“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
AI Summary.Since 1982, real growth in the median U.S. wage has trailed growth at both the top and bottom of the wage distribution, with higher and lower percentiles outperforming the middle.
Cardiff Garcia and Ben GlasnerAgglomerations
Date Posted:
Garcia and Glasner document the striking observation that inequality across the wage distribution rose mainly during the long overall wage stagnations of 1982–1996 and 2001–2014. Wage growth was both faster and more broadly shared in 1996–2001 and 2014–2020.
Has median wage growth lagged both the top and bottom?
Core argument: Real growth of the median U.S. wage has trailed growth at both the higher and lower ends of the wage distribution since 1982.
Figure 4 zooms into the First Long Wage Stagnation from December 1982 to 1996: negative growth for the 10th percentile wage and hardly any growth for the three middle wage categories. Meanwhile the 90th percentile wage climbed away from all the others despite itself growing by less than 1% a year. Figure 5 shows the more recent Second Long Wage Stagnation. The median wage averaged just 0.36% growth per year. And because the growth of the 75th and 90th percentile firmly outpaced the growth of the others, wage inequality climbed sharply. From 2015 through the start of 2020, wages climbed all across the distribution, [while] the widening between the 90th percentile wage and the other wages slowed. The escape from wage stagnation once again arrived as the labor market continued tightening. In the late 1990s boom, the median wage climbed an annualized 2.6%. The eras in which the median wage climbed at the steepest angle were those in which all the other wages climbed with it. [Finally], real growth of the median wage has trailed behind the growth of the other wage categories since 1982.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Real growth of the median U.S. wage has trailed growth at both the higher and lower ends of the wage distribution since 1982.
Figure 10 presents three wage ratios: the 90th percentile to the median, the 90th percentile to the 10th, and the median to the 10th.
Related Articles:
Baby Busts and Growth Booms: Demographic Change and the Macroeconomy— A 1pp lower birth rate 20 years earlier is associated with 22 log points higher output per worker 20 years later and 29 log points higher after 40 years, about 0.73pp faster annual growth. The authors find lower birth rates are also associated with more labor-saving patents, larger high-tech shares, and higher productivity growth.
The Pig In The Python: US Decennial Labor Flows And Economic Opportunity, 1910–2040— The surge of baby boomers, women, and immigrants entering the US labor force between 1960 and 1980 was difficult for the economy to absorb, and young workers' wages fell sharply after peaking in the early 1970s. The author argues those entrants kept occupying jobs and suppressing demand for new workers until retirement.
The Unexpected Compression: Competition at Work in the Low Wage Labor Market— Labor market tightness produced an unexpected compression in the US wage distribution, with disproportionate wage growth at the bottom reducing the college wage premium and reversing nearly 40% of the rise in 90-10 wage inequality since 1980. The authors attribute this in part to increased competition for low-wage workers.
AI Summary.Inflation-adjusted gross domestic product per person has grown at a 1.9% annual pace over the past 10 years, above the 1.7% of the 2010s and 0.8% of the 2000s and just below the 2.1% of the 1980s and 1990s. Avoiding prolonged recessions has supported household incomes and wages.
Justin FoxBloomberg
Date Posted:
Real median household income and real wages have risen since the mid-2010s, as real GDP per capita grew 1.9% annually over the past decade. Average real weekly earnings have grown since 2010, after falling substantially between 1973 and 1990.
Have incomes and output per person grown faster than in recent decades?
Core argument: U.S. per-capita GDP has grown at a 1.9% annual inflation-adjusted pace over the past 10 years, exceeding the 1.7% of the 2010s and 0.8% of the 2000s.
Some of the increase in both household incomes and wages can be chalked up to steady economic growth. Per-capita gross domestic product has risen at a 1.9% annual, inflation-adjusted pace over the past 10 years, which doesn’t sound like much but is better than in the 2010s (1.7%) and 2000s (0.8%) and only slightly below the 2.1% growth rate of the 1980s and 1990s and 2.2% of the 1970s.Avoiding recessions — and ensuring that the unusual pandemic-caused downturn in 2020 was short-lived — has done a lot for Americans’ incomes.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
U.S. per-capita GDP has grown at a 1.9% annual inflation-adjusted pace over the past 10 years, exceeding the 1.7% of the 2010s and 0.8% of the 2000s.
The 1.9% per-capita GDP growth rate of the past decade sits only slightly below the 2.1% pace of the 1980s and 1990s and the 2.2% pace of the 1970s.
Avoiding recessions and keeping the pandemic-caused 2020 downturn short-lived has done a lot for Americans’ incomes, with steady economic growth accounting for some of the rise in household incomes and wages.
Related Articles:
What Six Years of Inflation Mean for the Midterms— US consumer prices have risen almost 29% over the past six years, about 3x the pace of the prior six years, and on average prices have risen faster than wages over that period.
Income in the United States: 2025— Median U.S. household income rose 2.6% to $87,460, the highest level on record in data going back to 1967. Median income increased 3% for White households, 2.9% for non-Hispanic White households, and 4.8% for Black households, while changes for Asian and Hispanic households were not statistically significant.
US Focus: The Effect Of Soaring Profits— US nominal pre-tax corporate profits in the national accounts grew 23% over the past year, a pace not seen outside post-recession spikes since the mid-2000s. Wider margins were the key driver, as domestic profit growth far exceeded the 8% rise in corporate value added, pushing margins near all-time highs while the labor share hit new lows.
AI Summary.An analysis of federal aid recipients' tax-reported earnings finds the highest-earning bachelor's programs are concentrated at highly selective schools and in computer science, mathematics and electrical engineering. Nursing programs at several California schools produce graduates earning around $150,000 annually, placing them in the top 100 of nearly 25,000 programs analyzed.
Arfa Momin and Ron LieberNew York Times
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Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important
A HEA Group analysis of the earnings of 2018 and 2019 college graduates four years after graduation finds earnings are widely dispersed across schools in higher-earning fields such as computer science and economics and have a narrow dispersion in lower-earning fields such as English and drama.
Which college majors and schools produce the highest-earning graduates?
Core argument: HEA Group’s analysis of nearly 25,000 bachelor’s programs found computer science, mathematics and electrical engineering majors top the earnings list, with graduates of highly rejective schools including the Ivies, M.I.T., Stanford and U.C.L.A. dominating.
HEA Group tracked students who received federal financial aid and graduated during the 2017-18 and 2018-19 periods. The top of the earnings list is dominated by graduates of highly rejective schools — the Ivies and others, like M.I.T., Stanford and U.C.L.A. The majors that top the list are computer science, mathematics and electrical engineering. The income data come from whatever people reported on their federal tax returns. That means certain stock awards and other potential deferred compensation aren’t part of the totals. Nursing programs at a handful of California schools, including California State University, East Bay; San Francisco State University; and Samuel Merritt University, produce graduates earning around $150,000 annually, putting them in the top 100 out of the nearly 25,000 bachelor’s programs the HEA Group analyzed nationwide. They stick out amid quantitative and science majors from institutions like the California Institute of Technology and Cornell.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
HEA Group’s analysis of nearly 25,000 bachelor’s programs found computer science, mathematics and electrical engineering majors top the earnings list, with graduates of highly rejective schools including the Ivies, M.I.T., Stanford and U.C.L.A. dominating.
Nursing graduates of California State University, East Bay; San Francisco State University; and Samuel Merritt University earn around $150,000 annually, placing those programs in the top 100 amid quantitative and science majors from institutions like the California Institute of Technology and Cornell.
HEA Group tracked federal financial aid recipients who graduated during the 2017-18 and 2018-19 periods, using income reported on federal tax returns, which excludes certain stock awards and other potential deferred compensation.
Related Articles:
Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World?— An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.
Have Humans Passed Peak Brain Power?— The share of Americans reporting they read a book in the past year has fallen below half, alongside declining performance in numeracy and problem-solving in most countries. The share of adults unable to use mathematical reasoning to evaluate the validity of statements averages 25% in high-income countries and 35% in the US.
Standardized Test Scores and Academic Performance at a Public University System— A study of a large public urban university system finds that high school grade point average is a far stronger predictor of student academic success than SAT scores, contrasting with analyses of highly selective colleges that found the SAT superior. Under-represented minority students were less likely to graduate within six years at every grade point average level.
AI Summary.France's official retirement age for full benefits was 62 in 2023, versus 67 in Denmark and the US, and its average actual retirement age was the lowest in Western Europe while life expectancy at 65 reaches about 87, two years longer than in the US.
Paul KrugmanKrugman Wonks Out
Date Posted:
The sharp rise in the price of credit default swaps on French government debt implies a 1.2% of default over the next 5 years, which Krugman thinks “is too low” and cautions “France may have crossed the line from too big to fail to too big to save.”
Does France retire earlier than other wealthy countries despite longer lifespans?
Core argument: France’s official retirement age for full benefits was 62 in 2023, compared with 67 in both Denmark and the United States, and its average actual retirement age was the lowest in Western Europe.
France does stand out, even among fiscally troubled nations, in one main way: its persistent inability to get realistic about retirement. The official French retirement age — the age at which workers can collect full benefits — was only 62 in 2023. By comparison, the retirement age in Denmark was 67 (which is also the age in the U.S.). The average actual age of retirement, which is always lower than the statutory age because some people choose to accept reduced benefits, was lower in France than anywhere else in Western Europe. You don’t have to be a conservative to see France’s early retirement as unsustainable, especially given that French life expectancy at age 65 is about 87 years of age, 2 years longer than in the US. France’s reliance on the euro means that it’s all too easy to see how this loss of confidence could turn into an ugly crisis.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
France’s official retirement age for full benefits was 62 in 2023, compared with 67 in both Denmark and the United States, and its average actual retirement age was the lowest in Western Europe.
French life expectancy at age 65 is about 87, two years longer than in the United States, a gap that strengthens the case that France’s early retirement is unsustainable.
France’s reliance on the euro makes it easy to see how a loss of confidence could turn into an ugly crisis.
Related Articles:
France’s Marine Le Pen Pledges To Rein In Public Spending— France's National Rally party, historically a champion of big-state spending, has pledged to clean up the country's degraded public finances alongside tax cuts it describes as a fully financed "competitiveness shock." The party also proposed lowering the retirement age from 62 to 60 for those who start working young, estimating €15bn–€20bn in pension savings from correcting "unjust or inefficient" measures.
France is the Biggest Loser in the Global Rates Reset— French government borrowing costs now exceed the country's nominal income growth by about 2 percentage points, the most unfavorable gap between borrowing costs and growth in the rich world. By contrast, Spanish and Greek bond yields remain about 2 percentage points below their income growth rates.
Le Boomer Spread— The gap between French and German 10-year government bond yields exceeded 140 basis points, up from 40–50 basis points, which the author attributes to political choices favoring pensioners over bondholders, including a suspended pension reform leaving the minimum retirement age near 62. French over-65s hold higher average incomes than working-age people.
AI Summary.U.S. crude oil production rose from about 5m barrels per day in the late 2000s to nearly 14m by 2025, turning the country from a major petroleum importer into a net exporter. The authors estimate that adverse oil supply news shocks, which once contracted industrial production, now expand it.
Diego Känzig, James Stock and Luca ZanottiNational Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
The US shifted from a large net oil importer to a net exporter around 2010. Computing separate impulse responses pre-and post-2010, Känzig, et al find that adverse global oil-supply news switches from reducing US industrial production to raising it by a similar magnitude.
Has becoming a net oil exporter reversed how supply shocks affect output?
Core argument: Before 2010, an adverse oil supply news shock produced a persistent contraction in U.S. industrial production of roughly -0.6 percent after a year, while from 2010 onward the point estimate turns positive over most horizons and peaks near +1 percent.
As Figure 2 shows, U.S. crude oil production rose from roughly 5 million barrels per day in the late 2000s to almost 14 million barrels per day by 2025. Over the same period, net imports of crude oil and petroleum products fell steeply and turned negative in 2019. The United States thereby went from being one of the world’s largest petroleum importers to a net petroleum exporter. We examine whether the U.S. response to oil supply news shocks differs in the post-shale period by allowing the impulse responses to change from January 2010 onward. Figure 7 reports the results. Before 2010, an adverse oil supply news shock produced a persistent contraction in industrial production, reaching roughly -0.6 percent after a year. From 2010 onward, the point estimate instead becomes positive over most horizons and reaches almost +1 percent at its peak. Both the pre-2010 contraction and the post-2010 expansion are economically large and statistically significant over a range of horizons. This contrast mirrors the evidence from the time-varying VAR.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Before 2010, an adverse oil supply news shock produced a persistent contraction in U.S. industrial production of roughly -0.6 percent after a year, while from 2010 onward the point estimate turns positive over most horizons and peaks near +1 percent.
U.S. crude oil production rose from roughly 5 million barrels per day in the late 2000s to almost 14 million barrels per day by 2025, with net imports of crude oil and petroleum products turning negative in 2019.
The pre-2010 contraction and the post-2010 expansion in U.S. industrial production following oil supply news shocks are both economically large and statistically significant over a range of horizons, mirroring evidence from a time-varying VAR.
Related Articles:
U.S. Economy Less Vulnerable To Geopolitical Oil Price Shocks Than In The Past— The United States became a net oil exporter in late 2019, and oil and oil product spending fell from near 8% of GDP in 1980 to 3% in 2024. The authors estimate a 15% global oil supply disruption would now cut annualized U.S. real GDP growth by 0.3pp, versus 1.7pp in the rest of the world.
Fighting Words: The Energy Transition in 2026— Estimates based on primary energy overstate how much electricity is needed to replace oil in passenger cars, since electric motors convert 80%-90% of electricity into motion versus about 18% for gasoline cars. Measuring useful final energy net of waste heat avoids this "primary energy fallacy": the US consumed 45 exajoules of useful final energy versus 95 exajoules of primary energy.
Power Politics: Energy Self-Sufficiency in a Modern Mercantilist World— China leads in adding power to the grid, with more than 30,000 miles of ultra-high-voltage transmission lines versus zero in the US and lead times for large transformers of 48 weeks against a US average of 143 weeks. This positions China to accommodate new demand sources such as artificial intelligence.
AI Summary.French government borrowing costs now exceed the country's nominal income growth by about 2 percentage points, the most unfavorable gap between borrowing costs and growth in the rich world. By contrast, Spanish and Greek bond yields remain about 2 percentage points below their income growth rates.
Matthew KleinThe Overshoot
Date Posted:
The change in a country’s interest rate, Klein argues, should be measured against the change in nominal income growth. By that metric, France has moved from “core Europe” into the periphery – while Italy, Spain and especially Greece have moved in the opposite direction.
Do French borrowing costs now exceed its income growth?
Core argument: France’s borrowing costs exceeded its nominal income growth rate by about 2pp as of 2026Q2, and by roughly 3pp at current yields, the most unfavorable such spread in the rich world.
The problem for France is that its bond yields are surging even as its nominal income growth has slowed relative to the 2017-2019 pace, to the point that, almost uniquely among rich countries, borrowing costs there now substantially exceed growth rates. In fact, the spread between French sovereign borrowing costs and French growth rates is now the most unfavorable anywhere in the rich world. The French economy was not quite growing by 2% a year in euro terms as of 2026Q2, which was even worse than the anemic 3% yearly average nominal growth rate recorded in 2017Q1-2019Q4. As of 2026Q2, France’s cost of borrowing was therefore about 2pp higher than its income growth rate. (At current yields, the penalty is more like 3pp.) By contrast, Spanish and Greek bond yields are still about 2pp lower than their income growth rates.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
France’s borrowing costs exceeded its nominal income growth rate by about 2pp as of 2026Q2, and by roughly 3pp at current yields, the most unfavorable such spread in the rich world.
French nominal growth was running just under 2% a year in euro terms as of 2026Q2, below the 3% yearly average recorded in 2017Q1–2019Q4, even as French bond yields surged.
Spanish and Greek bond yields remain about 2pp below their nominal income growth rates, in contrast to France’s unfavorable gap.
Related Articles:
Soaring Yields Find Europe’s Weak Spot— A rapid rise in long-term US Treasury yields has highlighted vulnerabilities elsewhere, notably France, where risks are elevated. Because France is in the euro zone, any crisis there would extend to the currency area, and European stocks have sold off alongside a weakening euro.
France Seeks To Rein In Pensions And State Salaries In 2027— France plans to narrow its budget deficit to 5% of GDP by cutting state spending, capping increases to pensions and civil servant salaries, and raising taxes. Deteriorating public finances have left France borrowing at higher interest rates than Italy and Greece, with 10-year bond yields reaching their highest since 2002.
Global Debt Report 2026— Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.
AI Summary.An analysis finds a Social Security tax-increase package lowers the debt-to-GDP ratio by 14.3 percentage points, with 97% of that coming from smaller Social Security deficits rather than economic growth. A benefit-reduction package cuts the ratio by 29.2 percentage points, raising long-run GDP by 12.1% versus 0.4%.
Andrew BiggsAmerican Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
A Penn-Wharton simulation finds that restoring Social Security solvency with tax increases alone would cut debt/GDP by ~14pp by 2060, while a fix based only on benefit cuts would cut it by ~29pp.
How do benefit cuts and tax increases differ in reducing debt-to-GDP?
Core argument: The benefit-reduction package cuts the debt/GDP ratio by 29.2 percentage points in the long run, more than twice the 14.3 percentage points under the tax-increase package.
The first figure [in the gallery] decomposes the tax-increase reform package’s improvement to the debt/GDP ratio into separate effects: how much does it cut debt versus how much does it raise GDP? Almost all of the tax-increase plan’s improvement in debt/GDP comes from lowering federal debt by raising taxes. The plan has a small negative effect on the economy in the short run and a small positive effect in the long run. But 97% of its 14.3 percentage point long-run reduction in debt/GDP comes simply from reducing Social Security’s deficits. The economy is little-changed relative to a baseline in which Congress simply borrows to pay Social Security benefits. The benefit-reduction package [second figure in the gallery] tells a different story. It reduces debt/GDP by 29.2 percentage points, more than twice as much as the tax-increase package. Part of that comes from a larger reduction in debt: 17.2 percentage points versus 13.9. But the real kicker comes from higher long-run GDP: 12.1% under the benefit-reduction package versus just 0.4% under the tax-increase package.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The benefit-reduction package cuts the debt/GDP ratio by 29.2 percentage points in the long run, more than twice the 14.3 percentage points under the tax-increase package.
Of the tax-increase plan’s 14.3 percentage point long-run reduction in debt/GDP, 97% comes from reducing Social Security’s deficits, leaving the economy little changed relative to a baseline in which Congress borrows to pay benefits.
Long-run GDP rises 12.1% under the benefit-reduction package versus 0.4% under the tax-increase package, with debt falling 17.2 percentage points versus 13.9.
Related Articles:
The Fairest Way to Reform Social Security May Also Be the Worst Way to Grow the Economy— Fully closing Social Security's funding gap by raising the payroll tax rate would require an immediate, permanent increase from 12.4% to 17.6%, which would reduce labor supply and economic growth. Research on a prior benefit cut found affected Americans raised earnings by 61 cents per dollar of lost benefits, generating additional payroll tax revenue.
How Federal Spending is Distributed by Age— An analysis classifying $4.4tn of $7tn in federal spending by age finds retirees aged 65 and older receive $2.7tn, 38.6% of total outlays and 61.9% of age-assignable spending, versus $1.2tn for working-age adults and $449bn for those under 26. Social Security and Medicare account for 80% of age-assignable spending on older adults.
The Great “Transfer”-mation— Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
AI Summary.A rapid rise in long-term US Treasury yields has highlighted vulnerabilities elsewhere, notably France, where risks are elevated. Because France is in the euro zone, any crisis there would extend to the currency area, and European stocks have sold off alongside a weakening euro.
John AuthersBloomberg
Date Posted:
The spread between 10-year French OATs and German Bunds is pricing a second eurozone sovereign-debt crisis. Authers suggests that the recent surge in US long-term yields has “shone a light” on France’s fiscal weakness, raising its salience to investors.
Do rising US long-term yields expose vulnerabilities in Europe?
Core argument: The speed of the rise in US long-term Treasury yields has raised the risk of dislocations elsewhere, with France a point of elevated vulnerability that would extend to the rest of the euro zone.
The speed of [the upward move in US long yields] brought the risk of dislocations elsewhere, like in France. Much as a surprising hawkish shift from the Fed under Alan Greenspan in 1994 revealed underlying weaknesses in the Mexican financial system that led to the Tequila Crisis, so this Treasury scare has shone a light on where the world’s greatest vulnerabilities are to be found. As France is part of the euro zone, any crisis must naturally extend to the rest of the currency area, at a time when most of its members are moving in a nationalist direction and likely reluctant to help. That is beginning to have an impact on stocks. The main European bourses sold off even as US equities rallied on Thursday. In combination with a weakening euro, the continent’s stocks have now given up almost all their gains since Trump took office.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The speed of the rise in US long-term Treasury yields has raised the risk of dislocations elsewhere, with France a point of elevated vulnerability that would extend to the rest of the euro zone.
The Treasury scare echoes the Fed’s surprising hawkish shift under Alan Greenspan in 1994, which revealed weaknesses in Mexico’s financial system and led to the Tequila Crisis.
Europe’s main bourses sold off even as US equities rallied, and combined with a weakening euro, the continent’s stocks have given up almost all their gains since Trump took office.
Related Articles:
France Seeks To Rein In Pensions And State Salaries In 2027— France plans to narrow its budget deficit to 5% of GDP by cutting state spending, capping increases to pensions and civil servant salaries, and raising taxes. Deteriorating public finances have left France borrowing at higher interest rates than Italy and Greece, with 10-year bond yields reaching their highest since 2002.
Soaring Bond Yields, Gaping Deficits and Towering Debts: What Could Go Wrong?— An analysis of 22 rich countries estimates that if each refinanced its entire debt at current five-year bond yields, Britain would need the largest primary surplus to stabilize its debt-to-GDP ratio, about 1.5%, followed by Italy at 1.4%, France at 1.2% and America at 1%.
Global Debt Report 2026— Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.
