AI Summary. Estimated sustainable government net debt limits across 25 OECD countries average 234% of GDP under historical interest-rate and growth assumptions (221% for the US) and 214% under current rates (186% for the US). If interest rates rise systematically with debt, the model yields no solution for the US, UK, France, Italy, Greece, and Japan.

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Warshawsky calculates the US has a sustainable net debt limit, “the lowest level of debt at which a country can no longer service its sovereign debt and must effectively default,” of 186% of GDP, which he forecasts will be reached in ~15 years under current policy and economic conditions.

How high can government debt rise before it becomes unsustainable?

Core argument: Sustainable net debt limits across the US and 24 other OECD countries average 234% of GDP under historical interest rate–growth differentials and 221% for the US, falling to 214% on average and 186% for the US under current, higher interest rates and growth.

Using historical, current, and dynamic interest rate-to-economic growth differentials, countries’ sustainable debt limits are calculated on a net of central bank holdings of government debt basis. Sustainable net debt limits average 234% of GDP for these countries assuming historical rates and economic growth (221% for the US), 214% assuming (higher) current interest rates and economic growth (186% for the US). If, however, interest rates were to rise systematically with debt according to conservative assumptions, there is no model solution for France, Greece, Japan, Italy, the UK, and the US, given their current high debt levels; the average sustainable limit is 178% for the other countries. A reasonable conclusion to draw for the US is that the fiscal path under current policy and trends with rising interest rates is not sustainable in the short to intermediate term. A major fiscal consolidation package will be needed soon, as interest rates rise, unless significantly higher inflation or capital controls will result.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Sustainable net debt limits across the US and 24 other OECD countries average 234% of GDP under historical interest rate–growth differentials and 221% for the US, falling to 214% on average and 186% for the US under current, higher interest rates and growth.
  2. If interest rates rise systematically with debt under conservative assumptions, the model yields no solution for France, Greece, Japan, Italy, the UK, and the US given their current high debt levels, while the average limit for the remaining countries is 178%.
  3. A reasonable conclusion is that the US fiscal path under current policy and trends with rising interest rates is not sustainable in the short to intermediate term, and a major fiscal consolidation package will be needed soon unless significantly higher inflation or capital controls result.

AI Summary. US Treasuries erased nearly all gains that followed the Treasury Department's surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, with the 30-year yield rising above 5.27% and the 10-year touching 4.71%. The reversal signals the move has done little to ease concern about surging government debt.

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The 30-year yield rose ~7bps to as much as 5.27%, and the 10-year yield hit 4.71%, erasing “almost all” the gains that followed Treasury’s surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds.

Do bigger bond buybacks ease concerns about surging government debt?

Core argument: The US 30-year Treasury yield rose more than seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, returning to where it stood just ahead of the Treasury Department's buyback announcement, before paring the gain.

US Treasuries erased almost all of the gains that followed the Trump administration’s surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, signaling the move has done little to alleviate the angst about the surging government debt that has pushed some yields to the highest in close to two decades. The 30-year yield on Thursday rose over seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, where it was just ahead of the US Treasury Department’s announcement early Wednesday, before paring the gain. The 10-year yield touched 4.71%, just shy of its highest level since early 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US 30-year Treasury yield rose more than seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, returning to where it stood just ahead of the Treasury Department's buyback announcement, before paring the gain.
  2. US Treasuries erased almost all of the gains that followed the Trump administration's surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, suggesting the move has done little to alleviate angst about surging government debt.
  3. The US 10-year yield touched 4.71%, just shy of its highest level since early 2025, as angst over government debt pushed some yields to the highest in close to two decades.

AI Summary. The authors find no statistically significant evidence that $190bn in federal emergency K-12 school aid mitigated pandemic learning loss or raised district spending. Districts qualifying for additional funds saw local revenues fall by $907 per pupil over three years, about 8% of pre-pandemic average, roughly 80% from property taxes.

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Exploiting a discontinuity in K-12 public school districts’ qualification for Covid emergency funding (ESSR), Clemens et al find that the funds did not mitigate learning loss. To a large extent, local districts used them to lower property taxes.

Do federal emergency education grants reduce student learning loss?

Core argument: Districts crossing the 5% poverty cutoff for additional ESSER funds saw local revenues fall an estimated $907 per pupil over three years, about 8% of the pre-COVID average.

Emergency funding for K-12 public schools was an important component of recession spending packages during COVID, involving $190 billion in additional expenditure. We see no evidence that ESSER funds helped to mitigate learning loss, at least in the short run. We find no statistically significant evidence that districts increased expenditures in SY 2021 or SY 2022. We do find evidence that districts that qualified for additional ESSER funds had statistically significant reductions in local revenues that were in excess of their ESSER funds. This pass-through of federal funds may partially explain why ESSER had minimal impacts on learning loss for districts around the 5% poverty threshold. Our estimates suggest that over the three years, crossing the qualification cutoff for additional ESSER funds is associated with a $907 per pupil decrease in local revenues, or about 8% of the pre-COVID average. We show the decline in local revenues as an event study in Figure 3, which includes a flat pre-COVID trend in local revenues per pupil across the qualification threshold. In Table 5,Column 5 [], we can see that about 80% of the revenue decline came from decreases in revenues from property taxes, [which fell] by $718 per pupil across the 3 years. The findings apply specifically to districts in the neighborhood of the 5% poverty threshold for qualifying for additional ESSER funds.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Districts crossing the 5% poverty cutoff for additional ESSER funds saw local revenues fall an estimated $907 per pupil over three years, about 8% of the pre-COVID average.
  2. About 80% of that local revenue decline came from property taxes, which fell by $718 per pupil across the three years.
  3. The authors find no evidence that ESSER emergency K-12 funding, totaling $190 billion, mitigated learning loss in the short run, and no statistically significant increase in district expenditures in SY 2021 or SY 2022.

AI Summary. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that a permanent 0.5 percentage point increase in annual productivity growth would lower publicly held federal debt after 30 years by 39% of GDP, offsetting roughly half the projected rise from 101% of GDP to 175%. Higher revenue and slower spending growth outweigh higher interest costs.

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CBO baseline projects debt-to-GDP rising from 101% in 2026 to 175% in 2056. Dynan et al. study how AI might modify that projection. In all but their most optimistic scenario, TFP grows 0.5pp faster, and AI offsets 39–49 pp of that 74pp increase.

How much would faster productivity growth reduce federal debt?

Core argument: A permanent 0.5 pp increase in annual total factor productivity growth would lower publicly held federal debt after 30 years by 39% of GDP relative to CBO's extended baseline, offsetting roughly half of the projected rise.

[In the Base Case], faster economic growth [improves the federal budget and debt outlook] through four channels. First, [higher] incomes increase federal revenue, [while] the progressive tax system [modestly] raises revenue relative to GDP. CBO [estimates] that a [permanent] 0.5 pp increase in annual TFP growth would raise revenue after [30 years] by 0.14% of GDP. Second, [although] faster growth increases [some] federal spending, spending rises [more slowly] than GDP, [reducing noninterest outlays] relative to GDP. Under our [assumptions], discretionary spending falls from 6.1% of GDP in 2025 to 4.5% in 2056. Third, because faster growth does not [change the stock of] existing debt, that debt becomes smaller relative to GDP. Fourth, [stronger] growth generally raises interest rates, increasing the [cost] of new borrowing and [refinancing] existing debt. This represents a partial offset to the [fiscal gains]. [On balance], additional annual TFP growth of 0.5 pp would lower publicly held federal debt after [30 years] by 39% of GDP relative to CBO’s extended baseline. CBO’s extended baseline shows federal debt rising from 101% of GDP in 2026 to 175% in three decades, so this hypothesized increase in growth would offset roughly half of that projected rise.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A permanent 0.5 pp increase in annual total factor productivity growth would lower publicly held federal debt after 30 years by 39% of GDP relative to CBO's extended baseline, offsetting roughly half of the projected rise.
  2. CBO's extended baseline shows federal debt rising from 101% of GDP in 2026 to 175% three decades later, and CBO estimates a permanent 0.5 pp increase in TFP growth would raise revenue after 30 years by 0.14% of GDP.

AI Summary. Modeling U.S. venture-backed startups, the authors estimate that taxing capital gains as they accrue rather than at sale would cut founders' average ownership at exit by about 25% while raising the share of entrepreneurs with positive payoffs from roughly 16% to nearly 47%. Less risk-averse founders prefer taxation at sale.

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~84% of venture backed founders end with zero exit value, while the top 2% capture ~80% of total exit value. Accrual-based taxation would reduce mean founder ownership stakes at exit by ~25%, but with fully refundable tax credits, raise the share of founders with >0 payoffs to ~47%.

How does taxing unrealized capital gains affect startup founders?

Core argument: The authors estimate that average founder shares at exit fall about 25% under accrual-based capital gains taxation relative to realization-based taxation, as advance taxation forces additional share sales before exit.

This paper examines how taxing unrealized capital gains affects entrepreneurship, combining a dynamic career-choice model with new evidence on all U.S. venture capital backed startups. Figure 1a plots a histogram of the positive company exit values. The distribution spans several orders of magnitude and is relatively similar to a lognormal, but with a right skew and fatter right tail. A stylized model highlights a key trade-off: accrual-based capital gains taxes dilute successful founders by forcing additional share sales before exit, a well known concern, yet they also provide insurance through tax credits to founders whose ventures fail, an aspect often overlooked. Quantitatively, advance taxation substantially reduces founders' ownership at exit: average founder shares fall about 25% under accrual-based taxation relative to realization based taxation. At the same time, accrual taxation increases the fraction of entrepreneurs with positive payoffs from around 16% to nearly 47%. Embedding these outcomes in a career-choice framework shows that the insurance value of accrual taxation partly offsets dilution costs: less risk-averse founders favor realization-based taxes, while more risk averse ones prefer accrual-based taxes. The strength of this insurance channel depends on the highly skewed distribution of entrepreneurial payoffs and the design of loss provisions under accrual-based taxation.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors estimate that average founder shares at exit fall about 25% under accrual-based capital gains taxation relative to realization-based taxation, as advance taxation forces additional share sales before exit.
  2. Accrual-based taxation raises the fraction of entrepreneurs with positive payoffs from around 16% to nearly 47%, providing insurance through tax credits to founders whose ventures fail.
  3. In the authors' career-choice framework, less risk-averse founders favor realization-based taxes while more risk-averse founders prefer accrual-based taxes, with the insurance channel's strength depending on the skewed payoff distribution and loss-provision design.

AI Summary. The authors estimate that about $200bn of “missing” labor compensation would account for roughly a third of the fall in the labor share since the late 1970s, which workers owning a bit above 10% of corporate profits through stock compensation would cover. Spread across the 4.2m top-decile public company employees, that implies about $40,000 in additional pay each.

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Zidar & Zwick suggest about one‑third of the post‑1970s drop in labor’s share is due to stock‑based pay to workers, in addition to the one‑third they already attribute to pass‑through income. That leaves only around one‑third for genuine shifts in technology, power, etc.

Does stock compensation explain part of the falling labor share?

Core argument: The authors report 2017 employee compensation of $7.2 trillion against corporate value added of $12.2 trillion after adjusting for the rise of pass-throughs, with unadjusted corporate profits, which exclude partnership profits, at $1.7 trillion.

In our data for 2017, after adjustments for the rise of pass-throughs, we report employee compensation of $7.2 trillion and corporate value added of $12.2 trillion. The unadjusted corporate profits number (which excludes partnership profits) is $1.7 trillion. If we could find around $200 billion of “missing” labor compensation, that would account for about a third of the fall in the labor share since the late 1970s. Thus, if workers owned a bit above 10% of those corporate profits via stock compensation, then that would cover the difference. Distributing this amount across the top 10% of public company employees, of which there are 4.2 million, this ownership would imply an additional $40,000 or so in pay. The aggregate numbers are thus quite plausible in terms of how much pay might have shifted to corporate profits serving as tax-preferred payments to high earners.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors report 2017 employee compensation of $7.2 trillion against corporate value added of $12.2 trillion after adjusting for the rise of pass-throughs, with unadjusted corporate profits, which exclude partnership profits, at $1.7 trillion.
  2. The authors estimate that roughly $200 billion of "missing" labor compensation would account for about a third of the fall in the labor share since the late 1970s, a sum covered if workers owned somewhat above 10% of corporate profits via stock compensation.
  3. Spread across the 4.2 million employees in the top 10% of public company workforces, that amount would imply about $40,000 in additional pay each, which the authors consider plausible as pay shifted into corporate profits serving as tax-preferred payments to high earners.

AI Summary. Because Social Security and Medicare benefits are politically untouchable, retirees effectively hold the most senior claim on US government resources while Treasury bondholders hold the riskiest one. On this argument, bondholders absorb adverse fiscal shocks through surprise inflation, financial repression, or both.

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Lustig argues that bondholders in advanced economies are realizing they are facing higher inflation risk and thus may “sit at the bottom of the capital structure rather than the top,” given transfer recipients’ political power.

Do government bondholders, not retirees, hold the riskiest claim on public resources?

Core argument: Social Security and Medicare beneficiaries, the boomers, effectively sit atop the US capital structure as the most senior claimants holding the safest tranche, given that Social Security is treated as the third rail of American politics.

Social Security is typically referred to as the third rail of American politics. If you buy into that notion, then these retirees collecting Social Security and Medicare checks, the boomers, effectively sit at the top of the US capital structure. If you pursue the analogy with the corporate capital structure, then these beneficiaries are effectively the most senior bondholders. They own the safest tranche. The owners of the Treasurys, the bondholders, sit at the bottom of the capital structure rather than the top. The Treasury owners end up with the riskiest tranche, absorbing adverse fiscal shocks through either surprise inflation or financial repression, or a combination of both. And there is a lot of risk to be absorbed.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Social Security and Medicare beneficiaries, the boomers, effectively sit atop the US capital structure as the most senior claimants holding the safest tranche, given that Social Security is treated as the third rail of American politics.
  2. Treasury bondholders occupy the bottom of the US capital structure rather than the top, holding the riskiest tranche and absorbing adverse fiscal shocks through surprise inflation, financial repression, or a combination of both.

AI Summary. Fully closing Social Security's funding gap by raising the payroll tax rate would require an immediate, permanent increase from 12.4% to 17.6%, which would reduce labor supply and economic growth. Research on a prior benefit cut found affected Americans raised earnings by 61 cents per dollar of lost benefits, generating additional payroll tax revenue.

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Biggs argues that “fair” approaches to restoring Social Security solvency – those that do not cut already accrued benefits – are less effective than “unfair” ones that do, because the latter incentivize increased work effort, raising growth and revenue.

Does closing Social Security's gap with higher payroll taxes hurt growth?

Core argument: Keeping Social Security permanently solvent under the "fairness" model of paying accrued benefits in full would require an immediate and permanent payroll tax increase from 12.4% to 17.6%, which would decrease labor supply and reduce economic growth.

Imagine that Social Security reform follows the fairness model, in which accrued benefits are paid in full but the rate at which future benefits are earned is reduced. A simple way to do this is to increase the payroll tax rate To keep Social Security permanently solvent, meaning through 75 years and beyond, would require an immediate and permanent increase in the payroll tax rate [from] 12.4% to 17.6%. The higher rate would decrease labor supply and reduce economic growth. [Consider] an alternate reform, which looks clearly unfair: fix Social Security’s funding gap entirely by reducing accrued benefits that Americans already have earned. As of 2025, Americans had accrued $54 trillion in Social Security benefits. Social Security’s unfunded obligation as of 2025 was $26 trillion. So, roughly, this means cutting Americans’ “earned benefits” in half. [Analyzing the 1977 reform that undid the notorious 1972 “double-indexing” of benefits, a group of economists], using SSA earnings data, found that, for every dollar of lost benefits, the affected Americans increased their earnings by 61 cents. Moreover, these additional earnings would be taxed by Social Security, further strengthening the program’s finances. In effect, this makes cutting benefits a “cheaper” way to fix Social Security than raising taxes, because people respond in ways that also increase tax revenues.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Keeping Social Security permanently solvent under the "fairness" model of paying accrued benefits in full would require an immediate and permanent payroll tax increase from 12.4% to 17.6%, which would decrease labor supply and reduce economic growth.
  2. Americans had accrued $54 trillion in Social Security benefits as of 2025 against an unfunded obligation of $26 trillion, so closing the gap solely by cutting already-earned benefits would mean roughly halving those benefits.
  3. Economists analyzing the 1977 reform that undid the 1972 "double-indexing" of benefits found, using SSA earnings data, that affected Americans raised their earnings by 61 cents per dollar of lost benefits, earnings that Social Security would tax.