AI Summary. Fertility has fallen across modern societies, with tight-knit religious communities such as Israel's ultra-Orthodox and America's Amish remaining exceptions above replacement level. The relationship between income and childbearing has reversed: richer OECD countries once had fewer children, and researchers find higher-income men and more-educated women now have more children.

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Across OECD countries, richer members now tend to have higher fertility, even controlling for migration. According to Mexico’s newly released official survey, Mexico’s fertility rate in 2024 was 1.2, versus 1.57 for non-Hispanic white Americans, although Mexican income per capita was only 28% of the US level. Fernández-Villaverde argues that “ultralow fertility seems to be caused not by a lack of desire for children but by the absence of the conditions that would make having children easier, or even possible.”

Has the link between higher income and fewer children reversed?

Core argument: In the United States, economists Moshe Hazan and Hosny Zoabi find that in the first decade of the 2000s, women with a graduate degree had about 2 children, more than the 1.8 of women who stopped at a bachelor's degree.

Tight-knit religious communities, such as the ultra-Orthodox in Israel and the Amish in the United States, have managed to maintain high fertility rates well above replacement level. But these groups have also stayed apart from much of modern life. Apart from these idiosyncratic pockets, modernity has spread around the planet, with fertility falling everywhere. But rates are tumbling unevenly. In 1980, the richer an OECD country, the fewer children its women had. By 2000, the opposite was beginning to become true. The same reversal shows up inside countries. In Sweden, the demographer Martin Kolk has found that in every cohort born between 1940 and 1970, men with higher lifetime incomes have more children, and that among women born since the 1960s, the poorest have the fewest children. In the United States, the economists Moshe Hazan and Hosny Zoabi have found that in the first decade of the twenty-first century, women with a graduate degree had about 2 children, significantly more than the 1.8 for women who stopped at a bachelor’s degree.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In the United States, economists Moshe Hazan and Hosny Zoabi find that in the first decade of the 2000s, women with a graduate degree had about 2 children, more than the 1.8 of women who stopped at a bachelor's degree.
  2. The income–fertility relationship across OECD countries reversed: in 1980 richer countries had lower fertility, but by 2000 the opposite was beginning to hold.
  3. In Sweden, demographer Martin Kolk finds that in every cohort born between 1940 and 1970, men with higher lifetime incomes had more children, and among women born since the 1960s, the poorest had the fewest.

AI Summary. Racial and ethnic minorities accounted for all US population growth in recent years, offsetting losses in the white population, and now make up 52.8% of Americans under 30 versus 43.9% of the total population. Projections indicate minorities will exceed half the under-35 population by 2030 even with zero immigration.

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Non-Hispanic whites account for 47.2% of Americans under 30, ~9pp less than their share of the overall population. 69% of this difference reflects the larger Hispanic share among younger Americans (6.1pp), with smaller contributions from Blacks (1.1 pp) and multiracial Americans (1.8 pp), while the Asian share is ~ unchanged.

Are racial and ethnic minorities now a majority of young Americans?

Core argument: Racial and ethnic minorities comprise 52.8% of the U.S. under-30 population, higher than their 43.9% share of the total U.S. population, and they hold a majority at each individual age from zero to 29.

Between the 2020 census and July 1, 2025, racial and ethnic minorities—especially Latino or Hispanic and Asian Americans—accounted for all the nation’s population gains, countering significant losses in the white population. The 2020 to 2025 shifts in nonwhite racial and ethnic minority population shares have now led to a tipping point for the under-30 population, such that more than half identifies all or in part with a nonwhite racial or ethnic group. This is the case for each individual age between zero and 29, as well as for the entire under-30 population, where the combined minority groups comprise 52.8% of the population—substantially higher than those groups’ 43.9% share of the total U.S. population. In 2030, the nonwhite population will comprise more than half of the nation’s under-35 population. Those projections establish that even with absolutely zero immigration, the 2030 census could show that minority populations comprise 50.3% of the under-35 population, and even larger shares with moderate or high levels of immigration.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Racial and ethnic minorities comprise 52.8% of the U.S. under-30 population, higher than their 43.9% share of the total U.S. population, and they hold a majority at each individual age from zero to 29.
  2. Between the 2020 census and July 1, 2025, racial and ethnic minorities—especially Latino or Hispanic and Asian Americans—accounted for all U.S. population gains, countering losses in the white population.
  3. Projections indicate that even with zero immigration, the 2030 census could show minority populations comprising 50.3% of the under-35 population, with larger shares under moderate or high immigration.

AI Summary. Ukraine's population in government-controlled territory has fallen from about 37m to 27m–28m since Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion, with 3m–5m living under occupation and millions emigrated. The fertility rate has dropped from 1.2 children per woman to 0.8–0.9, far below the 2.1 replacement rate, and deaths now outnumber births by more than three to one.

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Ukraine’s fertility rate has fallen from 1.2 children per woman in 2020 to 0.8–0.9—lower than in any other major country except South Korea. A key driver of the fertility decline is the more than 5 million Ukrainians living abroad, mostly children and women under 44.

How severely has war reduced Ukraine's population and birth rate?

Core argument: Ukraine's population in government-controlled territory has fallen from about 37m to 27m–28m since Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, with 3m–5m Ukrainians living under Russian occupation and millions more emigrated.

Births in Ukraine are falling, in part because there are fewer adults. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 the population inside government-controlled territory has fallen from about 37m to 27m-28m. Around 3m-5m Ukrainians now live under Russian occupation, and millions more have emigrated. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, puts combat deaths at over 50,000; an independent estimate is closer to 150,000. Thousands of civilians have been killed, and Russia has deported over 20,000 children to Russify them. Wartime, moreover, is not good for starting families. The fertility rate has dropped from 1.2 children per woman in 2020 to 0.8-0.9, lower than any big country but South Korea. The replacement rate, needed to keep the population stable, is 2.1. In the first half of 2026 deaths outnumbered births by more than three to one.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Ukraine's population in government-controlled territory has fallen from about 37m to 27m–28m since Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, with 3m–5m Ukrainians living under Russian occupation and millions more emigrated.
  2. Ukraine's fertility rate has dropped from 1.2 children per woman in 2020 to 0.8–0.9, lower than any big country except South Korea and below the 2.1 replacement rate needed to keep the population stable.
  3. Deaths outnumbered births by more than three to one in Ukraine in the first half of 2026, while President Volodymyr Zelensky puts combat deaths above 50,000 and an independent estimate is closer to 150,000.

AI Summary. China recorded 4.648m marriage registrations in the first nine months of the year, down 504,000 from a year earlier, a nearly 10% decline that points to a full-year drop. Marriages peaked at 13.469m in 2013 and have generally trended downward since, with divorce registrations at 2.082m.

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The number of marriages in China fell ~10% y/y to ~4.6mm in the first three quarters of this year, after rising 10.8% to ~6.8mm in 2025. The number of marriages peaked in 2013 at 13.5mm, and the most recent trough was 6.1mm in 2024.

Are marriages in China declining again after last year's rebound?

Core argument: China recorded 4.648 million marriage registrations in the first nine months of 2026, down 504,000 from a year earlier, a decline of nearly 10%, according to Ministry of Civil Affairs data.

China has witnessed a nearly 10% drop in the number of marriages in the first three quarters of the year, signalling a possible full-year fall in 2026 after a rebound in 2025. The country recorded 4.648 million marriage registrations in the first nine months, down 504,000 from a year earlier, data released by the Ministry of Civil Affairs showed. The latest figures mean that 2026 marriage registrations would most likely see a year-on-year drop as well, said He Yafu, an independent demographer based in Guangdong province. Based on the historical share of annual marriage registrations recorded in each quarter, he estimated that nationwide marriages for the entire year would range from 5.88 million to 6.46 million couples. Even if registrations reached the upper end of that forecast, they would still be lower than the 2025 level.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China recorded 4.648 million marriage registrations in the first nine months of 2026, down 504,000 from a year earlier, a decline of nearly 10%, according to Ministry of Civil Affairs data.
  2. Independent demographer He Yafu estimates full-year 2026 marriages at 5.88 million to 6.46 million couples, below the 6.765 million recorded in 2025, when registrations rose 10.8%, boosted by auspicious dates, a new nationwide registration service and local incentives.
  3. China’s marriage registrations peaked at 13.469 million in 2013, fell below 10 million in 2019 and dropped to 6.1 million in 2024, a record low since the data was first published, while divorce registrations in the first nine months of 2026 reached 2.082 million, up 5,000 year-on-year.

AI Summary. U.S. public school K-12 enrollment totaled 48.8m students in the 2025-26 school year, down 3.7% from 2017-18, as kindergarten declines reflect fewer births five to six years earlier. Demographers expect the decline to continue, and even accelerate, because of lower birthrates.

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Enrollment at American K-12 public schools was ~48.8mm in the 2025–26 school year, down 3.7% from 2017–2018, reflecting demographics rolling over and flight from public schools. The decline is putting pressure on school budgets as state funding is generally tied to enrollment, while staff and building costs are fixed.

Are falling birthrates shrinking public school enrollment?

Core argument: U.S. K-12 public school enrollment totaled 48.8 million students in the 2025-26 school year, down 3.7% from 2017-18, according to Georgetown professor Marguerite Roza’s analysis of federal data.

Annual births in the U.S. have fallen off since peaking in 2007. Today’s kindergarten enrollment declines reflect the “missing” births of five to six years earlier. Enrollment at K-12 public schools totaled 48.8 million students in the 2025-26 school year, down 3.7% from 2017-18, according to [Marguerite Roza, a Georgetown professor] analysis of federal data. Demographers like her expect the decline to continue, even accelerate, because of lower birthrates.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. K-12 public school enrollment totaled 48.8 million students in the 2025-26 school year, down 3.7% from 2017-18, according to Georgetown professor Marguerite Roza’s analysis of federal data.
  2. Annual U.S. births have fallen since peaking in 2007, and current kindergarten enrollment declines reflect the “missing” births of five to six years earlier.
  3. Demographers including Marguerite Roza expect public school enrollment declines to continue and even accelerate because of lower birthrates.

AI Summary. An analysis of British convictions, standardised for age and sex, estimates Afghan nationals are convicted of sex crimes at about 7x the British rate, though the figure is uncertain and may be skewed by a few serial offenders or reporting and detection quirks. Absolute numbers remain small, rising from 92 to 102 convictions as the Afghan population roughly tripled.

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After adjusting for age and sex, an Economist analysis of Ministry of Justice data finds that immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa were convicted of sex offences in England and Wales at ~2.5x the rate of British nationals, immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa at ~3.5x, and Afghans at ~7x.

Do sex crime conviction rates differ by immigrants' country of origin?

Core argument: Analysis of 2020–22 convictions, standardised for age and sex because men commit 98% of sex crimes and Afghans are about ten years younger than the population at large, suggests Afghan nationals are convicted of sex crimes at seven times the British rate.

We analysed convictions during a three-year period, 2020-22, and averaged our population estimate over those three years. We then standardised our estimate to account for age and sex (men commit 98% of sex crimes, for example, and Afghans are about ten years younger than the population at large). This suggested Afghans are convicted of sex crimes at seven times the British rate. Our number is still uncertain: it may be skewed by a few serial offenders, by quirks in reporting and detection rates for such crimes. The numbers need to be kept in perspective. In 2010-12 Afghan nationals were convicted of 92 sex crimes; in 2022-24 the total was 102. Ten additional sex crimes, after the Afghan population has roughly tripled, is not an epidemic.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Analysis of 2020–22 convictions, standardised for age and sex because men commit 98% of sex crimes and Afghans are about ten years younger than the population at large, suggests Afghan nationals are convicted of sex crimes at seven times the British rate.
  2. The estimate remains uncertain and may be skewed by a few serial offenders or by quirks in reporting and detection rates for sex crimes.
  3. Afghan nationals were convicted of 92 sex crimes in 2010–12 and 102 in 2022–24, an increase of ten offences after the Afghan population roughly tripled.

AI Summary. Among U.S. households headed by someone aged 45–64, 49% of top-1% income earners have three or more children versus about 40% for the rest of the top 10%, with the gap concentrated in families with exactly three children. The author argues this reflects fertility decline elsewhere rather than a new pattern among the wealthy.

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Among US families headed by 45 to 64 year olds, 49% of the top 1% by income have 3 or more children, compared to ~40% of the rest of the top 10%. Since the 1990s, three-child families have become rarer everywhere except at the top.

Do top-1% households have more children than the merely affluent?

Core argument: Among U.S. households aged 45–64 in the 2025 Survey of Consumer Finances, 49% of top-1% income earners have three or more children versus about 40% for the 90th–99th percentile, with the gap concentrated in families of exactly three (34% vs 24%).

To get enough people in the [top] 1%, I pool the last five Surveys of Consumer Finance (SCF) [from 2013 through the newly available 2025 wave]. [We produce] a graph where the x-axis is all mid-life families, grouped by usual income (including capital income) relative to others their age, and the y-axis is the percent of families with a child count of at least three. From the 10th percentile up it’s pretty flat, around 40 to 43%. But it has a statistically significant rise at the top 1%: 49%, compared with about 40% for the rest of the top 10%. Under the hood, this is driven by those with exactly three kids: about 34% of the top 1%, versus 24% of the rest of the top 10%. A third kid isn’t new for them; what’s new is that it has become rarer for everyone else. Compared with the 1990s, families with three or more kids became less common overall and among the rest of the top 10%. The top 1%’s estimated share barely changed, though the uncertainty is substantial. Now this is a correlation, but it’s the one you’d expect if money solves the hard parts of raising kids.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Among U.S. households aged 45–64 in the 2025 Survey of Consumer Finances, 49% of top-1% income earners have three or more children versus about 40% for the 90th–99th percentile, with the gap concentrated in families of exactly three (34% vs 24%).
  2. Ranked by net worth, the share with three or more children falls from 47% at the 20th–30th percentiles to 34% at the 70th–80th, then rises to 50% at the top 1% versus 37% for the rest of the top 10%.
  3. Economist Mike Konczal argues the top-1% pattern reflects fertility decline elsewhere rather than a new cultural development, as three-or-more-child families grew less common overall and among the rest of the top 10% compared with the 1990s while the top-1%

AI Summary. Africa's population has grown from 228mn in 1950, with about 33mn in cities, to 1.6bn, or 19% of the world's total, with 670mn living in cities. UN data show cities with more than 1mn people quadrupled to 40 between 1975 and 2000, and Africa's urban population could double again by 2050.

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Africa’s urban population has grown from 33 million in 1950 to 670 million today. Its growth may now exceed even China’s post-Deng urban boom: ~15 million added annually in recent years, versus ~14 million in China in the 1990s. The UN projects ~19 million a year by 2050.

How fast is Africa's urban population growing?

Core argument: Africa’s population has grown from 228mn in 1950, with 33mn in cities, to 1.6bn today — 19% of the world’s total — of whom 670mn live in cities.

In 1950, there were 228mn people living in Africa, with about 33mn in cities. Today there are 1.6bn Africans, 19% of the world’s total, of whom 670mn live in cities. Almost unnoticed, Africa has become an urban story. In 1975, more than a decade after most African states won independence, there were only nine cities with a population above 1mn and just 537 with more than 50,000 residents, according to UN data. By 2000, the number of cities with more than 1mn people had quadrupled to 40, most of them capitals, historic port cities or, like Onitsha, major trading hubs. The total number of African cities doubled again by 2025, with some, such as Dar es Salaam, increasing their populations by 25 times in five decades. Demographics and migration mean Africa’s urban population could double again by 2050.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Africa’s population has grown from 228mn in 1950, with 33mn in cities, to 1.6bn today — 19% of the world’s total — of whom 670mn live in cities.
  2. African cities with more than 1mn residents quadrupled from nine in 1975 to 40 by 2000, most of them capitals, historic port cities or trading hubs such as Onitsha, according to UN data.
  3. Dar es Salaam’s population increased 25 times over five decades, and demographics and migration mean Africa’s urban population could double again by 2050.