AI Summary. The United States generates almost twice as much economic output per dollar invested as China, the opposite of what would be expected from a mature developed economy versus a fast-growing economy catching up. The gap points to overexuberance in Chinese investment.

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The US generates ~2x as much output per dollar of capital as China. Rivaton and Southwood argue that relentless competition among Chinese subnational governments, who account for ~85% of public expenditure, drives industrial growth at the cost of reduced capital efficiency.

Does China get less economic output per dollar invested than America?

Core argument: The United States obtains nearly twice as much GDP from every dollar invested as China does, measured by the capital efficiency ratio of output to invested capital stock.

Overexuberance is visible in economic data. Interest rates that banks pay to depositors are capped, giving banks artificially cheap capital. Entrepreneurs may be backed to attempt extremely unlikely, borderline schemes. The capital efficiency ratio measures how much output a country gets out of the capital stock it has invested – how many dollars of GDP a country can buy with a dollar of investment. The United States gets almost twice as much economic output out of every dollar it invests as China does, precisely the opposite of what we would expect from a developed country with a mature economy versus a rapidly growing country playing catch up.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The United States obtains nearly twice as much GDP from every dollar invested as China does, measured by the capital efficiency ratio of output to invested capital stock.
  2. China’s capital efficiency inverts the expected pattern, in which a rapidly growing catch-up economy would extract more output per dollar of investment than a mature developed economy.
  3. Overexuberance is visible in Chinese macroeconomic data, with China’s investment generating less economic output per dollar than that of the United States.

AI Summary. The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.

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Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh projects ~$10.3T will be spent on the AI buildout over 2025–2032, averaging 3.63% of GDP. He estimates 2/3 of that spending reflects IT equipment and one-third real estate and associated power infrastructure.

How much of the planned data center pipeline gets built?

Core argument: Using Cleanview project-level data from July 2026, the authors estimate roughly 57 GW of operating U.S. data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of roughly 509 GW, which they stress is not a completion forecast.

The required investment is enormous. A representative 200 MW AI training campus costs roughly $8.2 billion, about two-thirds of which reflects IT equipment and one-third the real estate and associated power infrastructure. We estimate that 183 GW is completed by 2032 with a further 118 GW completed after 2032. This pipeline will trigger about $10.3 trillion dollars of investment over 2025–2032. At an average of 3.63% of GDP per year, the projected buildout would be larger relative to the economy than the major U.S. canal, railroad, electrification, highway, and telecommunications investment booms. It would double the electricity consumption of the entire U.S. residential sector.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Using Cleanview project-level data from July 2026, the authors estimate roughly 57 GW of operating U.S. data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of roughly 509 GW, which they stress is not a completion forecast.
  2. The authors’ central scenario allocates the announced pipeline so that 182.8 GW of additional U.S. capacity becomes operational during 2025–32, including 19.0 GW tied to projects already operational in 2025 or 2026.
  3. The authors’ scenario has 117.2 GW of planned data center capacity completed after 2032 and 226.9 GW never completed, applying lower realization rates to more distant and less fully documented projects.

AI Summary. Prime-age adults aged 25–54 and older workers aged 55–64 have higher employment rates in Europe than in the US, while US youth employment is higher because Europeans spend longer in education. The share of young people not in education, employment or training is higher in the US than in Europe.

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Despite Europe’s high social spending relative to the US, Chris Giles notes that prime-age adult (25–54) labor force participation in the Eurozone has overtaken that of the US, and there has been a dramatic convergence in the LFP of older workers.

Do Europeans work less than Americans?

Core argument: Prime-age adults aged 25–54 in Europe are more likely to be employed than their US counterparts, whether measured with EU or Eurozone data, and Europeans aged 55–64 also have higher employment rates than Americans.

It does not matter whether you use EU or Eurozone data, prime-age adults (between 25 and 54) in Europe are more likely to be in work than those in the US. Older people (between 55 and 64) also have higher employment rates in Europe. Younger people (between 15 and 24) are more likely to have a job in the US, but that results from Europeans educating themselves for longer. The proportion of young people not in education, employment or training is higher in the US than in Europe. So welfare is not stopping work. More than that, the higher-welfare north of Europe tends to have higher employment rates than the south, although there is convergence within the Eurozone. Spain, in particular, has enjoyed rapid improvements.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Prime-age adults aged 25–54 in Europe are more likely to be employed than their US counterparts, whether measured with EU or Eurozone data, and Europeans aged 55–64 also have higher employment rates than Americans.
  2. Young people aged 15–24 are more likely to have a job in the US than in Europe, but that gap results from Europeans spending longer in education, and the share not in education, employment or training is higher in the US.
  3. The higher-welfare north of Europe tends to have higher employment rates than the south, with convergence within the Eurozone and rapid improvement in Spain.

AI Summary. Global fertility is likely below the replacement level needed to keep population constant in the long run, though population momentum from large cohorts of women now having children means world population will keep growing for roughly another 30 years. Unless trends change, it is projected to peak near 9bn around 2056 and then decline.

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The UN appears to systematically overestimate births; e.g. 33 of 37 countries with high-quality statistics registered fewer births in 2024 than the UN had forecast. Fernández-Villaverde and Norrick infer humanity is below replacement fertility in 2026.

Will world population keep growing even as fertility falls below replacement?

Core argument: As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below replacement fertility, with fewer births than needed to keep population constant in the long run.

In Table A1 we compare the World Population Prospects (WPP) estimates of births in 2022-2023 with the official numbers reported by several countries. [A2 shows the full sample with the deviations.] As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below the replacement fertility level: we are having fewer births than we need to keep population constant in the long run. This astonishing fact does not mean that population has stopped growing. Because of momentum effects (the large cohorts of women born two or three decades ago are having their children now, and their own parents have not died yet), world population will keep growing for another 30 years or so. But unless trends change, it will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then start falling, first slowly, then fast.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below replacement fertility, with fewer births than needed to keep population constant in the long run.
  2. World population is set to keep growing for roughly another 30 years because of momentum effects, as large cohorts of women born two or three decades ago have their children while their own parents are still alive.
  3. Unless trends change, world population will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then start falling, first slowly, then fast.

AI Summary. Only 20% of global household wealth growth came from net new investment in real assets such as machinery, housing, infrastructure and intellectual property, down from a 30% average over the prior quarter century. Nearly 60% came from asset prices rising faster than inflation and negative net worth in other sectors.

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A McKinsey analysis finds global wealth is increasingly composed of “paper wealth,” driven by the rise of US equity values to 2.4x the book value of net corporate assets, and the debt of Chinese corporations, which grew to 80% of their real asset value.

Is household wealth growth driven more by asset prices than investment?

Core argument: Only 20% of global household wealth growth in 2025 came from net new investment in real assets such as machinery, homes, infrastructure, and intellectual property less depreciation, versus a 30% average over 2000–2024.

In 2025, global wealth growth was driven to a greater extent by paper wealth, or nominal asset value growth decoupled from the real economy. Only 20% of household wealth growth was based on net new investment (real assets including machinery and equipment, homes and buildings, infrastructure, and intellectual property, less depreciation), compared to 30% on average from 2000 to 2024. Nearly 60% came from asset price growth above and beyond general inflation and negative net worth positions from other sectors. [For example, this includes equity value growth above net assets for corporations as well as government bonds greater than the book value of government assets]. This was a marked increase over the average from 2000 to 2024, when paper gains drove one-third of global wealth growth.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Only 20% of global household wealth growth in 2025 came from net new investment in real assets such as machinery, homes, infrastructure, and intellectual property less depreciation, versus a 30% average over 2000–2024.
  2. Nearly 60% of 2025 global household wealth growth came from asset price gains above general inflation plus negative net worth positions in other sectors, compared with about one-third on average over 2000–2024.
  3. Paper wealth, meaning nominal asset value growth decoupled from the real economy, drove a greater share of global wealth growth in 2025, including equity values above corporate net assets and government bonds exceeding the book value of government assets.

AI Summary. In the US, Europe and Japan, pay growth has decoupled from productivity growth, with productivity pulling ahead. US labor productivity, measured as real GDP per hour worked, is more than 5x its 1947 level while real hourly compensation is only about 3x, and median wage growth lags even further behind.

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In advanced economies, increases in labor productivity growth have decoupled from real wage growth, especially post-1980.

Are wages falling further behind productivity growth in advanced economies?

Core argument: US labour productivity, measured as real GDP per hour worked, is more than five times its 1947 level, while real hourly compensation is only about three times greater.

In the US, Europe and Japan, pay growth has decoupled from productivity growth, with the latter having pulled ahead. US Labour productivity — measured as real GDP per hour worked — is now more than five times greater than in 1947, whereas real hourly compensation is only about three times greater. Median wage growth has lagged even further behind productivity growth, with inequality pushing the average wage higher than the median. (The figures above show average rather than median wages; plotting median wages would show an even greater divergence.)

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US labour productivity, measured as real GDP per hour worked, is more than five times its 1947 level, while real hourly compensation is only about three times greater.
  2. Pay growth has decoupled from productivity growth in the US, Europe and Japan, with productivity pulling ahead in all three.
  3. Median wage growth has lagged productivity growth by even more than average wage growth, as inequality pushes the average wage above the median.

AI Summary. About 73m US households hold retirement accounts, mostly defined-contribution plans whose balances have risen $6.7tn, and 45m households account for nearly $15tn in annual outlays, close to 3x Germany's economy and 70% of China's GDP. This group's spending has sustained faster growth than comparably wealthy economies.

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Citing the spending of the top 45mm US households, Jason Thomas argues that US economic growth could be characterized less as ‘k-shaped’ than “travelling at two speeds, one roughly the same rate as Europe’s and another that’s racing far ahead.”

Does retirement wealth explain why US spending outpaces peer economies?

Core argument: Balances in US defined-contribution retirement plans have risen by $6.7tn since the start of 2019, a 12.7% annually compounded gain, with roughly 73 million US households holding retirement accounts.

Roughly 73 million US households have retirement accounts (primarily defined-contribution plans like 401ks) that consist primarily of claims on businesses whose revenue growth and market values provide another hedge against inflation. Balances in defined contribution plans have increased by $6.7 trillion (+12.7%, annually compounded) since the start of 2019. US personal savings rates have fallen sharply over the past year (from 5.5% in April 2025 to 3% in May 2026) but that seems entirely rational. If your retirement balance is far above where you expected it to be, why not spend a bit more of your current income than previously intended? If we net across these overlapping cohorts and exclude recent first-time home purchases, we’re left with 45 million households that combine to account for nearly $15 trillion in annual outlays. That’s an extraordinary sum, equal to nearly 3x the size of the entire German economy and 70% of the GDP of China. And this third of the population has not only been insulated from the inflation shock but also exhibits the propensity to spend out of wealth and income to an extent that’s sustained a far higher rate of GDP growth than observed in economies with comparable living standards.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Balances in US defined-contribution retirement plans have risen by $6.7tn since the start of 2019, a 12.7% annually compounded gain, with roughly 73 million US households holding retirement accounts.
  2. Netting overlapping cohorts and excluding recent first-time home purchases leaves 45 million US households accounting for nearly $15tn in annual outlays, equal to nearly 3x the German economy and 70% of China's GDP.
  3. The US personal savings rate fell from 5.5% in April 2025 to 3% in May 2026, a decline the article argues is rational when retirement balances sit far above expectations.

AI Summary. Using 5.1m product listings from Sears catalogs, the authors construct a quality-adjusted price index implying much lower goods inflation for 1900–1990 than standard deflators, with real goods consumption growing 39x rather than 10.3x. They estimate faster growth before World War II (5.4% a year, 1900–1939) than after (4.2%, 1946–1980).

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Using 5.1mm Sears catalog listings and LLM-based hedonic estimation, this study finds real goods consumption grew 39-fold from 1900 to 1990, not 10.3-fold as official data imply, with the largest mismeasurement concentrated before WWII.

Does quality-adjusted pricing show faster goods consumption growth before the war?

Core argument: Using a quality-adjusted price index built from 5.1 million Sears catalog listings, the authors estimate real goods consumption grew by a factor of 39 between 1900 and 1990, compared with a factor of 10.3 using standard goods deflators.

Measuring real GDP growth requires distinguishing changes in prices from changes in product quality... systematic quality adjustment. price indexes are unavailable for much of the twentieth century. We construct a new quality-adjusted price index using 5.1 million product listings from Sears catalogs, 1900–1990. The resulting cost-of-living index implies substantially lower goods inflation than conventional deflators between 1900 and 1990, real goods consumption grew by a factor of 39 using our index,compared with a factor of 10.3 using standard goods deflators. Figure 5 shows our estimates of the cost-of-living index for consumer goods in the solid red line. The dashed black line shows average cumulated price changes for the same sample of consumer goods. The gap.is largest before World War II, reversing the conventional view that goods consumption growth was slower before 1945 than in the post-war decades.As Gordon puts it, 'the history of price changes from 1914 to 1947 [is] the black hole where little is known.' This paper sheds light on that black hole. We estimate average annual real goods consumption growth of 5.4% for 1900-1939 and 4.2% for 1946-1980... the era of fastest growth was in the prewar, not postwar, contrary to conventional estimates.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Using a quality-adjusted price index built from 5.1 million Sears catalog listings, the authors estimate real goods consumption grew by a factor of 39 between 1900 and 1990, compared with a factor of 10.3 using standard goods deflators.
  2. The authors estimate average annual real goods consumption growth of 5.4% for 1900–1939 and 4.2% for 1946–1980, implying the fastest growth came in the prewar rather than postwar era, contrary to conventional estimates.
  3. The new cost-of-living index implies substantially lower goods inflation than conventional deflators, with the gap largest before World War II, a period Gordon describes as "the black hole where little is known.".