“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
“Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
AI Summary.U.S. survey data on high school students show the share of 9th graders identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual fell from 17% to 11% over two years, compared with a decline from 18% to 16% among 12th graders. The drop was concentrated among girls, from 27% to 22%, versus 9% to 7% among boys.
Jean TwengeGeneration Tech
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Among US high-school students, the LGB share fell btw 2023 to 2025 by 5pp for girls (27% to 22%), and 2pp for boys (9% to 7%). The preceding rise was likewise larger for girls: +128% from 2015 to 2021, versus +99% for boys to 2023.
Are younger teens less likely to identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual?
Core argument: The share of U.S. 9th graders identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual fell from 17% in 2023 to 11% in 2025 in the CDC’s Youth Risk Behavior Survey, while 12th graders declined from 18% to 16%.
[New data from the Youth Risk Survey of U.S. 9th to 12th graders from the CDC shows] for 12th graders, 17 and 18 years old, identifying as LGB declines only a few percentage points between 2023 and 2025 (from 18% to 16%). But the headline result is for 9th graders (14 and 15 years old): Identifying as LGB absolutely plummets between 2023 and 2025, from 17% to 11%. That really does look like a free fall. The decline appears to be driven almost entirely by girls. Identifying as LGB dropped from 27% in 2023 to 22% in 2025 among girls, and from 9% to 7% among boys. [In terms of the share of high school students reporting engaging in same-sex activity] most high school students are not sexually active, so this is only a subsample of the larger group. For boys, there’s been a fairly steady rise in same-sex partners, not too different from the pattern of identifying as LGB among boys. The story is different for girls, where having non-heterosexual sex peaked in 2021 and then fell steeply.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The share of U.S. 9th graders identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual fell from 17% in 2023 to 11% in 2025 in the CDC’s Youth Risk Behavior Survey, while 12th graders declined from 18% to 16%.
The decline appears driven almost entirely by girls, whose LGB identification fell from 27% in 2023 to 22% in 2025, compared with a drop from 9% to 7% among boys.
Among sexually active teens, the share of boys reporting at least one same-sex partner has risen fairly steadily, while for girls it peaked in 2021 and then fell steeply.
Related Articles:
Is There Really a Generational Difference in Identifying as Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual?— General Social Survey data show that increases among young American adults appear in same-sex sexual behavior as well as in identification, with 20% reporting a same-sex partner versus 18.5% identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual. The increases are larger among 27- to 41-year-olds.
Teens Used To Be Happier. What Changed?— The share of US high school seniors describing themselves as "very happy" peaked at 24.8% and remained around 24.4% before falling to 11.4% at its low, recovering only to 12.7%, well below the 17.9% recorded before the pandemic. The decline coincided with smartphones and social media becoming pervasive.
US College Students’ Well-Being— A study of US college students finds moderate-to-severe depression reported by 26% of students at one elite institution, 22% reporting moderate-to-severe anxiety and 10% contemplating suicide. Poorer mental health is associated with being female, little exercise, low grades, and financial aid; financial stress is associated with higher suicidal thoughts.
AI Summary.A survey finds more than half of young men gamble, with 23% doing so daily, and 43% watch pornography daily or several times a week. 42% say the statement "I am inclined to think that I am a failure" describes them very or somewhat well, a view more common among daily gamblers (66%) and daily pornography viewers (63%).
Joseph Davis, Michael Toscano and Ken BurchfielInstitute For Family Studies
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An ISF survey of 2,000 American men aged 18–29 found 23% reported gambling daily and 27% watch pornography daily. 66% of the men who gambled daily reported feeling like a failure, as well as 63% of the men who watch pornography daily.
Do daily gambling and pornography use correlate with young men's self-perceived failure?
Core argument: More than half of young men surveyed gamble, with 23% gambling daily, 12% more than several times a week, and 21% at least some of the time.
More than half of young men in our survey are now gamblers. Nearly 1 in 4 (23%) report that they gamble daily, plus 12% doing so more than several times a week, and a further 21% at least some of the time. 43% of young men say they watch pornography daily (27%) or several times a week (16%), with another 26% about weekly or less. More than 4 in 10 young men (42%) believe that the statement “all in all, I am inclined to think that I am a failure” describes them “very well” (15%) or “somewhat well” (27%). Those who view pornography (63%) and gamble (66%) every day—along with day trading and playing fantasy sports—are significantly more inclined to see themselves as a failure.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
More than half of young men surveyed gamble, with 23% gambling daily, 12% more than several times a week, and 21% at least some of the time.
43% of young men report watching pornography daily (27%) or several times a week (16%), and daily pornography viewers (63%) and daily gamblers (66%) are significantly more inclined to see themselves as failures.
Related Articles:
The Case for Prohibiting Vice— A record 62m Americans used marijuana in a single year, 17m of them daily or near daily, while half of American men now hold sports-betting accounts, up from almost zero seven years earlier. The author argues vice and addiction undermine citizens' capacity for free action, justifying state regulation beyond individual-harm criteria.
Americans Increasingly See Legal Sports Betting As A Bad Thing For Society and Sports— Survey data show 43% of U.S. adults say legalized sports betting is a bad thing for society, up from 34% three years earlier, and 40% say it is bad for sports, up from 33%. The largest shift came among men under 30, 47% of whom now call it bad for society versus 22% earlier.
Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity— The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
AI Summary.American Time Use Survey diary data show that on an average day in 2023, one in 10 Americans aged 23 to 29 spent no time interacting face to face with another person. The most isolated group's time around others fell from roughly a third of the day to essentially zero.
John Burn-MurdochFinancial Times
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According to American Time Use Survey data, on a three-year rolling average basis in 2023, 10% of Americans aged between 23 and 29 reported spending zero time interacting face-to-face with another person.
How isolated have young Americans become in daily face-to-face contact?
Core argument: On an average day in 2023, one in 10 Americans aged 23–29 spent no time at all interacting face to face with another person, according to American Time Use Survey diary data.
While exploring data from the American Time Use Survey, which draws on detailed diaries to track how and with whom people spend every minute of a randomly selected day, I came across the following: on an average day in 2023, one in 10 young Americans aged between 23 and 29 did not spend a single minute interacting face to face with another person. The most socially connected quarter of young people used to spend 87% of their day with other people, whether family, friends, co-workers, or others. During the pandemic, that dipped to 78%, but it has rebounded to 83%. The most isolated segment used to still spend roughly a third of their day around others, but that has now collapsed to essentially zero.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
On an average day in 2023, one in 10 Americans aged 23–29 spent no time at all interacting face to face with another person, according to American Time Use Survey diary data.
The most isolated segment of young Americans once spent roughly a third of the day around other people, a share that has collapsed to essentially zero.
The most socially connected quarter of young Americans spent 87% of the day with others before the pandemic, dipping to 78% during it and rebounding to 83%.
Related Articles:
Disconnected: The Growing Class Divide in American Civic Life— 17% of Americans report having no close friends, and survey data show a wide educational gap: 24% of those with a high school education or less have no close friends versus 10% of college graduates. Three decades ago, Americans with less formal education reported social circles at least as large.
AI Summary.Using new price indexes for child- and adult-specific goods, the authors estimate that real spending per child and per parent each rose by about half from 1990 to 2023, indicating a broad rise in household consumption rather than a child-specific one. The share of household spending going to children was stable, near 30% for one child and 40% for two.
Christina Patterson and Heather SarsonsNational Bureau of Economic Research
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A Child Cost Index newly created by Patters and Sarsons finds little rise in costs per child relative to adult consumption (not counting parental leisure time). Higher child costs are thus unlikely to be the main explanation for falling fertility.
Has spending on children risen faster than spending on parents?
Core argument: Real spending per child and real spending per parent each rose by roughly one-half between 1990 and 2023, deflated by the authors' new child and adult cost indices, and moved closely together over the medium run.
Figure 6 shows that real spending on children has increased substantially. Panel (a) plots real spending per child, deflated [by the authors’ new] child cost index, together with real spending per parent, deflated by [their adult cost index.] Both series rise by roughly one-half between 1990 and 2023 and move closely together over the medium run. Thus, households devote more real resources to children today than in 1990, but this increase appears to be part of a broader rise in household consumption rather than a child-specific expansion in required market inputs. Panel (b) reinforces this interpretation by plotting the share of total household spending allocated to children, separately by family size. Children absorb a large share of household resources in every year of the sample, but that share is strikingly stable over time within family size. Households with one child allocate just under 30% of total spending to that child in both 1990 and 2023. The sacrifice of adult consumption associated with children is therefore large, but it is not a recent development. Panel (b) also reveals clear economies of scale in child-rearing. Moving from one to two children raises the child share of household spending from roughly 30% to roughly 40%, far less than a doubling, and the incremental spending share falls further for larger families.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Real spending per child and real spending per parent each rose by roughly one-half between 1990 and 2023, deflated by the authors' new child and adult cost indices, and moved closely together over the medium run.
Households with one child allocated just under 30% of total spending to that child in both 1990 and 2023, a share that is stable over time within family size.
Moving from one child to two raises the child share of household spending from roughly 30% to roughly 40%, far less than a doubling, with the incremental share falling further for larger families.
Related Articles:
America’s Big Cities Are Rapidly Losing Kids— An analysis of census data found the number of children under 18 in large U.S. cities fell 6% over a decade, versus 1% nationwide, with children under 5 down 15% in big cities versus 7% nationally. The number of children declined in about two-thirds of the 38 U.S. cities with more than 500,000 residents, including some cities gaining population overall.
City Parenting Has Become A Financial Flex— Census data show the under-18 population fell 22% in Chicago, 23% in Los Angeles and 12% in New York between 2010 and 2024, while wealthier white families defy the trend in central neighborhoods of the densest, richest cities. Brooklyn's white child population grew 13% over that period, rising from a third to more than two-fifths of the total.
The Demographic Outlook: 2026 to 2056— The Congressional Budget Office projects the US population rises from 349m to 364m between 2026 and 2056, with annual growth slowing from 0.3% over the next decade to 0.1% thereafter before reaching zero and then shrinking. Declining fertility is projected to push deaths above births starting in 2030, increasingly offsetting net immigration.
AI Summary.An analysis of census data found the number of children under 18 in large U.S. cities fell 6% over a decade, versus 1% nationwide, with children under 5 down 15% in big cities versus 7% nationally. The number of children declined in about two-thirds of the 38 U.S. cities with more than 500,000 residents, including some cities gaining population overall.
Rachel Louise Ensign and Paul OverbergWall Street Journal
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The number of children living in the US declined 1% overall btw 2015 and 2024, while the number living in large American cities fell 6%. The number of American children under the age of 5 fell 7%, while the number living in big cities fell 15%.
Are large U.S. cities losing children faster than the nation overall?
Core argument: The number of children under 18 living in big U.S. cities fell 6% over the past decade, versus a 1% decline nationwide, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of census data from 2015 through 2024.
The number of children under 18 living in big U.S. cities is down 6% in the past decade, the Journal found, compared with a 1% decline nationwide. The drop is especially stark among families with little kids: The number of children under age 5 in big cities fell 15%, compared with a drop of 7% nationwide. Even cities that are gaining population are losing children. In all, the number of children declined in about two-thirds of the 38 U.S. cities with more than 500,000 residents. The Journal analyzed census data from 2015 through 2024, the most recent data available.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The number of children under 18 living in big U.S. cities fell 6% over the past decade, versus a 1% decline nationwide, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of census data from 2015 through 2024.
The number of children under age 5 in big U.S. cities declined 15%, compared with a 7% drop nationwide, the Wall Street Journal found.
The number of children declined in about two-thirds of the 38 U.S. cities with more than 500,000 residents, including cities that are gaining population overall.
Related Articles:
Young Families Have Stopped Leaving Big Cities, For Now— New data show the population of children under five in large U.S. urban counties fell 0.2%, matching the national rate of decline and ending a stretch in which big cities lost young children faster than the country as a whole. Every large urban county with under-five growth since 2020 is in Texas, North Carolina, or Florida.
City Parenting Has Become A Financial Flex— Census data show the under-18 population fell 22% in Chicago, 23% in Los Angeles and 12% in New York between 2010 and 2024, while wealthier white families defy the trend in central neighborhoods of the densest, richest cities. Brooklyn's white child population grew 13% over that period, rising from a third to more than two-fifths of the total.
The Demographic Outlook: 2026 to 2056— The Congressional Budget Office projects the US population rises from 349m to 364m between 2026 and 2056, with annual growth slowing from 0.3% over the next decade to 0.1% thereafter before reaching zero and then shrinking. Declining fertility is projected to push deaths above births starting in 2030, increasingly offsetting net immigration.
AI Summary.Using linked Danish administrative data, the authors estimate that starting GLP-1 treatment reduces long-term sickness leave by 0.95 percentage points, a 17.3% decline from a pre-treatment mean of 5.5%, with no statistically significant effects on employment or total income over four years. The reduced absence is valued at 1.3–1.5% of annual labor income per employed person.
N. Meltem Daysal, Camille Fredrickson, Ida Kristiansen, Mircea Trandafir, et al.National Bureau of Economic Research
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In Danish data, GLP-1 treatment reduced long-term sick leave meaningfully and persistently, generating fiscal savings of 1.3 to 1.5% of annual labor income per employed individual, even in the absence of detectable gains in employment or income.
Do weight-loss drugs reduce long-term sickness leave without raising employment or income?
Core argument: GLP-1 treatment reduces long-term sickness leave by 0.95 percentage points, a 17.3% decline relative to the pre-initiation mean of 5.5%, according to estimates from linked Danish administrative data and a matched stacked difference-in-differences design.
This paper provides new evidence on the economic consequences of GLP-1 treatment using linked Danish administrative data and a matched stacked difference-in-differences design. Comparing early Ozempic initiators to observably similar patients who initiate four years later, we find that GLP-1 treatment reduces long-term sickness leave by 0.95 percentage points, corresponding to a 17.3% decline relative to the pre-initiation mean of 5.5% (Figure 2). This effect grows from roughly 0.8 percentage points in the first two post-initiation years to about 1.1 percentage points in years 3 and 4 (Figure 2) and is accompanied by declines in emergency department encounters and cardiovascular medication use, consistent with sustained treatment exposure and gradual improvements in underlying health. [There are no statistically significant or economically meaningful effects on employment or total income over four years.] Yet, even in their absence, GLP-1 treatment generates meaningful fiscal spillovers by reducing prolonged sickness absence, valued at 1.3–1.5% of annual labor income per employed individual. [The long-term sickness-leave results are robust across alternative specifications and comparison groups (Figure 3).]
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
GLP-1 treatment reduces long-term sickness leave by 0.95 percentage points, a 17.3% decline relative to the pre-initiation mean of 5.5%, according to estimates from linked Danish administrative data and a matched stacked difference-in-differences design.
The estimated sickness-leave effect grows from roughly 0.8 percentage points in the first two post-initiation years to about 1.1 percentage points in years 3 and 4, alongside declines in emergency department encounters and cardiovascular medication use.
GLP-1 treatment shows no statistically significant or economically meaningful effects on employment or total income over four years, while the reduction in prolonged sickness absence is valued at 1.3–1.5% of annual labor income per employed individual.
GLP-1–Induced Weight Loss and the Female Obesity Penalty— Women starting GLP-1 weight-loss treatment lose 1.4–2.5 BMI points, rising to 2.7–4.2 points after 1.5 years or more, and those who are single increase their probability of being married or cohabiting by 18.3 percentage points, with no change for women already partnered. Women not employed at the outset raise their employment rate by 13 percentage points.
Victoria’s Secret Hits Record High as Bra Strategy Resonates— Victoria's Secret shares hit a record high after the lingerie retailer beat earnings estimates and raised its annual net sales guidance to as much as $7.13bn. The company has posted four consecutive quarters of annual revenue growth, with its bras gaining market share among 18- to 44-year-olds and growth in both the under-$50,000 and over-$200,000 income categories.
AI Summary.33% of U.S. adults live in households with at least two generations of adults, and 49% of adults under 30 live with a parent — up 6 percentage points since 2022 and 12 points since 2019. Overall 13% of adults live alone, rising to 20% among those 60 and older.
Alicia Lloro, Ellen Merry, Anna Tranfaglia, Mike Zabek, et al.Federal Reserve Board
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Federal Reserve survey data finds that in 2025, 49% of American adults under the age of 30 lived with a parent, up 12pp from 37% in 2019 prior to the pandemic.
Are more young adults living with their parents?
Core argument: Among U.S. adults under age 30, 49% lived with a parent in 2025, up 6 percentage points since 2022 and 12 percentage points since 2019, just before the pandemic.
Most frequently, people lived with a spouse, partner, or children under age 18. Yet, 33% of adults lived in households with at least two generations of adults. Specifically, 19% of adults lived with their adult children (age 18 or older), and 15% lived with a parent. Two percent of adults simultaneously lived with a parent and an adult child. The share of young adults who live with their parents has increased in recent years. In 2025, 49% of adults under age 30 lived with a parent. This share was up by 6 percentage points since 2022, and up 12 percentage points since 2019, just before the pandemic. Conversely, adults aged 60 and older were more likely to live alone than were younger adults. Overall, 13% of people lived alone in 2025. Among those ages 60 and older, a higher 20% were living alone.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Among U.S. adults under age 30, 49% lived with a parent in 2025, up 6 percentage points since 2022 and 12 percentage points since 2019, just before the pandemic.
In 2025, 33% of U.S. adults lived in households with at least two generations of adults, with 19% living with adult children age 18 or older, 15% with a parent, and 2% with both.
In 2025, 13% of people in the U.S. lived alone, with the share reaching 20% among those ages 60 and older.
Related Articles:
Changes in Milestones of Adulthood— Among US young adults aged 25–34, the share completing a high school or college degree rose 9 percentage points to 83%, while the share ever married fell 18 points to 44% and the share living with a child fell 16 points to 39%. Economic milestones became more common as family formation milestones became less common.
The Happiness Crash of 2020— Survey data show that after 2020 self-reported happiness fell across groups, compressing pre-existing differences — the black-white gap narrowed from 14 points to 6 — while the marital happiness premium of more than 30 points survived intact. Confidence in major public and private institutions declined nearly across the board, with double-digit drops common and losses spanning all parties and ideologies.
Rising Young Worker Despair in the United States— In the United States, mental despair once peaked in middle age but now declines steadily with age, a shift the authors attribute to rising despair among workers under 40. The hump-shaped age pattern persists among those unemployed or unable to work, while it remains flat for homemakers, students, and retirees.
AI Summary.Women starting GLP-1 weight-loss treatment lose 1.4–2.5 BMI points, rising to 2.7–4.2 points after 1.5 years or more, and those who are single increase their probability of being married or cohabiting by 18.3 percentage points, with no change for women already partnered. Women not employed at the outset raise their employment rate by 13 percentage points.
Rebecca DiamondHarvard University
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Women who began treatment with GLP-1 drugs when not currently married or partnered saw an increased probability of marriage or cohabitation of ~29pp after 6 quarters. Those not initially employed were 27pp more likely to be working after 6 quarters.
Does weight-loss medication improve women's marriage and employment outcomes?
Core argument: Women who were single when starting GLP-1 treatment raised their probability of being married or cohabiting by 18.3 pp overall and 28.6 pp (s.e. 7.1) at six or more quarters, building gradually as they lost weight.
BMI is flat before women start [GLP-1 treatment] and then falls (Figure 2, Panel A). All groups lose between 1.4 and 2.5 BMI points in the post period. These effects grow to between 2.7 and 4.2 BMI points at 1.5+ years after initiation. The largest magnitude change is in the marriage market. Women who are single when they start (Figure 2, Panel B) increase their probability of being married or living with a partner by 18.3 pp overall and 28.6pp (s.e. 7.1) at six or more quarters, building gradually as they lose weight. Partnered women’s relationships, by contrast, are stable. Their partnership probability barely moves (0.1 points, s.e. 1.8), and there is no excess relationship dissolution (0.0, s.e. 1.7). The marriage-market response is the making of new matches, not the breaking or remaking of old ones. In contrast, single women’s weight loss seems to dramatically affect first impressions of potential partners, leading to a large increase in marriage and cohabitation. This is consistent with prior work on the obesity penalty negatively affecting women in the marriage market. Figure 2, panels C and D show that women not employed at baseline move into work: their employment rate rises 13pp overall and 27pp after six or more quarters, and their weekly hours rise by nearly ten hours at the longer horizon.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Women who were single when starting GLP-1 treatment raised their probability of being married or cohabiting by 18.3 pp overall and 28.6 pp (s.e. 7.1) at six or more quarters, building gradually as they lost weight.
Partnered women's relationships remained stable after GLP-1 initiation, with partnership probability moving 0.1 points (s.e. 1.8) and no excess dissolution (0.0, s.e. 1.7).
Women not employed at baseline moved into work after GLP-1 initiation, with employment rates rising 13 pp overall and 27 pp after six or more quarters and weekly hours up nearly ten at the longer horizon.
Related Articles:
Victoria’s Secret Hits Record High as Bra Strategy Resonates— Victoria's Secret shares hit a record high after the lingerie retailer beat earnings estimates and raised its annual net sales guidance to as much as $7.13bn. The company has posted four consecutive quarters of annual revenue growth, with its bras gaining market share among 18- to 44-year-olds and growth in both the under-$50,000 and over-$200,000 income categories.
Today’s Most Important Technology— The share of patients taking semaglutide for weight control rather than type 2 diabetes rose from under 10% in 2019 to 41.7%. Obesity and overweight, affecting 1 in 8 people worldwide, cost the global economy $2tn — nearly 70 cents on the dollar from premature mortality and lost productivity — an impact projected to double by 2035 absent intervention.
