AI Summary. An analysis of more than 31,000 global venture capital deals finds 62% lost money and over half lost 50–100% of invested capital, though the distribution of returns has much fatter tails than buyouts or public equities. Venture funds averaged a public market equivalent ratio of about 1.4, indicating returns above public markets.

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Btw the mid-90s and 2018, 62% of global venture capital investments lost money, and more than half of the deals lost 50–100% of invested capital. Yet US VC returned ~40% higher mean wealth btw 1984 and 2020 than a parallel investment path in the S&P 500.

Do most venture deals lose money while funds outperform public markets?

Core argument: Across more than 31,000 global venture capital deals from the mid-1990s to 2018, 62% lost money and over half of all deals lost 50–100% of invested capital, measured as multiples of invested capital.

Exhibit 8 shows in excess of 31,000 observations of returns, measured as multiples of invested capital at the beginning of the period, for global venture capital deals. These results are from the mid-1990s to 2018. 62% lost money and more than one-half of all deals lost 50 to 100% of invested capital. The offset is that the tails are much fatter than those for buyouts or public equities. Public market equivalent (PME) is generally reflected as a ratio between private equity and public market returns. A ratio above 1 reveals relative outperformance and below 1 means underperformance. Here’s an example of how PME works. Say a fund drew $200 million from its investors in January 2021 and paid out $470 million in December 2025. An investor could have invested the $200 million in the S&P 500, which returned $392 million over the same period. The PME would be 1.2 ($470/$392). For venture funds, the average over [1984-2020] was about 1.4.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Across more than 31,000 global venture capital deals from the mid-1990s to 2018, 62% lost money and over half of all deals lost 50–100% of invested capital, measured as multiples of invested capital.
  2. Venture capital return distributions have much fatter tails than those of buyouts or public equities, offsetting the majority of deals that lose money.
  3. Public market equivalent, the ratio of private equity returns to public market returns, averaged about 1.4 for venture funds from 1984 to 2020, with a ratio above 1 reflecting relative outperformance.

AI Summary. Modeling U.S. venture-backed startups, the authors estimate that taxing capital gains as they accrue rather than at sale would cut founders' average ownership at exit by about 25% while raising the share of entrepreneurs with positive payoffs from roughly 16% to nearly 47%. Less risk-averse founders prefer taxation at sale.

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~84% of venture backed founders end with zero exit value, while the top 2% capture ~80% of total exit value. Accrual-based taxation would reduce mean founder ownership stakes at exit by ~25%, but with fully refundable tax credits, raise the share of founders with >0 payoffs to ~47%.

How does taxing unrealized capital gains affect startup founders?

Core argument: The authors estimate that average founder shares at exit fall about 25% under accrual-based capital gains taxation relative to realization-based taxation, as advance taxation forces additional share sales before exit.

This paper examines how taxing unrealized capital gains affects entrepreneurship, combining a dynamic career-choice model with new evidence on all U.S. venture capital backed startups. Figure 1a plots a histogram of the positive company exit values. The distribution spans several orders of magnitude and is relatively similar to a lognormal, but with a right skew and fatter right tail. A stylized model highlights a key trade-off: accrual-based capital gains taxes dilute successful founders by forcing additional share sales before exit, a well known concern, yet they also provide insurance through tax credits to founders whose ventures fail, an aspect often overlooked. Quantitatively, advance taxation substantially reduces founders' ownership at exit: average founder shares fall about 25% under accrual-based taxation relative to realization based taxation. At the same time, accrual taxation increases the fraction of entrepreneurs with positive payoffs from around 16% to nearly 47%. Embedding these outcomes in a career-choice framework shows that the insurance value of accrual taxation partly offsets dilution costs: less risk-averse founders favor realization-based taxes, while more risk averse ones prefer accrual-based taxes. The strength of this insurance channel depends on the highly skewed distribution of entrepreneurial payoffs and the design of loss provisions under accrual-based taxation.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors estimate that average founder shares at exit fall about 25% under accrual-based capital gains taxation relative to realization-based taxation, as advance taxation forces additional share sales before exit.
  2. Accrual-based taxation raises the fraction of entrepreneurs with positive payoffs from around 16% to nearly 47%, providing insurance through tax credits to founders whose ventures fail.
  3. In the authors' career-choice framework, less risk-averse founders favor realization-based taxes while more risk-averse founders prefer accrual-based taxes, with the insurance channel's strength depending on the skewed payoff distribution and loss-provision design.

AI Summary. US technology and finance firms offer new engineering graduates higher pay and greater prestige than large industrial companies like Boeing, whereas engineering graduates in France, Japan, China, and Germany take industrial jobs such as Airbus at a fraction of US engineering pay. The author argues this talent pull is a genuine obstacle to re-industrializing the US.

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Louis-Vincent Gave notes that while “Airbus can hire the cream of the French, or even European, crop,” established American industrial firms like Boeing may struggle to attract engineering talent due to competition from startups and Wall Street.

Does tech and finance pay pull engineering talent away from US industry?

Core argument: Engineering graduates in France, Japan, China, and Germany take jobs at industrial firms such as Airbus for a fraction of US engineering pay, while US graduates target Google, Microsoft, Meta, Goldman Sachs, or Morgan Stanley.

Shifts in staff compensation stacked the decks against Boeing and other big US industrial companies—at least relative to other industrial powers. In France, for example, graduates of engineering schools will gladly take jobs at Airbus and be paid a fraction of what an engineer makes in the US. The same is true in Japan, China, and Germany. In the US, however, a new engineering graduate today likely has his or her sights on a job at Google, Microsoft, or Meta, or alternatively at Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley. Such jobs offer better pay and more social prestige, along with the promise of stock options and potential riches. Now the SpaceX IPO has turned this dial all the way up to 11. In short, for the past 15 years or so, the US tech industry has sucked most of the oxygen out of the room. This is true for capital allocation and stock market performance, and it follows that the same has also been true for human resources and talent acquisition. This seems like a genuine hurdle to today’s widespread hopes of re-industrializing the US.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Engineering graduates in France, Japan, China, and Germany take jobs at industrial firms such as Airbus for a fraction of US engineering pay, while US graduates target Google, Microsoft, Meta, Goldman Sachs, or Morgan Stanley.
  2. US technology and finance jobs offer better pay and more social prestige than industrial employers, along with stock options and the promise of riches, shifting compensation against Boeing and other large US industrial companies.
  3. The US tech industry has drawn most capital allocation, stock market performance, and talent for roughly 15 years, and the SpaceX IPO intensifies that pull, posing a hurdle to hopes of re-industrializing the US.

AI Summary. Europe trains more engineering graduates per capita than China and more STEM PhDs than any region outside the United States, yet the only EU-born companies to reach $100bn market value in the past fifty years, Spotify and BioNTech, listed on US exchanges. Europe captures 6% of global AI startup funding versus 61% for the United States.

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Despite top STEM talent and high savings, Europe captures just 6% of AI funding and lacks trillion-dollar firms. Between 2008 and 2021, ~30% of EU-founded unicorns relocated abroad, largely to the US, seeking deeper liquidity, higher valuations, and pro-growth regulation.

Why does Europe's world-class STEM talent fail to produce giant companies?

Core argument: Europe captures just 6% of global AI startup funding, versus 61% for the United States and 17% for China, despite training more engineering graduates per capita than China and more STEM PhDs than any region outside the U.S.

Europe produces more engineering graduates per capita than China. It trains more PhDs in STEM fields than any region outside the United States. Europe's universities rank among the world's best in dozens of disciplines. Europe's household savings rate exceeds that of America. Europe's research output, measured by publications and citations, is world-class. And yet the only EU-born companies to reach a market capitalisation of $100 billion in the past fifty years, Spotify and BioNTech, did so on the NYSE and Nasdaq respectively. Both chose American exchanges over European ones. None of the world's trillion-dollar companies is European. Europe captures just 6% of global AI startup funding, compared with 61% for the United States and 17% for China. Between 2008 and 2021, nearly 30% of European-founded unicorns relocated their headquarters abroad, overwhelmingly to the United States. They did not leave for the weather. They left because U.S. capital markets offered deeper liquidity, broader analyst coverage, higher valuations, and a regulatory environment designed for growth.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Europe captures just 6% of global AI startup funding, versus 61% for the United States and 17% for China, despite training more engineering graduates per capita than China and more STEM PhDs than any region outside the U.S.
  2. The only EU-born companies to reach $100bn market capitalisation in the past fifty years, Spotify and BioNTech, listed on the NYSE and Nasdaq respectively, and none of the world's trillion-dollar companies is European.
  3. Nearly 30% of European-founded unicorns relocated their headquarters abroad between 2008 and 2021, overwhelmingly to the United States, where capital markets offered deeper liquidity, broader analyst coverage, higher valuations, and a regulatory environment designed for growth.