“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
“Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
AI Summary.A survey finds more than half of young men gamble, with 23% doing so daily, and 43% watch pornography daily or several times a week. 42% say the statement "I am inclined to think that I am a failure" describes them very or somewhat well, a view more common among daily gamblers (66%) and daily pornography viewers (63%).
Joseph Davis, Michael Toscano and Ken BurchfielInstitute For Family Studies
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An ISF survey of 2,000 American men aged 18–29 found 23% reported gambling daily and 27% watch pornography daily. 66% of the men who gambled daily reported feeling like a failure, as well as 63% of the men who watch pornography daily.
Do daily gambling and pornography use correlate with young men's self-perceived failure?
Core argument: More than half of young men surveyed gamble, with 23% gambling daily, 12% more than several times a week, and 21% at least some of the time.
More than half of young men in our survey are now gamblers. Nearly 1 in 4 (23%) report that they gamble daily, plus 12% doing so more than several times a week, and a further 21% at least some of the time. 43% of young men say they watch pornography daily (27%) or several times a week (16%), with another 26% about weekly or less. More than 4 in 10 young men (42%) believe that the statement “all in all, I am inclined to think that I am a failure” describes them “very well” (15%) or “somewhat well” (27%). Those who view pornography (63%) and gamble (66%) every day—along with day trading and playing fantasy sports—are significantly more inclined to see themselves as a failure.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
More than half of young men surveyed gamble, with 23% gambling daily, 12% more than several times a week, and 21% at least some of the time.
43% of young men report watching pornography daily (27%) or several times a week (16%), and daily pornography viewers (63%) and daily gamblers (66%) are significantly more inclined to see themselves as failures.
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The Case for Prohibiting Vice— A record 62m Americans used marijuana in a single year, 17m of them daily or near daily, while half of American men now hold sports-betting accounts, up from almost zero seven years earlier. The author argues vice and addiction undermine citizens' capacity for free action, justifying state regulation beyond individual-harm criteria.
Americans Increasingly See Legal Sports Betting As A Bad Thing For Society and Sports— Survey data show 43% of U.S. adults say legalized sports betting is a bad thing for society, up from 34% three years earlier, and 40% say it is bad for sports, up from 33%. The largest shift came among men under 30, 47% of whom now call it bad for society versus 22% earlier.
Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity— The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
AI Summary.The share of U.S. 12th graders who say they will likely get married someday fell to 67% in 2023 from 80% in 1993, a decline the Pew Research Center attributes to shifting views among girls. Boys are now more likely than girls to say they want to marry (74% vs. 61%), reversing the 1993 pattern.
Dana BragaPew Research Center
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Btw 1993 and 2023, the share of American female high school seniors who reported wanting to get married “someday” fell from 83% to 61%. Their male counterparts saw just a 2pp decline to 74%.
Are high school girls now less likely than boys to want marriage?
Core argument: 67% of U.S. 12th graders said in 2023 that they will likely choose to get married someday, down from 80% in 1993, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of University of Michigan survey data.
U.S. high schoolers are less likely now than in the past to say they want to get married someday. And a smaller share today say that they’re very likely to have children if they do get married, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of survey data from the University of Michigan. As of 2023, 67% of the nation’s 12th graders say they’ll likely choose to get married someday, down from 80% in 1993. The drop in the share of 12th graders who say they want to get married reflects shifting views among girls. Boys are more likely than girls to say they want to get married someday (74% vs. 61%), but this wasn’t always the case. In 1993, a larger share of girls (83%) than boys (76%) said they wanted to get married.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
67% of U.S. 12th graders said in 2023 that they will likely choose to get married someday, down from 80% in 1993, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of University of Michigan survey data.
Boys in 12th grade are more likely than girls to say they want to marry someday (74% vs. 61%), a reversal from 1993, when 83% of girls and 76% of boys said so.
Pew finds that the decline in 12th graders' stated desire to marry reflects shifting views among girls, and that a smaller share today say they are very likely to have children if they do marry.
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All Over The Rich World, Fewer People Are Hooking Up And Shacking Up— In the US, 41% of women and 50% of men aged 25-34 were single, double the share of five decades earlier, and the share of people living alone rose in 26 of 30 mostly rich OECD countries. One estimate puts the global increase in single people at over 100m in a decade.
Changes in Milestones of Adulthood— Among US young adults aged 25–34, the share completing a high school or college degree rose 9 percentage points to 83%, while the share ever married fell 18 points to 44% and the share living with a child fell 16 points to 39%. Economic milestones became more common as family formation milestones became less common.
Bachelors Without Bachelor’s: Gender Gaps in Education and Declining Marriage Rates— Marriage rates for college-educated women have remained stable over the past fifty years even as the relative supply of college-educated men declined, with the overall decline in marriage driven almost entirely by fewer marriages between non-college women and non-college men. The education gap in women's marriage rates is larger in areas where non-college men face the highest joblessness and incarceration.
AI Summary.In a randomized trial, parents receiving $1,000 per month in unconditional cash for three years spent more on their children monthly and reported better parenting behaviors, such as closer supervision, than parents receiving $50 per month. The transfer had no meaningful effect on most educational outcomes, the home environment, child food security, homelessness, or parental satisfaction.
Patrick Krause, Elizabeth Rhodes, Sarah Miller, Alexander Bartik, et al.National Bureau of Economic Research
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A randomized experiment giving 1,000 parents an unconditional $1K/month over 3 years found essentially no differences in family outcomes; treated children showed no significant gains in well-being or education.
Do unconditional cash transfers improve children's outcomes?
Core argument: Parents randomly assigned a $1,000 per month unconditional cash transfer for three years spent more on their children monthly and reported better parenting behaviors, such as closer supervision, than parents receiving $50 per month.
Parents who were randomly selected to receive a $1,000 per month unconditional cash transfer for three years spent more on their children each month and reported better parenting behaviors (such as supervising their children more closely) compared to those randomized to receive $50 per month. The transfer did not have a meaningful effect on most educational outcomes measured in school administrative records, nor did it affect characteristics of the home environment, child food security, exposure to homelessness, or parental satisfaction. Figure A3 shows no significant effect of the transfer on the home environment overall in any year, nor on the probability a child is unhoused. It appears that child food insecurity is [actually] significantly worse for transfer recipients in the third year of the transfer and close to zero in the first two years, [though] this third year effect on child food security does not remain significant after adjusting inference for False Discovery Rates due to repeated testing. Among adult participants, food security improves significantly as a result of the transfer in the first year but worsens over time. Treated families were more likely to move, [but] we did not detect changes in most measures of neighborhood quality,
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Parents randomly assigned a $1,000 per month unconditional cash transfer for three years spent more on their children monthly and reported better parenting behaviors, such as closer supervision, than parents receiving $50 per month.
The $1,000 monthly transfer had no meaningful effect on most educational outcomes in school administrative records, nor on the home environment, child food security, exposure to homelessness, or parental satisfaction.
Adult food security improved significantly in the first year of the transfer but worsened over time, and child food insecurity was significantly worse for recipients in year three, a result that does not survive False Discovery Rate adjustment.
Related Articles:
The Employment Effects of a Guaranteed Income: Experimental Evidence from Two U.S. States— In a randomized experiment, 1,000 low-income individuals received $1,000/month unconditionally for three years while a control group of 2,000 received $50/month, and the transfers reduced individual income excluding transfers by about $1,500/year. The authors find no significant effects on human capital investment and conclude the transfers produced a moderate labor supply reduction not offset by other productive activities.
The Causal Effects of Income on Political Attitudes and Behavior: A Randomized Field Experiment— A randomized experiment giving 1,000 low-income Americans $1,000 monthly tax-free for three years, against controls receiving $50 monthly, found no effects on political participation, engagement, policy preferences, trust in government, polarization, or support for democracy. The authors argue this contrasts with prior findings that government transfers mobilize recipients, suggesting citizens' attribution of responsibility to the state drives those effects.
AI Summary.Survey research estimates that an additional 13.3 million American adults were single by 2022 compared with before the Covid-19 pandemic, with informal relationships dissolving while married and cohabitating couples largely remained intact. The share of single, non-dating adults was higher in 2022 than in 2020, when in-person dating was dangerous.
Ben StevermanBloomberg
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Stanford sociologist Michael Rosenfeld finds that declining social connections during COVID led to 13.3mm more single Americans in 2022 vs. pre-pandemic, delaying traditional adult milestones like getting married, having children, or buying a home.
Did the pandemic leave millions more American adults single and not dating?
Core argument: Stanford sociologist Michael Rosenfeld estimates an extra 13.3 million Americans were single by 2022 compared with before the pandemic, a dating disruption encompassing more than 1 in 20 US adults.
When Covid-19 hit, Stanford sociology professor Michael Rosenfeld reran a survey he had conducted in 2017 to measure those more casual [social] ties. The exercise revealed that millions of informal relationships fell apart, even as married and cohabitating couples survived the pandemic largely intact. More disturbing than the size of this dating disruption—encompassing more than 1 out of every 20 US adults—was the timing. After the number of singles surged in 2020, when in-person dating was dangerous, Rosenfeld ran the survey again in 2022 and was surprised to find that even more people were alone and not dating. Compared with before the pandemic, he estimates an extra 13.3 million Americans were single by 2022. A longer-term consequence of the “dating recession,” Rosenfeld says, is that Americans continue to delay traditional adult milestones. Since the 1980s, the shares of those who live on their own, get married, have children, or buy a home by age 30 have been dropping steadily.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Stanford sociologist Michael Rosenfeld estimates an extra 13.3 million Americans were single by 2022 compared with before the pandemic, a dating disruption encompassing more than 1 in 20 US adults.
Rosenfeld's surveys found the number of singles surged in 2020, when in-person dating was dangerous, and his 2022 rerun showed even more people alone and not dating.
Rosenfeld's survey work indicates informal relationships fell apart during Covid-19 while married and cohabitating couples survived largely intact, and he says a longer-term consequence of the "dating recession" is continued delay of traditional adult milestones.
Related Articles:
Disconnected: The Growing Class Divide in American Civic Life— 17% of Americans report having no close friends, and survey data show a wide educational gap: 24% of those with a high school education or less have no close friends versus 10% of college graduates. Three decades ago, Americans with less formal education reported social circles at least as large.
Why Young Men and Women are Drifting Apart— An analysis of polling from 20 rich countries found that a political gap between men and women aged 18-29 that was negligible two decades ago reached 0.75 points on a 1-10 liberal-conservative scale by 2020, roughly twice the gap between graduates and non-graduates. Young men were more conservative than young women in every large country examined.
The Data is Clear: People Are Having Less Sex— Survey data show every age group now reports less frequent sexual activity than counterparts in earlier decades, with roughly an 8 percentage point decline across age groups. Among people around age 25, the share reporting sex at least monthly fell from over 80% to 72%, while the peak years remain ages 30 to 40.
