high, with capital expenditure projected to be €77bn higher in 2028 than in 2025. Utilities account for about 40% (€31bn) of the increase, while defense spending is projected to rise 36%, industrials excluding defense 24% and information technology 78%.
Huw van SteenisApollo
Date Posted:
The ratio of capex to sales for the Euro STOXX 600 excluding financials is approaching its highest level since the crisis, driven by a spike in defense, industrial and IT spending.
Are utilities, defense and digitization lifting European capital spending?
Core argument: European listed companies are expected to spend €77 billion more on capital expenditure in 2028 than in 2025, with the capex-to-sales ratio approaching a 10-year high after a long period of underinvestment.
European companies are investing again. The capex-to-sales ratio is approaching a 10-year high, and European listed companies are expected to spend €77 billion more on capex in 2028 than in 2025. Utilities alone account for €31 billion, or around 40%, of the increase. Defense capex is expected to rise 36%, industrials excluding defense 24% and information technology 78%. This comes after a long period of underinvestment. Across Europe, higher spending on energy, grids, defense, reshoring, infrastructure and digitalization is now lifting capital intensity.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
European listed companies are expected to spend €77 billion more on capital expenditure in 2028 than in 2025, with the capex-to-sales ratio approaching a 10-year high after a long period of underinvestment.
Utilities account for €31 billion, or around 40%, of the expected increase in European capital expenditure between 2025 and 2028.
Defense capital expenditure in Europe is expected to rise 36%, industrials excluding defense 24% and information technology 78%, as higher spending on energy, grids, reshoring, infrastructure and digitalization lifts capital intensity.
Related Articles:
Economic Size and Economic Power— By manufacturing value added China has the world's largest manufacturing sector, with the US and European Union roughly co-equal and individually smaller; netting out intra-EU trade, the EU is the largest exporter of goods and services and the US a distant third. The author argues all three are vulnerable to weaponized interdependence, with China apparently least so.
Capital Is Making a Comeback— Tangible investment in property, factories and equipment fell from 12.5% to 8.5% of private gross domestic product, while intangible investment in intellectual property, software and process knowledge rose from about 11.5% to 16.75%. The author argues demand for tangible capital investment will now have to rise.
Carbon Pricing’s Impact on Global Industry Is Quietly Growing— Direct carbon pricing—carbon taxes and emissions trading systems—now covers about 30% of global emissions, with most coverage coming from emissions trading systems in China and the European Union. The EU complements its system with a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism that prices carbon on certain high-emitting imports regardless of where they are produced.
AI Summary.Countries that become dependent on increasingly uneconomic investment have found adjustment difficult, as in Japan, where average GDP growth fell from about 5% to under 1% after 1991 and its share of global manufacturing fell by nearly 60%. Rebalancing requires a larger role for consumption, and absent a sharp rise in consumption growth, it occurs through slower production growth.
Michael PettisChina Financial Markets
Date Posted:
Pettis argues that China faces the same dilemma as Japan after 1991: reducing uneconomic investment requires consumption to become a larger source of demand. But raising household income may undermine manufacturing competitiveness, while China’s higher debt limits its ability to cushion the adjustment.
How costly is rebalancing away from dependence on uneconomic investment?
Core argument: Japan’s average GDP growth fell from around 5% in the decade before 1991 to under 1% in the decade after, while its share of global GDP fell by nearly half between 1991 and 2008.
Every country that has become excessively dependent on increasingly uneconomic investment has found it difficult to begin an adjustment that its leaders knew was necessary. Japan in the 1980s, Brazil in the 1970s, and the Soviet Union in the 1960s all faced versions of this problem. The Japanese experience shows how costly that adjustment can be. Rebalancing meant for Japan, and means for China, increasing the role of consumption in driving GDP growth, and if an economy cannot rebalance through a sharp increase in consumption growth – and historical precedents suggest that this is extremely unlikely – it must, almost by definition, rebalance through slower growth in production. This is especially difficult when the international competitiveness of manufacturing depends on the same distribution of income that constrains consumption. Raising the role of consumption, in that case, requires raising household income relative to production, but this automatically reduces the cost advantages on which manufacturing depends.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Japan’s average GDP growth fell from around 5% in the decade before 1991 to under 1% in the decade after, while its share of global GDP fell by nearly half between 1991 and 2008.
Japan’s share of global manufacturing fell by nearly 60% over the broader period, illustrating how costly adjustment can be for an economy dependent on increasingly uneconomic investment.
Rebalancing means raising consumption’s role in driving GDP growth, and since historical precedents suggest a sharp increase in consumption growth is extremely unlikely, China would rebalance through slower growth in production.
Related Articles:
Two Asian Giants, One Economic Trap— China's combined public and private debt is estimated at about 300% of GDP, and an updated "Japanisation" index indicates China has scored as more Japanised than Japan for the past five years. Analysts attribute the 1.7% yield on 10-year Chinese government bonds to weak credit demand, with investors parking cash in government debt.
Why Global Imbalances Matter— Countries running persistent trade surpluses, such as China, Germany and Japan, have built their economies around an excess supply of tradeable goods and services, leaving them dependent on deficit countries to absorb it. That dependence gives deficit countries bargaining power and exposes surplus countries to pressure to expand domestic demand.
Is China’s High-Quality Investment Output Economically Viable?— China's technological progress and infrastructure do not refute claims of overinvestment, since overinvestment often produces real physical assets and technological gains yet still counts as overinvestment when it generates less real value than the resources, subsidies, and transfers it consumes. When such losses are capitalized, assets are carried above their real economic value.
AI Summary.China's leadership interprets weak consumption, slow household income growth, rising unemployment, persistent deflation, and growing external surpluses as acceptable costs of a development model that equates growth with capital accumulation and technology deployment. In this view, higher wages, consumption, and services follow naturally once productive industries mature.
Oliver Melton and Logan WrightForeign Affairs
Date Posted:
Oliver Melton and Logan Wright note that Zhongnanhai’s push to expand production amid weak consumer demand is entrenching deflation. The current leadership, they argue, views some deflation as a feature of “hard-won efficiency gains” and is not concerned about growing reliance on foreign demand.
Does China view weak consumption and deflation as acceptable development costs?
Core argument: China’s leadership sees the same data—rising external surpluses, weak consumption, slower household income growth, weak credit demand, rising unemployment and underemployment, and persistent deflation—but draws different conclusions about what these developments indicate and what Beijing should do in response.
The party is sticking to this path because the leadership believes it is working. It sees the same troubling data—including rising external surpluses, weak consumption, slower household income growth, weak credit demand, rising unemployment and underemployment, and persistent deflation—but it has reached wildly different conclusions about what these developments indicate and what Beijing should do in response. China’s worldview treats development as equivalent to capital accumulation and sees productivity as determined by the control and deployment of technology. It posits that the growth of the service sector, higher wages, and higher consumption are the consequences of that physical underlying foundation—they follow naturally in later stages of the development process once the productive industries have flourished. The resulting structural imbalance that weakens household income growth, the service sector, and public services was thus not an accident; in China’s economic development theory, this is seen as self-discipline that will pay off with more rapid long-term development.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
China’s leadership sees the same data—rising external surpluses, weak consumption, slower household income growth, weak credit demand, rising unemployment and underemployment, and persistent deflation—but draws different conclusions about what these developments indicate and what Beijing should do in response.
China’s economic worldview treats development as equivalent to capital accumulation and productivity as determined by the control and deployment of technology, with service-sector growth, higher wages, and higher consumption following once productive industries have flourished.
The structural imbalance weakening household income growth, the service sector, and public services is treated in China’s economic development theory not as an accident but as self-discipline that will pay off with more rapid long-term development.
Related Articles:
The Future, Made In China— China's economy runs on parallel tracks: a property crash, a booming high-tech manufacturing sector, and university graduates trained for traditional white-collar jobs entering a labor market geared toward advanced manufacturing. Researchers at Stanford and Harvard found a swing from optimism to pessimism, with about 28% of citizens expecting living standards to improve.
China Sees Nearly 10% Decline In Marriages in 2026 So Far, Foreshadowing Lower Birth Rate— China recorded 4.648m marriage registrations in the first nine months of the year, down 504,000 from a year earlier, a nearly 10% decline that points to a full-year drop. Marriages peaked at 13.469m in 2013 and have generally trended downward since, with divorce registrations at 2.082m.
The Year of the Trojan Fire Horse: China’s Imbalanced Economy and Unrelenting Mercantilism— About 30% of Chinese industrial companies are unprofitable "zombies" kept alive by subsidies far larger than those elsewhere, rather than exiting amid falling industrial producer prices. Countries with large increases in manufactured imports from China also saw slowdowns in domestic manufacturing, including declining manufacturing shares of output across most of Southeast Asia.
AI Summary.The author argues the AI boom's economic significance lies more in stock market gains than in data center construction, and that the inability to monetize AI investments could end the boom. Simulations using the Federal Reserve's FRB/US model suggest that an end to the buildout plus a roughly 30% market decline would slow growth to about 1.5%, short of recession.
Jason FurmanEconvitals
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important
Furman estimates that the data-center buildout, which began in mid-2024, had raised US GDP by only ~0.3% by 2026Q3, as the equipment is largely imported and the US was already near full employment. Counting AI-driven stock market gains, the effect rises to ~0.6%. If the buildout ended and stocks fell ~30%, growth would slow to ~1.5%.
How would an end to the AI boom affect growth?
Core argument: If the AI data center buildout ended and the stock market fell about 30%, the FRB/US model predicts growth would slow to roughly 1½ percent, short of even a shallow recession.
The data center buildout is set to be among the largest investment expansions in peacetime American history. How different is our economy today because of it? The answer, based on a simulation using the large-scale macroeconomic model used by the Federal Reserve (FRB/US), is not much. The buildout by itself has raised GDP by only about 0.3%, because most of the investment is imported, and imports do not add to U.S. GDP or lower the unemployment rate. The stock market boom that came with it matters more—together they have raised GDP by about 0.6% and lowered the unemployment rate by about 0.3 percentage point.This analysis suggests that the economy could survive less data center buildout just fine. Investment would fall, but so would imports and interest rates, and GDP would be little changed. A broader fall in the stock market would be a bigger deal, The bottom line: so far the AI economy is less a story about data centers than about the stock market—and that is also where the risk is.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
If the AI data center buildout ended and the stock market fell about 30%, the FRB/US model predicts growth would slow to roughly 1½ percent, short of even a shallow recession.
The economy could withstand less data center buildout, making the AI economy so far less a story about data centers than about the stock market, which is also where the risk lies.
Public policy changes or an inability to monetize AI investments could stop the AI boom, and financial-system complexities such as unwinding leverage, absent from the FRB/US model, pose a tail risk resembling 2001 more than 2007–09.
Related Articles:
Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected— The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
The S&P 500 And Cembalest’s “AI Universe” After The Midterms— An "AI universe" index of 42 stocks groups companies into three categories: 28 direct AI firms including NVIDIA, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta and Broadcom; 8 AI-linked utilities such as Vistra, NextEra and Constellation; and 6 capital equipment makers including Eaton, Quanta and GE Vernova.
US Labor Productivity Increases at Fastest Pace in a Year— US labor productivity, measured as nonfarm business output per hour, rose at a 3.6% annualized rate, up from an upwardly revised 2.1% pace, while unit labor costs fell 0.7%. The acceleration suggests a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
AI Summary.Texas, Georgia and Ohio account for more than 40% of all planned U.S. data center capacity, including large projects from OpenAI and Meta. AI investment is projected to account for 1.9% of U.S. gross domestic product this year, the biggest share of economic growth for a new industry's buildout since the 19th-century railroad boom.
Will Parker, Anissa Gardizy and Amrith RamkumarWall Street Journal
Date Posted:
According to an Evercore ISI analysis, 40% of planned US data center construction is located in three states: Texas, Georgia, and Ohio. All three states have incoming Democratic governors who ran for office on restricting data center construction.
How concentrated is US data center buildout in a few states?
Core argument: Texas, Georgia and Ohio account for more than 40% of all planned U.S. data center capacity, according to Evercore ISI, with OpenAI’s Stargate under construction in Texas and Project Camellia planned for Georgia.
Texas, Georgia and Ohio account for more than 40% of all planned data center capacity in the U.S., according to investment bank Evercore ISI. OpenAI’s Stargate is under construction in Texas and it is planning another massive data center effort—Project Camellia—in Georgia. Meta is building a large data center in Texas and another dubbed Prometheus in Ohio. AI investment is projected to account for 1.9% of gross domestic product this year, according to Goldman Sachs, the biggest share of economic growth for the build out of a new industry since the railroad boom in the 19th century. And 750,000 new jobs in the U.S. from 2023 through September were also tied to AI, according to LinkedIn estimates.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Texas, Georgia and Ohio account for more than 40% of all planned U.S. data center capacity, according to Evercore ISI, with OpenAI’s Stargate under construction in Texas and Project Camellia planned for Georgia.
Goldman Sachs projects AI investment will account for 1.9% of U.S. GDP this year, the biggest share of economic growth for the build out of a new industry since the 19th-century railroad boom.
LinkedIn estimates that 750,000 new U.S. jobs from 2023 through September were tied to AI, and Meta is building a large data center in Texas and another dubbed Prometheus in Ohio.
Related Articles:
Now You Can See Everything— Nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won, putting an estimated 37.5 GW of planned capacity at risk of a pause and another 15 GW subject to conditions such as grid cost-sharing, water limits, and ended tax incentives. The 37 GW expected in 2027, 75% already under construction, is largely unaffected.
Financing the AI Buildout— The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected— The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
AI Summary.European and Asian buyers pay over $30 per million British thermal units for natural gas while US buyers pay around $3 and Canadian buyers about $1.5, a roughly 12x gap that is the widest on record. US liquefied natural gas exports have not been enough to fully link the domestic market to global prices.
Javier BlasBloomberg
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
The price of natural gas in Western Europe and Japan is now a record 12x that of the North American price, as the shale revolution and ample domestic reserves shield North American gas consumers from the fallout of the Iran war.
How wide is the gap between US and overseas gas prices?
Core argument: European and Asian gas buyers pay north of $30 per mBtu while US buyers pay around $3 and Canadian buyers about $1.5, a gap reaching a ratio of 12 times.
While European and Asian consumers are now paying north of $30 per million British thermal unit for their gas, US buyers pay around $3 per mBtu. Last week, US gas prices briefly touched a two-year low of $2.5 per mBut — in the middle of an energy crisis. Canadian costs are even lower, at about $1.5 per mBtu. The price difference between gas in Europe and Asia versus North America, reaching now a ratio of 12 times, has never been wider; not during the 2022 gas shock following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, nor in 2011-2012 after the Fukushima nuclear accident. Today, the US is exporting huge amounts of gas as LNG. But even that isn’t enough to fully connect its domestic market to the global one. As such, America is making a double profit: First, it enjoys ultra-low gas prices; second, it’s paid enormous sums for its exports.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
European and Asian gas buyers pay north of $30 per mBtu while US buyers pay around $3 and Canadian buyers about $1.5, a gap reaching a ratio of 12 times.
The price gap between European and Asian gas and North American gas has never been wider, exceeding the spreads during the 2022 shock after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and in 2011–2012 after the Fukushima accident pushed Japan toward gas.
US gas prices briefly touched a two-year low of $2.5 per mBtu, and large LNG exports have not fully connected the domestic market to the global one, leaving America with low domestic prices and large export earnings.
Related Articles:
U.S. Economy Less Vulnerable To Geopolitical Oil Price Shocks Than In The Past— The United States became a net oil exporter in late 2019, and oil and oil product spending fell from near 8% of GDP in 1980 to 3% in 2024. The authors estimate a 15% global oil supply disruption would now cut annualized U.S. real GDP growth by 0.3pp, versus 1.7pp in the rest of the world.
Fighting Words: The Energy Transition in 2026— Estimates based on primary energy overstate how much electricity is needed to replace oil in passenger cars, since electric motors convert 80%-90% of electricity into motion versus about 18% for gasoline cars. Measuring useful final energy net of waste heat avoids this "primary energy fallacy": the US consumed 45 exajoules of useful final energy versus 95 exajoules of primary energy.
Power Politics: Energy Self-Sufficiency in a Modern Mercantilist World— China leads in adding power to the grid, with more than 30,000 miles of ultra-high-voltage transmission lines versus zero in the US and lead times for large transformers of 48 weeks against a US average of 143 weeks. This positions China to accommodate new demand sources such as artificial intelligence.
AI Summary.Productivity gains and headcount declines attributed to AI are concentrated in the US tech sector, with no comparable pattern in US finance and professional services or in other high-income countries. The column argues the evidence is more consistent with interest rate increases, inflation, and economic uncertainty prompting large technology firms to cut staff than with AI-driven displacement.
John Burn-MurdochFinancial Times
Date Posted:
AI-adopting sectors’ output has risen further above its pre-2023 trend in the US than in Europe. John Burn-Murdoch points to US tech layoffs after 2022 rate hikes, hinting that the reduction in employment may itself be the reason for increased productivity.
Do tech job cuts reflect AI or economic conditions?
Core argument: Burn-Murdoch finds the productivity divergence in AI-adopting sectors is concentrated in US tech and absent in the UK, Canada, Australia, France, Germany, Sweden, and the EU27, and “weak to non-existent” in US finance and professional services.
Labour productivity in the sectors with heaviest adoption of AI has decisively ticked up from its pre-2023 trend, while other sectors have not. The link visible in the US between AI usage, productivity growth and falling employment is absent elsewhere. Where the pattern does show up, it is overwhelmingly a story about the tech sector rather than the broader triumvirate of tech, finance and professional services. The key inflection point comes in 2022 — when AI meant chatbots, not agents. The productivity story is not one of accelerating output and revenue, but flatlining or contracting headcount. Put all of this together and “productivity is surging in AI-adopting sectors” [might] become “rate hikes, inflation and other economic uncertainty starting in 2022 caused companies to pull back on hiring, and Big Tech went further in making substantial lay-offs long before production-ready AI.” None of this completely rules out any role for direct AI job displacement. AI is already disrupting the nature of many jobs. Hiring slowdowns and lay-offs began as a response to broader economic shocks and uncertainty, and could now be extended by company beliefs that AI allows them to do more with less.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Burn-Murdoch finds the productivity divergence in AI-adopting sectors is concentrated in US tech and absent in the UK, Canada, Australia, France, Germany, Sweden, and the EU27, and “weak to non-existent” in US finance and professional services.
Tech employment contraction dates to Q4 2022, before production-ready AI, with productivity gains arising from flat or falling headcount against stable revenues at Alphabet, Meta, Microsoft, and Spotify, while Bank of America, Visa, Accenture, and Deloitte show no comparable pattern.
Burn-Murdoch argues rate hikes, inflation, and economic uncertainty from 2022 onward better explain Big Tech headcount cuts than AI-driven displacement, noting a Goldman Sachs link between AI usage and employment declines disappears when a richer employment dataset is substituted.
Related Articles:
Looking for the Ladder— The article argues that the hiring downturn in occupations most exposed to generative AI reflects interest-rate sensitivity rather than AI itself, since roughly 38% of workers in the most AI-exposed quintile work in information, finance and insurance, and professional and technical services, versus under 2% in the least-exposed quintile.
Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected— The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
No Signs of AI Payoff Outside the Tech Sector— Revenue per worker and profit margins are rising for the seven largest technology companies but flat for the rest of the S&P 500, with no signs of artificial intelligence boosting productivity growth. The author argues that as long as spending on artificial intelligence stays confined to a small part of the economy, its macroeconomic effects will remain very limited.
AI Summary.The US economy grew at a 3.4% annualised rate, beating analyst forecasts of 3.2% and accelerating from 2.2% in the prior quarter, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Private fixed investment jumped 9.4%, led by AI data centre and high-tech equipment spending, while consumer spending rose 3.8%.
Myles McCormick and Kate DuguidFinancial Times
Date Posted:
US real GDP grew at a 3.4% annualized rate in Q3, supported by the AI data center buildout and robust consumer spending. Private fixed investment rose at a 9.4% annualized rate in Q3.
Are AI investment and consumer spending driving faster US growth?
Core argument: The US economy grew at a 3.4% annualised rate in the third quarter, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, accelerating from 2.2% in the second quarter and beating the 3.2% forecast in a Bloomberg poll of analysts.
The US economy expanded at an annualised rate of 3.4% in the third quarter, topping Wall Street expectations, as companies invested heavily in AI and American consumers continued to splash out despite high prices. The strong GDP figure from the Bureau of Economic Analysis marked an acceleration from the 2.2% growth rate in the second quarter and was ahead of the 3.2% forecast in a Bloomberg poll of analysts. The increase was fuelled by corporate America’s huge spending on infrastructure associated with the AI boom and a continued splurge by consumers, even as the Iran war causes inflation to surge. AI spending led the gains, with private fixed investment jumping 9.4% during the quarter, its biggest rise since the post-Covid rebound in 2020, as tech groups raced to build data centres and snap up high-tech equipment. Consumer spending rose 3.8%, the same pace as the previous period, even as a torrent of inflation washed across the economy and a boost from tax refunds faded.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The US economy grew at a 3.4% annualised rate in the third quarter, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, accelerating from 2.2% in the second quarter and beating the 3.2% forecast in a Bloomberg poll of analysts.
Private fixed investment jumped 9.4% in the third quarter, its biggest rise since the post-Covid rebound in 2020, as tech groups raced to build data centres and buy high-tech equipment.
Consumer spending rose 3.8%, matching the previous quarter’s pace, even as inflation surged amid the Iran war and a boost from tax refunds faded.
Related Articles:
Higher Utilisation Explains The Recent Surge In Productivity Growth— Measured total factor productivity growth is estimated to come almost entirely from higher input utilisation rather than underlying efficiency gains, based on a method that infers unobserved capital and labour utilisation from movements in hours per worker. On this evidence, recent productivity gains reflect "working harder" rather than "working smarter.
Have We Entered an Era of High Productivity Growth?— Labor productivity has grown solidly while the San Francisco Federal Reserve's total factor productivity index, which adjusts for the equipment and technology workers use, has grown modestly, suggesting gains so far reflect better tools rather than broader advances. A regime-switching model puts the probability of a high-productivity regime at 57% using labor productivity and 21% using total factor productivity.
What Is AI Investment Crowding Out?— Analysts estimate US artificial intelligence investment will total nearly $600bn in 2026, about 2% of GDP and over 10% of business fixed investment, yet add just 0.1pp to measured GDP growth because much equipment is imported or uncounted. Accounting for crowding-out, wealth effects, and higher prices subtracts roughly 0.1pp more.