“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
AI Summary.Ukraine's population in government-controlled territory has fallen from about 37m to 27m–28m since Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion, with 3m–5m living under occupation and millions emigrated. The fertility rate has dropped from 1.2 children per woman to 0.8–0.9, far below the 2.1 replacement rate, and deaths now outnumber births by more than three to one.
Economist StaffThe Economist
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Ukraine’s fertility rate has fallen from 1.2 children per woman in 2020 to 0.8–0.9—lower than in any other major country except South Korea. A key driver of the fertility decline is the more than 5 million Ukrainians living abroad, mostly children and women under 44.
How severely has war reduced Ukraine's population and birth rate?
Core argument: Ukraine's population in government-controlled territory has fallen from about 37m to 27m–28m since Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, with 3m–5m Ukrainians living under Russian occupation and millions more emigrated.
Births in Ukraine are falling, in part because there are fewer adults. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 the population inside government-controlled territory has fallen from about 37m to 27m-28m. Around 3m-5m Ukrainians now live under Russian occupation, and millions more have emigrated. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, puts combat deaths at over 50,000; an independent estimate is closer to 150,000. Thousands of civilians have been killed, and Russia has deported over 20,000 children to Russify them. Wartime, moreover, is not good for starting families. The fertility rate has dropped from 1.2 children per woman in 2020 to 0.8-0.9, lower than any big country but South Korea. The replacement rate, needed to keep the population stable, is 2.1. In the first half of 2026 deaths outnumbered births by more than three to one.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Ukraine's population in government-controlled territory has fallen from about 37m to 27m–28m since Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, with 3m–5m Ukrainians living under Russian occupation and millions more emigrated.
Ukraine's fertility rate has dropped from 1.2 children per woman in 2020 to 0.8–0.9, lower than any big country except South Korea and below the 2.1 replacement rate needed to keep the population stable.
Deaths outnumbered births by more than three to one in Ukraine in the first half of 2026, while President Volodymyr Zelensky puts combat deaths above 50,000 and an independent estimate is closer to 150,000.
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The Russian Paradox: So Much Education, So Little Human Capital— Russia is an exception to the global correspondence between educational attainment and human capital, combining an advanced educational profile with strikingly poor health outcomes and only weak contributions to knowledge production and skills-intensive service exports. World Health Organization estimates put male life expectancy at age 15 near that of the world's least developed countries.
Russians Shun Putin’s Plea for More Babies as Population Shrinks— Russia's population decline has accelerated, with births falling 3.4% to 1.22m — the lowest level in roughly 25 years — while deaths rose 3.3% to 1.82m, according to Russia's Federal Statistics Service. The decline is attributed in part to Russia's war on Ukraine, though detailed mortality data has been classified and war deaths enter the statistics with long delays.
How Russia’s Fatalities Compare With Ukraine’s— A model estimates Russian casualties in the full-scale Ukraine war at 1.1m–1.4m, including 230,000–430,000 dead, equivalent to roughly one in 25 Russian men aged 18–49 killed or severely wounded. One estimate puts Ukrainian casualties at 600,000 with 100,000–140,000 dead—lower in absolute terms but a higher share of its population.
AI Summary.An estimated 7.2m Chinese Communist Party members have been punished since 2012, including at least 632 officials at or above vice-ministerial rank, with disciplinary actions reaching a record 983,000 cadres in one year. Analysts argue the campaign encourages officials to filter information upward and increases risk aversion that could slow project execution and weaken fiscal stimulus.
Joe Leahy and Edward WhiteFinancial Times
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~25% of Central Committee members were absent from the last plenum due to Xi’s purges. The escalating anti-corruption campaign may be weakening state capacity, as lower-level cadres are “too scared or unwilling to tell [Zhongnanhai] the true picture about social or economic challenges.”
Does a sweeping party purge slow economic decision-making and stimulus?
Core argument: Minxin Pei of Claremont McKenna College calculates that roughly 7.2mn CCP members have been punished politically, administratively, or judicially since 2012, including at least 632 officials at or above vice-ministerial rank.
This Monday, in an article under [Xi’s] own byline in the mass-circulation People’s Daily — a rare occurrence — the president suggested there was some way to go. He wrote of how, while living in a “cave dwelling” in 1945, Mao had suggested letting the Chinese people supervise the party. Mao saw this idea, which he called “democracy”, as a means of preventing dynastic rule, says David Bandurski of the China Media Project. Xi added that the party had arrived at a second answer during his own rule — “self-revolution”, the party’s supervision of itself — to maintain its “advanced nature and purity” and achieve “self-renewal”. The danger is that the policy will backfire by creating the incentive for cadres to inform on their peers, decimating the ranks for little return, analysts say.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Minxin Pei of Claremont McKenna College calculates that roughly 7.2mn CCP members have been punished politically, administratively, or judicially since 2012, including at least 632 officials at or above vice-ministerial rank.
Disciplinary actions averaged more than 800,000 cadres per year in Xi Jinping's third term and reached a record 983,000 in 2024, against an average of 145,800 per year during Hu Jintao's second term, with criminal prosecutions averaging about 75,000 officials annually.
China's score on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index moved from 39 in 2012 to 43 in 2025, against a global average of 42, with scores below 50 indicating serious corruption problems.
Related Articles:
China Tightens Control Of Overseas Travel In Sweeping New Law— China has imposed new legal controls on overseas travel that formalise restrictions on mid-to-senior civil servants, Communist Party cadres, state-owned enterprise employees, and private citizens working in sensitive areas, as part of efforts to protect state secrets, advanced technology, and highly skilled workers. Violators face steep fines and exit bans ranging from three months to indefinite.
The Future, Made In China— China's economy runs on parallel tracks: a property crash, a booming high-tech manufacturing sector, and university graduates trained for traditional white-collar jobs entering a labor market geared toward advanced manufacturing. Researchers at Stanford and Harvard found a swing from optimism to pessimism, with about 28% of citizens expecting living standards to improve.
China’s Growth Machines— The United States generates almost twice as much economic output per dollar invested as China, the opposite of what would be expected from a mature developed economy versus a fast-growing economy catching up. The gap points to overexuberance in Chinese investment.
AI Summary.Anthropic has been expected to raise up to $100bn in an initial public offering valuing it near $1.5tn, but three major investors who plan to participate say the valuation will likely need to come down, with one suggesting closer to $1tn. One investor said the company could instead raise around $80bn.
Corrie Driebusch, Berber Jin, Kate Clark and Anissa GardizyWall Street Journal
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The WSJ reports that market participants are “increasingly skeptical” that Anthropic’s IPO can proceed at its proposed $1.5T valuation. Some major investors see the valuation falling sharply, perhaps to as low as ~$1T.
Will a leading AI company's IPO valuation fall short of expectations?
Core argument: Anthropic is targeting an IPO the week before Thanksgiving that has been expected to raise up to $100 billion at a valuation of around $1.5 trillion.
Anthropic is aiming to stage the IPO the week before Thanksgiving and has been expected to raise up to $100 billion in an offering that could value the company at around $1.5 trillion. But three major investors who plan to participate in the IPO say the valuation will likely need to come down, with one saying it could be closer to $1 trillion. The company could also decide to raise less money than anticipated, perhaps to around $80 billion, said one investor who plans to participate in the IPO. That same investor hopes for the company to have well over $200 billion on its balance sheet post-IPO. Anthropic had $146.6 billion cash on hand as of Sept. 30.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Anthropic is targeting an IPO the week before Thanksgiving that has been expected to raise up to $100 billion at a valuation of around $1.5 trillion.
Three major investors who plan to participate in the Anthropic IPO say the valuation will likely need to come down, with one putting it closer to $1 trillion.
One investor planning to participate says Anthropic could raise less than anticipated, perhaps around $80 billion, and hopes the company holds well over $200 billion on its balance sheet post-IPO, compared with $146.6 billion cash on hand as of Sept. 30.
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The Cage Fight for Capital— A slowdown in artificial intelligence financing could become self-reinforcing, as falling stock prices widen credit spreads, which further slows financing. The author argues the S&P 500's roughly 8% gain this year rests on a small number of stocks driven up by competition among deep-pocketed players betting on artificial intelligence.
Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected— The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
A Catalyst For The AI Bubble Break— Historically, controlling for valuations, a 1% rise in the share of the market represented by initial public offerings has been associated with roughly a 4% decline in prices. With large artificial-intelligence company listings expected and share issuance exceeding buybacks, equity supply could shift from shrinking about 1% a year to growing near 5%, implying returns roughly 20% below average.
AI Summary.China recorded 4.648m marriage registrations in the first nine months of the year, down 504,000 from a year earlier, a nearly 10% decline that points to a full-year drop. Marriages peaked at 13.469m in 2013 and have generally trended downward since, with divorce registrations at 2.082m.
Mandy ZuoSouth China Morning Post
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The number of marriages in China fell ~10% y/y to ~4.6mm in the first three quarters of this year, after rising 10.8% to ~6.8mm in 2025. The number of marriages peaked in 2013 at 13.5mm, and the most recent trough was 6.1mm in 2024.
Are marriages in China declining again after last year's rebound?
Core argument: China recorded 4.648 million marriage registrations in the first nine months of 2026, down 504,000 from a year earlier, a decline of nearly 10%, according to Ministry of Civil Affairs data.
China has witnessed a nearly 10% drop in the number of marriages in the first three quarters of the year, signalling a possible full-year fall in 2026 after a rebound in 2025. The country recorded 4.648 million marriage registrations in the first nine months, down 504,000 from a year earlier, data released by the Ministry of Civil Affairs showed. The latest figures mean that 2026 marriage registrations would most likely see a year-on-year drop as well, said He Yafu, an independent demographer based in Guangdong province. Based on the historical share of annual marriage registrations recorded in each quarter, he estimated that nationwide marriages for the entire year would range from 5.88 million to 6.46 million couples. Even if registrations reached the upper end of that forecast, they would still be lower than the 2025 level.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
China recorded 4.648 million marriage registrations in the first nine months of 2026, down 504,000 from a year earlier, a decline of nearly 10%, according to Ministry of Civil Affairs data.
Independent demographer He Yafu estimates full-year 2026 marriages at 5.88 million to 6.46 million couples, below the 6.765 million recorded in 2025, when registrations rose 10.8%, boosted by auspicious dates, a new nationwide registration service and local incentives.
China’s marriage registrations peaked at 13.469 million in 2013, fell below 10 million in 2019 and dropped to 6.1 million in 2024, a record low since the data was first published, while divorce registrations in the first nine months of 2026 reached 2.082 million, up 5,000 year-on-year.
Related Articles:
Why China’s Women Are Having Fewer Babies— In China, about 30% of 30-year-olds were unmarried in 2023, up from 14.5% a decade earlier, while the share of 40-year-olds who were divorced roughly doubled from 2.6% to 5%. Women have outnumbered men in Chinese undergraduate and postgraduate programs since 2009, even as men outnumber women nationally.
Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come— Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
The Power of Demography and the Fate of East Asia— East Asia's total population has peaked and is projected to decline for at least a generation, with the pace of decline likely accelerating each decade, while US population is projected to keep growing for decades. The author argues such sustained divergence can shift the global balance of power.
AI Summary.An "AI universe" index of 42 stocks groups companies into three categories: 28 direct AI firms including NVIDIA, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta and Broadcom; 8 AI-linked utilities such as Vistra, NextEra and Constellation; and 6 capital equipment makers including Eaton, Quanta and GE Vernova.
Edward ConardMacro Roundup
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As the probability of a Democrat-controlled Senate rose from 50% in online betting in early September to 100% after the election, the S&P 500 fell 4.7% lead by an 8.9% drop in AI-related stocks and a 1.1% decline in the rest of the market.
How is the AI universe index of stocks composed?
Core argument: Michael Cembalest's "AI universe" comprises 42 stocks across three categories: 28 direct AI names, 8 AI utilities, and 6 AI capital equipment companies.
As the probability of a Democrat-controlled Senate rose from 50% in online betting in early September to 100% after the election, the S&P 500 fell 4.7% lead by an 8.9% drop in AI-related stocks and a 1.1% decline in the rest of the market.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Michael Cembalest's "AI universe" comprises 42 stocks across three categories: 28 direct AI names, 8 AI utilities, and 6 AI capital equipment companies.
The 28 direct AI stocks in Cembalest's universe include NVIDIA, Microsoft, Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Broadcom, Tesla, Oracle, Palantir, AMD, Salesforce, IBM, Intel, Micron, Dell and Super Micro Computer.
Cembalest's AI universe includes 8 utilities, among them NRG, Vistra, NextEra and Constellation, and 6 capital equipment makers, among them Eaton, Trane, Quanta and GE Vernova.
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The Stock Market’s Read On The Midterms, In Its Winners And Losers— Stocks rose broadly after a sweeping Democratic win in midterm elections, with health insurers tied to the Affordable Care Act and solar companies gaining while data-center firms and companies linked to Trump and Musk fell. The move reflects the increment beyond already-priced-in Democratic victories, from greater certainty and a larger-than-expected margin.
Califoreboding— A basket of 42 AI stocks accounts for 60%-80% of all S&P 500 earnings growth, price returns and capital spending, while 60% of S&P 500 stocks sit 20% or more below their highs and only 30% outperform the index. AI-related construction spending has risen 38%, the only positive trend as manufacturing, commercial real estate and residential construction decline.
One Hundred Years in the U.S. Stock Markets— Over a century, U.S. publicly traded stocks generated roughly $91tn in shareholder wealth enhancement, with returns strongly positively skewed and dominated by a relatively small number of high-performing firms. Because most possible outcomes fall below the mean in a skewed distribution, the authors argue financial planning should focus on median outcomes or the full distribution.
AI Summary.US labor productivity, measured as nonfarm business output per hour, rose at a 3.6% annualized rate, up from an upwardly revised 2.1% pace, while unit labor costs fell 0.7%. The acceleration suggests a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
Julia FanzeresBloomberg
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Nonfarm business productivity grew at a 3.6% annualized rate in Q3, the fastest pace in a year. Real hourly compensation rose 1.1%, while the labor share fell to 53%, the lowest in data going back to 1947.
Is a capital spending boom lifting worker productivity?
Core argument: US nonfarm business output per hour rose at a 3.6% annualized rate in the third quarter, the fastest pace in a year, following an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
US labor productivity accelerated in the third quarter at the fastest pace in a year, suggesting a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency at a time when input costs have soared. Productivity, or nonfarm business output per hour, increased at a 3.6% annualized rate after an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics showed Thursday. Unit labor costs — what businesses pay employees to produce one unit of output — fell 0.7%, the first decline since the second quarter of 2025.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
US nonfarm business output per hour rose at a 3.6% annualized rate in the third quarter, the fastest pace in a year, following an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Unit labor costs, what businesses pay employees to produce one unit of output, fell 0.7% in the third quarter, the first decline since the second quarter of 2025.
The third-quarter productivity acceleration suggests a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency at a time when input costs have soared.
Related Articles:
Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected— The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
Higher Utilisation Explains The Recent Surge In Productivity Growth— Measured total factor productivity growth is estimated to come almost entirely from higher input utilisation rather than underlying efficiency gains, based on a method that infers unobserved capital and labour utilisation from movements in hours per worker. On this evidence, recent productivity gains reflect "working harder" rather than "working smarter.
US Focus: The Effect Of Soaring Profits— US nominal pre-tax corporate profits in the national accounts grew 23% over the past year, a pace not seen outside post-recession spikes since the mid-2000s. Wider margins were the key driver, as domestic profit growth far exceeded the 8% rise in corporate value added, pushing margins near all-time highs while the labor share hit new lows.
AI Summary.Texas has surpassed Virginia as a data center hub and is larger than the Northeast data center cluster combined, with a pipeline the author describes as staggering in dollars, square footage, and power. A moratorium on Texas data centers would therefore carry revenue consequences up and down the supply chain.
Paul KedroskyApplied Complexity
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Texas ranks ~ third globally in data-center investment, behind the rest of the US and ~ level with China. Kedrosky illustrates that if half of Texas’s estimated $66.2B in 2026 data-center spending were disrupted, $9.9–16.6B of Nvidia sales could be delayed, equal to 4.6–7.7% of its FY2026 revenue.
Would halting data center construction in Texas hit the supply chain hard?
Core argument: Texas has become more important than Virginia as a data center market and is larger than the Northeast data center nexus combined.
Bulls made the argument yesterday that [a moratorium on Texas data centers] was positive for the largest hyperscalers, in that it might save them from themselves. While that might be true-ish, it was too blithe about the supply chain consequences. Texas has become much more important than Virginia, and larger than the Northeast data center nexus combined. The scale of what's in the Texas data center pipeline is fairly staggering, whether in dollars, footprint, or power. And, thus, the revenue consequences up and down the supply chain.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Texas has become more important than Virginia as a data center market and is larger than the Northeast data center nexus combined.
The scale of the Texas data center pipeline, measured in dollars, footprint, and power, carries revenue consequences up and down the supply chain.
The argument that a Texas data center moratorium would benefit the largest hyperscalers by saving them from themselves is too blithe about supply chain consequences.
Related Articles:
Now You Can See Everything— Nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won, putting an estimated 37.5 GW of planned capacity at risk of a pause and another 15 GW subject to conditions such as grid cost-sharing, water limits, and ended tax incentives. The 37 GW expected in 2027, 75% already under construction, is largely unaffected.
Financing the AI Buildout— The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected— The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
AI Summary.US debt held by the public peaked at a record 106.1% of GDP after World War II and fell as a share of the economy through 1974, aided by rapid growth, deficits averaging just 0.4% of GDP, and more tax increases than cuts. The federal deficit was 6.2% of GDP in fiscal 2026.
Justin FoxBloomberg
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Both growth and fiscal restraint gradually erased the WWII debt burden. Tax increases in 1982–93 helped reverse the large deficits of the 1980s, contributing to surpluses in 1998–2001. In line with this history, growth alone is unlikely to stabilize the current debt trajectory.
Can economic growth alone bring down the national debt?
Core argument: US debt held by the public peaked at a record 106.1% of GDP in fiscal 1946 and fell as a share of GDP through 1974, aided by rapid growth and a fiscal balance averaging -0.4% of GDP from 1947 to 1974.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, also known as the Reagan tax cuts, is remembered variously as a budget-busting disaster and the driver of a new era of growth. There’s some truth to both portrayals, but what doesn’t come up nearly enough is that the 1981 tax cuts were followed by tax increases in 1982, 1983, 1984, 1986 (just barely; that year’s Tax Reform Act was supposed to be revenue-neutral), 1987, 1990 and 1993. Thanks in part to the end of the Cold War, Congress was also able to reduce spending growth in the 1990s, with federal outlays falling from 21.7% of GDP in 1991 to 17.7% in 2000 and 2001. The result: four straight years of budget surpluses, and a debt-to-GDP ratio that fell from 47.9% in 1993 to 31.5% in 2001.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
US debt held by the public peaked at a record 106.1% of GDP in fiscal 1946 and fell as a share of GDP through 1974, aided by rapid growth and a fiscal balance averaging -0.4% of GDP from 1947 to 1974.
The US fiscal balance in fiscal 2026 was -6.2% of GDP, compared with the -0.4% average that accompanied the postwar decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio.
Federal spending tripled in inflation-adjusted terms from 1947 to 1974 and rose from 16.1% to 17.8% of GDP, with revenue rising almost as fast in a period with more tax increases than decreases, according to a 2013 Treasury Department accounting of major tax legislation.
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Projections of Deficits and Debt Under Two Scenarios With Higher Interest Rates— The Congressional Budget Office projects that if interest rates run 1.5 percentage points above its economic forecast, deficits would be $6tn larger over 2026–2036, reflecting a $4.9tn rise in net interest costs and $1.1tn in added debt-service costs. Debt held by the public would reach 133.1% of GDP in 2036, 12.9 percentage points above its baseline.
The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036— The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal deficit will grow from $1.9tn (5.8% of GDP) to $3.1tn (6.7%) over a decade, above the 3.8% averaged over the past 50 years, with rising net interest costs driving much of the increase. Federal debt held by the public is projected to rise from 101% to 120% of GDP.
How Might Fiscal Policy Respond to the Rise of Artificial Intelligence?— The Congressional Budget Office estimates that a permanent 0.5 percentage point increase in annual productivity growth would lower publicly held federal debt after 30 years by 39% of GDP, offsetting roughly half the projected rise from 101% of GDP to 175%. Higher revenue and slower spending growth outweigh higher interest costs.