“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
AI Summary.30% of US adults have literacy skills typical of a 10-year-old, yet US workers scoring at that low level earn an average of nearly $30 an hour and two-thirds are employed, compared with about $20 and fewer than half employed in Britain. The author argues this reflects stronger economic growth rather than vocational education policy.
John Burn-MurdochFinancial Times
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Using OECD skills data and the Luxembourg Income Study, Burn-Murdoch finds US workers at the lowest levels of literacy and numeracy earn ~ on par with British workers scoring a 2, ~ a mean score.
Does economic growth matter more than education policy for low-skilled workers' pay?
Core argument: 30% of US adults have literacy skills typical of a 10-year-old, yet US workers scoring that low earn an average of almost $30 per hour and two-thirds of them are employed.
30% of US adults have literacy skills typical of a 10-year-old. The same proportion of US workers who score stunningly low on literacy earn an average of almost $30 per hour, and two-thirds of them are in work. Their British counterparts make the equivalent of $20 and fewer than half are employed. This all looks more like the fruits of years of stronger growth than vocational education policy. We should view education as creating potential that a strong economy unleashes (and a weak one disappoints).
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
30% of US adults have literacy skills typical of a 10-year-old, yet US workers scoring that low earn an average of almost $30 per hour and two-thirds of them are employed.
British workers with similarly low literacy scores earn the equivalent of $20 per hour and fewer than half are employed, a gap the author attributes to years of stronger US growth rather than vocational education policy.
The author argues that education should be viewed as creating potential that a strong economy unleashes and a weak one disappoints.
Related Articles:
Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World?— An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.
Toward An Understanding Of The Returns To Cognitive Skills Across Cohorts— The authors find that the estimated decline in labor market returns to pre-labor-market cognitive skills for white men across two U.S. youth cohorts depends critically on the widening and increased left-skewness of the test-score distribution, with declines appearing only at the lower end of that distribution.
Cognitive Skills Beyond Childhood— Wages at age 50 rise more steeply with cognitive skills measured at age 16 than with cognitive skills measured at age 50; for women, moving from average to two standard deviations above average raises expected hourly wages from £11 to £22 using age-16 skills, versus £12 to £15 using age-50 skills.
AI Summary.A study of China's imperial civil service examination estimates that both exam performance and ties to powerful examiners had larger effects on career outcomes for high-performing candidates, indicating merit and networks were complements rather than substitutes. The authors argue this complementarity makes the influence of networks harder to distinguish from merit.
Ying Bai and Ruixue JiaNational Bureau of Economic Research
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From 1644–1905, Qing China staffed its bureaucracy through exams and patronage. Only 12.6% of exam graduates reached top office, but patronage favored stronger performers, illustrating how merit and connections can be complements rather than substitutes.
Do merit and connections reinforce each other in civil service careers?
Core argument: In China's imperial examination system, exam performance mattered more for candidates in the high-performing category, consistent with an institutional design that steered that elite group toward more prestigious careers.
Figure 5 studies the interplay between merit and networks by estimating the effects of exam performance and ties to powerful examiners separately for the high- and low-performing categories. The left panel shows the effects of exam performance for the two categories, while the right panel presents those of examiner power. Two patterns stand out. First, exam performance matters more for the high category, consistent with the institutional design that steered this elite group toward more prestigious careers. Second, ties to powerful examiners are also more valuable for the high category, pointing to a complementarity between merit and networks. To understand the implications of our finding on complementarity, it is useful to contrast it with the counterfactual of substitution. When merit and networks are complements (rather than substitutes), those who attained top office tend to exhibit both stronger exam performance and stronger connections. By contrast, under substitution, strong networks would compensate for weaker exam performance, and vice versa. Complementarity implies [a higher degree of meritocracy than substitution, as] successful candidates appear to have had better performance. Second, complementarity makes it harder to identify the influence of networks: their effects can operate under the guise of merit rather than as a visible substitute for it.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
In China's imperial examination system, exam performance mattered more for candidates in the high-performing category, consistent with an institutional design that steered that elite group toward more prestigious careers.
Ties to powerful examiners were also more valuable for the high-performing category, pointing to complementarity between merit and networks rather than substitution.
Complementarity implies a higher degree of meritocracy than substitution, since those attaining top office tended to show both stronger exam performance and stronger connections, and it makes the influence of networks harder to identify because it can operate under the guise of merit.
Related Articles:
Elite Strategies for Big Shocks: The Case of the Fall of the Ming— A study of China's Ming-to-Qing dynastic transition finds elite families in Central China lost influence in the short run but their descendants regained and tightened their hold on power under the new dynasty, even as the hardest-hit regions stayed worse off. The authors attribute the recovery to emphasis on portable civil-service exam skills.
The Inheritance Of Social Status: England, 1600 to 2022— Using a genealogical database of 422,374 English people with rarer surnames, the authors find social status persists strongly even among distant relatives, with status correlations declining by a constant factor of 0.79 per step in the lineage across all status measures and eras studied. The authors argue this constancy suggests social interventions have modest effects.
For Whom the Bell Curve Tolls: A Lineage of 400,000 English Individuals 1750-2020 Shows Genetics Determines Most Social Outcomes— A study of 402,000 English individuals across 1750–2020 estimates an intergenerational occupational status correlation of 0.88 and a genetic correlation between spouses of 0.76, which the authors interpret as a strong genetic basis for the persistence of social status. The authors argue that highly assortative mating around status genetics limits what policy can do to raise social mobility.
AI Summary.Black and Hispanic students make up about 62% of New York City public school enrollment but about 10% of the incoming freshman class at the city's eight most prestigious high schools, where roughly 80% of seats went to Asian and white students. Asian students are about 19% of public school enrollment and received 57% of specialized-school offers.
Matthew HaagNew York Times
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62% of New York City public school students are black or Hispanic, and 19% are Asian. Stuyvesant, an elite public school, offered admission to 777 students. Three offers went to black students, and 21 to Hispanics; 69% went to Asian students.
How do admissions at elite public high schools compare with district enrollment?
Core argument: Stuyvesant High School made 3 of its 777 admissions offers to Black students and 21 to Hispanic students, together a nearly one-third decline from the previous freshman class.
About 62% of the students in the city’s public schools are Black or Hispanic. At [NYC] eight most prestigious high schools, about 10% of the students in the incoming freshman class are expected to be Black or Hispanic, roughly the same as last year. About 80% of the seats went to Asian and white students. At Stuyvesant High School in Manhattan, often considered the most selective of the city’s specialized high schools, three of the 777 offers were made to Black students, and 21 were for Hispanic students, together representing a nearly one-third decline from the previous freshman class. About 19% of all public school students are Asian, but they received 57% of the offers for the specialized schools for the fall. The rates were higher at some schools, including 69% at Stuyvesant and 78% at Queens High School for the Sciences at York College.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Stuyvesant High School made 3 of its 777 admissions offers to Black students and 21 to Hispanic students, together a nearly one-third decline from the previous freshman class.
Black and Hispanic students make up about 62% of New York City public school enrollment but about 10% of the incoming freshman class at the city's eight most prestigious high schools, roughly unchanged from last year.
Asian students account for about 19% of New York City public school students but received 57% of specialized high school offers for the fall, including 69% at Stuyvesant and 78% at Queens High School for the Sciences at York College.
Related Articles:
White Flight from Asian Immigration: Evidence from California Public Schools— In California public schools, the authors estimate that the arrival of one Asian student in a high-socioeconomic-status suburban district is associated with the departure of 1.5 white students, alongside rising academic performance. They suggest this reflects parental concerns about academic competition rather than housing market dynamics or direct racial animus.
Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World?— An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.
Americans and Affirmative Action: How the Public Sees the Consideration of Race in College Admissions, Hiring— Survey research finds more Americans disapprove than approve of colleges considering race and ethnicity in admissions: half of U.S. adults said they disapprove of selective colleges weighing race and ethnicity to increase diversity, a third approved, and 16% were unsure. In another survey, 82% said colleges should not consider race or ethnicity, versus 17% who said they should.
AI Summary.Chinese state-owned enterprises are advertising party-building and propaganda posts requiring Communist Party membership and political and theoretical grounding, with average pay of about Rmb110,000 ($16,200) a year, below the Rmb124,000 average for non-private employers. Such roles offer job security and benefits exceeding those in the private sector, appealing to graduates facing youth unemployment.
Joe Leahy and Daniel Gage-BrownFinancial Times
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Elite Chinese universities (Peking, Renmin, Tsinghua) now offer “party building” courses (Mao through Xi) to give graduates a job edge as youth unemployment climbs. Party loyalty is a hireable credential. CCP cells number 5.25mn, with 30% inside state/private firms.
Are ideological credentials becoming a career advantage for Chinese graduates?
Core argument: Party-building roles in China pay an average Rmb110,000 ($16,200) a year according to job site Zhiyouji, below the Rmb124,000 average for non-private entities, but offer job security and generous benefits relative to the private sector.
Still for China's young graduates, who are grappling with rising youth unemployment, party building could lead to a stable, if not especially lucrative, income. A job posting on recruitment site Yingjiesheng for a "Party building and propaganda officer" at a Tianjin-based engineering state-owned enterprise demanded that applicants be CCP members with "good political literacy and theoretical grounding." According to job site Zhiyouji, the average annual salary for such a role is Rmb110,000 ($16,200), trending below the national average of Rmb124,000 for non-private entities. However, such roles offer job security and generous benefits compared with the private sector.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Party-building roles in China pay an average Rmb110,000 ($16,200) a year according to job site Zhiyouji, below the Rmb124,000 average for non-private entities, but offer job security and generous benefits relative to the private sector.
A Tianjin-based state-owned engineering enterprise advertised a "Party building and propaganda officer" post on recruitment site Yingjiesheng requiring applicants to be CCP members with "good political literacy and theoretical grounding.".
China's young graduates, contending with rising youth unemployment, are turning to party-building work for a stable if not especially lucrative income.
Related Articles:
China’s Youth Unemployment Hits New High As Fresh Graduates Flood Market— China's National Bureau of Statistics reported the jobless rate for 16-to-24-year-olds, excluding students, rose to 16.9% from 16.1%, while the rate for those aged 25 to 29 rose to 7.7% from 7.2%, and overall urban unemployment edged up to 5.4%. A record 12.7m students, about 4% more than the prior year, are expected to graduate.
China Says Hostile Foreign Forces Are Driving Its Youth to Slack Off— China's Ministry of State Security attributes youth disillusionment to ideological infiltration by foreign anti-China hostile forces, calling young people the primary targets of such efforts. Millions of young Chinese have embraced a "lying flat" mindset, rejecting pressure to overwork or leaving work entirely in an economy with limited well-paying jobs.
China Punishes ‘Excessively Pessimistic’ Social Media Users— China's internet regulator has launched a campaign to remove online content that incites "excessively pessimistic sentiment," panic, or defeatist ideas such as "hard work is useless." Authorities have punished bloggers who advocated working less, an influencer who said forgoing marriage and children made financial sense, and a commentator who said China's quality of life lags Western countries.
AI Summary.Undergraduate enrollment in degrees tied to the most AI-exposed jobs has risen 8%, indicating students are moving toward rather than away from fields exposed to artificial intelligence. A decline in computer science degrees is more than offset by growth in other exposed fields such as engineering.
Sarah Eckhardt and Nathan GoldschlagAgglomerations
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Far from shying away from AI, American undergraduates “are flocking towards the most-AI-exposed degrees,” with enrollment in these majors up 8% last year compared to 2017.
Are students moving toward or away from degrees exposed to AI?
Core argument: Undergraduate enrollment in the most-AI-exposed degrees rose 8% last year compared with 2017, indicating students are moving toward fields whose likely jobs have greater AI exposure.
Are students shying away from fields that have more exposure to AI, perhaps worried that AI will shrink the number of jobs available to them? Or are students shifting towards those fields, preparing for a future in which they will have to be comfortable using AI? To find out, we can check enrollment for groups of degrees based on the AI exposure of the jobs that students with those degrees are likely to take, as shown in Figure 1. As is clear, undergraduates are flocking towards the most-AI-exposed degrees, with enrollment in those degrees up 8% last year compared to 2017. This trend holds despite a notable decline in Computer Science degrees, one of the most-AI-exposed degrees, but whose decline is more than offset by increases in other exposed degrees like Engineering.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Undergraduate enrollment in the most-AI-exposed degrees rose 8% last year compared with 2017, indicating students are moving toward fields whose likely jobs have greater AI exposure.
Computer Science, one of the most-AI-exposed degrees, saw a notable enrollment decline that was more than offset by increases in other exposed fields such as Engineering.
Grouping degrees by the AI exposure of the jobs their graduates are likely to take offers a way to test whether students are avoiding or embracing AI-exposed fields.
Related Articles:
Attention (And Money) Is All You Need: Why Universities Are Struggling to Keep AI Talent— The annual compensation gap between top industry and academic artificial intelligence researchers widened from roughly $294,000 to $1.5m, coinciding with accelerating academic out-migration toward large incumbent technology firms. Researchers who move to industry cut paper production by about 63% while increasing patent filings nearly sixfold, consistent with a shift from open science toward proprietary innovation.
AI and Young-adult Jobs: The Real Mystery— Employment rates have declined for young adults both with and without college degrees, with non-degree holders faring marginally worse, and employment growth for young workers of all education levels has lagged that of other workers. Artificial intelligence can replace some lower-skilled jobs, but those jobs are too few to drive youth labor market weakness.
Tracking the Impact of AI on the Labor Market— US labor force survey data show occupational stability rather than economy-wide disruption from generative artificial intelligence, with the dissimilarity in occupational mix between older and more recent college graduates rarely deviating outside a 30–33% range. The authors note this limited early impact resembles the pace of change in previous periods of technological disruption.
AI Summary.A meta-study of 79 causal estimates finds an average 8.2% earnings gain per year of education, matching earlier work, but also finds evidence of publication bias favoring statistically significant and positive estimates. Correcting for these biases implies an average causal return in the 0%–3% range.
Gregory Clark and Christian Alexander Abildgaard NielsenKyklos
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Clark and Nielsen replicate the ~8% estimates of the return to education obtained by standard methods, but find evidence of selection biases in favor of high estimated returns. After correcting for these biases, they calculate returns on the order of 3%.
Do publication biases inflate estimated earnings returns to education?
Core argument: A meta-study of 79 causal estimates of education's effect on earnings, drawn from school-leaving age mandates and child labor bans, reports an 8.2% earnings gain per year of education, similar to the earlier Ashenfelter et al. study.
In this meta-study of 79 estimates of the causal effects of education on earnings (derived from increases of the mandated school-leaving age or legislation banning child labor under certain ages), we report a similar effect to [the classic] earlier study (Ashenfelter, et al): an 8.2% gain in earnings for each year of education. We also find clear evidence of significant publication biases. Studies passing the filter of publication were more likely to have coefficients statistically significantly greater than 0, and we observe strong evidence that studies with returns estimated at less than 0 were more difficult to publish. There is strong suggestive evidence of the first publication bias in the data. Figure 6 shows that the average estimated return rises substantially where the standard error is larger. This suggests a greater likelihood of an estimate being published when it was statistically significantly different from 0. If all estimates were published independent of the estimated return, we would not expect there to be such a gradient. Correcting the first publication bias by looking at the average return on the studies with the lowest standard errors would suggest an average causal return to education of no more than 3%, compared to the reported 8.2%. Independent of this, correcting for the omission of returns less than 0 implies an overall causal return to education only in the 0%–3% range.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
A meta-study of 79 causal estimates of education's effect on earnings, drawn from school-leaving age mandates and child labor bans, reports an 8.2% earnings gain per year of education, similar to the earlier Ashenfelter et al. study.
Average estimated returns to education rise substantially where standard errors are larger, which suggests estimates were more likely to be published when statistically significantly different from 0.
Correcting for publication bias by using the studies with the lowest standard errors would suggest an average causal return to education of no more than 3%, while correcting for omitted negative estimates implies a 0%–3% range.
Related Articles:
Standardized Test Scores and Academic Performance at Ivy-Plus Colleges— An analysis of admissions and transcript records at Ivy-Plus colleges finds standardized test scores predict first-year college grades with a normalized slope 4x greater than high school grade point average, controlling for race, gender, and socioeconomic status. The authors find no evidence test scores underpredict college performance for students from less advantaged backgrounds.
Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World?— An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.
Military Officer Quality in the All-Volunteer Force— The authors find a steady decline in U.S. Marine Corps officers' General Classification Test scores, which is statistically associated with the expansion of college attendance and explains 96% of the measured change. They also find a positive association between African American officers and mean test scores, arguing affirmative action has not lowered officer quality.
AI Summary.Students admitted to elite high schools just above the admissions cutoff are estimated to be 3.2pp less likely to have ever held a formal private-sector job five years later — a 16% decline versus those just missing the cutoff — and to earn 5.3% lower wages. These gaps shrink over time and are statistically insignificant after 15 years.
Francisco Cabrera-Hernández, Andrew Dustan, Daniel Osuna Gomez and María Padilla-RomoNational Bureau of Economic Research
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In data from the Mexico City metro area over 2003–2009, students who just missed the exam score cutoff for admission to an elite high school have 5.3% higher wages after five years (2.5% after 10 years) than marginally admitted students.
Does barely getting into an elite high school lower early earnings?
Core argument: Marginal assignment to an elite high school causes a 3.2pp decline in the probability of ever having held a formal job five years later at ages 19–20, a 16% drop from the 20% base rate for students just below the cutoff.
[We] trace out the [harmful] causal impact of [marginal] assignment to an elite school [as opposed to just missing the admissions cutoff] on formal private labor market outcomes over time. Five years after the assignment process (at ages 19-20, beyond high school age), elite assignment [based on a test score marginally above the cutoff] causes a 3.2pp decline in the probability of ever having held a formal job. This is a 16% decline relative to the base rate of 20% for students missing the elite cutoff by one point. Over time, this elite disadvantage declines: after 10 years (at ages 24-25, after the typical age of college graduation), the effect is -2.1pp, while after 15 years (at ages 29-30) the estimated -0.2pp impact is statistically insignificant. While the negative effect on formal employment eventually fades, it leaves elite students with a deficit in formal labor market experience. After 5 years, elite assignment reduces the cumulative number of months with a formal job by 14%. Conditional on formal employment, marginal elite assignment causes a reduction in wages that fades out over time. Five years after assignment, elite assignment reduces wages by 5.3%. This reduction declines to 2.6% after 10 years, and [essentially vanishes] after 15 years.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Marginal assignment to an elite high school causes a 3.2pp decline in the probability of ever having held a formal job five years later at ages 19–20, a 16% drop from the 20% base rate for students just below the cutoff.
The elite-assignment employment disadvantage fades over time, falling to -2.1pp after 10 years (ages 24–25) and a statistically insignificant -0.2pp after 15 years (ages 29–30).
Conditional on formal employment, marginal elite assignment reduces wages by 5.3% after five years and 2.6% after 10 years, and cuts cumulative months of formal work by 14% after five years.
Related Articles:
Marginal Returns to Public Universities— Using admission-score cutoffs across all 35 Texas public universities, the author estimates that marginally admitted students complete an additional year of four-year education, are 12 percentage points more likely to earn a bachelor's degree, and earn 5–10% more than marginally rejected peers, with gains driven by students who otherwise would not attend a four-year school.
Are China’s Students Really Number One? A Statistical Riddle— China's reported 65-point jump in mean international student test scores between testing rounds coincided with a change in which provinces represented the country, swapping the most populous province for a richer, much smaller one. The author argues such swings, including a fall in low performers from 43% to 19% in reading, are unmatched elsewhere.
AI Summary.A falling US birth rate is projected to shrink the pool of college-age Americans, leaving schools with empty classrooms. Many smaller, lesser-known colleges are already firing professors, cutting liberal arts courses in favor of science and technology programs, or closing entirely.
Elizabeth Rembert, Amanda Albright and Marie PatinoBloomberg
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As America’s demographics roll over, smaller public and private liberal arts colleges have “already hit the precipice.” Btw 2003 and 2024, more than 100 public campuses closed, and ~ 2/3 of private for-profit colleges have shut down since the 2010s.
How is a falling birth rate reshaping American colleges?
Core argument: The US pool of college-aged Americans is expected to shrink after 2025, pushing schools toward a "demographic cliff" in which a steadily dropping population of people in their late teens and early 20s leaves desks and classrooms empty.
The country’s tumbling birth rate is pushing schools toward a “demographic cliff,” where a steadily dropping population of people in their late teens and early 20s will leave desks and classrooms empty. Many smaller, lesser-known schools have already hit the precipice. They’re firing professors, paring back liberal arts courses in favor of STEM — or closing altogether. Others will likely reach the cliff in the next few years. Although it has plunged since the 1950s, the US birth rate ticked upward slightly before the 2008 financial crisis, and that brief demographic boost has kept enrollment at larger schools afloat. But the nationwide pool of college-aged Americans is expected to shrink after 2025. The financial pressure will be relentless. “If colleges were facing a stark decline in one or two cohorts, higher ed could likely say, ‘Well, we could admit a few additional students and tighten our belts to muddle through,’” said Nathan Grawe, an economics professor at Carleton College in Minnesota, who has written books about education and demographics. “But it’s one year after another of contraction, of ratcheting up the pressure.”
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The US pool of college-aged Americans is expected to shrink after 2025, pushing schools toward a "demographic cliff" in which a steadily dropping population of people in their late teens and early 20s leaves desks and classrooms empty.
Many smaller, lesser-known US colleges have already reached the precipice, firing professors, paring back liberal arts courses in favor of STEM, or closing altogether, with others likely to reach it in the next few years.
Carleton College economics professor Nathan Grawe argues that higher education could muddle through a decline in one or two cohorts by admitting a few additional students and tightening belts, but faces one year after another of contraction.
Related Articles:
Labor Market Strength and Declining Community College Enrollment— Declines in U.S. college enrollment are concentrated in community colleges, with four-year institutions maintaining stable enrollments and over one-third of the apparent community college drop stemming from administrative reclassification. The authors estimate that stronger labor markets explain 60% of the community college enrollment decline over 2009-19.
Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World?— An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.
Changes in the College Mobility Pipeline Since 1900— Students from the bottom third of parental income now earn less than half the college enrollment wage premium of top-third students. The authors attribute this mainly to the rising relative value of research universities, lower-income students' diversion to community and for-profit colleges, and their shift from computer science and engineering into humanities.
