“Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
AI Summary.Racial and ethnic minorities accounted for all US population growth in recent years, offsetting losses in the white population, and now make up 52.8% of Americans under 30 versus 43.9% of the total population. Projections indicate minorities will exceed half the under-35 population by 2030 even with zero immigration.
William FreyBrookings Institution
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Non-Hispanic whites account for 47.2% of Americans under 30, ~9pp less than their share of the overall population. 69% of this difference reflects the larger Hispanic share among younger Americans (6.1pp), with smaller contributions from Blacks (1.1 pp) and multiracial Americans (1.8 pp), while the Asian share is ~ unchanged.
Are racial and ethnic minorities now a majority of young Americans?
Core argument: Racial and ethnic minorities comprise 52.8% of the U.S. under-30 population, higher than their 43.9% share of the total U.S. population, and they hold a majority at each individual age from zero to 29.
Between the 2020 census and July 1, 2025, racial and ethnic minorities—especially Latino or Hispanic and Asian Americans—accounted for all the nation’s population gains, countering significant losses in the white population. The 2020 to 2025 shifts in nonwhite racial and ethnic minority population shares have now led to a tipping point for the under-30 population, such that more than half identifies all or in part with a nonwhite racial or ethnic group. This is the case for each individual age between zero and 29, as well as for the entire under-30 population, where the combined minority groups comprise 52.8% of the population—substantially higher than those groups’ 43.9% share of the total U.S. population. In 2030, the nonwhite population will comprise more than half of the nation’s under-35 population. Those projections establish that even with absolutely zero immigration, the 2030 census could show that minority populations comprise 50.3% of the under-35 population, and even larger shares with moderate or high levels of immigration.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Racial and ethnic minorities comprise 52.8% of the U.S. under-30 population, higher than their 43.9% share of the total U.S. population, and they hold a majority at each individual age from zero to 29.
Between the 2020 census and July 1, 2025, racial and ethnic minorities—especially Latino or Hispanic and Asian Americans—accounted for all U.S. population gains, countering losses in the white population.
Projections indicate that even with zero immigration, the 2030 census could show minority populations comprising 50.3% of the under-35 population, with larger shares under moderate or high immigration.
Related Articles:
How 250 Years Of Immigration Shaped America— Periods of high immigration to America have tended to be followed by restrictions, including the 1882 ban on Chinese laborers and 1924 quotas that capped European arrivals and barred Asian immigration. Those quotas suppressed immigration for 40 years, and the foreign-born share of the population fell to about 5% by 1970.
Americans Are Done With Being Put in Racial Boxes— Immigration from Asia and Latin America has been the chief driver of rising US diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White share of the population. Intermarriage across racial and ethnic lines is far more common among Hispanic and Asian Americans, and rising among Black and non-Hispanic White Americans, leaving more people outside single racial categories.
The Pig In The Python: US Decennial Labor Flows And Economic Opportunity, 1910–2040— The surge of baby boomers, women, and immigrants entering the US labor force between 1960 and 1980 was difficult for the economy to absorb, and young workers' wages fell sharply after peaking in the early 1970s. The author argues those entrants kept occupying jobs and suppressing demand for new workers until retirement.
AI Summary.China recorded 4.648m marriage registrations in the first nine months of the year, down 504,000 from a year earlier, a nearly 10% decline that points to a full-year drop. Marriages peaked at 13.469m in 2013 and have generally trended downward since, with divorce registrations at 2.082m.
Mandy ZuoSouth China Morning Post
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The number of marriages in China fell ~10% y/y to ~4.6mm in the first three quarters of this year, after rising 10.8% to ~6.8mm in 2025. The number of marriages peaked in 2013 at 13.5mm, and the most recent trough was 6.1mm in 2024.
Are marriages in China declining again after last year's rebound?
Core argument: China recorded 4.648 million marriage registrations in the first nine months of 2026, down 504,000 from a year earlier, a decline of nearly 10%, according to Ministry of Civil Affairs data.
China has witnessed a nearly 10% drop in the number of marriages in the first three quarters of the year, signalling a possible full-year fall in 2026 after a rebound in 2025. The country recorded 4.648 million marriage registrations in the first nine months, down 504,000 from a year earlier, data released by the Ministry of Civil Affairs showed. The latest figures mean that 2026 marriage registrations would most likely see a year-on-year drop as well, said He Yafu, an independent demographer based in Guangdong province. Based on the historical share of annual marriage registrations recorded in each quarter, he estimated that nationwide marriages for the entire year would range from 5.88 million to 6.46 million couples. Even if registrations reached the upper end of that forecast, they would still be lower than the 2025 level.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
China recorded 4.648 million marriage registrations in the first nine months of 2026, down 504,000 from a year earlier, a decline of nearly 10%, according to Ministry of Civil Affairs data.
Independent demographer He Yafu estimates full-year 2026 marriages at 5.88 million to 6.46 million couples, below the 6.765 million recorded in 2025, when registrations rose 10.8%, boosted by auspicious dates, a new nationwide registration service and local incentives.
China’s marriage registrations peaked at 13.469 million in 2013, fell below 10 million in 2019 and dropped to 6.1 million in 2024, a record low since the data was first published, while divorce registrations in the first nine months of 2026 reached 2.082 million, up 5,000 year-on-year.
Related Articles:
Why China’s Women Are Having Fewer Babies— In China, about 30% of 30-year-olds were unmarried in 2023, up from 14.5% a decade earlier, while the share of 40-year-olds who were divorced roughly doubled from 2.6% to 5%. Women have outnumbered men in Chinese undergraduate and postgraduate programs since 2009, even as men outnumber women nationally.
Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come— Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
The Power of Demography and the Fate of East Asia— East Asia's total population has peaked and is projected to decline for at least a generation, with the pace of decline likely accelerating each decade, while US population is projected to keep growing for decades. The author argues such sustained divergence can shift the global balance of power.
AI Summary.An analysis of British convictions, standardised for age and sex, estimates Afghan nationals are convicted of sex crimes at about 7x the British rate, though the figure is uncertain and may be skewed by a few serial offenders or reporting and detection quirks. Absolute numbers remain small, rising from 92 to 102 convictions as the Afghan population roughly tripled.
Economist StaffThe Economist
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After adjusting for age and sex, an Economist analysis of Ministry of Justice data finds that immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa were convicted of sex offences in England and Wales at ~2.5x the rate of British nationals, immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa at ~3.5x, and Afghans at ~7x.
Do sex crime conviction rates differ by immigrants' country of origin?
Core argument: Analysis of 2020–22 convictions, standardised for age and sex because men commit 98% of sex crimes and Afghans are about ten years younger than the population at large, suggests Afghan nationals are convicted of sex crimes at seven times the British rate.
We analysed convictions during a three-year period, 2020-22, and averaged our population estimate over those three years. We then standardised our estimate to account for age and sex (men commit 98% of sex crimes, for example, and Afghans are about ten years younger than the population at large). This suggested Afghans are convicted of sex crimes at seven times the British rate. Our number is still uncertain: it may be skewed by a few serial offenders, by quirks in reporting and detection rates for such crimes. The numbers need to be kept in perspective. In 2010-12 Afghan nationals were convicted of 92 sex crimes; in 2022-24 the total was 102. Ten additional sex crimes, after the Afghan population has roughly tripled, is not an epidemic.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Analysis of 2020–22 convictions, standardised for age and sex because men commit 98% of sex crimes and Afghans are about ten years younger than the population at large, suggests Afghan nationals are convicted of sex crimes at seven times the British rate.
The estimate remains uncertain and may be skewed by a few serial offenders or by quirks in reporting and detection rates for sex crimes.
Afghan nationals were convicted of 92 sex crimes in 2010–12 and 102 in 2022–24, an increase of ten offences after the Afghan population roughly tripled.
Related Articles:
Quo Vadis, Hispania? Part IV— In Spain, immigrant households work less, earn less, pay less in taxes, and are more likely to use social assistance than native households at every level of education. Non-EU-origin households are almost three times as likely to receive social assistance, with 6% of highly educated non-EU households receiving it versus 4.4% of all native households.
Africa’s Explosive Growth In Cities— Africa's population has grown from 228mn in 1950, with about 33mn in cities, to 1.6bn, or 19% of the world's total, with 670mn living in cities. UN data show cities with more than 1mn people quadrupled to 40 between 1975 and 2000, and Africa's urban population could double again by 2050.
How Many Are Criminals— In the United States, between one in four and one in three Black men eventually serve prison time, compared with one in seven Hispanic men and roughly one in fifteen non-Hispanic white men. In Denmark, about 9% of men of Danish origin and 27% of men of non-Western origin have a criminal conviction by age 24.
AI Summary.U.S. survey data on high school students show the share of 9th graders identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual fell from 17% to 11% over two years, compared with a decline from 18% to 16% among 12th graders. The drop was concentrated among girls, from 27% to 22%, versus 9% to 7% among boys.
Jean TwengeGeneration Tech
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Among US high-school students, the LGB share fell btw 2023 to 2025 by 5pp for girls (27% to 22%), and 2pp for boys (9% to 7%). The preceding rise was likewise larger for girls: +128% from 2015 to 2021, versus +99% for boys to 2023.
Are younger teens less likely to identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual?
Core argument: The share of U.S. 9th graders identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual fell from 17% in 2023 to 11% in 2025 in the CDC’s Youth Risk Behavior Survey, while 12th graders declined from 18% to 16%.
[New data from the Youth Risk Survey of U.S. 9th to 12th graders from the CDC shows] for 12th graders, 17 and 18 years old, identifying as LGB declines only a few percentage points between 2023 and 2025 (from 18% to 16%). But the headline result is for 9th graders (14 and 15 years old): Identifying as LGB absolutely plummets between 2023 and 2025, from 17% to 11%. That really does look like a free fall. The decline appears to be driven almost entirely by girls. Identifying as LGB dropped from 27% in 2023 to 22% in 2025 among girls, and from 9% to 7% among boys. [In terms of the share of high school students reporting engaging in same-sex activity] most high school students are not sexually active, so this is only a subsample of the larger group. For boys, there’s been a fairly steady rise in same-sex partners, not too different from the pattern of identifying as LGB among boys. The story is different for girls, where having non-heterosexual sex peaked in 2021 and then fell steeply.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The share of U.S. 9th graders identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual fell from 17% in 2023 to 11% in 2025 in the CDC’s Youth Risk Behavior Survey, while 12th graders declined from 18% to 16%.
The decline appears driven almost entirely by girls, whose LGB identification fell from 27% in 2023 to 22% in 2025, compared with a drop from 9% to 7% among boys.
Among sexually active teens, the share of boys reporting at least one same-sex partner has risen fairly steadily, while for girls it peaked in 2021 and then fell steeply.
Related Articles:
Is There Really a Generational Difference in Identifying as Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual?— General Social Survey data show that increases among young American adults appear in same-sex sexual behavior as well as in identification, with 20% reporting a same-sex partner versus 18.5% identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual. The increases are larger among 27- to 41-year-olds.
Teens Used To Be Happier. What Changed?— The share of US high school seniors describing themselves as "very happy" peaked at 24.8% and remained around 24.4% before falling to 11.4% at its low, recovering only to 12.7%, well below the 17.9% recorded before the pandemic. The decline coincided with smartphones and social media becoming pervasive.
US College Students’ Well-Being— A study of US college students finds moderate-to-severe depression reported by 26% of students at one elite institution, 22% reporting moderate-to-severe anxiety and 10% contemplating suicide. Poorer mental health is associated with being female, little exercise, low grades, and financial aid; financial stress is associated with higher suicidal thoughts.
AI Summary.Across surveyed countries, intended fertility and the ideal number of children both declined, while children came to be seen more as a constraint on parental freedom and less as a source of status. Gender roles grew less traditional and housework more equally shared, yet the belief that a fulfilled life requires children weakened most of all attitudes measured.
Raquel Fernández, Inés Berniell and Milagros OnofriNational Bureau of Economic Research
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Fernández et al. cast doubt on Goldin’s hypothesis that men’s limited willingness to share domestic responsibilities is central to fertility decline, pointing instead to the erosion of the belief that children are necessary for a fulfilling life.
Are shifting attitudes about children behind falling fertility intentions?
Core argument: Intended fertility fell in every Generations and Gender Survey country, from 28% to 21% on average, while the ideal number of children fell in 17 of 22 International Social Survey Programme countries, from 2.42 to 2.31.
Figure 1 documents how fertility outcomes and attitudes changed over the decade. Intended fertility fell in every GGS country, from 28 to 21% on average (Figure 1a). The ideal number of children fell in 17 of the 22 ISSP countries, from 2.42 to 2.31 on average (Figure 1b). [Children] became more likely to be seen as constraining parental freedom and less likely to be seen as conferring status (Figure 1c). Gender roles became less traditional, and the division of household work became more equal [Figures 1i]. Despite this greater sharing of chores and care, work–family conflict rose sharply. The decade saw changes that might have been expected to make the burden of children lighter, at least for women. Simultaneously, however, children became less attractive and, above all, less necessary: the belief that a fulfilled life requires children lost more ground than any attitude we measure [Table 2, Part II, Panel B].
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Intended fertility fell in every Generations and Gender Survey country, from 28% to 21% on average, while the ideal number of children fell in 17 of 22 International Social Survey Programme countries, from 2.42 to 2.31.
Children became more likely to be seen as constraining parental freedom and less likely to be seen as conferring status, and the belief that a fulfilled life requires children lost more ground than any other attitude measured.
Gender roles became less traditional and household work was divided more equally, yet work–family conflict rose sharply.
Related Articles:
The Rise of Female Autonomy and the Decline of Fertility: The Role of Mismatch— Across 22 countries, the gap between women's and men's daily hours of housework and caregiving is strongly correlated with lower total fertility rates. Countries that modernized rapidly show larger gender gaps in home work and lower fertility than those with more continuous economic growth since 1920.
Babies and the Macroeconomy— Fertility rates have fallen in nearly every country, but timing differed: some developed nations fell below the 2.1 replacement level as early as the 1970s, while others dropped to "lowest low" levels below 1.3. The author argues nations with rapid, discontinuous growth saw sharper declines as women's expectations outpaced tradition-bound men's willingness to share family time.
The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences— The authors estimate the world total fertility rate is around 2.17, below the global replacement rate of roughly 2.21, meaning humanity is already below replacement, with fertility and births falling faster than anticipated. They project middle-income countries' fertility may fall below that of rich countries outside East Asia, with emigration compounding population decline.
AI Summary.Survey data indicate 60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans. Identification is highest among blue-collar workers at 77%, versus 61% in other occupations, and ranges from 52% of Asian adults to 62% of White adults.
Steven Shepard, Hannah Hartig, Andy Cerda and Jocelyn KileyPew Research Center
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60% of Americans say “working class” describes them “extremely” or “very” well. Republicans are more likely than Democrats to identify as working class – strikingly 61% of Republicans who have a family income of at least $155,600 identify as working class, compared to 38% of such Democrats.
Do most Americans identify as working class across income and education levels?
Core argument: 60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, an identity adopted across income and educational groups, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans.
Most Americans think of themselves as “working class” today: Overall, 60% of U.S. adults say the term describes them well. And the identity is widely adopted by people across all income and educational groups – including half of both Americans who have a bachelor’s degree and those who are upper-income. Those working in blue-collar occupations are particularly likely to identify as working class (77%), [as are] a majority of those working in other occupations (61%). White adults are more likely than Black adults to identify as working class. About six-in-ten White (62%) and Hispanic adults (59%) overall view themselves as working class, as do roughly half of Black (54%) and Asian adults (52%).
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, an identity adopted across income and educational groups, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans.
Workers in blue-collar occupations identify as working class at a rate of 77%, compared with 61% of those in other occupations.
About 62% of White and 59% of Hispanic adults view themselves as working class, as do roughly 54% of Black and 52% of Asian adults.
Related Articles:
America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade— Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.
Political Representation Gaps and Populism— A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.
The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile— US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" hold postgraduate degrees but household incomes of $30,000–$60,000 a year, an unusual combination given that education and income are typically positively correlated. In the Democratic Socialists of America's most recent member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000.
AI Summary.Official Spanish data show births exceeded deaths by barely 200,000 over the first quarter of the 21st century—less than 0.5% of Spain's population at the start—while immigration accounted for 98% of the country's population growth, the largest increase of any European Union member. Deaths have exceeded births since 2015.
Nicholas EberstadtAmerican Enterprise Institute
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Btw 2000 and 2025, ~98% of Spain’s population growth was due to immigration. In 2024, about one-third of babies born in Spain had a foreign-born mother.
Has immigration accounted for nearly all of Spain's population growth?
Core argument: Immigration accounted for 98% of Spain's population growth between 2000 and 2025, according to official Spanish data.
Without immigration, Spain’s population would have stagnated in the first quarter of the 21st century. According to official Spanish data, births exceeded deaths by barely 200,000 for the 2000-2025 period (2025 numbers still provisional)—or less than one half of 1% of Spain’s 2000 population. Thanks to its robust immigration inflows, however, Spain registered more population growth than any other EU country between 2000 and 2025. Virtually all (98%) of Spain’s population growth was due to immigration during those years. And since deaths have exceeded births in Spain since 2015, any future growth would have to come entirely from additional immigration.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Immigration accounted for 98% of Spain's population growth between 2000 and 2025, according to official Spanish data.
Spain's births exceeded deaths by barely 200,000 over 2000–2025, with 2025 figures still provisional, less than one half of 1% of Spain's 2000 population.
Spain registered more population growth than any other EU country between 2000 and 2025 on the strength of immigration inflows, and with deaths exceeding births since 2015, any future growth would have to come entirely from additional immigration.
Related Articles:
European Stagnation Is Real— Comparing the United States, France, and Germany at current purchasing power parity prices shows the European economies roughly constant relative to America since 2000, but current-price measures miss output gains in sectors where prices fall, such as software. The author argues constant-price comparisons, the standard approach for growth over time, reveal greater European stagnation.
Four Ways Europe’s Big Immigration Experiment Has Changed Spain— Spain has been the world's fastest-growing large advanced economy and, by Financial Times analysis, accounted for one in four of the 11.1mn jobs added across the European Union, with roughly 70% going to immigrants according to the think-tank Funcas. Spain's fertility rate of 1.1 births per woman is the EU's lowest after Malta.
Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come— Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
AI Summary.Global fertility is likely below the replacement level needed to keep population constant in the long run, though population momentum from large cohorts of women now having children means world population will keep growing for roughly another 30 years. Unless trends change, it is projected to peak near 9bn around 2056 and then decline.
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde and Patrick NorrickUniversity of Pennsylvania
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The UN appears to systematically overestimate births; e.g. 33 of 37 countries with high-quality statistics registered fewer births in 2024 than the UN had forecast. Fernández-Villaverde and Norrick infer humanity is below replacement fertility in 2026.
Will world population keep growing even as fertility falls below replacement?
Core argument: As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below replacement fertility, with fewer births than needed to keep population constant in the long run.
In Table A1 we compare the World Population Prospects (WPP) estimates of births in 2022-2023 with the official numbers reported by several countries. [A2 shows the full sample with the deviations.] As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below the replacement fertility level: we are having fewer births than we need to keep population constant in the long run. This astonishing fact does not mean that population has stopped growing. Because of momentum effects (the large cohorts of women born two or three decades ago are having their children now, and their own parents have not died yet), world population will keep growing for another 30 years or so. But unless trends change, it will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then start falling, first slowly, then fast.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below replacement fertility, with fewer births than needed to keep population constant in the long run.
World population is set to keep growing for roughly another 30 years because of momentum effects, as large cohorts of women born two or three decades ago have their children while their own parents are still alive.
Unless trends change, world population will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then start falling, first slowly, then fast.
Related Articles:
The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences— The authors estimate the world total fertility rate is around 2.17, below the global replacement rate of roughly 2.21, meaning humanity is already below replacement, with fertility and births falling faster than anticipated. They project middle-income countries' fertility may fall below that of rich countries outside East Asia, with emigration compounding population decline.
Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come— Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
The Wealth of Working Nations— Because of population aging, growth in GDP per capita and GDP per working-age adult have diverged across advanced economies; from 1998 to 2019 Japan's accumulated growth per working-age adult was 31.9% versus 29.5% in the US. The authors find a standard neoclassical growth model calibrated to each country's working-age population tracks output per working-age adult in most economies.