AI Summary. Corporate profit margins, long regarded as one of the economy's most reliably mean-reverting series, have risen continuously so far this century. Measured through the national income accounts used in calculating GDP, profits now take a larger share of the economy than on the eve of the 1929 crash.

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Since 2000, post-tax corporate profits as a share of GDP have trended upward across cyclical setbacks and are now near an all time high, above their 1929 level.

Have corporate profit margins stopped reverting to the mean?

Core argument: Corporate profits measured in the National Income and Product Accounts take a larger share of the U.S. economy than on the eve of the 1929 Great Crash.

Throughout the 20th century, profit margins were regarded as one of the purest mean-reverting series in the economy. So far this century, however, margins have done nothing but rise. Measured with the National Income and Product Accounts, part of the GDP calculation, profits are currently taking a bigger share of the economy even than on the eve of the Great Crash in 1929. The series comes with a lag, so we can assume the profit share on this basis is comfortably at a record by now.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Corporate profits measured in the National Income and Product Accounts take a larger share of the U.S. economy than on the eve of the 1929 Great Crash.
  2. Profit margins were regarded throughout the 20th century as one of the purest mean-reverting series in the economy, yet so far this century they have done nothing but rise.
  3. The National Income and Product Accounts profits series comes with a lag, so the profit share on this basis can be assumed to be comfortably at a record.

AI Summary. The gap between French and German 10-year government bond yields has widened at a pace matched only during the euro zone sovereign debt crisis. France and the UK have less room than the US to close deficits with tax increases, as tax revenues equal 43.9% of GDP in France and 35.3% in the UK versus 25.2% in the US.

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The spread between 10-year French OATs and German Bunds has widened at a pace seen only during the eurozone sovereign-debt crisis. John Authers warns that France “satisfies all the classic conditions for a major debt crisis.”

Do high tax burdens limit France and the UK's deficit options?

Core argument: The spread of 10-year French OATs over German Bunds has risen at a pace matched only during the worst days of the euro-zone sovereign debt crisis in 2011 and 2012, fueling talk of a second crisis centered in Paris.

Only in the worst days of the euro zone’s sovereign debt crisis, in 2011 and 2012, has the [spread of 10-Year French OATS over German Bunds] risen so fast. Talk of a second euro-zone crisis, this time with an epicenter in Paris, is growing, and it’s easy to see why. Why is this more of a problem for France and the UK? Beyond their deficits, they also shoulder much higher tax burdens than the US. Tax revenues are 25.2% of GDP in the US, the lowest of the major developed economies - but 35.3% in the UK and 43.9% in France. It’s hard to imagine after decades of tax-cutting, but a US politician could deal with the deficit fairly easily with a tax hike. It’s not clear that option is open to French lawmakers, even if they could somehow persuade voters to go along with them. The populist politicians of left and right, who currently look well placed in next year’s presidential elections, are in any case unlikely to try.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The spread of 10-year French OATs over German Bunds has risen at a pace matched only during the worst days of the euro-zone sovereign debt crisis in 2011 and 2012, fueling talk of a second crisis centered in Paris.
  2. Tax revenues equal 25.2% of GDP in the US, the lowest among major developed economies, versus 35.3% in the UK and 43.9% in France, leaving American politicians more room to close the deficit with a tax hike.
  3. Populist politicians of left and right, currently well placed for France’s presidential election, are unlikely to attempt tax increases to address the deficit.

AI Summary. Foreign investors made a record $942bn in net purchases of US stocks and investment fund shares over 12 months, the highest rolling 12-month total in Treasury data going back to 1985. Foreign demand for US debt securities moved in the opposite direction, falling to a net $188bn in the second quarter from $314bn in the first.

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Foreign investors bought a record net $426B of US equities and fund shares in Q2, up 62% y/y, part of a record $942B in the 12 months through July. Overseas investors bought a net $188B of US debt securities in Q2, down from $314B in Q1.

Are foreign investors shifting from US debt into US stocks?

Core argument: Foreign investors made a record $942bn in net purchases of US equities and investment fund shares in the 12 months to July, the highest rolling 12-month total in Treasury data going back to 1985.

Foreign investors made a record $942bn in net purchases of US equities and investment fund shares in the 12 months to July, accelerating a shift in overseas investment towards American stocks and away from debt. The flows represented the highest rolling 12-month total in Treasury data going back to 1985. Net purchases of US equities and investment fund shares by foreign investors jumped to $426bn in the second quarter, up 62% from the same period in 2025, and surpassing the previous quarterly record of $299bn in 2022, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Foreign demand for US debt moved in the opposite direction. Overseas investors bought a net $188bn of US debt securities in the second quarter, down from $314bn in the first.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Foreign investors made a record $942bn in net purchases of US equities and investment fund shares in the 12 months to July, the highest rolling 12-month total in Treasury data going back to 1985.
  2. Net foreign purchases of US equities and investment fund shares reached $426bn in the second quarter, up 62% from the same period in 2025 and above the prior quarterly record of $299bn in 2022, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
  3. Overseas investors bought a net $188bn of US debt securities in the second quarter, down from $314bn in the first.

AI Summary. Much of the official-sector inflow into the U.S. now comes from investors who are not traditional reserve managers, and those flows remain heavily tilted toward the dollar and toward risk assets rather than Treasuries. The author argues this shift in the global investor base helps explain why Treasuries trade at a discount while the dollar retains a premium.

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The stock of global dollar reserves has been roughly stable over the past decade. The world is not moving away from the dollar: dollar assets are shifting from official holdings of Treasurys towards private and quasi-sovereign holdings of risk assets.

Why do Treasuries trade at a discount while the dollar keeps premium?

Core argument: Most official-sector inflows into the U.S. come from investors who are not classic reserve managers, and those flows remain heavily tilted toward the dollar, so any real de-dollarization would likely begin among these investors.

Most of the current flow into the US from the “official” sector is coming from investors who are not classic reserve managers. Those flows remain heavily tilted toward the dollar, at least for now. Any real de-dollarization would likely occur first among these investors. Put differently, the dollar’s global role is increasingly as a source of returns, not a source of safety. The foreign bid, private and public, is for risk, not for Treasuries. It is currently fashionable in some circles to point to the diminution of the “convenience yield” on Treasuries even while the U.S. dollar continues to enjoy such a privilege. But the shift in the global investor base and their apparent portfolio preference for U.S. risk assets in lieu of Treasuries may help explain the divergence between the convenience yield on Treasuries and the convenience yield on the USD.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Most official-sector inflows into the U.S. come from investors who are not classic reserve managers, and those flows remain heavily tilted toward the dollar, so any real de-dollarization would likely begin among these investors.
  2. The dollar’s global role is increasingly as a source of returns rather than safety, with the foreign bid, private and public, directed at risk assets rather than Treasuries.
  3. The shift in the global investor base toward U.S. risk assets in lieu of Treasuries may help explain the divergence between the convenience yield on Treasuries and that on the dollar, and suggests the “profit dollar” is likely trading at a historical premium.

AI Summary. International flows into US stocks averaged 2.8% of US GDP over a year, overtaking flows into US Treasuries at 2% of GDP for the first time this century outside brief episodes during the Covid-19 pandemic and after the global financial crisis, according to Deutsche Bank analysis of US Treasury data.

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International net flows into US equities reached 2.8% of GDP in the year through June, exceeding net inflows into Treasuries of 2% of GDP. Outside brief episodes during the pandemic and the aftermath of the GFC, this is the first time this century that equity inflows have surpassed Treasury inflows.

Are foreign investors now buying more US stocks than Treasuries?

Core argument: Foreign inflows into US stocks averaged 2.8% of US GDP in the year to June, overtaking Treasuries at 2% of GDP, according to Deutsche Bank analysis of US Treasury data.

International flows into US stocks reached 2.8% of US GDP on average in the year to June, overtaking Treasuries — at 2% of GDP — for the first time this century outside brief episodes in the Covid-19 pandemic and the aftermath of the global financial crisis, according to analysis of US Treasury data by Deutsche Bank. The change reflects the ever-growing lure of the US stock market, with the S&P 500 on track for a fourth straight year of double-digit gains. Powering the rally has been vast AI investment, which is driving profit margins to new highs, according to FactSet data stretching back to 2009.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Foreign inflows into US stocks averaged 2.8% of US GDP in the year to June, overtaking Treasuries at 2% of GDP, according to Deutsche Bank analysis of US Treasury data.
  2. Deutsche Bank’s analysis marks the first time this century that foreign equity flows have exceeded Treasury flows, outside brief episodes during the Covid-19 pandemic and the aftermath of the global financial crisis.
  3. The S&P 500 is on track for a fourth straight year of double-digit gains, powered by vast AI investment that is driving profit margins to new highs, according to FactSet data stretching back to 2009.

AI Summary. An estimate of the intrinsic 10-year US Treasury rate, built from actual inflation and real economic growth, far exceeded the actual 10-year Treasury rate after inflation surged, and that gap has since narrowed to roughly 4.75% actual versus 5.41% intrinsic.

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Damodaran’s “intrinsic” 10-year Treasury rate—calculated as US real GDP growth plus inflation—has broadly tracked the nominal 10-year Treasury yield since 1962. As of early September 2026, the 10-year yield of ~5% was 41bp below his 5.41% intrinsic-rate estimate.

Do long-term Treasury rates line up with inflation and growth fundamentals?

Core argument: As of September 2026, the US 10-year Treasury rate stood at 4.75% while the intrinsic 10-year rate was 5.41%, a gap of 66 basis points.

[The graph shows] the actual inflation rates and real GDP growth rates for the US, going back to 1962, and [the implied] intrinsic 10-year treasury rate (the cumulative column) and actual 10-year treasury rate each year. When inflation surged in 2022, interest rates went up, but since the rates that I am tracking are long term rates, the intrinsic risk free rate vastly exceeded the actual rate that year, but the difference has narrowed over time, and almost dissipated by September 2026 (when the US 10-year treasury bond rate was [5%] and and the intrinsic ten-year rates yielded 5.41%).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. As of September 2026, the US 10-year Treasury rate stood at 4.75% while the intrinsic 10-year rate was 5.41%, a gap of 66 basis points.
  2. When inflation surged in 2022, the intrinsic risk-free rate vastly exceeded the actual 10-year Treasury rate, and that difference has narrowed since.
  3. The intrinsic 10-year Treasury rate is built from actual US inflation and real GDP growth rates going back to 1962 and compared against the actual 10-year Treasury rate each year.

AI Summary. Pension funds and insurers in Canada, Denmark, Australia, Taiwan, Japan and Finland hedged just 41% of their foreign-currency exposure, the lowest share since at least 2015. With some of the largest holders of US assets carrying little protection against a weaker dollar, the currency is at risk of steeper declines if sentiment turns.

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A Bloomberg analysis finds only 41% of global investors’ foreign-currency exposure is hedged in six major markets, the lowest level since 2015. Foreigners now hold almost $40T of American assets.

Does low currency hedging by foreign investors leave the dollar vulnerable?

Core argument: Pension funds and insurers in Canada, Denmark, Australia, Taiwan, Japan and Finland hedged just 41% of their foreign-currency exposure as of June 30, the lowest share since at least 2015.

Sift through the filings of pension funds and insurers around the world and one thing stands out: some of the biggest holders of US assets have little protection against a weaker dollar, leaving the currency at risk of steeper declines if sentiment suddenly turns. Across markets [Canada, Denmark, Australia, Taiwan, Japan and Finland for which data is available] investors hedged just 41% of their foreign-currency exposure as of June 30 — the lowest since at least 2015. While not a complete picture, it offers a glimpse into how the sudden rush last year to hedge against dollar losses triggered by President Donald Trump’s global tariff rollout has faded as the US currency slowly stabilized.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Pension funds and insurers in Canada, Denmark, Australia, Taiwan, Japan and Finland hedged just 41% of their foreign-currency exposure as of June 30, the lowest share since at least 2015.
  2. Some of the biggest holders of US assets have little protection against a weaker dollar, leaving the currency at risk of steeper declines if sentiment suddenly turns.
  3. The rush to hedge against dollar losses triggered by President Donald Trump's global tariff rollout has faded as the US currency slowly stabilized.

AI Summary. A decomposition of the 2.54 percentage-point rise in the 10-year US Treasury yield attributes 1.56 points, nearly two-thirds, to a higher term premium rather than expected future short-term rates. The author argues the premium had earlier turned negative as the Federal Reserve absorbed long-dated Treasury and mortgage-backed issuance, removing interest-rate risk.

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Lustig presents a decomposition that attributes 156bp of the 254bp rise in the 10-year yield since March 2022 to an increase in the term premium, which he associates with the additional duration risk borne by investors as the Fed reduced its balance sheet.

Is the term premium driving most of the yield increase?

Core argument: Of the 2.54 percentage point increase in the 10-year Treasury yield since March 2022, 1.56 points — nearly two-thirds — comes from a higher term premium, according to the author's decomposition.

I plot a decomposition of the increase in the 10-year yield into a term premium component and a future short rate component. According to this measure, a big chunk —1.56 pps (or nearly 2/3 rds)— of the 2.54 pps increase in the 10-year yield since March 2022 is actually due to an increase in the term premium. That premium (the red line in the figure) turned negative around 2015, and [when] it bottomed out in 2020, yields (black line) were trading 135 bps below the path of future short rates (blue line). That’s not entirely surprising: The Fed was absorbing a large share of Treasury issuance at the long end of the yield curve —as well as MBS issuance— effectively removing a great deal of interest rate risk from the market.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Of the 2.54 percentage point increase in the 10-year Treasury yield since March 2022, 1.56 points — nearly two-thirds — comes from a higher term premium, according to the author's decomposition.
  2. The term premium turned negative around 2015 and bottomed in 2020, when 10-year yields traded 135 basis points below the path of future short rates.
  3. The author attributes the 2020 trough in the term premium to the Fed absorbing a large share of long-end Treasury and MBS issuance, effectively removing interest rate risk from the market.