AI Summary. 30% of US adults have literacy skills typical of a 10-year-old, yet US workers scoring at that low level earn an average of nearly $30 an hour and two-thirds are employed, compared with about $20 and fewer than half employed in Britain. The author argues this reflects stronger economic growth rather than vocational education policy.

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Using OECD skills data and the Luxembourg Income Study, Burn-Murdoch finds US workers at the lowest levels of literacy and numeracy earn ~ on par with British workers scoring a 2, ~ a mean score.

Does economic growth matter more than education policy for low-skilled workers' pay?

Core argument: 30% of US adults have literacy skills typical of a 10-year-old, yet US workers scoring that low earn an average of almost $30 per hour and two-thirds of them are employed.

30% of US adults have literacy skills typical of a 10-year-old. The same proportion of US workers who score stunningly low on literacy earn an average of almost $30 per hour, and two-thirds of them are in work. Their British counterparts make the equivalent of $20 and fewer than half are employed. This all looks more like the fruits of years of stronger growth than vocational education policy. We should view education as creating potential that a strong economy unleashes (and a weak one disappoints).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. 30% of US adults have literacy skills typical of a 10-year-old, yet US workers scoring that low earn an average of almost $30 per hour and two-thirds of them are employed.
  2. British workers with similarly low literacy scores earn the equivalent of $20 per hour and fewer than half are employed, a gap the author attributes to years of stronger US growth rather than vocational education policy.
  3. The author argues that education should be viewed as creating potential that a strong economy unleashes and a weak one disappoints.

AI Summary. A study of China's imperial civil service examination estimates that both exam performance and ties to powerful examiners had larger effects on career outcomes for high-performing candidates, indicating merit and networks were complements rather than substitutes. The authors argue this complementarity makes the influence of networks harder to distinguish from merit.

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From 1644–1905, Qing China staffed its bureaucracy through exams and patronage. Only 12.6% of exam graduates reached top office, but patronage favored stronger performers, illustrating how merit and connections can be complements rather than substitutes.

Do merit and connections reinforce each other in civil service careers?

Core argument: In China's imperial examination system, exam performance mattered more for candidates in the high-performing category, consistent with an institutional design that steered that elite group toward more prestigious careers.

Figure 5 studies the interplay between merit and networks by estimating the effects of exam performance and ties to powerful examiners separately for the high- and low-performing categories. The left panel shows the effects of exam performance for the two categories, while the right panel presents those of examiner power. Two patterns stand out. First, exam performance matters more for the high category, consistent with the institutional design that steered this elite group toward more prestigious careers. Second, ties to powerful examiners are also more valuable for the high category, pointing to a complementarity between merit and networks. To understand the implications of our finding on complementarity, it is useful to contrast it with the counterfactual of substitution. When merit and networks are complements (rather than substitutes), those who attained top office tend to exhibit both stronger exam performance and stronger connections. By contrast, under substitution, strong networks would compensate for weaker exam performance, and vice versa. Complementarity implies [a higher degree of meritocracy than substitution, as] successful candidates appear to have had better performance. Second, complementarity makes it harder to identify the influence of networks: their effects can operate under the guise of merit rather than as a visible substitute for it.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In China's imperial examination system, exam performance mattered more for candidates in the high-performing category, consistent with an institutional design that steered that elite group toward more prestigious careers.
  2. Ties to powerful examiners were also more valuable for the high-performing category, pointing to complementarity between merit and networks rather than substitution.
  3. Complementarity implies a higher degree of meritocracy than substitution, since those attaining top office tended to show both stronger exam performance and stronger connections, and it makes the influence of networks harder to identify because it can operate under the guise of merit.

AI Summary. A meta-study of 79 causal estimates finds an average 8.2% earnings gain per year of education, matching earlier work, but also finds evidence of publication bias favoring statistically significant and positive estimates. Correcting for these biases implies an average causal return in the 0%–3% range.

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Clark and Nielsen replicate the ~8% estimates of the return to education obtained by standard methods, but find evidence of selection biases in favor of high estimated returns. After correcting for these biases, they calculate returns on the order of 3%.

Do publication biases inflate estimated earnings returns to education?

Core argument: A meta-study of 79 causal estimates of education's effect on earnings, drawn from school-leaving age mandates and child labor bans, reports an 8.2% earnings gain per year of education, similar to the earlier Ashenfelter et al. study.

In this meta-study of 79 estimates of the causal effects of education on earnings (derived from increases of the mandated school-leaving age or legislation banning child labor under certain ages), we report a similar effect to [the classic] earlier study (Ashenfelter, et al): an 8.2% gain in earnings for each year of education. We also find clear evidence of significant publication biases. Studies passing the filter of publication were more likely to have coefficients statistically significantly greater than 0, and we observe strong evidence that studies with returns estimated at less than 0 were more difficult to publish. There is strong suggestive evidence of the first publication bias in the data. Figure 6 shows that the average estimated return rises substantially where the standard error is larger. This suggests a greater likelihood of an estimate being published when it was statistically significantly different from 0. If all estimates were published independent of the estimated return, we would not expect there to be such a gradient. Correcting the first publication bias by looking at the average return on the studies with the lowest standard errors would suggest an average causal return to education of no more than 3%, compared to the reported 8.2%. Independent of this, correcting for the omission of returns less than 0 implies an overall causal return to education only in the 0%–3% range.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A meta-study of 79 causal estimates of education's effect on earnings, drawn from school-leaving age mandates and child labor bans, reports an 8.2% earnings gain per year of education, similar to the earlier Ashenfelter et al. study.
  2. Average estimated returns to education rise substantially where standard errors are larger, which suggests estimates were more likely to be published when statistically significantly different from 0.
  3. Correcting for publication bias by using the studies with the lowest standard errors would suggest an average causal return to education of no more than 3%, while correcting for omitted negative estimates implies a 0%–3% range.

AI Summary. Students admitted to elite high schools just above the admissions cutoff are estimated to be 3.2pp less likely to have ever held a formal private-sector job five years later — a 16% decline versus those just missing the cutoff — and to earn 5.3% lower wages. These gaps shrink over time and are statistically insignificant after 15 years.

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In data from the Mexico City metro area over 2003–2009, students who just missed the exam score cutoff for admission to an elite high school have 5.3% higher wages after five years (2.5% after 10 years) than marginally admitted students.

Does barely getting into an elite high school lower early earnings?

Core argument: Marginal assignment to an elite high school causes a 3.2pp decline in the probability of ever having held a formal job five years later at ages 19–20, a 16% drop from the 20% base rate for students just below the cutoff.

[We] trace out the [harmful] causal impact of [marginal] assignment to an elite school [as opposed to just missing the admissions cutoff] on formal private labor market outcomes over time. Five years after the assignment process (at ages 19-20, beyond high school age), elite assignment [based on a test score marginally above the cutoff] causes a 3.2pp decline in the probability of ever having held a formal job. This is a 16% decline relative to the base rate of 20% for students missing the elite cutoff by one point. Over time, this elite disadvantage declines: after 10 years (at ages 24-25, after the typical age of college graduation), the effect is -2.1pp, while after 15 years (at ages 29-30) the estimated -0.2pp impact is statistically insignificant. While the negative effect on formal employment eventually fades, it leaves elite students with a deficit in formal labor market experience. After 5 years, elite assignment reduces the cumulative number of months with a formal job by 14%. Conditional on formal employment, marginal elite assignment causes a reduction in wages that fades out over time. Five years after assignment, elite assignment reduces wages by 5.3%. This reduction declines to 2.6% after 10 years, and [essentially vanishes] after 15 years.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Marginal assignment to an elite high school causes a 3.2pp decline in the probability of ever having held a formal job five years later at ages 19–20, a 16% drop from the 20% base rate for students just below the cutoff.
  2. The elite-assignment employment disadvantage fades over time, falling to -2.1pp after 10 years (ages 24–25) and a statistically insignificant -0.2pp after 15 years (ages 29–30).
  3. Conditional on formal employment, marginal elite assignment reduces wages by 5.3% after five years and 2.6% after 10 years, and cuts cumulative months of formal work by 14% after five years.

AI Summary. A falling US birth rate is projected to shrink the pool of college-age Americans, leaving schools with empty classrooms. Many smaller, lesser-known colleges are already firing professors, cutting liberal arts courses in favor of science and technology programs, or closing entirely.

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As America’s demographics roll over, smaller public and private liberal arts colleges have “already hit the precipice.” Btw 2003 and 2024, more than 100 public campuses closed, and ~ 2/3 of private for-profit colleges have shut down since the 2010s.

How is a falling birth rate reshaping American colleges?

Core argument: The US pool of college-aged Americans is expected to shrink after 2025, pushing schools toward a "demographic cliff" in which a steadily dropping population of people in their late teens and early 20s leaves desks and classrooms empty.

The country’s tumbling birth rate is pushing schools toward a “demographic cliff,” where a steadily dropping population of people in their late teens and early 20s will leave desks and classrooms empty. Many smaller, lesser-known schools have already hit the precipice. They’re firing professors, paring back liberal arts courses in favor of STEM — or closing altogether. Others will likely reach the cliff in the next few years. Although it has plunged since the 1950s, the US birth rate ticked upward slightly before the 2008 financial crisis, and that brief demographic boost has kept enrollment at larger schools afloat. But the nationwide pool of college-aged Americans is expected to shrink after 2025. The financial pressure will be relentless. “If colleges were facing a stark decline in one or two cohorts, higher ed could likely say, ‘Well, we could admit a few additional students and tighten our belts to muddle through,’” said Nathan Grawe, an economics professor at Carleton College in Minnesota, who has written books about education and demographics. “But it’s one year after another of contraction, of ratcheting up the pressure.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US pool of college-aged Americans is expected to shrink after 2025, pushing schools toward a "demographic cliff" in which a steadily dropping population of people in their late teens and early 20s leaves desks and classrooms empty.
  2. Many smaller, lesser-known US colleges have already reached the precipice, firing professors, paring back liberal arts courses in favor of STEM, or closing altogether, with others likely to reach it in the next few years.
  3. Carleton College economics professor Nathan Grawe argues that higher education could muddle through a decline in one or two cohorts by admitting a few additional students and tightening belts, but faces one year after another of contraction.

AI Summary. Adjusted for poverty and student demographics, Mississippi ranks first nationally in fourth-grade reading and math and at or near the top in eighth grade, according to the Urban Institute. The state changed reading instruction and adopted accountability policies that credit schools for student progress, with double credit for the bottom 25%.

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Controlling for poverty and demographics, Mississippi has the best outcomes for fourth-grade reading and math, and is near the top in eighth-grade scores. In absolute terms, “eighth graders still rank 41st on national tests for reading, and 35th for math.”

How did one state's reading instruction and accountability reforms raise test scores?

Core argument: Adjusted for poverty and other student demographics, Mississippi ranks No. 1 nationally in fourth grade reading and math and at or near the top in eighth grade, according to the Urban Institute.

Adjusted for poverty and other student demographics, Mississippi is No. 1 for fourth grade reading and math, and at or near the top in eighth grade, according to the Urban Institute. Mississippi’s gains have been confined mostly to the early years, where the state has focused its efforts. The system revolves around standardized testing, and the gains have not always persisted. By raw scores, Mississippi eighth graders still rank 41st on national tests for reading, and 35th for math. The state pushed through a vast list of other changes from the top down, including changing the way reading is taught, in an approach known as the science of reading, but also embracing contentious school accountability policies other states have backed away from. Unlike No Child Left Behind, the Bush-era federal law that set a goal of having every child in America be proficient in reading and math, Mississippi also measures how much students progress toward proficiency. Schools get credit if students show improvement — and double credit for the improvement of students in the bottom 25%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Adjusted for poverty and other student demographics, Mississippi ranks No. 1 nationally in fourth grade reading and math and at or near the top in eighth grade, according to the Urban Institute.
  2. Mississippi's gains are concentrated in the early grades where the state focused its efforts, and by raw scores its eighth graders still rank 41st in reading and 35th in math on national tests.
  3. Mississippi's accountability system, unlike No Child Left Behind's proficiency goal, credits schools for student progress toward proficiency and gives double credit for improvement among students in the bottom 25%.

AI Summary. Registered disability rates among undergraduates have risen at elite US universities, reaching 38% at Stanford and 21% at Harvard, both up from 5% in 2009, with similar increases across 19 European countries. In the poorest US school districts, 1% of young people are on special-support plans, unchanged, while the share in the richest areas tripled from 2% to 6%.

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In 2025, 38% of Stanford and 21% of Harvard undergrads were registered as having a disability — up from 5% in 2009; 6% of youth from the richest US school districts, and 1% from the poorest, are now in special support programs.

Are rising student disability rates concentrated among the wealthiest families?

Core argument: Research by Rose Horowitch for The Atlantic found 38% of Stanford undergraduates and 21% of Harvard undergraduates are registered as having a disability, both up from 5% in 2009.

In the US, research by Rose Horowitch for the Atlantic magazine found that 38% of undergraduates at Stanford this year are registered as having a disability, as are 21% at Harvard — both up from 5% in 2009. My analysis of data from 19 European countries finds similar trends, with health impairments among students doubling on average over the past decade. In 2010, 1% of American young people from the poorest school districts were on plans that provide special support, and today that figure is unchanged. But among those in the richest areas, it has tripled from 2 to 6%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Research by Rose Horowitch for The Atlantic found 38% of Stanford undergraduates and 21% of Harvard undergraduates are registered as having a disability, both up from 5% in 2009.
  2. An analysis of data from 19 European countries finds health impairments among students doubled on average over the past decade.
  3. Among American young people in the richest school districts, the share on plans providing special support tripled from 2% to 6% since 2010, while the share in the poorest districts remained at 1%.

AI Summary. Declines in U.S. college enrollment are concentrated in community colleges, with four-year institutions maintaining stable enrollments and over one-third of the apparent community college drop stemming from administrative reclassification. The authors estimate that stronger labor markets explain 60% of the community college enrollment decline over 2009-19.

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First-time undergraduate enrollment in public 4-year colleges has ~ doubled since 1990. In public 2-year and for-profit institutions, enrollment has ~ halved. Stronger labor markets explain 60% of the drop in enrollment in two-year colleges.

Do stronger labor markets explain falling community college enrollment?

Core argument: Strengthening labor markets explain 60% of the decline in U.S. community college enrollment from 2009–19 and nearly 50% of the decline through 2023, according to the authors.

We demonstrate that widely discussed declines in U.S. college enrollment reflect patterns concentrated in community colleges rather than a broad crisis in higher education. We show that: four-year institutions have maintained stable enrollments; over one-third of apparent community college declines stem from administrative reclassification; community college enrollments are strongly countercyclical; strengthening labor markets explain 60% of the community college enrollment decline from 2009-19 (and nearly 50% of the decline through 2023); and students on the margin between community college enrollment and employment appear unlikely to complete a degree. Figure 3 overlays six decades of first-time enrollment data with gray bars indicating years when the national unemployment rate was increasing. Of the last six such recessionary periods, all but the most recent pandemic-related rise in unemployment show local maxima in community college enrollments. Unemployment rates seem less clearly related to enrollments in public four-year colleges over this time period, or to enrollment in private four-year and for-profit colleges during the last three decades.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Strengthening labor markets explain 60% of the decline in U.S. community college enrollment from 2009–19 and nearly 50% of the decline through 2023, according to the authors.
  2. Over one-third of the apparent community college enrollment decline stems from administrative reclassification, while four-year institutions have maintained stable enrollments.
  3. Of the last six periods of rising national unemployment, all but the pandemic-related rise coincide with local maxima in community college first-time enrollment, with less clear relationships for public four-year, private four-year, and for-profit colleges.