Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

AI Summary. China's record goods trade surplus surpassed $1tn, driven by fierce domestic competition among manufacturers that investors describe as malignant but that yields high-quality products at prices rivals struggle to match. European leaders have called the surge of high-tech Chinese goods an existential threat to their continent's manufacturing.

Ryan McMorrow, Sam Fleming, Peter Foster and Joe Leahy Financial Times
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

As Chinese firms’ profits vanish in the face of “involution,” a second China Shock is underway. China boosted exports ~15% y/y in the first 3 months of 2026. China’s Jaecoo 7 SUV, with a starting price of £29,000, was the UK’s best-selling car in March.

Is domestic competition in China making its manufacturers unbeatable abroad?

Core argument: China recorded a record goods trade surplus surpassing $1tn in 2025, alongside a surge of high-quality Chinese goods sold at low prices.

“Companies that can survive in China are unbeatable anywhere else in the world,” says Huang He, an investor in Mega-Senway and more than a dozen other Chinese industrial groups. Chinese founders have to “use every possible means” to survive, he says, collectively creating the country’s unmatchable competitiveness. “China is full of engineers — tech barriers last six months to a year at most.” For Huang it feels like a whirlpool sucking his company downwards. “This is not a healthy situation,” he says. “There’s malignant competition.” The outside world sees unstoppable Chinese champions selling quality products at impossible prices. After racking up a record trade surplus in goods that surpassed $1tn in 2025. France’s President Emmanuel Macron, one of several European leaders to visit Beijing in the past six months, did not mince his words on a threat he sees as existential. The surge of high-quality Chinese goods, he said, represented nothing less than a “question of life or death” for manufacturing on his continent.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China recorded a record goods trade surplus surpassing $1tn in 2025, alongside a surge of high-quality Chinese goods sold at low prices.
  2. French President Emmanuel Macron called the surge of high-quality Chinese goods a "question of life or death" for manufacturing in Europe.
  3. Chinese investor Huang He attributes China's competitiveness to founders using "every possible means" to survive and an abundance of engineers that limits technology barriers to six months to a year, calling the resulting "malignant competition" unhealthy.

Related Articles:

  • The Deflation Doom Loop Trapping China’s Economy — China's broad price gauge, the GDP deflator, has been negative since 2023, indicating weak domestic demand, with profits shrinking across industries from steel and electric vehicles to cosmetics and profit margins among publicly traded mainland firms at their lowest since 2009. Fixed-asset investment in homes, factories and roads fell for the first time on record.
  • What’s New About Involution? — China's cycle of relentless competition and price cutting stems from its long-standing growth model, with the latest phase driven by an engineered shift of investment from property into manufacturing that was not tied to expected demand growth. Administrative fixes and exports shift excess capacity between sectors rather than resolving it.
  • Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push — Stronger Chinese growth driven by export-oriented manufacturing may not produce net positive spillovers: for every 1pp export-driven boost to China's GDP, other economies may see a 0.1–0.3pp drag, with high-tech producers such as Europe and Japan facing greater pressure. Cheaper Chinese goods continue to exert a disinflationary impulse.

AI Summary. China's energy security rests on coal rather than imported oil and gas: the country consumes more than half the world's coal, and coal powers its industry and electricity system. Coal consumption has risen since 2022, with roughly 95GW of new coal capacity added in one year, exceeding Vietnam's entire installed electricity capacity.

Damien Ma Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Due to electrification, China’s energy security is not contingent on Hormuz. China is increasing its absolute coal generation capacity while coal’s share of domestic generation falls overall.

Does China's energy security depend on coal rather than oil imports?

Core argument: China added roughly 95GW of coal capacity in 2024, a decade high exceeding Vietnam's entire installed electricity capacity, with total coal consumption rising markedly since 2022 after Beijing's pivot to energy security following its domestic energy crisis.

[China's] energy security isn’t really tied to oil or gas, for which the country does depend on imports. It has always been inextricably linked to coal. China consumes more than half of the world’s coal, and it is the main commodity that powers Chinese industry and the electricity system. Total coal consumption has risen markedly since 2022, which aligns with the rebound in commissioned capacity resulting from Beijing’s hard pivot to energy security after the domestic energy crisis noted above. In 2024 alone, China added a staggering decade-high of ~95GW of coal capacity, which is larger than the entire installed electricity capacity of Vietnam. [While Chinese] solar power [has] achieved cost parity with coal, the country has a deep industrial base and a comprehensive electro-tech ecosystem that is intent on manufacturing a new energy landscape, or an “electro-state,” as some have come to call it. Peak coal is not only congruent with but is also a necessary condition for realizing this strategy.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China added roughly 95GW of coal capacity in 2024, a decade high exceeding Vietnam's entire installed electricity capacity, with total coal consumption rising markedly since 2022 after Beijing's pivot to energy security following its domestic energy crisis.
  2. China consumes more than half of the world's coal, the main commodity powering its industry and electricity system, and its energy security is linked to coal rather than to imported oil and gas.
  3. Chinese solar power has reached cost parity with coal, and the country's industrial base and electro-tech ecosystem aim to build an "electro-state," a strategy for which peak coal is a necessary condition.

Related Articles:

  • The Real China Model — China generates more electricity annually than the United States and European Union combined, having added capacity equivalent to the United Kingdom's total supply each year. Electricity makes up nearly 30% of China's energy use, versus 22% in the US and 21% globally, and its share is growing about 6% a year.
  • Fighting Words: The Energy Transition in 2026 — Estimates based on primary energy overstate how much electricity is needed to replace oil in passenger cars, since electric motors convert 80%-90% of electricity into motion versus about 18% for gasoline cars. Measuring useful final energy net of waste heat avoids this "primary energy fallacy": the US consumed 45 exajoules of useful final energy versus 95 exajoules of primary energy.
  • Power Politics: Energy Self-Sufficiency in a Modern Mercantilist World — China leads in adding power to the grid, with more than 30,000 miles of ultra-high-voltage transmission lines versus zero in the US and lead times for large transformers of 48 weeks against a US average of 143 weeks. This positions China to accommodate new demand sources such as artificial intelligence.

AI Summary. China graduates about 5x as many medical and biomedical students as the US each year, 7x as many engineers, and nearly double the number of science and engineering PhDs, while one-sixth to one-fifth of US science and engineering graduates are themselves Chinese. One study found returning Chinese scientists lead-author 2.5x more papers than peers who stay in the US.

Tanner Greer Scholar's Stage
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Greer argues that the scale and intensity of investment in science in China suggests that “even if you believe that political instability or economic uncertainty might arrest China’s upward climb, that might not change the trajectory of Chinese science.”

Is China outpacing the US in producing scientists and engineers?

Core argument: China graduates five times as many medical and biomedical students, seven times as many engineers, and two-and-a-half times as many undergraduates with artificial intelligence research experience as the United States each year.

The scale of Chinese scientific production is in part a story about people. China graduates five times the number of medical and biomedical students than we do every year, seven times the number of engineers, and two-and-a-half times the number of undergraduates with research experience in artificial intelligence. Last year China graduated almost double the number of STEM PhD students than we did—and that number is actually worse than it sounds because—depending on the exact year you do the counting—between one sixth and one fifth of our STEM graduates are themselves Chinese. Many of these researchers go back. They go back partially because they are well compensated for doing so. They also go back because of the research opportunities afforded to them. A recent study found that returning Chinese scientists go on to become the lead author on 2.5 times more papers than their colleagues who stay in the United States. Many Chinese research labs have 30 or 40 people attached to them—the equivalent to a commercial research lab in the United States.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China graduates five times as many medical and biomedical students, seven times as many engineers, and two-and-a-half times as many undergraduates with artificial intelligence research experience as the United States each year.
  2. China graduated almost double the number of STEM PhD students as the United States, while between one sixth and one fifth of U.S. STEM graduates are themselves Chinese.
  3. A recent study found that Chinese scientists who return home go on to become lead author on 2.5 times more papers than colleagues who stay in the United States, and many Chinese research labs have 30 or 40 people attached to them.

Related Articles:

  • How China Is Outperforming the United States in Critical Technologies — The Australian Strategic Policy Institute's Critical Technology Tracker finds China leads in 57 of 64 critical technology categories while the United States leads in 7, and that China surpasses the United States in top-tier scientific publications across all 8 technology domains. In energy and environment China accounts for 46% of top-tier publications versus 10% for the United States.
  • Litigation Nation, Engineering Empire — Regrouping US college majors to match Chinese disciplines yields a 2:1 ratio of science and engineering to humanities and social sciences, the same ratio as in China. The author argues America's building slowdown reflects structural economic shifts—urbanization reached 70% by 1960 and 85% by 2020, shifting needs toward maintenance—rather than a lawyerly culture.
  • The US Is The World’s Science Superpower — But For How Long? — International students on temporary visas received more than a third of US science and engineering doctorates, including 59% in computer science, with most coming from China and India, and 77% of Chinese doctoral recipients said they intended to stay in the US. The US hosts 15% of the world's international students, down from 23%.

AI Summary. The share of Chinese who believe effort is always rewarded fell from 62% in 2004 to 28% in 2023, according to survey research, with respondents now citing unequal opportunity, connections, and being born rich as the keys to wealth. Those reporting their family situation had improved over the prior five years fell from about 70% to 39%.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Piketty’s data suggest China’s top 10% hold 68% of net personal wealth, on par with the US. As the wealth distribution has shifted, sentiment has declined. In 2004, 62% of Chinese felt “effort is always rewarded;” by 2023, the share had fallen to 28%.

Are Chinese losing faith that hard work brings success?

Core argument: The share of Chinese who believe "effort is always rewarded" fell from 62% in 2004 to 28% in 2023, according to a paper by Michael Alisky, Scott Rozelle and Martin Whyte.

Many Chinese once viewed wealth and success as reflections of hard work or intelligence. The rich were an advertisement for the dream of advancement. In 2004, according to a paper by Michael Alisky, Scott Rozelle and Martin Whyte, 62% of Chinese felt that “effort is always rewarded” and blamed poverty on lack of ability. But in recent years economic growth has slowed sharply and ordinary Chinese have become gloomy about their prospects. The proportion who think hard work pays off fell to 28% in 2023. People now see unequal opportunity as the biggest factor contributing to poverty; connections and being born rich are considered the keys to wealth. They think mobility has slowed. From 2004 to 2014 70% of respondents thought their family situation was better or much better than five years before. In 2023 only 39% thought so.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The share of Chinese who believe "effort is always rewarded" fell from 62% in 2004 to 28% in 2023, according to a paper by Michael Alisky, Scott Rozelle and Martin Whyte.
  2. Chinese respondents now identify unequal opportunity as the biggest factor contributing to poverty, and view connections and being born rich as the keys to wealth.
  3. The share of Chinese saying their family situation was better than five years earlier fell from 70% between 2004 and 2014 to 39% in 2023.

Related Articles:

  • 2025 Letter — China's economy features intense market competition, with firms continually expanding into each other's core businesses, a dynamic the author argues involves greater capitalist competition and greater capitalist excess than in the United States. The author attributes China's sideways-trending stock market in part to profits being competed away.
  • The Grandchildren of China’s Pre-Revolutionary Elite Have Regained Their Social Advantage, Earning 12% More Than Their Contemporaries and Surpassing Communist Party Members By 2% — A survey of 36,000 Chinese residents found that grandchildren of China's pre-revolutionary elite, born between 1966 and 1990, were 6% more likely to finish high school and earned 12% more than their contemporaries, exceeding Communist Party members by 2%. An earlier generation, the children of the old elite, earned 5% less than other Chinese.
  • The Sinister Disappearance Of China’s Bosses — China's liuzhi detention system operates alongside normal policing, requiring no court approval and denying detainees lawyers, with windowless cells, constant lighting and round-the-clock supervision. Stock-exchange filings show 39 executives at listed companies disappearing into the system by the end of September, exceeding the prior year's record.

AI Summary. Chinese exports rose nearly 22% year-over-year in the first two months of 2026, exceeding expectations and producing a record trade surplus for the period. Growth is concentrated in less labor-intensive goods such as batteries, cars and chips, while an alternative wage measure sits near its lowest level outside the pandemic.

Bloomberg Staff Bloomberg
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

In the first two months of the year, China’s exports were 22% above their level a year earlier. A Goldman analysis found that as of Q3 2025, wages had grown at close to their lowest y/y level on record, excluding the pandemic period.

Does surging export growth lift wages for China's factory workers?

Core argument: Chinese exports rose almost 22% from a year earlier in the first two months of 2026, exceeding expectations and producing a record trade surplus for the period, according to official data.

Official data on Tuesday showed Chinese exports surged almost 22% from a year earlier in the first two months of 2026, an increase that was more than expected and resulted in a record trade surplus for the period. Future technologies such as batteries, cars and chips — deemed essential for competing with the US — are taking a larger share of exports, but those products are less labor intensive. Perhaps more alarming for global trade, the trend only appears set to get worse in the short term as an explosion of AI and robotics spawns so-called dark factories that require no human workers. An alternative measure of China’s wage growth compiled by Goldman Sachs is hovering around the lowest level outside the pandemic in data going back to the beginning of the century. Further masking the pain is gig work, which now accounts for about 40% of urban employment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Chinese exports rose almost 22% from a year earlier in the first two months of 2026, exceeding expectations and producing a record trade surplus for the period, according to official data.
  2. Batteries, cars and chips — technologies deemed essential for competing with the US — are taking a larger share of Chinese exports, but those products are less labor intensive, and AI and robotics are spawning dark factories requiring no human workers.
  3. An alternative measure of Chinese wage growth compiled by Goldman Sachs is hovering near its lowest level outside the pandemic in data going back to the beginning of the century, with gig work now about 40% of urban employment.

Related Articles:

  • The True Cost of China’s Falling Prices — Prices fell for 51 of 67 consumer items tracked over a two-year period in China, while the broader GDP deflator, which includes upstream sectors, declined for 10 straight quarters, indicating deflation is more entrenched in industry. The share of "zombie" firms whose profits cannot cover debt interest rose from 19% to 34% over five years.
  • China’s Trade Surplus, Part I — China's very high investment rates, combined with a shrinking workforce and slowing productivity, produce sharply diminishing returns, making its decades-old high-savings, high-investment growth model unsustainable. The author argues China's leaders resist a pivot toward consumption because of ideology and geopolitical ambition, with the leadership rejecting welfare spending as breeding dependency.
  • Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push — Stronger Chinese growth driven by export-oriented manufacturing may not produce net positive spillovers: for every 1pp export-driven boost to China's GDP, other economies may see a 0.1–0.3pp drag, with high-tech producers such as Europe and Japan facing greater pressure. Cheaper Chinese goods continue to exert a disinflationary impulse.

AI Summary. Prices fell for 51 of 67 consumer items tracked over a two-year period in China, while the broader GDP deflator, which includes upstream sectors, declined for 10 straight quarters, indicating deflation is more entrenched in industry. The share of "zombie" firms whose profits cannot cover debt interest rose from 19% to 34% over five years.

Bloomberg Bloomberg Staff
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

A Bloomberg analysis finds that prices dropped on 51 of 67 products and services in China over the past two years. 34% of Chinese firms are unable to cover interest on their debt – a 25-year high – as China’s deflationary spiral worsens.

How deeply has deflation taken hold in China's industrial sector?

Core argument: Prices fell on 51 of 67 items tracked by Bloomberg News over the last two years, while China's GDP deflator, which includes upstream sectors, has declined for 10 straight quarters, indicating deflation is more entrenched in industry.

Among 67 items tracked by Bloomberg News, prices on 51 dropped over the last two years. A broader gauge that includes upstream sectors, known as the GDP deflator, has been steadily declining for 10 quarters, indicating that deflation is much more entrenched in the industrial sector. Polysilicon, the raw material for solar panels, saw prices drop to less than a fifth of its peak in 2022. Prices for steel rebar, widely used in construction, fell to an eight-year low in May. Across the market, company results show the same pressures: the share of “zombie” firms — those whose profits can’t cover interest payments on their debt — rose from 19% to 34% over the past five years; capital and R&D spending fell for most companies, a first in a decade; and more than a third of companies across industries cut jobs in 2024.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Prices fell on 51 of 67 items tracked by Bloomberg News over the last two years, while China's GDP deflator, which includes upstream sectors, has declined for 10 straight quarters, indicating deflation is more entrenched in industry.
  2. Polysilicon, the raw material for solar panels, has fallen to less than a fifth of its 2022 peak price, and steel rebar used in construction hit an eight-year low in May.
  3. The share of Chinese "zombie" firms whose profits cannot cover debt interest payments rose from 19% to 34% over five years, capital and R&D spending fell for most companies for the first time in a decade, and over a third cut jobs in 2024.

Related Articles:

  • How NOT To Negotiate With China — Trade diversion signals deep distress in China's export sector, and the author argues a sustained 10% tariff hike would be more credible than larger ones and could counter China's rare earths leverage. Easing up on Chinese exporters instead signals weakness and discourages Europe from coordinating with the US.
  • China’s Youth Unemployment Soars To 2-Year High As Job Crunch Deepens — China's urban unemployment rate for 16- to 24-year-olds excluding students rose to 18.9% from 17.8%, the highest since the National Bureau of Statistics revised its calculation method for the series. A record 12.2m university students graduated into a job market strained by deflationary pressures and external uncertainties, with many struggling to find roles matching their education and skills.
  • Xi Overcapacity Fight Leaves Economy Vulnerable Without Stimulus — China's total debt has risen to over 300% of gross domestic product from a little over 200% a decade ago, and with the main policy rate at 1.4%, the central bank has limited room to cut. Price declines are more widespread than in past deflationary episodes, and large-scale stimulus remains off the table.

AI Summary. New foreign direct investment into China has fallen sharply, while new inflows to the rest of the emerging markets have remained stable. Reinvested earnings of foreign subsidiaries in China, historically strongly positive, have turned negative, a sign those subsidiaries may be making losses.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

FDI flows into China have decreased, while flows into other emerging markets remain steady. Robin Brooks suggests “China’s status as an export hub for the world looks increasingly challenged over the medium term.”

Is foreign direct investment shifting away from China toward other emerging markets?

Core argument: Genuine new foreign direct investment into China has fallen sharply, a trend that has picked up in recent years.

The left chart above shows non-resident FDI into China (black line), breaking this down into genuine new FDI investment (blue bars) and reinvested earnings (red bars), which reflect retained profits of foreign subsidiaries in China. The latter have in the past been strongly positive, as foreign subsidiaries found it difficult to repatriate earnings back to their home countries. More recently, these reinvested earnings have gone negative, a sign that foreign subsidiaries in China may be making losses. The more interesting development is the sharp fall in genuine new FDI flows into China, a trend that’s picked up in recent years. The right chart shows that this drop-off in genuine new FDI stands in stark contrast to the rest of EM, where new FDI inflows are stable.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Genuine new foreign direct investment into China has fallen sharply, a trend that has picked up in recent years.
  2. Reinvested earnings of foreign subsidiaries in China have turned negative after long being strongly positive, which may indicate that those subsidiaries are making losses.
  3. New FDI inflows to the rest of emerging markets remain stable, in contrast to the drop-off in genuine new FDI into China.

Related Articles:

  • US Share of Global Foreign Direct Investment Surges to Record — The US share of newly announced global greenfield foreign direct investment projects rose to 14.3% from 11.6%, with the estimated value of new US projects up by more than $100bn to $227bn. Over the same period China secured just under 400 new projects, close to a record low, while Germany's fell to 470, an 18-year low.
  • The Rise & Fall of Foreign Direct Investment in China — Net foreign direct investment into China has been negative for four consecutive quarters, as foreign investors shifted from reinvesting earnings from their Chinese operations to repatriating them. Whether this reflects cash management or signals a future slowdown in foreign direct investment is unclear, but the repatriation of profits is negative for China's currency.
  • Globalization and Growth In A Bipolar World — Trade and investment flows between the US and China have declined, with protectionist measures prompting some reshoring alongside rerouting of trade and investment through third countries such as Vietnam and Mexico. The result is a loosening of US-China economic links rather than an end to globalization.

AI Summary. China installed 277 gigawatts of wind and solar capacity in seven months, roughly four times the utility-scale additions U.S. federal analysts project for all power sources over a full year. Chinese firms' global market share in batteries and solar modules has reached 75% or higher, according to BloombergNEF.

David Uberti, Ed Ballard, and Brian Spegele Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

So far this year, China has installed 277 gigawatts of wind and solar capacity, 4x the scale of “utility-scale additions,” via all power sources the US will bring online in 2025. Chinese firms now have a ~75% market share in clean energy manufacturing.

Is China outpacing the US in clean-energy buildout and manufacturing?

Core argument: China installed 277 gigawatts of wind and solar capacity in the first seven months of the year, quadruple the utility-scale additions U.S. federal analysts project across all power sources for 2025, which could give China a big advantage in the power-hungry AI race.

China installed 277 gigawatts of wind and solar capacity in the first seven months of the year, quadruple the utility-scale additions federal analysts in the U.S. project across all power sources for 2025. That could give China a big advantage in the power-hungry AI race. Chinese companies have also stepped up manufacturing capacity of batteries and solar modules, pumping out exports. Their global market share for those technologies has swelled to 75% or higher, according to BloombergNEF. Countries across the world “are going to be even more reliant on Chinese technology to power their economies, to make the cars they drive,” said Wally Adeyemo, who was deputy Treasury secretary under President Joe Biden. “It creates real chokepoints for China.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China installed 277 gigawatts of wind and solar capacity in the first seven months of the year, quadruple the utility-scale additions U.S. federal analysts project across all power sources for 2025, which could give China a big advantage in the power-hungry AI race.
  2. Chinese global market share in batteries and solar modules has swelled to 75% or higher, according to BloombergNEF, as Chinese companies expanded manufacturing capacity and exports of those technologies.
  3. Wally Adeyemo, deputy Treasury secretary under President Joe Biden, said countries worldwide will be even more reliant on Chinese technology to power their economies and make the cars they drive, creating real chokepoints for China.

Related Articles:

  • How Xi Sparked China’s Electricity Revolution — Electricity has risen to 30% of China's final energy use while plateauing near 22% in Europe and the US, supported by a decades-long grid expansion and upgrade program projected to cost as much as $800bn by 2030. Chinese grid investment is forecast to grow about 5% annually through 2030, faster than projected economic growth.
  • How China Curbed Its Oil Addiction—and Blunted a U.S. Pressure Point — Nearly half of passenger vehicles sold in China last year were all-electric or plug-in hybrids, up from 6% in 2020, while domestic oil output rose 13% from 2018 to 2024 to about 4.3m barrels a day. China still imports roughly 11m barrels a day, about 70% of what it consumes.
  • The Real China Model — China generates more electricity annually than the United States and European Union combined, having added capacity equivalent to the United Kingdom's total supply each year. Electricity makes up nearly 30% of China's energy use, versus 22% in the US and 21% globally, and its share is growing about 6% a year.