“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
AI Summary.Immigration from Asia and Latin America has been the chief driver of rising US diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White share of the population. Intermarriage across racial and ethnic lines is far more common among Hispanic and Asian Americans, and rising among Black and non-Hispanic White Americans, leaving more people outside single racial categories.
Justin FoxBloomberg
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Less than half of Americans < 29 years old are non-Hispanic whites. As of 2020, 33.8mm Americans – 10.2% of the population – identify as being of two or more races, largely driven by intermarriage between whites and either Hispanics or Asian Americans.
Are immigration and intermarriage making single racial categories obsolete?
Core argument: Immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of rising U.S. diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White share of the population.
The increase in immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of the rise in diversity and decline in the non-Hispanic White share of the population. But those immigrants have been doing what generations of immigrants before them did and, well, becoming Americans. Marriages across racial and ethnic lines are much more prevalent among Hispanic and Asian Americans than Black or non-Hispanic White Americans, while intermarriage rates have been rising steadily for the latter two groups, too. As a result, a growing share of Americans just isn’t going to fit neatly into any single racial or ethnic category that the US government can come up with.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of rising U.S. diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White share of the population.
Intermarriage across racial and ethnic lines is much more prevalent among Hispanic and Asian Americans than among Black or non-Hispanic White Americans, though rates have been rising steadily for the latter two groups as well.
A growing share of Americans does not fit neatly into any single racial or ethnic category the U.S. government defines, as recent immigrants follow earlier generations in becoming Americans.
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Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World?— An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.
Do Past Wealth Gaps Explain Modern Inequality? Evidence From Immigration To The United States— Historical records indicate immigrants arriving in the United States around the turn of the twentieth century came with almost no wealth, and by 1920 nearly half of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents. Households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry, who arrived later with fewer resources, are on average wealthier than those of Northwestern European ancestry.
America’s Immigration Mess: An Illustrated Guide— Current Population Survey estimates indicate America's foreign-born population surpassed 50m for the first time and exceeded 15% of the national population, above the prior peak of 14.8% recorded in 1890. Mass immigration during that earlier wave was associated in contemporary opinion with widening income and wealth gaps and depressed wages for less-skilled native-born men, and sweeping national restrictions followed.
AI Summary.The surge of baby boomers, women, and immigrants entering the US labor force between 1960 and 1980 was difficult for the economy to absorb, and young workers' wages fell sharply after peaking in the early 1970s. The author argues those entrants kept occupying jobs and suppressing demand for new workers until retirement.
Steven RugglesProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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Accounting for both inflows and the overhang of previous labor market entrants, Ruggles predicts a labor shortage such that “Americans born in the 2020s might be the first cohort in a half century that earns significantly more than their parents did.”
How does a large influx of workers affect young workers' wages?
Core argument: Wages for young U.S. workers declined sharply after peaking in 1973, as the economy struggled to absorb the influx of workers entering the labor force between 1960 and 1980 from the baby-boom cohort, rising female participation, and increased immigration.
Figure 3A highlights the influx of workers that occurred between 1960 and 1980, as the large baby-boom cohort entered the labor force, female labor-force participation expanded, and immigration rose [see Figure 2 for a detailed breakdown]. It was difficult for the economy to absorb all the new workers, and wages for young people declined sharply after peaking in 1973. Figure 3A does not, however, provide a valid measure of labor-market competition because the baby boomers and newly employed women and immigrants did not suddenly vanish after they entered the labor force; they kept working and occupying jobs until they eventually retired decades later. The glut of workers entering the labor force in the 1970s would continue to stifle demand for new workers until their eventual exit from the labor force, a process that is still in progress. The index of employment competition shown in Figure 3B is [a better] measure of relative cohort size than 3A. It represents the cumulative net labor-market entries over the previous five decades as a % of the working-age population in the current decade. As shown in Figure 1C, we are already seeing signs of an uptick in the wages of young workers, and as the demographic shortage accelerates we may finally see real wages of the young exceed the levels of the early 1970s.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Wages for young U.S. workers declined sharply after peaking in 1973, as the economy struggled to absorb the influx of workers entering the labor force between 1960 and 1980 from the baby-boom cohort, rising female participation, and increased immigration.
Decennial labor-force entries alone misstate labor-market competition, because baby boomers, newly employed women, and immigrants kept occupying jobs and stifling demand for new workers until their retirements, a process still in progress.
An index of employment competition measuring cumulative net labor-market entries over the previous five decades as a percentage of the current decade's working-age population is offered as a better gauge of relative cohort size, with young workers' wages already showing an uptick.
Related Articles:
Baby Busts and Growth Booms: Demographic Change and the Macroeconomy— A 1pp lower birth rate 20 years earlier is associated with 22 log points higher output per worker 20 years later and 29 log points higher after 40 years, about 0.73pp faster annual growth. The authors find lower birth rates are also associated with more labor-saving patents, larger high-tech shares, and higher productivity growth.
Technology and the Baby Bust Paradox— Aging populations create structural incentives to automate, and the argument is that demographic change could become one of the strongest long-run drivers of artificial intelligence deployment. Technology-producing economies may benefit twice, offsetting their own labor shortages while exporting automation, robotics, and AI to other aging societies.
Can A Depopulating America Still Flourish?— US labor force participation among women aged 25-54 has reached all-time highs, exceeding its previous 1999 peak, yet remains over 4 points below Europe's level and nearly 6 points below Japan's. About 3.5m prime-age American women are neither working nor looking for work, without children at home or husbands, compared with roughly 7m such men.
AI Summary.Historical records indicate immigrants arriving in the United States around the turn of the twentieth century came with almost no wealth, and by 1920 nearly half of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents. Households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry, who arrived later with fewer resources, are on average wealthier than those of Northwestern European ancestry.
Brian MareinWake Forest University
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Except possibly at the very top of the distribution which SIPP cannot measure, the wealth of “new” Southern and Eastern European immigrants to the US has fully caught up with “old” immigrants. Wealth converges quickly once earnings inequality vanishes.
Do initial wealth disadvantages among immigrant groups persist across generations?
Core argument: Households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry, whose families arrived later and with substantially fewer resources, are on average wealthier than those of Northwestern European ancestry, contrary to what persistent initial wealth disadvantages would predict.
Inferring the determinants of long-run inequality from group-level data is complicated by the arrival of 30 million Europeans during the Age of Mass Migration (roughly 1850 to 1924), who are by construction included in average white wealth despite having no direct claim to the wealth accumulated by earlier Americans. By1920, nearly half of white adults were either foreign-born or had foreign-born parents. Using the United States Immigration Commission Reports (commonly known as the Dillingham Commission Reports), I document that immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century arrived with almost no wealth. [Thus] a large share of the white population started from a substantial wealth disadvantage. Northwestern Europeans comprised the overwhelming majority of earlier immigrants, dating back to the initial European settlement of North America, while Southern and Eastern Europeans predominated at the turn of the twentieth century. If initial wealth disadvantages persisted across generations, one would expect households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry to possess less wealth than those of Northwestern European ancestry, since their families arrived later and started with substantially fewer resources. In fact, they do not. On average, they are wealthier.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry, whose families arrived later and with substantially fewer resources, are on average wealthier than those of Northwestern European ancestry, contrary to what persistent initial wealth disadvantages would predict.
Roughly 30 million Europeans arrived during the Age of Mass Migration, spanning about 1850 to 1924, and by 1920 nearly half of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents, yet all are included in average white wealth.
The United States Immigration Commission Reports, known as the Dillingham Commission Reports, indicate that immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century arrived with almost no wealth, so a large share of the white population started from a substantial wealth disadvantage.
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The Myth of Nordic Mobility: Social Mobility Rla— Correcting for measurement error by using relative rather than absolute correlations among relatives, the authors estimate that educational intergenerational mobility in Denmark and Sweden is much lower than conventionally measured, with parent-child and sibling correlations much higher. They argue Nordic education spending and income compression have at best modestly reduced families' role in children's educational outcomes.
00 to 2022— Using a genealogical database of 422,374 English people with rarer surnames, the authors find social status persists strongly even among distant relatives, with status correlations declining by a constant factor of 0.79 per step in the lineage across all status measures and eras studied. The authors argue this constancy suggests social interventions have modest effects.
AI Summary.An analysis of industries that rely most heavily on noncitizen workers with a high-school degree or less—including construction, restaurants, food manufacturing and hotels—found hourly earnings in those 41 industries rose 3.5% from a year earlier, below the 3.8% increase for all workers. Employment in those industries fell by 90,400 over the same period, while overall employment grew by 298,000.
Paul Kiernan and Drew An-PhamWall Street Journal
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Industries most dependent on low-skilled immigrant workers saw wages rise 3.5% and employment fall by 90,400 Y/Y in Feb, underperforming the broader economy, where wages grew 3.8% and total employment rose by 298,000.
Have immigration-dependent industries seen wages rise faster than the broader economy?
Core argument: Hourly earnings across the 41 industries most reliant on low-skilled immigrants rose a weighted average of 3.5% in February from a year earlier, below the 3.8% gain for all workers and a slowdown from before Trump took office.
The analysis used 2024 census data to identify fields—including construction, restaurants, food manufacturing and hotels—that rely heavily on noncitizens with a high-school degree or less, a common proxy for people who entered the country illegally. The Journal excluded industries such as agriculture and the gig economy, for which the Labor Department doesn’t publish hourly earnings. The result: Across 41 industries that rely most heavily on low-skilled immigrants, hourly earnings rose by a weighted average of 3.5% in February from a year earlier, according to the latest figures. That was less than the 3.8% increase in average hourly earnings for all workers and marked a slowdown from before Trump took office. Employment in those 41 immigrant-dependent industries fell by 90,400 in February from a year earlier, while overall employment grew by 298,000 jobs in the same stretch. Preliminary March figures available for 23 of the sectors show a year-over-year gain of 39,400 jobs, boosted by hiring in construction and food service.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Hourly earnings across the 41 industries most reliant on low-skilled immigrants rose a weighted average of 3.5% in February from a year earlier, below the 3.8% gain for all workers and a slowdown from before Trump took office.
Employment in the 41 immigrant-dependent industries fell by 90,400 in February from a year earlier, while overall employment grew by 298,000 jobs over the same stretch.
Preliminary March figures available for 23 of the immigrant-dependent sectors show a year-over-year gain of 39,400 jobs, boosted by hiring in construction and food service.
Related Articles:
Macroeconomic Implications Of Immigration Flows In 2025 And 2026: January 2026 Update— The authors estimate that job growth consistent with full employment was 20,000–50,000 a month in the second half of 2025, while reported nonfarm payroll growth averaged about 14,500 and unemployment rose 0.3 percentage points. They project immigration policy changes will keep potential employment growth low, reducing GDP growth by roughly 0.2 percentage points in 2025 and 0.1 in 2026.
Labor Force Growth, Breakeven Employment, and Potential GDP Growth— Slowing net immigration could cut US labor force growth so much that the breakeven pace of job creation falls to nearly zero — under 10,000 jobs a month — far below any point in the past 65 years. Monthly payroll declines as large as 100,000 would then not be unusual even with output at potential.
Break-Even Employment Declines As Unauthorized Immigration Outflows Continue— Net outflows of unauthorized immigrants have lowered the break-even rate of U.S. payroll growth needed to hold the unemployment rate steady, so smaller job gains that once signalled economic slack are now consistent with a balanced labor market. Recent payroll growth has slightly exceeded that break-even rate on average.
AI Summary.Net outflows of unauthorized immigrants have lowered the break-even rate of U.S. payroll growth needed to hold the unemployment rate steady, so smaller job gains that once signalled economic slack are now consistent with a balanced labor market. Recent payroll growth has slightly exceeded that break-even rate on average.
Anton Cheremukhin, Daniel Wilson and Xiaoqing ZhouFederal Reserve Bank of Dallas
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A FRBD analysis finds immigration outflows lowered break-even employment growth to about -3,000 monthly, down from ~250,000 in 2023, “payroll gains that might historically have signaled economic slack are now consistent with a balanced labor market.”
Does immigration outflow lower the break-even rate for job growth?
Core argument: Payroll growth over December 2025–February 2026 slightly exceeded the estimated break-even rate on average, consistent with the unemployment rate remaining stable despite softer headline payroll numbers.
Comparing our break-even estimates with actual payroll growth (Chart 2, blue bars) suggests that job growth over the recent three months—December 2025–February 2026—has slightly exceeded the break-even rate on average, consistent with the unemployment rate remaining stable despite softer headline payroll numbers. Real-time data point to an important change in the U.S. labor market: The benchmark for evaluating payroll growth has moved significantly. As net outflows of unauthorized immigrants reduce employment growth in late 2025, payroll gains that might historically have signalled economic slack are now consistent with a balanced labor market.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Payroll growth over December 2025–February 2026 slightly exceeded the estimated break-even rate on average, consistent with the unemployment rate remaining stable despite softer headline payroll numbers.
Net outflows of unauthorized immigrants reduced employment growth in late 2025, lowering the break-even benchmark against which U.S. payroll gains are evaluated.
Payroll gains that would historically have signalled economic slack are now consistent with a balanced U.S. labor market, given the shift in break-even employment.
Related Articles:
New Data Show Intensifying Unauthorized Immigration Decline, With Large Local Variations— Individual-level immigration court and parole data indicate net unauthorized immigration has turned increasingly negative, averaging -48,000 per month over the first seven months of the year and reaching -89,000 in July. The authors estimate this pace implies an annual total of -576,000, compared with the Congressional Budget Office's projection of -290,000.
What Sweeping Revisions and a Blowout Month Tell Us About the U.S. Job Market— Labor Department revisions lowered previously estimated job gains for the past two calendar years, cutting the combined net change in construction, manufacturing, and retail by 115,000 jobs. Healthcare added about 437,000 jobs and social assistance about 321,000 over 12 months, while all other private-sector jobs combined shrank.
Trump’s Immigration Crackdown Fails to Deliver Jobs for US-Born Workers— Researchers at the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution estimate net migration into the US may have turned negative for the first time in at least 50 years. That decline coincided with rising joblessness among US-born workers, whose labor force participation has fallen in recent months to near its lowest level since 2021.
AI Summary.Researchers at the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution estimate net migration into the US may have turned negative for the first time in at least 50 years. That decline coincided with rising joblessness among US-born workers, whose labor force participation has fallen in recent months to near its lowest level since 2021.
Jonnelle MarteBloomberg
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While immigration may have been negative in 2025, the native-born unemployment rate is now 4.7%, up from 4.3% in January 2025. The labor force participation rate for native workers hasn’t risen since the start of the immigration crackdown.
Has falling immigration boosted employment for US-born workers?
Core argument: Net migration into the US may have been negative in 2025 for the first time in at least 50 years, according to estimates from researchers at the center-right American Enterprise Institute and the center-left Brookings Institution.
Net migration into the US may have been negative in 2025 for the first time in at least 50 years, according to estimates from researchers at the center-right American Enterprise Institute and center-left Brookings Institution. That squeeze coincided with a rise in joblessness among the native-born, even as some businesses say it’s becoming more challenging to fill positions. The labor participation for prime-age workers is near the highest since 2001, government data published last Friday show, but that of people over 16 who were born in the US has dropped in recent months, and is near the lowest level since 2021. The labor participation for prime-age workers is near the highest since 2001, government data published last Friday show, but that of people over 16 who were born in the US has dropped in recent months, and is near the lowest level since 2021.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Net migration into the US may have been negative in 2025 for the first time in at least 50 years, according to estimates from researchers at the center-right American Enterprise Institute and the center-left Brookings Institution.
Labor force participation among US-born people over 16 has dropped in recent months to near its lowest level since 2021, while prime-age participation sits near its highest since 2001, according to government data.
The migration squeeze coincided with rising joblessness among native-born workers, while some businesses say filling positions is becoming more challenging.
Related Articles:
Unprecedented ‘Jobless Boom’ Tests Limits of US Economic Expansion— Forecasters expect US gross domestic product to have expanded 2.7% over the year while employment barely grew, a divergence drawing comparisons to the "jobless recovery" that followed the early-2000s technology stock collapse. Unlike that episode, which began with a recession, this "jobless boom" is occurring without one — a first in the postwar era.
Macroeconomic Implications Of Immigration Flows In 2025 And 2026: January 2026 Update— The authors estimate that job growth consistent with full employment was 20,000–50,000 a month in the second half of 2025, while reported nonfarm payroll growth averaged about 14,500 and unemployment rose 0.3 percentage points. They project immigration policy changes will keep potential employment growth low, reducing GDP growth by roughly 0.2 percentage points in 2025 and 0.1 in 2026.
What Sweeping Revisions and a Blowout Month Tell Us About the U.S. Job Market— Labor Department revisions lowered previously estimated job gains for the past two calendar years, cutting the combined net change in construction, manufacturing, and retail by 115,000 jobs. Healthcare added about 437,000 jobs and social assistance about 321,000 over 12 months, while all other private-sector jobs combined shrank.
AI Summary.An analysis estimating immigrants' effects on output, capital, tax revenue, and descendants finds admitting one 30-year-old without a high school diploma costs the federal government $20,000 over 10 years and over $130,000 over 30 years, while a college-educated 30-year-old yields over $200,000 and $1.6m respectively.
Daniel Di MartinoManhattan Institute
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A 30-year-old immigrant without a high school degree yields net revenue losses of $20k to the federal government over 10 years and >$130k over 30 years, while his college-educated peer yields fiscal gains of $200k over 10 years and $1.6mm over 30 years.
How does an immigrant's education level change the fiscal impact?
Core argument: Admitting one college-educated 30-year-old immigrant yields a net federal gain of over $200,000 in the 10-year budget window and $1.6 million over 30 years, accounting for descendants, according to the analysis.
This updated analysis accounts for the economic impact of immigrants on Gross Domestic Product, the capital stock, and the resulting additional tax revenue. It also accounts for the fiscal and economic impact of the children and grandchildren of immigrants. [It does not account for inflation. All numbers from 2026 on are in nominal terms, mimicking CBO scoring]. Accounting for descendants, the total fiscal impact of admitting one immigrant who is 30 years old without a high school diploma is a loss of $20,000 to the federal government in the 10-year budget window and a loss of over $130,000 over the 30-year budget window. On the other hand, admitting one college-educated 30-year-old immigrant results in a net gain of over $200,000 in the 10-year window and a gain of $1.6 million in the 30-year budget window. Shifting visas toward high-skilled categories, wage-ranking H-1B visas, and recapturing unused employment-based green cards from previous years can reduce deficits while boosting GDP.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Admitting one college-educated 30-year-old immigrant yields a net federal gain of over $200,000 in the 10-year budget window and $1.6 million over 30 years, accounting for descendants, according to the analysis.
Admitting one 30-year-old immigrant without a high school diploma costs the federal government $20,000 over the 10-year window and over $130,000 over 30 years, including the fiscal impact of children and grandchildren.
The analysis finds that shifting visas toward high-skilled categories, wage-ranking H-1B visas, and recapturing unused employment-based green cards from prior years can reduce deficits while boosting GDP.
Related Articles:
Two New Estimates of the Fiscal Impact of Immigration— Estimates of immigrants' fiscal impact depend heavily on the assumptions used: the lifetime fiscal impact of a 22-year-old high school dropout shifts from negative $315,000 under one set of assumptions to a small negative number under another. The author argues the accounting approach common in this literature understates immigrants' contribution to fiscal sustainability.
America’s— Current Population Survey estimates indicate America's foreign-born population surpassed 50m for the first time and exceeded 15% of the national population, above the prior peak of 14.8% recorded in 1890. Mass immigration during that earlier wave was associated in contemporary opinion with widening income and wealth gaps and depressed wages for less-skilled native-born men, and sweeping national restrictions followed.
Immigration Mess: An Illustrated Guide— Current Population Survey estimates indicate America's foreign-born population surpassed 50m for the first time and exceeded 15% of the national population, above the prior peak of 14.8% recorded in 1890. Mass immigration during that earlier wave was associated in contemporary opinion with widening income and wealth gaps and depressed wages for less-skilled native-born men, and sweeping national restrictions followed.
Did The Political Establishment Pave The Way For Trump and Farage?— An analysis finds that voters and mainstream politicians have long been broadly aligned on economic issues such as tax and spending, but diverge widely on sociocultural issues like immigration and criminal justice, with publics favoring more order and cultural integration while politicians lean toward more inclusive, permissive approaches.
AI Summary.Because restrictive planning laws prevent housing supply from responding to demand in rich countries, researchers estimate that a 1% rise in a city's migrant population raises rents by 0.5–1%, with other studies estimating larger effects on house prices and median rents. Since migration has only a small positive effect on wages, housing becomes less affordable for natives.
Economist StaffThe Economist
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The ongoing wave of immigration to OECD countries has likely put upward pressure on housing costs. @TheEconomist reports on studies finding that a 1% increase in the migrant population of a region raises housing costs from 1-3%.
Does immigration make housing less affordable where building is restricted?
Core argument: A University of Waikato meta-analysis finds that a 1% increase in a city's migrant population raises rents by 0.5–1%, while Umut Unal of the Czech Research Institute for Labour and Social Affairs estimates a 1% rise in migration to a German district raises house prices by 3%.
Rich-world housing markets are often rigid and bound by restrictive planning laws that prevent supply from responding to demand. The lump of labour may be a fallacy but, without more housebuilding, there is effectively one lump of land that must be divided between a larger population. Research supports this intuition. A University of Waikato [meta-analysis] finds that a 1% increase in the migrant population of a city leads to a 0.5-1% rise in rents. Umut Unal of the Czech Research Institute for Labour and Social Affairs estimates that a 1% rise in migration to a German district leads to a 3% rise in house prices. James Cabral and Walter Steingress, both of the Bank of Canada, calculate that a 1% increase in an American county’s population raises median rents by 2.2%. As migration only has a small positive impact on wages, the rise in costs makes housing less affordable for natives. Housing demand depends not only on the number of people in an area but how densely they live. Often new migrants are willing to accept worse conditions than natives.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
A University of Waikato meta-analysis finds that a 1% increase in a city's migrant population raises rents by 0.5–1%, while Umut Unal of the Czech Research Institute for Labour and Social Affairs estimates a 1% rise in migration to a German district raises house prices by 3%.
James Cabral and Walter Steingress of the Bank of Canada calculate that a 1% increase in an American county's population raises median rents by 2.2%.
Because migration has only a small positive impact on wages, rising housing costs make housing less affordable for natives, and restrictive planning laws in rich-world markets prevent supply from responding to demand.
Related Articles:
Housing and the American Worker— Wages net of housing costs were once substantially higher in high-density areas than low-density areas for workers both with and without college education, but over the past half-century that urban wage premium has persisted only for college-educated workers, not for those with a high school degree or less.
Why Immigration Is an Urban Phenomenon— Because many immigrants send remittances home or plan to return, part of their spending occurs in their origin country rather than where they work, so local prices apply to only part of their budget. The authors argue this makes immigrants less deterred by high local costs, concentrating them in expensive cities.
Importing Shelter Inflation— Shelter costs make up about 30% of the consumer price index, and their monthly inflation appears to be stabilizing above pre-pandemic rates rather than delivering the disinflation forward-looking data had implied. The author suggests this may be related to a surge in migration, estimated at 3.3m migrants in a year.