AI Summary. Global current account balances widened to about 3.8% of world GDP, driven mainly by a rise in China's surplus to about 0.6% of world GDP (3.7% of China's GDP) and larger surpluses across other Asian economies, while the United States remained the largest deficit economy at about 1% of world GDP. Imbalances are projected to remain elevated.

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Global current account balances increased further in 2025 to ~3.8% of global GDP. The IMF calculates the rise was driven by a sharp increase in China’s surplus to ~.6% of global GDP (3.7% of China’s). The US deficit was ~1% of global GDP.

Are global current account imbalances widening as China's surplus grows?

Core argument: Global current account balances widened to about 3.8% of world GDP in 2025, continuing the upward trend since the pandemic and reversing the post-global-financial-crisis decline.

Global current account balances increased further in 2025 to about 3.8% of world GDP, continuing the upward trend observed since the pandemic and reversing the decline following the global financial crisis. The widening was driven primarily by a sharp increase in China’s surplus, which increased to about 0.6% of world GDP (3.7% of China’s GDP), alongside larger surpluses in several Asian economies, whereas the euro area surplus narrowed and oil exporters’ surpluses declined. At the same time, the United States remained the world’s largest deficit economy, with a current account deficit of about 1% of world GDP. Early 2026 trade data indicate that global imbalances are expected to increase slightly this year and are projected to remain elevated in 2027, with further increases in trade surpluses in China and other Asian exporters and weaker balances in the United States and the euro area.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Global current account balances widened to about 3.8% of world GDP in 2025, continuing the upward trend since the pandemic and reversing the post-global-financial-crisis decline.
  2. China’s surplus rose to about 0.6% of world GDP (3.7% of China’s GDP), driving the widening alongside larger surpluses in several Asian economies, while the euro area surplus narrowed and oil exporters’ surpluses declined.
  3. The United States remained the world’s largest deficit economy at a current account deficit of about 1% of world GDP, and early 2026 trade data indicate global imbalances are expected to increase slightly in 2026 and remain elevated in 2027.

AI Summary. The eurozone is the world's third-largest economy and second-largest source of demand but lacks the political cohesion to wield that power, given fragmented policymaking institutions and divergent member-state interests. If the US shrinks its trade deficit while China resists cutting its surpluses, Europe could absorb larger deficits by default, risking deindustrialization, rising debt, and weaker growth.

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Pettis suggests that if the US reduces its trade deficit while China maintains huge surpluses, a politically fragmented Europe will likely end up absorbing larger deficits, driving reduced competitiveness, deindustrialization, and weaker growth.

Will Europe absorb larger trade deficits if the US shrinks its own?

Core argument: The eurozone ranks as the world's third-largest economy and second-largest source of demand, yet its fragmented policymaking institutions and divergent member-state interests likely deny it the political ability to exercise that economic power.

The eurozone is the world’s third-largest economy and its second-largest source of demand, it has economic power at its disposal, but [likely not] the political ability to exercise this power, given its fragmented policymaking institutions and the often divergent interests of its member states. If the United States is able to reduce its trade deficit and expand its share of global manufacturing while China resists an equivalent contraction in its surpluses, a politically divided Europe could be forced to take on larger deficits almost by default. The costs could include deindustrialization, rising debt, and weaker growth. This process may have begun already.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The eurozone ranks as the world's third-largest economy and second-largest source of demand, yet its fragmented policymaking institutions and divergent member-state interests likely deny it the political ability to exercise that economic power.
  2. If the United States reduces its trade deficit and expands its share of global manufacturing while China resists an equivalent contraction in its surpluses, a politically divided Europe could be forced into larger deficits almost by default.
  3. The costs to Europe of absorbing larger deficits could include deindustrialization, rising debt, and weaker growth, a process that may have begun already.

AI Summary. Regression evidence suggests governments can buy current account surpluses: raising the fiscal balance by $1 tends to raise the current account by about $0.30, while issuing $1 of domestic-currency debt to buy foreign-currency assets raises it by roughly $0.50-$0.60. Combining a fiscal surplus with foreign-currency investment, as Norway and Singapore do, yields about $0.80 per $1.

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Using annual data for 146 countries from 1985 – 2024, Gagnon and Agrawal find that a $1 increase in a country’s cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit is associated with a 22–38¢ increase in its current-account deficit, with most of the estimates ~30¢.

Can governments buy current account surpluses with fiscal and currency policy?

Core argument: Regression results suggest that raising the fiscal balance by $1 tends to raise the current account by about $0.30.

Table 1 presents regression results. The evidence strongly suggests that governments can buy current account surpluses. Raising the fiscal balance by $1 tends to raise the current account by $0.30 [Table 1, first row]. Issuing $1 of domestic currency debt to buy foreign-currency assets (foreign exchange intervention) raises the current account anywhere from $0.20 to $1.00, with a value around $0.50 to $0.60 most plausible [Rows 2 though 5]. NOF is Net Official Flows, and NOS is the stock of net official foreign assets. The most powerful policy, as exemplified by Norway and Singapore, is to run a fiscal surplus and invest the proceeds in foreign-currency assets. In that case, $1 buys a current account surplus of around $0.80 or so. The results are supported by annual panel regressions of current accounts and cross-country stock regressions of cumulated current accounts or stocks of net foreign assets. The estimated effects in the panel regressions may be biased down slightly by incomplete modeling of lagged effects.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Regression results suggest that raising the fiscal balance by $1 tends to raise the current account by about $0.30.
  2. Issuing $1 of domestic currency debt to buy foreign-currency assets is estimated to raise the current account by $0.20 to $1.00, with $0.50 to $0.60 most plausible.
  3. Combining a fiscal surplus with investment of the proceeds in foreign-currency assets, as Norway and Singapore do, is estimated to buy a current account surplus of around $0.80 per $1.

AI Summary. Asia's $1.5tn trade surplus is larger as a share of world output than at any point since 1945 and is the only large surplus in the global economy. Exchange rates have a meaningful impact on trade balances: China's surplus reached about 10% of its output amid renminbi depreciation, then fell below 2% after a 40% real appreciation.

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Noting the strong connection between Asian countries’ currency depreciation and their trade surpluses since the early 2000s, Setser and Vallée argue “exchange rates still matter,” and urge G-7 “currency diplomacy” to fight chronic undervaluation.

Do exchange rates drive the size of trade surpluses?

Core argument: Asia's trade surplus of $1.5 trillion is larger as a share of world GDP than at any point since 1945, and it is the only large surplus in the global economy.

At $1.5 trillion, Asia’s trade surplus is far larger as a share of world GDP than at any point since 1945. It is also the only large surplus in the global economy. Currency moves were central to the development of the trade imbalances that preceded the 2008 global financial crisis. From 2002 to 2005, for instance, the renminbi was tightly linked to a depreciating dollar even as Beijing’s entry to the World Trade Organization turbocharged Chinese exports. The resulting depreciation is a key reason why China’s surplus reached ten percent or so of its GDP—the first China shock. Conversely, the 40 percent real appreciation in the renminbi from 2005 to 2014 was a big reason why China’s surplus fell back to under two percent of its GDP. Exchange rates still matter, and they have a meaningful impact on the balance of trade.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Asia's trade surplus of $1.5 trillion is larger as a share of world GDP than at any point since 1945, and it is the only large surplus in the global economy.
  2. The renminbi's tight link to a depreciating dollar from 2002 to 2005, alongside China's WTO entry turbocharging exports, is a key reason China's surplus reached roughly 10 percent of its GDP in the first China shock.
  3. The renminbi's 40 percent real appreciation from 2005 to 2014 was a big reason China's surplus fell back to under 2 percent of its GDP, indicating that exchange rates have a meaningful impact on the trade balance.

AI Summary. Foreign holdings of U.S. financial assets are valued at $69tn versus $41tn of U.S. holdings abroad, a gap that has been mounting for decades. With the net liability position in interest-bearing assets at -$15tn, a 1 percentage point rise in interest rates would subtract $150bn from the U.S. net investment income balance.

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The US net international investment position worsened by about $16tn between 2019 and 2025, driven by roughly $5.5tn in net inflows and $10tn in valuation losses, as higher rates hit a larger net liability stock, raising interest rate-sensitivity.

How does a growing net liability position affect U.S. investment income?

Core argument: Official estimates put the current market value of foreign holdings of U.S. financial assets at $69tn, against $41tn of U.S. holdings of foreign assets, a shortfall that has been mounting for decades.

Foreign holdings of U.S. financial assets are immense, with official estimates putting their current market value at $69 trillion. U.S. holdings of foreign assets are also impressive but much smaller, at $41 trillion. The shortfall in U.S. foreign assets relative to foreign liabilities has been mounting for decades. Yet U.S. investment income receipts—in profits, dividends, and interest—comfortably exceeded income payments until recently. Payments on U.S. assets owned by foreign investors represent a servicing burden for the U.S. economy. Profits, dividends, and interest payments that would otherwise accrue to domestic investors instead flow abroad. Given the need to sell U.S. assets to finance ongoing trade deficits, this servicing burden seems likely to mount. The related buildup in the U.S. net liability position in interest-bearing assets will also make the income balance more sensitive to swings in interest rates. This increased sensitivity is already in evidence. At present, with the asset-liability gap at -$15 trillion, a 1 percentage point increase in U.S. and foreign interest rates would subtract $150 billion from the U.S. net income balance. (A 1pp fall in rates would result in a similar improvement.) Only five years ago, a 1 percentage point rise in rates would have subtracted $100 billion.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Official estimates put the current market value of foreign holdings of U.S. financial assets at $69tn, against $41tn of U.S. holdings of foreign assets, a shortfall that has been mounting for decades.
  2. With the U.S. asset-liability gap in interest-bearing assets at -$15tn, a 1 percentage point rise in U.S. and foreign interest rates would subtract $150bn from the U.S. net income balance, compared with $100bn five years ago.
  3. U.S. investment income receipts in profits, dividends, and interest exceeded income payments until recently, and the servicing burden on foreign-owned U.S. assets seems likely to mount given the need to sell U.S. assets to finance ongoing trade deficits.

AI Summary. The European Union's Industrial Accelerator Act would let member states veto foreign investments above €100mn in strategic sectors such as batteries, electric vehicles, solar panels and critical raw materials when the investor comes from a country holding over 40% of global manufacturing capacity, unless conditions on local jobs, joint ventures, intellectual property, research spending and local sourcing are met.

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The EU’s “Made In Europe Act” would condition Chinese market access on IP transfers, FDI and joint ownership in strategic sectors. A Rhodium analysis found there was ~$12B of Chinese greenfield investment in European factories in 2025, 3x the 2022 level.

Should Europe block foreign investment in strategic manufacturing sectors?

Core argument: The EU's Industrial Accelerator Act would let member states veto any foreign direct investment above €100mn in strategic sectors when the investor comes from a country holding more than 40% of global manufacturing capacity.

[The EU's] Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) [will allow] member states veto any FDI exceeding €100mn in strategic sectors if the investor is from a country with more than 40% of global manufacturing capacity. Those sectors include batteries, EVs, solar panels and the extraction and processing of critical raw materials — all areas where China dominates. To win approval, investment projects must fill at least half of their jobs with EU workers and satisfy three of five other conditions. One is that the investment must be undertaken via a joint venture. Another is that the foreign partner does not own more than 49% of the entity — a condition unpopular with Chinese companies, according to European officials. Other conditions cover the licensing of intellectual property rights, spending 1% of revenue on research and development in the EU, and publishing a strategy for sourcing 30% of inputs from the bloc.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The EU's Industrial Accelerator Act would let member states veto any foreign direct investment above €100mn in strategic sectors when the investor comes from a country holding more than 40% of global manufacturing capacity.
  2. The sectors covered by the Industrial Accelerator Act include batteries, EVs, solar panels, and the extraction and processing of critical raw materials, all areas where China dominates.

AI Summary. Ford's chief executive argues Chinese carmakers should be barred from the US market, contending that large direct government support lets them undercut prices and that camera-equipped Chinese vehicles collecting data pose national security risks. He has told US officials that Chinese automakers building cars in America should be required to form joint ventures controlled by US automakers.

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Jim Farley the CEO of Ford, argued that allowing Chinese automakers into the American market would be “devastating” to American manufacturing. The US currently has a 100% tariff on Chinese-made electric vehicles.

Should Chinese carmakers be barred from the US market?

Core argument: Ford CEO Jim Farley warned of national security risks from technology-laden Chinese vehicles on US roads, saying "All of these vehicles have 10 cameras" and "They can collect a lot of data.".

The Ford leader contends the “huge direct support” Chinese carmakers receive from their government gives them an unfair advantage to slash prices and decimate domestic automakers in the US, “There is no way this is a fair fight.” Farley also warned of national security risks from allowing technology-laden Chinese vehicles to navigate US roads. “All of these vehicles have 10 cameras,” Farley said. “They can collect a lot of data.” President Donald Trump in January told the Detroit Economic Club he was willing to “let China come in” as long as they built factories and hired American workers. Farley subsequently told administration officials that Chinese carmakers should have to form joint ventures where US automakers hold controlling stakes in order to build cars in America, Bloomberg has reported.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Ford CEO Jim Farley warned of national security risks from technology-laden Chinese vehicles on US roads, saying "All of these vehicles have 10 cameras" and "They can collect a lot of data.".
  2. President Donald Trump told the Detroit Economic Club in January he was willing to "let China come in" if Chinese carmakers built factories and hired American workers.
  3. Farley told administration officials that Chinese carmakers should be required to form joint ventures in which US automakers hold controlling stakes in order to build cars in America, Bloomberg has reported.

AI Summary. Foreign official purchases of dollars are too small to mirror the US current account deficit, and net official financial inflows have fluctuated around zero even as the deficit widened; the euro area runs a current account surplus despite the euro's reserve role. The author argues materially reducing the US fiscal deficit is the key policy prerequisite for global rebalancing.

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Noting the minimal relationship between official liabilities and the CA, Obstfeld argues that the reserve currency role of the dollar is not the cause of the trade deficit. He urges reduction in the US fiscal deficit to increase national saving.

Does the dollar's reserve role drive the US current account deficit?

Core argument: US net incurrence of liabilities to official foreign holders over 2003–25, measured as a share of GDP, is usually far too small to mirror the US current account deficit, contradicting claims that official dollar purchases feed one-for-one into it.

Critics of the dollar's global role have argued that foreign official dollar purchases (labeled US incurrence of official liabilities in the figure) feed one-for-one into US current account deficits. To illustrate the true loose relationship between these two variables, the figure shows both of them over the 2003–25 period, as percentages of GDP. US net incurrence of liabilities to official holders, reported with a minus sign as in standard balance-of-payments methodology, is usually far too small to mirror the US current account deficit. And since roughly 2014, net official financial inflows have fluctuated around zero as the current account deficit has widened. To be sure, the strong international demand for dollars may make the dollar stronger against foreign currencies than it would be otherwise, [but] while they imply a smaller current account balance, they do not necessarily imply a negative balance and certainly not a rising negative balance, especially when foreign dollar reserve holdings have been shrinking relative to global economic activity (as figure 1 also implies). The euro is the world's second reserve currency, yet the euro area has a current account surplus. Britain had surpluses up until World War I despite issuing the world's premier global currency and hosting its leading financial center. Reducing the US fiscal deficit materially and sustainably is the most important US policy prerequisite for global current account rebalancing.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US net incurrence of liabilities to official foreign holders over 2003–25, measured as a share of GDP, is usually far too small to mirror the US current account deficit, contradicting claims that official dollar purchases feed one-for-one into it.
  2. Since roughly 2014, US net official financial inflows have fluctuated around zero while the US current account deficit widened, and foreign dollar reserve holdings have been shrinking relative to global economic activity.
  3. The euro area runs a current account surplus despite the euro's status as the world's second reserve currency, and Britain ran surpluses until World War I while issuing the premier global currency and hosting its leading financial center.