“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
AI Summary.AI adoption has risen to 22.4%, with labor market effects visible but narrow: employment drags appear in marketing, graphic design, customer service, and some tech occupations, offset by 209k in added data center-exposed construction jobs. Corporate layoffs attributed to AI totaled 113k year-to-date, including 11k in a single month.
Sarah Dong and Joseph BriggsGoldman Sachs
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While finding a “slight positive correlation between AI adoption and unemployment among younger workers,” GS argues AI’s impact on the labor market remains “narrow.” The technology sector’s share of total employment continues to decline relative to its pre-2022 trend.
Is AI's labor market impact still narrow as adoption rises?
Core argument: AI adoption rose to 22.4%, with labor market effects remaining visible but narrow, concentrated in marketing, graphic design, customer service, and some tech occupations.
AI’s labor market impact remains visible but narrow. We continue to observe employment drags in specific industries where AI-use cases have been established such as marketing, graphic design, customer service, and some tech occupations. However, this is offset by construction job growth in data center-exposed categories, which is up 209k since 2022 (relative to broader construction employment trends). The tech share of total employment continues to decline relative to the pre-2022 trend. The correlation between AI adoption and broad labor market slack measures remains limited but has strengthened in recent months. Corporate layoffs attributed to AI affected 11k employees in June, bringing the 2026 YTD total to 113k.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
AI adoption rose to 22.4%, with labor market effects remaining visible but narrow, concentrated in marketing, graphic design, customer service, and some tech occupations.
Construction employment in data center-exposed categories is up 209k since 2022 relative to broader construction employment trends, offsetting employment drags in industries with established AI use cases.
Corporate layoffs attributed to AI affected 11k employees in June, bringing the 2026 year-to-date total to 113k, while the correlation between AI adoption and broad labor market slack measures remains limited though it has strengthened in recent months.
Related Articles:
Graduating into Disruption: Labor Market Outcomes for AI-Exposed College Majors— College graduates in the majors most exposed to artificial intelligence show statistically significant employment declines following the arrival of AI chatbots, with the most-exposed 10% of majors down about 5 percentage points and the seventh and eighth deciles down about 2 points. The authors note flat pre-2020 trends and precise timing argue against alternative explanations such as uneven post-pandemic recovery.
Looking for the Ladder— The article argues that the hiring downturn in occupations most exposed to generative AI reflects interest-rate sensitivity rather than AI itself, since roughly 38% of workers in the most AI-exposed quintile work in information, finance and insurance, and professional and technical services, versus under 2% in the least-exposed quintile.
Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence— Employment for workers aged 22–25 in the occupations most exposed to artificial intelligence has declined roughly 18pp relative to less-exposed peers, with no comparable decline in other age groups. The authors find this operates mainly through reduced hiring, concentrated where AI substitutes for human tasks rather than complements them.
AI Summary.College graduates in the majors most exposed to artificial intelligence show statistically significant employment declines following the arrival of AI chatbots, with the most-exposed 10% of majors down about 5 percentage points and the seventh and eighth deciles down about 2 points. The authors note flat pre-2020 trends and precise timing argue against alternative explanations such as uneven post-pandemic recovery.
Cody Orr, Lee Tucker and Lawrence WarrenU.S. Census Bureau
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A Census Bureau analysis of 29% of recent US college grads ranked majors by AI exposure using pre-ChatGPT occupational patterns. After ChatGPT’s November 2022 release, employment fell across the top 4 exposure deciles, with the top decile down 5pp compared to the bottom 6 deciles.
Are graduates in AI-exposed majors seeing employment declines?
Core argument: Employment for graduates in the most AI-exposed decile of college majors declined by an average of five percentage points relative to 2022 after ChatGPT’s release, with statistically significant declines of about two percentage points for deciles seven and eight.
In the quarters prior to 2020, the event study coefficients are usually statistically indistinguishable from zero across all deciles. Post-ChatGPT, there is a small to moderate decline in employment relative to the control group across the top four deciles with a particularly large effect for the tenth decile. For deciles seven, eight, and especially ten, these are statistically significant declines: an average of two percentage points for deciles seven and eight and five percentage points for decile ten relative to 2022. Decile nine also shows evidence of statistically significant declines, but this might reflect reversion to long-run trends rather than a negative effect of AI. Employment effects are clearly most acute among the most-exposed decile of majors. The relatively fat pre-trends and precise timing help to rule out some alternative explanations, such as heterogeneity in the post-pandemic recovery or the effects of a tight labor market in the reference period.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Employment for graduates in the most AI-exposed decile of college majors declined by an average of five percentage points relative to 2022 after ChatGPT’s release, with statistically significant declines of about two percentage points for deciles seven and eight.
Event study coefficients were usually statistically indistinguishable from zero across all exposure deciles in the quarters before 2020, with small to moderate employment declines concentrated in the top four deciles afterward.
Flat pre-trends and the precise timing of the employment declines help rule out some alternative explanations, such as heterogeneity in the post-pandemic recovery or a tight labor market in the reference period, while decile nine’s decline may reflect reversion to long-run trends.
Related Articles:
Looking for the Ladder— The article argues that the hiring downturn in occupations most exposed to generative AI reflects interest-rate sensitivity rather than AI itself, since roughly 38% of workers in the most AI-exposed quintile work in information, finance and insurance, and professional and technical services, versus under 2% in the least-exposed quintile.
Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence— Employment for workers aged 22–25 in the occupations most exposed to artificial intelligence has declined roughly 18pp relative to less-exposed peers, with no comparable decline in other age groups. The authors find this operates mainly through reduced hiring, concentrated where AI substitutes for human tasks rather than complements them.
The College Wage Premium in the Generative AI Era— The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 to 0.575 after four decades of expansion, implying the first sustained negative growth in relative demand for college-educated labor. The authors estimate that weaker wage growth in occupations highly exposed to artificial intelligence accounts for roughly 28% of that decline, though the patterns are not causal.
AI Summary.Prime-age adults aged 25–54 and older workers aged 55–64 have higher employment rates in Europe than in the US, while US youth employment is higher because Europeans spend longer in education. The share of young people not in education, employment or training is higher in the US than in Europe.
Chris GilesFinancial Times
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Despite Europe’s high social spending relative to the US, Chris Giles notes that prime-age adult (25–54) labor force participation in the Eurozone has overtaken that of the US, and there has been a dramatic convergence in the LFP of older workers.
Do Europeans work less than Americans?
Core argument: Prime-age adults aged 25–54 in Europe are more likely to be employed than their US counterparts, whether measured with EU or Eurozone data, and Europeans aged 55–64 also have higher employment rates than Americans.
It does not matter whether you use EU or Eurozone data, prime-age adults (between 25 and 54) in Europe are more likely to be in work than those in the US. Older people (between 55 and 64) also have higher employment rates in Europe. Younger people (between 15 and 24) are more likely to have a job in the US, but that results from Europeans educating themselves for longer. The proportion of young people not in education, employment or training is higher in the US than in Europe. So welfare is not stopping work. More than that, the higher-welfare north of Europe tends to have higher employment rates than the south, although there is convergence within the Eurozone. Spain, in particular, has enjoyed rapid improvements.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Prime-age adults aged 25–54 in Europe are more likely to be employed than their US counterparts, whether measured with EU or Eurozone data, and Europeans aged 55–64 also have higher employment rates than Americans.
Young people aged 15–24 are more likely to have a job in the US than in Europe, but that gap results from Europeans spending longer in education, and the share not in education, employment or training is higher in the US.
The higher-welfare north of Europe tends to have higher employment rates than the south, with convergence within the Eurozone and rapid improvement in Spain.
Related Articles:
Why Do Americans No Longer Work So Much More Than Non-Americans?— About half of the 1990s gap between American and European hours worked had reversed by the end of the 2010s. The authors estimate US hours per person declined after the 2000s because of rising benefits for the non-employed—especially health benefits like Medicaid—while non-US hours rose with higher wages and lower work costs.
The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe— A European Union competitiveness report attributes the EU's labour productivity growth gap with the US largely to weaker activity in information and communications technology and large-scale digital services; excluding main ICT sectors, EU productivity was broadly at par with the US from 2000-2019. It estimates Europe's investment share must rise about 5 percentage points of GDP.
Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking”— A debate on U.S. fiscal policy argues that spending increases, rather than the tax increases needed to fund them, slow growth, and that higher taxes would reduce the expected value of America's innovative risk-taking. The argument holds that cutting debt below 100% of GDP is critical.
AI Summary.Employment in five industries tied to the data-centre build-out, including electrical contracting and equipment manufacturing, has risen roughly 320,000 above what broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest. Engineers, software developers, mathematicians and data scientists have added about 730,000 jobs above the trend for professional employment overall.
Economist StaffThe Economist
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The Economist estimates that so far the AI boom has created ~1mm new jobs in the US, exceeding their estimate of ~200,000 layoffs attributed to AI since mid-2023.
Is the AI build-out adding jobs above trend?
Core argument: Employment in five industries tied to the data-centre build-out, from electrical contracting to equipment manufacturing, has risen by roughly 320,000 more since 2023 than broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest.
[We] tracked five industries at the heart of the data-centre build-out, from electrical contracting to equipment manufacturing. Since 2023 employment in them has risen by roughly 320,000 more than broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest. Not all of those jobs owe their existence to AI—grid upgrades and other factory building matters too. [We also] tracked employment in professional occupations closest to the AI boom—engineers, software developers, mathematicians and data scientists—and compared their growth since 2022 with professional employment overall. These roles have added roughly 730,000 jobs above trend in recent years. AI will not have created every single one of them. But it has almost certainly created quite a few.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Employment in five industries tied to the data-centre build-out, from electrical contracting to equipment manufacturing, has risen by roughly 320,000 more since 2023 than broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest.
Professional occupations closest to the AI boom—engineers, software developers, mathematicians and data scientists—have added roughly 730,000 jobs above the trend for professional employment overall since 2022.
Not all of these above-trend gains are attributable to AI, since grid upgrades and other factory building also matter, though AI has almost certainly created quite a few of them.
Related Articles:
The College Wage Premium in the Generative AI Era— The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 to 0.575 after four decades of expansion, implying the first sustained negative growth in relative demand for college-educated labor. The authors estimate that weaker wage growth in occupations highly exposed to artificial intelligence accounts for roughly 28% of that decline, though the patterns are not causal.
Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence— Employment for workers aged 22–25 in the occupations most exposed to artificial intelligence has declined roughly 18pp relative to less-exposed peers, with no comparable decline in other age groups. The authors find this operates mainly through reduced hiring, concentrated where AI substitutes for human tasks rather than complements them.
Looking for the Ladder— The article argues that the hiring downturn in occupations most exposed to generative AI reflects interest-rate sensitivity rather than AI itself, since roughly 38% of workers in the most AI-exposed quintile work in information, finance and insurance, and professional and technical services, versus under 2% in the least-exposed quintile.
AI Summary.The unemployment rate for workers ages 22 to 34 without a college degree has rarely been lower in the past two decades, and relative to their own historical ranges the job market looks much better for blue-collar and manual-service workers. Degree-holders still face lower unemployment rates overall.
Theo Francis and Ray SmithWall Street Journal
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In 2026, the 12-month moving-average unemployment for college-educated 22–34-year-olds is above its post-2003 mean, while the rate for non-college peers is historically low. Prime-age college grads still have lower unemployment than those with no degree.
Is the job market unusually strong for workers without college degrees?
Core argument: The unemployment rate for workers ages 22 to 34 who never graduated from college has rarely been lower in the past two decades, based on data through July.
The unemployment rate for workers ages 22 to 34 who never graduated from college has rarely been lower in the past two decades. To gauge how the job market has shifted for each cohort, [Gad Levanon, Burning Glass’s chief economist] compared current unemployment rates for the different groups with their own range of unemployment rates since 2003. The analysis included data through July. By that measure, the job market looks much better for blue-collar workers, including those in construction and on manufacturing lines, and manual-service workers. It is [however] still easier to find a job with a college degree. The unemployment rate for degree-holders in their prime working years—ages 25 to 54—averaged 2.7% for the 12 months ending in July - well below the 3.6% rate for workers with just some college education, and 4.7% for people with a high-school diploma only.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The unemployment rate for workers ages 22 to 34 who never graduated from college has rarely been lower in the past two decades, based on data through July.
Burning Glass chief economist Gad Levanon compared each cohort's current unemployment rate against its own range since 2003, and by that measure the job market looks much better for blue-collar workers in construction and manufacturing and for manual-service workers.
College graduates ages 25 to 54 averaged a 2.7% unemployment rate for the 12 months ending in July, below the 3.6% rate for workers with some college education and 4.7% for those with only a high-school diploma.
Related Articles:
College Grads Struggle to Find Jobs. Non-Grads Are Giving Up— The narrowing gap in unemployment rates between young college graduates and non-graduates appears driven mainly by non-graduates dropping out of the labor force rather than by diplomas losing value, since people not seeking work aren't counted as unemployed. The share of young non-graduates employed is 1.7 percentage points below pre-pandemic levels.
To Fix Education, Fix The Economy First— 30% of US adults have literacy skills typical of a 10-year-old, yet US workers scoring at that low level earn an average of nearly $30 an hour and two-thirds are employed, compared with about $20 and fewer than half employed in Britain. The author argues this reflects stronger economic growth rather than vocational education policy.
The College Wage Premium in the Generative AI Era— The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 to 0.575 after four decades of expansion, implying the first sustained negative growth in relative demand for college-educated labor. The authors estimate that weaker wage growth in occupations highly exposed to artificial intelligence accounts for roughly 28% of that decline, though the patterns are not causal.
AI Summary.The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 to 0.575 after four decades of expansion, implying the first sustained negative growth in relative demand for college-educated labor. The authors estimate that weaker wage growth in occupations highly exposed to artificial intelligence accounts for roughly 28% of that decline, though the patterns are not causal.
José Azar, Mireia Gine and Javier Sanz-EspínSocial Science Research Network
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The college wage premium flattened in the mid-2010s and has fallen ~8% since 2022. The authors argue that this compression reflects a broad decline in the returns to formal schooling, rather than a decline in the upper tail.
Is AI exposure driving the decline in the college wage premium?
Core argument: The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 in 2022 to 0.575 in 2026 after expanding for four decades, with Current Population Survey data implying the first sustained negative relative demand growth for college labor.
After expanding for four decades, the U.S. college wage premium [dropped] sharply from 0.626 in 2022 to 0.575 in 2026. Current Population Survey data through 2026 implies an unprecedented drop in relative demand for college labor—the first sustained negative relative demand growth. Post-2022 wage growth slowed disproportionately in high-exposure occupations, which employ a disproportionate share of college graduates. By 2026, going from zero occupational AI exposure to full exposure had a negative effect on wages of−0.086. Combined with the college–non-college exposure gap, this mechanism accounts for roughly 28% of the total drop in the college wage premium from 2022 to 2026. While non-causal, these patterns indicate that task displacement in AI-exposed white-collar occupations plays a quantitatively meaningful role in the recent compression of the aggregate skill premium.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 in 2022 to 0.575 in 2026 after expanding for four decades, with Current Population Survey data implying the first sustained negative relative demand growth for college labor.
By 2026, moving from zero occupational AI exposure to full exposure had a -0.086 effect on wages, and combined with the college–non-college exposure gap this mechanism accounts for roughly 28% of the 2022–2026 drop in the college wage premium.
Post-2022 wage growth slowed disproportionately in high-exposure occupations that employ a disproportionate share of college graduates, patterns that, while non-causal, indicate task displacement in AI-exposed white-collar occupations plays a quantitatively meaningful role in compressing the skill premium.
Related Articles:
Looking for the Ladder— The article argues that the hiring downturn in occupations most exposed to generative AI reflects interest-rate sensitivity rather than AI itself, since roughly 38% of workers in the most AI-exposed quintile work in information, finance and insurance, and professional and technical services, versus under 2% in the least-exposed quintile.
How Students and Recent Grads are Responding to the Rise of AI— Undergraduate enrollment in degrees tied to the most AI-exposed jobs has risen 8%, indicating students are moving toward rather than away from fields exposed to artificial intelligence. A decline in computer science degrees is more than offset by growth in other exposed fields such as engineering.
AI and Young-adult Jobs: The Real Mystery— Employment rates have declined for young adults both with and without college degrees, with non-degree holders faring marginally worse, and employment growth for young workers of all education levels has lagged that of other workers. Artificial intelligence can replace some lower-skilled jobs, but those jobs are too few to drive youth labor market weakness.
AI Summary.In a guaranteed income experiment, the gap between participant income and total household income fell by roughly $1,700 per year, which the authors attribute to lower earnings among other household members. Net transfers to extended family rose by about $135 per year, while measures of household stability, decision-making, and division of labor clustered near zero.
Elizabeth Rhodes, David Broockman, Eva Vivalt, Patrick Krause, et al.National Bureau of Economic Research
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In a randomized guaranteed-income experiment, giving one adult a transfer of $1,000/month for two years cut the other household members’ income by ~$1,700/year. Partners worked less and advanced less at work, while schooling and training among others rose.
How does guaranteed income affect other household members' earnings?
Core argument: In the guaranteed income experiment, the gap between participant income and total household income fell by about $1,700 per year (s.e. $800), a decline that appears to reflect lower earnings among other household members.
Figure 4 summarizes treatment effects on the standardized family-level indices. The transfers’ effects reshaped the income and employment of other household members. The gap between participant income and total household income fell by about $1,700 per year (s.e. $800). The decline appears to reflect lower earnings among other household members. Effects on employment outcomes are consistent with this interpretation. Partner promotions and transitions to better jobs decrease significantly, but these effects are very small in magnitude. Partner hours and employment show more meaningful declines but are not significant in the unconditional analysis. Several other measures provide supporting evidence of negative effects on labor supply. Net transfers—the value given [to extended family] minus the value received—increased by roughly $135 per year. Estimates for household stability, decision-making, and the division of labor cluster near zero.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
In the guaranteed income experiment, the gap between participant income and total household income fell by about $1,700 per year (s.e. $800), a decline that appears to reflect lower earnings among other household members.
Partner promotions and transitions to better jobs decreased significantly but were very small in magnitude, while partner hours and employment showed more meaningful declines that were not significant in the unconditional analysis.
Net transfers to extended family—value given minus value received—rose by roughly $135 per year, while estimates for household stability, decision-making, and the division of labor cluster near zero.
Related Articles:
The Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers on Parenting and Children— In a randomized trial, parents receiving $1,000 per month in unconditional cash for three years spent more on their children monthly and reported better parenting behaviors, such as closer supervision, than parents receiving $50 per month. The transfer had no meaningful effect on most educational outcomes, the home environment, child food security, homelessness, or parental satisfaction.
The Employment Effects of a Guaranteed Income: Experimental Evidence from Two U.S. States— In a randomized experiment, 1,000 low-income individuals received $1,000/month unconditionally for three years while a control group of 2,000 received $50/month, and the transfers reduced individual income excluding transfers by about $1,500/year. The authors find no significant effects on human capital investment and conclude the transfers produced a moderate labor supply reduction not offset by other productive activities.
AI Summary.Using observed AI usage data across 321 U.S. occupations, the authors estimate that highly exposed occupations saw a 6.7% decline in real wage growth with no detectable employment effects. The estimated declines are concentrated among the lowest earners, with service workers down 24.3% and the bottom wage quartile down 10.7%, while top earners show no significant effect.
Sania Edlich and Torsten SløkApollo
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A difference-in-differences design finds 6.7% slower real-wage growth in AI-exposed occupations since 2023 than in low-exposure ones, with no detectable job loss. The largest effects were for the lowest quartile (-10.7%) and service occupations (-24.3%).
How does AI exposure affect wages across occupational earnings levels?
Core argument: Using observed AI usage data from the Anthropic Economic Index across 321 matched occupations from 2015–2025, the authors estimate that high-exposure occupations saw a 6.7% decline in real wage growth after 2023, with no detectable employment effects.
We examine the wage and employment effects of AI adoption across U.S. occupations using observed usage data from the Anthropic Economic Index rather than the theoretical exposure measures that dominate prior work. Using a difference-in-differences design with occupation and year fixed effects across 321 matched occupations from 2015 to 2025, we find that high-exposure occupations experience a 6.7% decline in real wage growth post-2023 with no detectable employment effects. The effect is concentrated among the lowest earners: service workers face a 24.3% decline and the bottom wage quartile a 10.7% decline, while top earners show no significant effect.Today, 5.8 million workers are affected, but as AI adoption deepens across corporate America, this figure is likely to grow substantially, with significant implications for income inequality and labor market policy in the years ahead. Only 321 of roughly 800 BLS occupations were matched, and the post-2023 period may be partially confounded by post-pandemic labor market dynamics. [Editor’s note: Figure 3 shows both wage and employment growth and decline among high-exposure workers, but the exposure measure combines automated and augmentative use, and thus cannot distinguish substitution from complementarity.]
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Using observed AI usage data from the Anthropic Economic Index across 321 matched occupations from 2015–2025, the authors estimate that high-exposure occupations saw a 6.7% decline in real wage growth after 2023, with no detectable employment effects.
The estimated wage effects are concentrated among the lowest earners, with service workers facing a 24.3% decline and the bottom wage quartile a 10.7% decline, while top earners show no significant effect.
The authors estimate that 5.8 million workers are affected and expect that figure to grow as AI adoption deepens, while noting that only 321 of roughly 800 BLS occupations were matched and post-2023 results may be partly confounded by post-pandemic labor dynamics.
Related Articles:
AI and the Fable of the ATMs— Bank tellers per branch fell steadily as automated teller machines spread, and total teller employment held up only because banking deregulation drove a rise in branch numbers; teller jobs are down nearly 40% from their peak. The author argues invoking this case for AI requires identifying an equivalent offsetting source of labor demand.
Looking for the Ladder— The article argues that the hiring downturn in occupations most exposed to generative AI reflects interest-rate sensitivity rather than AI itself, since roughly 38% of workers in the most AI-exposed quintile work in information, finance and insurance, and professional and technical services, versus under 2% in the least-exposed quintile.
Technology and the Baby Bust Paradox— Aging populations create structural incentives to automate, and the argument is that demographic change could become one of the strongest long-run drivers of artificial intelligence deployment. Technology-producing economies may benefit twice, offsetting their own labor shortages while exporting automation, robotics, and AI to other aging societies.