“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
AI Summary.Analysis allocating US federal spending by age group estimates that Americans over 65 received about 10x as much federal money per person as younger groups until the 2010s, falling to about 6x by 2024 as the elderly population grew. Similar trends appear in most of 29 other rich countries.
Economist StaffThe Economist
Date Posted:
An Economist analysis finds that in most advanced economies it examined (26 of 32), elderly incomes are now falling relative to those of working-age people. By its estimates, Americans over 65 received ~10x as much federal spending per person as other age groups until the 2010s, falling to ~6x by 2024. That drop mostly reflects the elderly population growth outpacing spending increases, not spending cuts.
Is federal spending per elderly person falling relative to younger groups?
Core argument: Using a University of Pennsylvania methodology, The Economist estimates Americans over 65 received ten times as much federal money per person as other age groups until the 2010s, falling to six times by 2024.
Wonks at the University of Pennsylvania allocate federal spending in America to different age groups. Using their methodology, we estimate that until the 2010s Americans over 65 received ten times as much federal money per person as other age groups did. Outlays on Social Security and Medicare, the health-care programme for the elderly, vastly outweighed spending on child benefits (lots of education spending is within the purview of states and cities rather than the federal government). Pots of money continue to flow to the elderly. But because so many people are ageing so fast, individual oldsters are losing out. By 2024 the American old were getting six times as much government largesse as younger cohorts rather than ten times. In the majority of the other 29 rich countries we examine, we find similar trends. In Italy old-age spending has gone from almost 15 times as much as spending on families and children before the pandemic to less than ten times as much.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Using a University of Pennsylvania methodology, The Economist estimates Americans over 65 received ten times as much federal money per person as other age groups until the 2010s, falling to six times by 2024.
Social Security and Medicare outlays vastly outweighed federal spending on child benefits in the United States, where much education spending falls to states and cities rather than the federal government.
Similar trends appear in most of the 29 other rich countries examined, with Italy’s old-age spending falling from almost 15 times spending on families and children before the pandemic to less than ten times.
Over 65? Congratulations, You Own the Economy— The share of the U.S. population aged 65 and over has risen from 13% to 18%, and federal spending on elderly programs has climbed from 6.9% of gross domestic product to 9.4%, which the Congressional Budget Office projects will reach 11.3% in a decade. Elderly programs plus interest are the primary driver of the budget deficit.
How Federal Spending is Distributed by Age— An analysis classifying $4.4tn of $7tn in federal spending by age finds retirees aged 65 and older receive $2.7tn, 38.6% of total outlays and 61.9% of age-assignable spending, versus $1.2tn for working-age adults and $449bn for those under 26. Social Security and Medicare account for 80% of age-assignable spending on older adults.
AI Summary.Long-term U.S. Treasury yields did not fall during an artificial-intelligence equity sell-off, which the author argues contradicts the view that AI capital spending and hyperscaler debt issuance are the main force pushing yields higher. The author attributes elevated long-term yields instead to a rising fiscal risk premium tied to U.S. public debt growth.
Robin BrooksRobin Brooks Substack
Date Posted:
Brooks notes that while the 2-year and 10-year Treasury yields fell during last week’s AI sell-off, the 10y10y forward yield did not. He argues its failure to do so “further cements the case for the fiscal risk premium,” concluding that long yields are up “because of mounting fiscal stress, not because of AI capex.”
Are elevated long-term yields driven by fiscal strain rather than AI borrowing?
Core argument: Robin Brooks argues that long-term Treasury yields failed to fall during the late-2026 AI equity sell-off, contradicting the view that AI capital expenditure and hyperscaler debt issuance have been the primary force pushing yields higher.
The black line shows daily data from the start of 2026 for the two-year Treasury yield.The blue line is the 10-year yield and the purple line is the 10y10y forward yield. If the AI bubble were a material driver of the rise in long-term yields, the purple line should have fallen this week alongside the blue and black ones. It didn’t and that in my mind further cements the case for the fiscal risk premium. The midterm elections and the AI sell-off that’s ensued have given us the perfect natural experiment to disentangle what’s going on with long-term yields. They’re up because of mounting fiscal stress, not because of AI. Once the war ends - and it will - we’ll be left with all the structural challenges the US and others in the G10 face. The fact that we’re rapidly running out of fiscal space is top of that list.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Robin Brooks argues that long-term Treasury yields failed to fall during the late-2026 AI equity sell-off, contradicting the view that AI capital expenditure and hyperscaler debt issuance have been the primary force pushing yields higher.
The November payrolls print of 165,000 jobs beat the Bloomberg consensus of 70,000 by 95,000, or 1.2 standard deviations against a historical standard deviation of 76,000, and the two-year yield rose five basis points, in line with or above the historical regression of yield responses to payrolls surprises.
Brooks concludes that elevated long-term yields reflect mounting fiscal stress rather than AI, noting the 10-year/10-year forward yield did not decline alongside shorter maturities during the sell-off week and that corporate dissaving is “not remotely near where it was in the IT bubble of the early 2000s.”.
Related Articles:
Global Bond Sales Smash Record, Fueled by AI Borrowing Binge— Financial firms, companies and governments raised about $6.61tn through broadly syndicated investment-grade and junk-bond sales, up 15% year-over-year to a record. Cloud-computing giants and data-center developers sold almost $368bn of debt, more than 6x the prior year, accounting for roughly a third of the increase in borrowing.
Is the AI Buildout Pushing Up Yields?— US saving-investment data show that non-financial corporations remain net savers, unlike the early-2000s information technology boom when they flipped to net borrowers and their capital spending accounted for the entire current account deficit. Government dissaving through the budget deficit, not the artificial intelligence buildout, is absorbing national resources.
The Meaning Of Higher Real Yields— US inflation-protected Treasury yields have broken above their post-2008 highs, indicating the real cost of capital is rising, while nominal 20- and 30-year Treasury yields remain within their three-year ranges. The article argues an artificial-intelligence-driven investment boom has raised demand for capital, and that corporate debt-to-equity ratios have fallen and interest coverage has surged since Covid.
AI Summary.US debt held by the public peaked at a record 106.1% of GDP after World War II and fell as a share of the economy through 1974, aided by rapid growth, deficits averaging just 0.4% of GDP, and more tax increases than cuts. The federal deficit was 6.2% of GDP in fiscal 2026.
Justin FoxBloomberg
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Both growth and fiscal restraint gradually erased the WWII debt burden. Tax increases in 1982–93 helped reverse the large deficits of the 1980s, contributing to surpluses in 1998–2001. In line with this history, growth alone is unlikely to stabilize the current debt trajectory.
Can economic growth alone bring down the national debt?
Core argument: US debt held by the public peaked at a record 106.1% of GDP in fiscal 1946 and fell as a share of GDP through 1974, aided by rapid growth and a fiscal balance averaging -0.4% of GDP from 1947 to 1974.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, also known as the Reagan tax cuts, is remembered variously as a budget-busting disaster and the driver of a new era of growth. There’s some truth to both portrayals, but what doesn’t come up nearly enough is that the 1981 tax cuts were followed by tax increases in 1982, 1983, 1984, 1986 (just barely; that year’s Tax Reform Act was supposed to be revenue-neutral), 1987, 1990 and 1993. Thanks in part to the end of the Cold War, Congress was also able to reduce spending growth in the 1990s, with federal outlays falling from 21.7% of GDP in 1991 to 17.7% in 2000 and 2001. The result: four straight years of budget surpluses, and a debt-to-GDP ratio that fell from 47.9% in 1993 to 31.5% in 2001.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
US debt held by the public peaked at a record 106.1% of GDP in fiscal 1946 and fell as a share of GDP through 1974, aided by rapid growth and a fiscal balance averaging -0.4% of GDP from 1947 to 1974.
The US fiscal balance in fiscal 2026 was -6.2% of GDP, compared with the -0.4% average that accompanied the postwar decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio.
Federal spending tripled in inflation-adjusted terms from 1947 to 1974 and rose from 16.1% to 17.8% of GDP, with revenue rising almost as fast in a period with more tax increases than decreases, according to a 2013 Treasury Department accounting of major tax legislation.
Related Articles:
Projections of Deficits and Debt Under Two Scenarios With Higher Interest Rates— The Congressional Budget Office projects that if interest rates run 1.5 percentage points above its economic forecast, deficits would be $6tn larger over 2026–2036, reflecting a $4.9tn rise in net interest costs and $1.1tn in added debt-service costs. Debt held by the public would reach 133.1% of GDP in 2036, 12.9 percentage points above its baseline.
The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036— The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal deficit will grow from $1.9tn (5.8% of GDP) to $3.1tn (6.7%) over a decade, above the 3.8% averaged over the past 50 years, with rising net interest costs driving much of the increase. Federal debt held by the public is projected to rise from 101% to 120% of GDP.
How Might Fiscal Policy Respond to the Rise of Artificial Intelligence?— The Congressional Budget Office estimates that a permanent 0.5 percentage point increase in annual productivity growth would lower publicly held federal debt after 30 years by 39% of GDP, offsetting roughly half the projected rise from 101% of GDP to 175%. Higher revenue and slower spending growth outweigh higher interest costs.
AI Summary.The average premium in the Affordable Care Act insurance marketplaces is projected to rise 13%, according to an analysis by the health research group KFF. That increase is slightly higher than elsewhere, with consulting firms projecting roughly 10% increases for employer plans covering about 150m people and more than 10% for federal workers.
Reed Abelson and Margot Sanger-KatzNew York Times
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Database
According to a KFF analysis, the average benchmark health care premium on the Obamacare insurance marketplaces will increase 13% in 2027, compared to 10% for private insurance. This follows a 26% increase last year.
Are marketplace health premiums rising faster than employer plan premiums?
Core argument: Average premiums in the Obamacare marketplaces will rise 13% in 2027, according to an analysis by KFF that combined newly published federal prices for 30 states with state-level figures.
Obamacare premiums will rise an average of 13% in 2027, following a 26% increase in 2026. Much of the increase reflects rising medical costs, with employer-plan premiums also expected to climb about 10%. But the expiration of enhanced federal subsidies has left some Obamacare customers particularly exposed. Remaining income-based subsidies will shield most enrollees from next year’s premium increases by shifting the additional expense to taxpayers. Those ineligible for assistance—including many self-employed workers and early retirees—must absorb the full increase, sometimes after already paying over $1,000 more per month in 2026.Many customers have responded by buying cheaper coverage with higher deductibles, pushing the average deductible to nearly $4,000 this year. Having already traded down, they have less room to offset further increases. KFF estimates suggest enrollment had fallen by nearly five million by June, while a Commonwealth Fund survey indicates that the uninsured rate among working-age adults has risen.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Average premiums in the Obamacare marketplaces will rise 13% in 2027, according to an analysis by KFF that combined newly published federal prices for 30 states with state-level figures.
Reports by several consulting firms project that 2027 premiums for employer plans, which cover around 150 million people, could rise by about 10%, below the 13% marketplace increase.
Premiums for federal workers are increasing by more than 10%.
Related Articles:
Saved by Medicaid: New Evidence on Health Insurance and Mortality from the Universe of Low-Income Adults— Using linked Census and tax records for 37m low-income adults, the authors estimate that state Medicaid expansions raised enrollment by 12 percentage points and cut mortality among low-income adults by 2.5%, implying a 21% reduction in the mortality hazard of new enrollees. They estimate direct budgetary costs of $5.4m per life saved and $179,000 per life-year saved.
Will Medical Care Strangle or Save the Federal Budget?— A National Bureau of Economic Research paper projects U.S. medical spending, 18% of GDP in 2024, reaching 19%–26% of GDP by 2040, with federal medical spending consuming 45%–61% of federal revenue excluding Social Security contributions. The author argues only the low-spending path is consistent with current tax levels and other commitments.
AI Summary.Financial firms, companies and governments raised about $6.61tn through broadly syndicated investment-grade and junk-bond sales, up 15% year-over-year to a record. Cloud-computing giants and data-center developers sold almost $368bn of debt, more than 6x the prior year, accounting for roughly a third of the increase in borrowing.
Gerson Freitas Jr. and Ronan MartinBloomberg
Date Posted:
Bloomberg data shows that global investment-grade and high-yield bond sales, counting only governments’ syndicated deals and not their auctions, have hit a record ~$6.61T year-to-date, up 15%. AI-related issuers account for about a third of the increase.
Is AI borrowing driving global bond sales to a record?
Core argument: Global broadly syndicated investment-grade and junk-bond sales reached about $6.61 trillion so far this year, up 15% from a year earlier and eclipsing 2025’s record with two months still to go, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
Financial firms, companies and governments have raised a combined ~$6.61 trillion through broadly syndicated investment-grade and junk-bond sales so far this year, up 15% from the same period a year earlier and eclipsing 2025’s record with two months still to go, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Cloud-computing giants and data-center developers alone sold almost $368 billion in debt, more than six times as much as a year ago, the data shows. The group has accounted for about a third of the increase in borrowing so far this year, outpacing every other non-financial sector and adding twice as much incremental debt as governments.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Global broadly syndicated investment-grade and junk-bond sales reached about $6.61 trillion so far this year, up 15% from a year earlier and eclipsing 2025’s record with two months still to go, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
Cloud-computing giants and data-center developers sold almost $368 billion in debt, more than six times the amount a year earlier, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
Cloud-computing and data-center borrowers accounted for about a third of this year’s increase in borrowing, outpacing every other non-financial sector and adding twice as much incremental debt as governments.
Related Articles:
Wall Street’s AI Debt Machine Is Starting to Choke on Supply— At least 18 data-center financings in the junk-bond and leveraged loan markets carry double-digit yields, and a $5bn syndicated loan for neocloud Volta Infrastructure required steeper discounts and higher interest, pushing its yield above 11%. The average yield on investment-grade technology bonds has risen to about 6%, roughly 1.4 percentage points higher than a year earlier.
The Post‑Pandemic Global R*— Using an econometric model extracting the common trend in real interest rates across advanced economies, the authors estimate that the global neutral real interest rate fell about 3.5 percentage points from 1990 to 2019, then rose about 1 percentage point after COVID, leaving global and U.S. estimates near 0.5%.
AI Set to be Largest CapEx Cycle Ever … and Soon Majority Externally Financed— Hyperscaler and data-center investment is tracking toward $1.5tn annually by 2030, which in real terms would exceed the 2005-06 housing boom, the 1990s fiber peak, and the 1882 railroad peak combined. External debt and equity are projected to fund close to 90% of the buildout, making it dependent on credit markets.
AI Summary.A National Bureau of Economic Research paper projects U.S. medical spending, 18% of GDP in 2024, reaching 19%–26% of GDP by 2040, with federal medical spending consuming 45%–61% of federal revenue excluding Social Security contributions. The author argues only the low-spending path is consistent with current tax levels and other commitments.
David CutlerNational Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
From 1970 to 2010, growth in US medical spending outpaced GDP growth by ~2.4pp annually. From 2010 to 2024, that growth differential fell to just 0.3pp. If it persists, medical spending reaches only 19% of GDP by 2040; if excess spending growth reverts to 2.4pp, it reaches 26%.
How much federal revenue will medical spending consume by 2040?
Core argument: David Cutler projects U.S. medical spending reaching 26%, 22.3%, or 19% of GDP by 2040 under high, benchmark, and low scenarios, versus 18% in 2024 and 6.9% in 1970.
Figure 1 shows that in 1970, medical care was 6.9% of GDP. In 2024, it was 18%. From 1970 through around 2010; mean medical spending growth exceeded GDP growth by 2.4 pp annually. Since 2010, the growth of medical spending has exceeded the growth of GDP by only 0.3 pp annually. There is no comparable time period with anything like the sustained slowdown in spending growth since 2010. Patient cost-sharing has increased enormously [indirectly reducing overall expenditure via incentives] as shown in Figure 5. An additional role [was] played by the diffusion of cost-reducing technologies. Because they are often less invasive, second-round therapies typically have lower unit prices. [mechanism in Fgure 6]. Finally, there [are] fewer expensive new innovations than in the past. [However], recent data show an uptick in spending growth in 2024, which continued in 2025. Some of this is a result of new technologies— prime examples are GLP-1 medications and new drugs for cancer that are taken on an ongoing basis. To consider a scenario with [a reversion to] more rapid spending increases, I assume that the growth of medical spending above GDP growth after 2024 returns to the average rate realized between 1970 and 2010. This scenario is shown as the High-spending scenario in figure 1, in which medical care in 2040 rises to 26% of GDP.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
David Cutler projects U.S. medical spending reaching 26%, 22.3%, or 19% of GDP by 2040 under high, benchmark, and low scenarios, versus 18% in 2024 and 6.9% in 1970.
Federal medical spending consumed 45% of “discretionary revenue”—total federal revenue less Social Security contributions—in 2024, up from 13% in 1987, and Cutler projects 61% by 2040 under the high-spending scenario.
Cutler states that only the low-spending scenario is consistent with current tax levels and non-medical spending commitments, attributing the post-2010 slowdown to high-deductible plans, prior authorization, cost-reducing technology, and reduced administrative friction.
Related Articles:
Has the United States Bent the Health Care Cost Curve?— The authors estimate that a slowdown in US health care spending reflects technology-associated changes in health and site of care (21% of the slowdown, double that in Medicare), more elastic long-run supply (6%), market changes reducing and making demand more elastic (11–27%), improved population health (7%), and slower price growth net of upcoding (24%).
Can AI Avert the Impending Federal Budget Crisis?— U.S. GDP per capita, about $87,000, is projected to reach $102,000 by 2035 with 1.8% annual productivity growth, or $110,000 with 2.7% growth. Because the healthcare sector has been slow to adopt AI, health spending is projected to rise from 18.3% of GDP to 21% under slower growth and 21.7% under faster growth.
AI Summary.A proposed one-time 5% tax on California billionaires would still give them reason to leave after the snapshot date, since its retroactive residency provision faces legal challenges that may not survive. The author argues that expectations of future wealth taxes could drive relocation decisions whether or not such taxes materialize.
Josuha Rauh, Benjamin Jaros, Gregory Kearney and Siddharth GundapaneniThe Fiscal Reality Check
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Moneyed individuals representing at least ~30% of California’s billionaire wealth have left the state ahead of the proposed Billionaire Wealth Tax.
Does a one-time wealth tax still give billionaires reason to leave?
Core argument: California’s Prop 40 one-time 5% wealth tax leaves billionaires with incentives to leave the state after the snapshot date, contrary to Gabriel Zucman’s claim that one cannot avoid the tax by moving.
[Responding to Gabriel Zucman's claim, “There is no incentive to move to another state. One cannot avoid the tax by moving. This is one of the main reasons why it was structured as a one-time tax.”] Billionaires still have incentives to leave after the snapshot date. They may reasonably question whether the retroactive residency provision will ultimately survive the many legal challenges it will face, and the passage of the tax may alter their expectations about future wealth taxation. Even if billionaires consider the initial 5% tax insufficient reason to leave California, the belief in the possibility of future, additional wealth taxes could change their decision-making, regardless of whether those taxes ultimately occur or not. This is not an unreasonable or merely hypothetical concern. Zucman himself has called the fight over California’s Prop 40 “the beginning of a global movement to end the ultra-rich’s ability to escape taxation with impunity.” Additionally, fellow Prop 40 proponent Emmanuel Saez said back in June that “we will have to see whether this one passes and then whether it makes sense to do a permanent wealth tax down the road.”
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
California’s Prop 40 one-time 5% wealth tax leaves billionaires with incentives to leave the state after the snapshot date, contrary to Gabriel Zucman’s claim that one cannot avoid the tax by moving.
Billionaires may reasonably question whether Prop 40’s retroactive residency provision will survive the many legal challenges it will face.
Gabriel Zucman has called the Prop 40 fight “the beginning of a global movement to end the ultra-rich’s ability to escape taxation with impunity,” and Emmanuel Saez raised the prospect of a permanent wealth tax later, which could shift billionaires’ expectations.
Behavioral Responses to State Income Taxation of High Earners: Evidence from California— A California ballot measure raising top marginal income tax rates by up to 3 percentage points prompted an additional 0.8% of the affected tax base to leave the state, with an estimated income elasticity of 2.5–3.2 for high earners who stayed. The authors estimate these responses eroded 45.2% of windfall revenues within one year and 60.9% within two.
Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking”— A debate on U.S. fiscal policy argues that spending increases, rather than the tax increases needed to fund them, slow growth, and that higher taxes would reduce the expected value of America's innovative risk-taking. The argument holds that cutting debt below 100% of GDP is critical.
AI Summary.An analysis indexes 10-year government bond yields across countries from the start of the year, cumulating their rise in basis points, and compares each against an equal-weighted average of daily changes in all those yields to show which countries are performing better or worse than average.
Robin BrooksRobin Brooks Substack
Date Posted:
Brooks argues a global debt crisis is underway, pointing to contagion from France driving rising yields in Italy and Spain, and a flight to safety driving down yields in the US, while low-debt safe havens like Germany, Sweden and Switzerland extend their outperformance.
Are government bond yields rising faster in some countries than others?
Core argument: The charts index 10-year government bond yields to 100 on January 1, 2026, and cumulate each country’s rise in basis points, so a reading of 200 means a yield up 100 basis points since the start of 2026.
The blue lines in the charts show how 10-year government bond yields have evolved so far this year. I’ve indexed them to 100 on January 1, 2026, and cumulate the rise in basis points from that day to yesterday. If you’re at 200 as of yesterday, that means your ten year yield is up 100 basis points since the start of 2026. The black line in each chart is the same and is the equal-weighted average of daily changes in all of these yields. I cumulate this up to show who’s better or who’s worse than average.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The charts index 10-year government bond yields to 100 on January 1, 2026, and cumulate each country’s rise in basis points, so a reading of 200 means a yield up 100 basis points since the start of 2026.
A black line identical across the charts cumulates the equal-weighted average of daily changes in all the yields shown, serving as the benchmark for which countries are better or worse than average.
Related Articles:
What’s the Matter With France?— France's official retirement age for full benefits was 62 in 2023, versus 67 in Denmark and the US, and its average actual retirement age was the lowest in Western Europe while life expectancy at 65 reaches about 87, two years longer than in the US.
Global Debt Report 2026— Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.
Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic?— Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.