“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
AI Summary.The Economist estimates artificial intelligence needs roughly $3tn in revenue by 2030 for the planned data-centre buildout to earn a conventional return, a figure other analysts have also reached. That equals almost a tenth of the roughly $35tn in total worker compensation across rich OECD countries.
Economist StaffThe Economist
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The Economist calculates that the US data center buildout needs ~$3T in revenue by 2030 to offer a competitive ROI. That amounts to ~18% of US annual labor compensation inclusive of health care or ~10% of labor compensation across the OECD.
How much revenue does the AI buildout need to pay off?
Core argument: The Economist calculates that AI needs roughly $3trn in revenue by 2030 for the planned data-centre buildout to deliver a conventional rate of return.
The Economist calculates that AI needs around $3trn in revenue by 2030 for the planned data-centre buildout to offer a conventional rate of return. Other analysts, including Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh of Columbia Business School and a duo at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, have reached similar figures. To put that number into perspective, all compensation for all workers—wages, plus perks like health insurance—adds up to around $16.5trn in America, or $35trn across the OECD, a club mostly of rich countries. So AI would need to lay claim to almost a tenth of today’s rich-world wages for the data-centre boom to pencil out. Of course, that could happen in a more benign fashion if the entire economy grows swiftly—and AI evangelists do also expect dramatic growth from here.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The Economist calculates that AI needs roughly $3trn in revenue by 2030 for the planned data-centre buildout to deliver a conventional rate of return.
The $3trn figure amounts to almost a tenth of the roughly $35trn in total worker compensation across the OECD, which compares with about $16.5trn in America alone.
Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh of Columbia Business School and a pair of researchers at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research have reached similar revenue figures, while AI evangelists expect dramatic economic growth from here.
Related Articles:
Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected— The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
No Signs of AI Payoff Outside the Tech Sector— Revenue per worker and profit margins are rising for the seven largest technology companies but flat for the rest of the S&P 500, with no signs of artificial intelligence boosting productivity growth. The author argues that as long as spending on artificial intelligence stays confined to a small part of the economy, its macroeconomic effects will remain very limited.
AI Summary.Long-term U.S. Treasury yields did not fall during an artificial-intelligence equity sell-off, which the author argues contradicts the view that AI capital spending and hyperscaler debt issuance are the main force pushing yields higher. The author attributes elevated long-term yields instead to a rising fiscal risk premium tied to U.S. public debt growth.
Robin BrooksRobin Brooks Substack
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Brooks notes that while the 2-year and 10-year Treasury yields fell during last week’s AI sell-off, the 10y10y forward yield did not. He argues its failure to do so “further cements the case for the fiscal risk premium,” concluding that long yields are up “because of mounting fiscal stress, not because of AI capex.”
Are elevated long-term yields driven by fiscal strain rather than AI borrowing?
Core argument: Robin Brooks argues that long-term Treasury yields failed to fall during the late-2026 AI equity sell-off, contradicting the view that AI capital expenditure and hyperscaler debt issuance have been the primary force pushing yields higher.
The black line shows daily data from the start of 2026 for the two-year Treasury yield.The blue line is the 10-year yield and the purple line is the 10y10y forward yield. If the AI bubble were a material driver of the rise in long-term yields, the purple line should have fallen this week alongside the blue and black ones. It didn’t and that in my mind further cements the case for the fiscal risk premium. The midterm elections and the AI sell-off that’s ensued have given us the perfect natural experiment to disentangle what’s going on with long-term yields. They’re up because of mounting fiscal stress, not because of AI. Once the war ends - and it will - we’ll be left with all the structural challenges the US and others in the G10 face. The fact that we’re rapidly running out of fiscal space is top of that list.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Robin Brooks argues that long-term Treasury yields failed to fall during the late-2026 AI equity sell-off, contradicting the view that AI capital expenditure and hyperscaler debt issuance have been the primary force pushing yields higher.
The November payrolls print of 165,000 jobs beat the Bloomberg consensus of 70,000 by 95,000, or 1.2 standard deviations against a historical standard deviation of 76,000, and the two-year yield rose five basis points, in line with or above the historical regression of yield responses to payrolls surprises.
Brooks concludes that elevated long-term yields reflect mounting fiscal stress rather than AI, noting the 10-year/10-year forward yield did not decline alongside shorter maturities during the sell-off week and that corporate dissaving is “not remotely near where it was in the IT bubble of the early 2000s.”.
Related Articles:
Global Bond Sales Smash Record, Fueled by AI Borrowing Binge— Financial firms, companies and governments raised about $6.61tn through broadly syndicated investment-grade and junk-bond sales, up 15% year-over-year to a record. Cloud-computing giants and data-center developers sold almost $368bn of debt, more than 6x the prior year, accounting for roughly a third of the increase in borrowing.
Is the AI Buildout Pushing Up Yields?— US saving-investment data show that non-financial corporations remain net savers, unlike the early-2000s information technology boom when they flipped to net borrowers and their capital spending accounted for the entire current account deficit. Government dissaving through the budget deficit, not the artificial intelligence buildout, is absorbing national resources.
The Meaning Of Higher Real Yields— US inflation-protected Treasury yields have broken above their post-2008 highs, indicating the real cost of capital is rising, while nominal 20- and 30-year Treasury yields remain within their three-year ranges. The article argues an artificial-intelligence-driven investment boom has raised demand for capital, and that corporate debt-to-equity ratios have fallen and interest coverage has surged since Covid.
AI Summary.The author argues the AI boom's economic significance lies more in stock market gains than in data center construction, and that the inability to monetize AI investments could end the boom. Simulations using the Federal Reserve's FRB/US model suggest that an end to the buildout plus a roughly 30% market decline would slow growth to about 1.5%, short of recession.
Jason FurmanEconvitals
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Furman estimates that the data-center buildout, which began in mid-2024, had raised US GDP by only ~0.3% by 2026Q3, as the equipment is largely imported and the US was already near full employment. Counting AI-driven stock market gains, the effect rises to ~0.6%. If the buildout ended and stocks fell ~30%, growth would slow to ~1.5%.
How would an end to the AI boom affect growth?
Core argument: If the AI data center buildout ended and the stock market fell about 30%, the FRB/US model predicts growth would slow to roughly 1½ percent, short of even a shallow recession.
The data center buildout is set to be among the largest investment expansions in peacetime American history. How different is our economy today because of it? The answer, based on a simulation using the large-scale macroeconomic model used by the Federal Reserve (FRB/US), is not much. The buildout by itself has raised GDP by only about 0.3%, because most of the investment is imported, and imports do not add to U.S. GDP or lower the unemployment rate. The stock market boom that came with it matters more—together they have raised GDP by about 0.6% and lowered the unemployment rate by about 0.3 percentage point.This analysis suggests that the economy could survive less data center buildout just fine. Investment would fall, but so would imports and interest rates, and GDP would be little changed. A broader fall in the stock market would be a bigger deal, The bottom line: so far the AI economy is less a story about data centers than about the stock market—and that is also where the risk is.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
If the AI data center buildout ended and the stock market fell about 30%, the FRB/US model predicts growth would slow to roughly 1½ percent, short of even a shallow recession.
The economy could withstand less data center buildout, making the AI economy so far less a story about data centers than about the stock market, which is also where the risk lies.
Public policy changes or an inability to monetize AI investments could stop the AI boom, and financial-system complexities such as unwinding leverage, absent from the FRB/US model, pose a tail risk resembling 2001 more than 2007–09.
Related Articles:
Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected— The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
The S&P 500 And Cembalest’s “AI Universe” After The Midterms— An "AI universe" index of 42 stocks groups companies into three categories: 28 direct AI firms including NVIDIA, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta and Broadcom; 8 AI-linked utilities such as Vistra, NextEra and Constellation; and 6 capital equipment makers including Eaton, Quanta and GE Vernova.
US Labor Productivity Increases at Fastest Pace in a Year— US labor productivity, measured as nonfarm business output per hour, rose at a 3.6% annualized rate, up from an upwardly revised 2.1% pace, while unit labor costs fell 0.7%. The acceleration suggests a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
AI Summary.An "AI universe" index of 42 stocks groups companies into three categories: 28 direct AI firms including NVIDIA, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta and Broadcom; 8 AI-linked utilities such as Vistra, NextEra and Constellation; and 6 capital equipment makers including Eaton, Quanta and GE Vernova.
Edward ConardMacro Roundup
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As the probability of a Democrat-controlled Senate rose from 50% in online betting in early September to 100% after the election, the S&P 500 fell 4.7% lead by an 8.9% drop in AI-related stocks and a 1.1% decline in the rest of the market.
How is the AI universe index of stocks composed?
Core argument: Michael Cembalest's "AI universe" comprises 42 stocks across three categories: 28 direct AI names, 8 AI utilities, and 6 AI capital equipment companies.
As the probability of a Democrat-controlled Senate rose from 50% in online betting in early September to 100% after the election, the S&P 500 fell 4.7% lead by an 8.9% drop in AI-related stocks and a 1.1% decline in the rest of the market.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Michael Cembalest's "AI universe" comprises 42 stocks across three categories: 28 direct AI names, 8 AI utilities, and 6 AI capital equipment companies.
The 28 direct AI stocks in Cembalest's universe include NVIDIA, Microsoft, Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Broadcom, Tesla, Oracle, Palantir, AMD, Salesforce, IBM, Intel, Micron, Dell and Super Micro Computer.
Cembalest's AI universe includes 8 utilities, among them NRG, Vistra, NextEra and Constellation, and 6 capital equipment makers, among them Eaton, Trane, Quanta and GE Vernova.
Related Articles:
The Stock Market’s Read On The Midterms, In Its Winners And Losers— Stocks rose broadly after a sweeping Democratic win in midterm elections, with health insurers tied to the Affordable Care Act and solar companies gaining while data-center firms and companies linked to Trump and Musk fell. The move reflects the increment beyond already-priced-in Democratic victories, from greater certainty and a larger-than-expected margin.
Califoreboding— A basket of 42 AI stocks accounts for 60%-80% of all S&P 500 earnings growth, price returns and capital spending, while 60% of S&P 500 stocks sit 20% or more below their highs and only 30% outperform the index. AI-related construction spending has risen 38%, the only positive trend as manufacturing, commercial real estate and residential construction decline.
One Hundred Years in the U.S. Stock Markets— Over a century, U.S. publicly traded stocks generated roughly $91tn in shareholder wealth enhancement, with returns strongly positively skewed and dominated by a relatively small number of high-performing firms. Because most possible outcomes fall below the mean in a skewed distribution, the authors argue financial planning should focus on median outcomes or the full distribution.
AI Summary.US labor productivity, measured as nonfarm business output per hour, rose at a 3.6% annualized rate, up from an upwardly revised 2.1% pace, while unit labor costs fell 0.7%. The acceleration suggests a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
Julia FanzeresBloomberg
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Nonfarm business productivity grew at a 3.6% annualized rate in Q3, the fastest pace in a year. Real hourly compensation rose 1.1%, while the labor share fell to 53%, the lowest in data going back to 1947.
Is a capital spending boom lifting worker productivity?
Core argument: US nonfarm business output per hour rose at a 3.6% annualized rate in the third quarter, the fastest pace in a year, following an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
US labor productivity accelerated in the third quarter at the fastest pace in a year, suggesting a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency at a time when input costs have soared. Productivity, or nonfarm business output per hour, increased at a 3.6% annualized rate after an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics showed Thursday. Unit labor costs — what businesses pay employees to produce one unit of output — fell 0.7%, the first decline since the second quarter of 2025.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
US nonfarm business output per hour rose at a 3.6% annualized rate in the third quarter, the fastest pace in a year, following an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Unit labor costs, what businesses pay employees to produce one unit of output, fell 0.7% in the third quarter, the first decline since the second quarter of 2025.
The third-quarter productivity acceleration suggests a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency at a time when input costs have soared.
Related Articles:
Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected— The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
Higher Utilisation Explains The Recent Surge In Productivity Growth— Measured total factor productivity growth is estimated to come almost entirely from higher input utilisation rather than underlying efficiency gains, based on a method that infers unobserved capital and labour utilisation from movements in hours per worker. On this evidence, recent productivity gains reflect "working harder" rather than "working smarter.
US Focus: The Effect Of Soaring Profits— US nominal pre-tax corporate profits in the national accounts grew 23% over the past year, a pace not seen outside post-recession spikes since the mid-2000s. Wider margins were the key driver, as domestic profit growth far exceeded the 8% rise in corporate value added, pushing margins near all-time highs while the labor share hit new lows.
AI Summary.Financial firms, companies and governments raised about $6.61tn through broadly syndicated investment-grade and junk-bond sales, up 15% year-over-year to a record. Cloud-computing giants and data-center developers sold almost $368bn of debt, more than 6x the prior year, accounting for roughly a third of the increase in borrowing.
Gerson Freitas Jr. and Ronan MartinBloomberg
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Bloomberg data shows that global investment-grade and high-yield bond sales, counting only governments’ syndicated deals and not their auctions, have hit a record ~$6.61T year-to-date, up 15%. AI-related issuers account for about a third of the increase.
Is AI borrowing driving global bond sales to a record?
Core argument: Global broadly syndicated investment-grade and junk-bond sales reached about $6.61 trillion so far this year, up 15% from a year earlier and eclipsing 2025’s record with two months still to go, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
Financial firms, companies and governments have raised a combined ~$6.61 trillion through broadly syndicated investment-grade and junk-bond sales so far this year, up 15% from the same period a year earlier and eclipsing 2025’s record with two months still to go, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Cloud-computing giants and data-center developers alone sold almost $368 billion in debt, more than six times as much as a year ago, the data shows. The group has accounted for about a third of the increase in borrowing so far this year, outpacing every other non-financial sector and adding twice as much incremental debt as governments.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Global broadly syndicated investment-grade and junk-bond sales reached about $6.61 trillion so far this year, up 15% from a year earlier and eclipsing 2025’s record with two months still to go, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
Cloud-computing giants and data-center developers sold almost $368 billion in debt, more than six times the amount a year earlier, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
Cloud-computing and data-center borrowers accounted for about a third of this year’s increase in borrowing, outpacing every other non-financial sector and adding twice as much incremental debt as governments.
Related Articles:
Wall Street’s AI Debt Machine Is Starting to Choke on Supply— At least 18 data-center financings in the junk-bond and leveraged loan markets carry double-digit yields, and a $5bn syndicated loan for neocloud Volta Infrastructure required steeper discounts and higher interest, pushing its yield above 11%. The average yield on investment-grade technology bonds has risen to about 6%, roughly 1.4 percentage points higher than a year earlier.
The Post‑Pandemic Global R*— Using an econometric model extracting the common trend in real interest rates across advanced economies, the authors estimate that the global neutral real interest rate fell about 3.5 percentage points from 1990 to 2019, then rose about 1 percentage point after COVID, leaving global and U.S. estimates near 0.5%.
AI Set to be Largest CapEx Cycle Ever … and Soon Majority Externally Financed— Hyperscaler and data-center investment is tracking toward $1.5tn annually by 2030, which in real terms would exceed the 2005-06 housing boom, the 1990s fiber peak, and the 1882 railroad peak combined. External debt and equity are projected to fund close to 90% of the buildout, making it dependent on credit markets.
AI Summary.At least 18 data-center financings in the junk-bond and leveraged loan markets carry double-digit yields, and a $5bn syndicated loan for neocloud Volta Infrastructure required steeper discounts and higher interest, pushing its yield above 11%. The average yield on investment-grade technology bonds has risen to about 6%, roughly 1.4 percentage points higher than a year earlier.
Neil Callanan, Caleb Mutua, and Paula DoeneckeBloomberg
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The bid-to-cover ratios for hyperscaler debt continue to decline while the cost of insuring against losses on the debt related to the AI buildout continues to rise. At least 18 data-center financings across the junk-bond and leveraged loan markets now carry double-digit yields.
Are investors demanding higher yields to finance data centers?
Core argument: At least 18 data-center financings in the junk-bond and leveraged loan markets carry double-digit yields, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
At least 18 data-center financings across the junk-bond and leveraged loan markets now carry double-digit yields, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Even new deals are feeling the strain. JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs had to offer steeper discounts and higher interest payments to drum up demand for neocloud Volta Infrastructure Holdings' $5 billion syndicated loan, pushing its yield above 11%. Nowhere is that unease more pronounced than in the CDS market. The cost of insuring Oracle debt, widely seen as a barometer of risk across the AI boom, reached a fresh record last week. So did default protection costs for SpaceX, Nvidia and Meta. The pressure is showing up in their borrowing costs. The average yield on bonds in the Bloomberg Investment Grade Technology Index has surged to about 6%, about 1.4 percentage points higher than a year ago.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
At least 18 data-center financings in the junk-bond and leveraged loan markets carry double-digit yields, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs offered steeper discounts and higher interest payments to generate demand for neocloud Volta Infrastructure Holdings’ $5 billion syndicated loan, pushing its yield above 11%.
The cost of insuring Oracle’s debt, widely seen as a barometer of risk across the AI boom, reached a record last week, as did default protection costs for SpaceX, Nvidia and Meta.
Related Articles:
AI Debt Worries Spark Surge In Default Insurance Trading— Weekly trading in credit default swaps—insurance against bond default—tied to Oracle, SpaceX, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Broadcom and Nvidia debt averaged over $9bn in a recent month, up from under $2bn, according to Morgan Stanley Research. Five-year protection on Meta and Nvidia reached record highs, while swaps on CoreWeave traded near distressed levels.
Hyperscaler CDS Widening Is Not a Dealer Inventory Story— The cost of insuring large artificial intelligence firms' debt against default has widened while bank spreads have stayed flat near 40 basis points, which the author argues rules out dealer hedging of new bond supply as the cause. Instead, markets are repricing a debt-financed AI investment cycle with rising leverage and negative free cash flow.
AI Set to be Largest CapEx Cycle Ever … and Soon Majority Externally Financed— Hyperscaler and data-center investment is tracking toward $1.5tn annually by 2030, which in real terms would exceed the 2005-06 housing boom, the 1990s fiber peak, and the 1882 railroad peak combined. External debt and equity are projected to fund close to 90% of the buildout, making it dependent on credit markets.
AI Summary.The cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio for the S&P 500 stands at 40.7, implying an earnings yield of 2.46% and, combined with an estimated 1.8% annual real per-share earnings growth, a real expected return near 3% a year. Against a 2.75% inflation-protected 10-year Treasury yield, that leaves an equity premium of roughly 25 basis points, assuming the elevated multiple holds.
Hanno LustigThe Two Cents
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At 40.7, CAPE is nearing its December 1999 peak of 44.2. For the S&P 500 to beat TIPS over the next decade, today’s near-record P/E multiple must persist for ten years, or real earnings must grow more than 5.8% a year—a pace exceeded in only two decades since 1880: the 1920s and 2010s.
How much do stock valuations offer over inflation-protected Treasuries?
Core argument: The S&P 500’s cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio stands at 40.7, close to an all-time high, implying an earnings yield of just 2.46% for buyers of the index.
The CAPE is currently trading at 40.7, which is close to an all-time high. You’re paying close to 41 times annual earnings when you buy the S&P 500. The implied earnings yield is only 2.46%. According to AQR, a reasonable estimate for real earnings growth (on a per share basis) is 1.8% per annum. If you plug in today’s numbers, you end up with a real expected return of around 3% per year for U.S. equity. That’s a surprisingly low number. When you compare it to the 10-year TIPS yield of 2.75%, you’re left with a razor-thin equity premium. The stock market will only yield an extra 25 basis points per annum over the next, say, 10 years to compensate you for taking on equity risk. You might think this is a very conservative estimate, but it’s actually not, because we’re implicitly assuming that the CAPE stays at 40.7 over the next 10 years. That’s quite a lofty multiple. Even casual eyeball econometrics suggests that that’s not a great assumption, because the price-earnings ratio tends to revert back to its mean.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The S&P 500’s cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio stands at 40.7, close to an all-time high, implying an earnings yield of just 2.46% for buyers of the index.
Combining the 2.46% earnings yield with AQR’s estimate of 1.8% annual real per-share earnings growth yields a real expected return of roughly 3% per year for U.S. equity.
Against a 10-year TIPS yield of 2.75%, U.S. equities offer an equity premium of about 25 basis points per year, an estimate that assumes the CAPE stays at 40.7 for a decade despite the price-earnings ratio’s tendency to revert to its mean.
Related Articles:
Financing the AI Buildout— The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
A Catalyst For The AI Bubble Break— Historically, controlling for valuations, a 1% rise in the share of the market represented by initial public offerings has been associated with roughly a 4% decline in prices. With large artificial-intelligence company listings expected and share issuance exceeding buybacks, equity supply could shift from shrinking about 1% a year to growing near 5%, implying returns roughly 20% below average.
One Hundred Years in the U.S. Stock Markets— Over a century, U.S. publicly traded stocks generated roughly $91tn in shareholder wealth enhancement, with returns strongly positively skewed and dominated by a relatively small number of high-performing firms. Because most possible outcomes fall below the mean in a skewed distribution, the authors argue financial planning should focus on median outcomes or the full distribution.