AI Summary. Analysis allocating US federal spending by age group estimates that Americans over 65 received about 10x as much federal money per person as younger groups until the 2010s, falling to about 6x by 2024 as the elderly population grew. Similar trends appear in most of 29 other rich countries.

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An Economist analysis finds that in most advanced economies it examined (26 of 32), elderly incomes are now falling relative to those of working-age people. By its estimates, Americans over 65 received ~10x as much federal spending per person as other age groups until the 2010s, falling to ~6x by 2024. That drop mostly reflects the elderly population growth outpacing spending increases, not spending cuts.

Is federal spending per elderly person falling relative to younger groups?

Core argument: Using a University of Pennsylvania methodology, The Economist estimates Americans over 65 received ten times as much federal money per person as other age groups until the 2010s, falling to six times by 2024.

Wonks at the University of Pennsylvania allocate federal spending in America to different age groups. Using their methodology, we estimate that until the 2010s Americans over 65 received ten times as much federal money per person as other age groups did. Outlays on Social Security and Medicare, the health-care programme for the elderly, vastly outweighed spending on child benefits (lots of education spending is within the purview of states and cities rather than the federal government). Pots of money continue to flow to the elderly. But because so many people are ageing so fast, individual oldsters are losing out. By 2024 the American old were getting six times as much government largesse as younger cohorts rather than ten times. In the majority of the other 29 rich countries we examine, we find similar trends. In Italy old-age spending has gone from almost 15 times as much as spending on families and children before the pandemic to less than ten times as much.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Using a University of Pennsylvania methodology, The Economist estimates Americans over 65 received ten times as much federal money per person as other age groups until the 2010s, falling to six times by 2024.
  2. Social Security and Medicare outlays vastly outweighed federal spending on child benefits in the United States, where much education spending falls to states and cities rather than the federal government.
  3. Similar trends appear in most of the 29 other rich countries examined, with Italy’s old-age spending falling from almost 15 times spending on families and children before the pandemic to less than ten times.

AI Summary. US debt held by the public peaked at a record 106.1% of GDP after World War II and fell as a share of the economy through 1974, aided by rapid growth, deficits averaging just 0.4% of GDP, and more tax increases than cuts. The federal deficit was 6.2% of GDP in fiscal 2026.

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Both growth and fiscal restraint gradually erased the WWII debt burden. Tax increases in 1982–93 helped reverse the large deficits of the 1980s, contributing to surpluses in 1998–2001. In line with this history, growth alone is unlikely to stabilize the current debt trajectory.

Can economic growth alone bring down the national debt?

Core argument: US debt held by the public peaked at a record 106.1% of GDP in fiscal 1946 and fell as a share of GDP through 1974, aided by rapid growth and a fiscal balance averaging -0.4% of GDP from 1947 to 1974.

The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, also known as the Reagan tax cuts, is remembered variously as a budget-busting disaster and the driver of a new era of growth. There’s some truth to both portrayals, but what doesn’t come up nearly enough is that the 1981 tax cuts were followed by tax increases in 1982, 1983, 1984, 1986 (just barely; that year’s Tax Reform Act was supposed to be revenue-neutral), 1987, 1990 and 1993. Thanks in part to the end of the Cold War, Congress was also able to reduce spending growth in the 1990s, with federal outlays falling from 21.7% of GDP in 1991 to 17.7% in 2000 and 2001. The result: four straight years of budget surpluses, and a debt-to-GDP ratio that fell from 47.9% in 1993 to 31.5% in 2001.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US debt held by the public peaked at a record 106.1% of GDP in fiscal 1946 and fell as a share of GDP through 1974, aided by rapid growth and a fiscal balance averaging -0.4% of GDP from 1947 to 1974.
  2. The US fiscal balance in fiscal 2026 was -6.2% of GDP, compared with the -0.4% average that accompanied the postwar decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio.
  3. Federal spending tripled in inflation-adjusted terms from 1947 to 1974 and rose from 16.1% to 17.8% of GDP, with revenue rising almost as fast in a period with more tax increases than decreases, according to a 2013 Treasury Department accounting of major tax legislation.

AI Summary. European Central Bank bond purchases replace private market-rate lending with official lending through the TARGET2 settlement system, leaving Germany with a large creditor balance and Italy and Spain with large debtor balances. The author argues this lets Italy, Spain and France borrow at below-market rates and run looser fiscal policy, while Germany bears the subsidy.

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Brooks argues Le Pen won’t be a “big” disruptor due to fiscal constraints but urges all eyes on Berlin, “The AfD is a different matter. All the stuff being done to cover up debt distress elsewhere is being paid for with German fiscal space. The AfD will shut that down. It’s the only populist movement in Europe that matters.”

How does the central bank's bond buying shift lending costs between countries?

Core argument: ECB quantitative easing replaces private market-rate lending to Italy with official Bundesbank lending to the Banca d’Italia at artificially low rates, producing Germany’s large TARGET2 creditor balance against debtor balances in Italy and Spain.

When the ECB buys Italian debt from a German bank as part of QE, that bond ends up on the Banca d’Italia balance sheet and - what would have been private lending at market interest rates - gets replaced by official lending by the Bundesbank to the Banca d’Italia at artificially low rates. This is why Germany (blue) has a massive creditor balance in the Euro zone, a system called TARGET2, while Italy (pink) and Spain (orange) have big debtor balances. Whenever the ECB does QE, or if it now activates its TPI program to stop contagion to Italy and Spain, Germany’s TARGET2 claim will grow. There’s two basic points to take away from all this. First, for Italy and Spain (and increasingly France), TARGET2 is a way to borrow at subsidized, below-market rates, which underwrites fiscal policy that is therefore looser than otherwise. What populist is going to say no to that? Second, for Germany, TARGET2 is a tax the AfD (and increasingly others) will be unwilling to pay. Why would you give subsidized loans to places running unsustainable pension systems with absurdly low retirement ages? No German political party - populists included - should agree to that.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. ECB quantitative easing replaces private market-rate lending to Italy with official Bundesbank lending to the Banca d’Italia at artificially low rates, producing Germany’s large TARGET2 creditor balance against debtor balances in Italy and Spain.
  2. TARGET2 lets Italy, Spain, and increasingly France borrow at subsidized below-market rates, underwriting fiscal policy looser than it would otherwise be, which the author argues no populist party would refuse.
  3. Germany’s TARGET2 claim grows whenever the ECB conducts QE or activates its TPI program to stop contagion to Italy and Spain, a cost the author argues the AfD and other German parties will be unwilling to pay.

AI Summary. In France, social protection and health rose from 53.1% to 58.7% of total government spending, and are projected to reach 59.7%, while education, defense and public order fell from 15.2% to 13.7% and transport from 5.3% to 3.8%. Public pension spending rose from 12.7% of GDP to 14.8%.

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At 59.7% of total government spending, France’s social safety net is crowding out core state functions such as education, defense and public order, whose collective share of spending fell from 15.2% to 13.7% of the total btw 1995 and 2024.

Is social spending squeezing out education, defense, and transport?

Core argument: French social protection and health spending, including all public pensions, rose from 53.1% to 58.7% of total government spending between 1995 and 2024, with a projected further increase to 59.7% in 2026.

Between 1995 and 2024, spending on social protection and health, including all public pensions (social spending from here on) increased from 53.1% to 58.7% as a fraction of total government spending. Social spending is projected to increase even more to 59.7% in 2026. Over the same period, government spending on education, defense and public order decreased from 15.2 % to 13.7% of total government spending. To compute these shares, I removed the State’s imputed pension contributions for teachers, soldiers and other civil servants from each function and from total spending, since the pensions actually paid are already counted in social spending; this gives a better sense of what the government spends on teaching kids and keeping the country safe. Transport fell from 5.3% to 3.8%. Pensions account for the lion’s share of transfers. Total public pension spending in France added up 14.8% of GDP in 2024, and it is projected to increase to 15% of GDP this year, up from 12.7% in 1995.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. French social protection and health spending, including all public pensions, rose from 53.1% to 58.7% of total government spending between 1995 and 2024, with a projected further increase to 59.7% in 2026.
  2. French government spending on education, defense and public order fell from 15.2% to 13.7% of total government spending between 1995 and 2024, while transport fell from 5.3% to 3.8%.
  3. Total French public pension spending reached 14.8% of GDP in 2024, up from 12.7% in 1995, and is projected to reach 15% of GDP this year.

AI Summary. France's National Rally party, historically a champion of big-state spending, has pledged to clean up the country's degraded public finances alongside tax cuts it describes as a fully financed "competitiveness shock." The party also proposed lowering the retirement age from 62 to 60 for those who start working young, estimating €15bn–€20bn in pension savings from correcting "unjust or inefficient" measures.

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Marine Le Pen has proposed a referendum that would cap national debt at 60% of GDP and reduce the public deficit by .5pp annually to reach “close to a balanced budget.” At the same time she has also proposed to reduce the retirement age from 62 to 60.

Is a populist party shifting toward fiscal restraint and tax cuts?

Core argument: Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National estimates it could save €15bn–€20bn on pensions spending by correcting what it calls “unjust or inefficient measures” in the current system, helping fund its plans.

Long a champion of big-state spending to protect the working class, Le Pen in recent months has swung behind the idea that France needs a major clean-up of its degraded public finances. Her party, Rassemblement National (RN), also pledged tax cuts on Tuesday in what it said would be a fully financed “competitiveness shock” from 2027. Allianz chief economist Ludovic Subran called the proposals “voodoo economics.” “The RN now presents itself as the party of fiscal rectitude, but the route to its targets is unclear. The savings figures are disputed,” he said. Delivering the announced savings would be impossible unless the RN reversed tack to lower the retirement age.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National estimates it could save €15bn–€20bn on pensions spending by correcting what it calls “unjust or inefficient measures” in the current system, helping fund its plans.
  2. Rassemblement National pledged tax cuts as part of what it said would be a fully financed “competitiveness shock” from 2027, alongside lowering the retirement age from 62 to 60 for those who begin working at a young age.
  3. Le Pen, long a champion of big-state spending to protect the working class, has swung behind the idea that France needs a major clean-up of its degraded public finances.

AI Summary. The gap between French and German 10-year government bond yields exceeded 140 basis points, up from 40–50 basis points, which the author attributes to political choices favoring pensioners over bondholders, including a suspended pension reform leaving the minimum retirement age near 62. French over-65s hold higher average incomes than working-age people.

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France has signaled that pensioners are the senior claimants on government revenues. In 2026, private investors must absorb net bond issuance equal to 7.5% of GDP, after years when ECB purchases exceeded issuance.

Why has France's borrowing cost gap with Germany widened?

Core argument: The French OAT-Bund 10-year spread exceeded 140 basis points in mid-2025, up from 40–50 basis points between 2022 and June 2024, which Lustig attributes to political decisions prioritizing pensioners over bondholders.

France’s 10-year spread over Germany has risen above 140bp, from 40–50bp before mid-2024. France has repeatedly signaled that pensioners are senior claimants on government revenues: pension reforms have been weakened or reversed, while governments trying to restrain pension spending have fallen. The minimum retirement age is now 62 years and 9 months, and French over-65s have higher average incomes than the working-age population. Meanwhile, ECB purchases exceeded French net bond issuance in five years from 2015–22, so private investors were net sellers of French bonds; in 2026 they must absorb net issuance equal to 7.5% of GDP. The 10-year (r-g) gap has swung from −3.9pp in October 2020 to +1.9pp. French insurers and pension funds’ share of negotiable government debt has fallen from about 25% in 2014 to under 11%, while nonresidents’ share has risen to 57.5%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The French OAT-Bund 10-year spread exceeded 140 basis points in mid-2025, up from 40–50 basis points between 2022 and June 2024, which Lustig attributes to political decisions prioritizing pensioners over bondholders.
  2. France’s legal minimum retirement age remains frozen at 62 years and 9 months for men — the lowest in the Eurozone except Bulgaria — after Prime Minister Lecornu suspended the 2023 pension reform, and French over-65s hold higher average incomes than the working-age population.
  3. French insurers and pension funds’ share of France’s negotiable state debt fell from about 25% in 2014 to under 11%, non-residents hold 57.5% of OATs, and private investors are projected to absorb 7.5% of GDP in net issuance in 2026.

AI Summary. French government borrowing costs now exceed the country's nominal income growth by about 2 percentage points, the most unfavorable gap between borrowing costs and growth in the rich world. By contrast, Spanish and Greek bond yields remain about 2 percentage points below their income growth rates.

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The change in a country’s interest rate, Klein argues, should be measured against the change in nominal income growth. By that metric, France has moved from “core Europe” into the periphery – while Italy, Spain and especially Greece have moved in the opposite direction.

Do French borrowing costs now exceed its income growth?

Core argument: France’s borrowing costs exceeded its nominal income growth rate by about 2pp as of 2026Q2, and by roughly 3pp at current yields, the most unfavorable such spread in the rich world.

The problem for France is that its bond yields are surging even as its nominal income growth has slowed relative to the 2017-2019 pace, to the point that, almost uniquely among rich countries, borrowing costs there now substantially exceed growth rates. In fact, the spread between French sovereign borrowing costs and French growth rates is now the most unfavorable anywhere in the rich world. The French economy was not quite growing by 2% a year in euro terms as of 2026Q2, which was even worse than the anemic 3% yearly average nominal growth rate recorded in 2017Q1-2019Q4. As of 2026Q2, France’s cost of borrowing was therefore about 2pp higher than its income growth rate. (At current yields, the penalty is more like 3pp.) By contrast, Spanish and Greek bond yields are still about 2pp lower than their income growth rates.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. France’s borrowing costs exceeded its nominal income growth rate by about 2pp as of 2026Q2, and by roughly 3pp at current yields, the most unfavorable such spread in the rich world.
  2. French nominal growth was running just under 2% a year in euro terms as of 2026Q2, below the 3% yearly average recorded in 2017Q1–2019Q4, even as French bond yields surged.
  3. Spanish and Greek bond yields remain about 2pp below their nominal income growth rates, in contrast to France’s unfavorable gap.

AI Summary. The Congressional Budget Office projects that if interest rates rose to 1 percentage point above its baseline, federal debt held by the public would reach 222% of GDP by 2056, 47 percentage points above baseline, with primary deficits averaging 2.3% of GDP and annual growth 0.1 percentage point slower.

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If interest rates rise 1pp above CBO’s current extended baseline (a mean rate of 4% over 2026–2056), CBO projects federal debt held by the public will be 222% of GDP in 2056, versus 175% under the current baseline.

How much would higher interest rates raise projected federal debt?

Core argument: CBO projects that under a scenario in which interest rates rise to 1 percentage point above its extended baseline, debt held by the public would reach 222% of GDP in fiscal year 2056, 47 percentage points above the extended baseline.

Under a scenario in which interest rates increased until they were 1 percentage point higher than in CBO’s extended baseline, primary deficits—that is, deficits excluding net outlays for interest—would average 2.3% of GDP over the 2026–2056 period, 0.2 percentage points larger than in the extended baseline. Debt held by the public would grow to 222 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2056, 47 percentage points larger than in the extended baseline. Average annual GDP growth over the 2026–2056 period would be 0.1 percentage point slower than in CBO’s extended baseline, and the average interest rate on federal debt would be 0.7 percentage points higher.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. CBO projects that under a scenario in which interest rates rise to 1 percentage point above its extended baseline, debt held by the public would reach 222% of GDP in fiscal year 2056, 47 percentage points above the extended baseline.
  2. Primary deficits, which exclude net outlays for interest, would average 2.3% of GDP over 2026–2056 in CBO’s higher-interest-rate scenario, 0.2 percentage points larger than in its extended baseline.
  3. Under CBO’s higher-interest-rate scenario, average annual GDP growth over 2026–2056 would be 0.1 percentage point slower and the average interest rate on federal debt 0.7 percentage points higher than in its extended baseline.